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Although Charles Darwin predicted that his theory “would give zest to [...] metaphysics,” even he would be astonished at the variety of paths his 
theory has in fact taken. This holds with regard to both gene-Darwinism, a 
purified Darwinian approach biologizing the social sciences, and process-
Darwinism found in the disciplines of psychology, philosophy of science, and 
economics. Although Darwinism is often linked to highly confirmed biological 
theories, some of its interpretations seem to profit from tautological claims 
as well, where scientific reputation cloaks ideological usage. This book dis-
cusses central tenets of Darwinism historically as well as systematically, for 
example the history of different Darwinian paradigms,  the units-of-selection 
debate, and the philosophical problem of induction as basis of metaphysical 
Darwinism. Crucially the book addresses the Darwinian claim that evolution 
is governed by an immutable and unrelentingly cruel law of natural selection. 
Paradoxically, Darwin’s theory is a static, non-evolutionary theory of evoluti-
on. The current book sketches the historical background and provides sug-
gestions that may help to replace this approach by the idea of an evolution of 
evolutionary mechanisms (see Escher’s “Drawing Hands” on the cover). This 
view even suggests a tendency to overcome the blindness of the knowledge 
acquisition of primordial Darwinian processes and allows for some freedom 
from external environments. This book first develops a radically Darwinian 
approach, then criticises this approach from within. Even Darwinism has a 
tendency to transcend itself. Although the book addresses several empirical 
issues, it does not challenge particular findings. Instead it builds on many 
insights of Darwinism and provides a proposal for interpreting known empi-
rical evidence in a different light. It should help pave the way for further de-
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“The progress of biology and psychology has probably been checked by the uncritical assumption of 
half-truths. If science is not to degenerate into a medley of ad hoc hypotheses, it must become 
philosophical and must enter into a thorough criticism of its own foundations.” 
 





It is a daring task for a single author to embark on an interdisciplinary inquiry dealing 
with Darwinism historically, biologically and philosophically; even more so if one 
finally proposes a critique of assumptions central to current Darwinian paradigms. 
Interdisciplinary work requires specialized devotion to various fields, merely to gain an 
overview of pertinent research – be it on the historical person of Darwin or on some 
current dispute in philosophy of biology. Yet, I consider it a genuine task of 
philosophy to undertake such broad interdisciplinary investigations. Moreover, the 
outcome demonstrates that more is at stake than some theories in biology. That is this 
interdisciplinary study in fact points to a Darwinian metaphysic virtually omnipresent 
in the Zeitgeist at the turn of the millennium. This metaphysics is not influential in 
biology, epistemology and psychology, but even in politics and economics. Moreover, 
in this work several lines of arguments are developed providing the basis for a 
systematic critique of this metaphysics. 
Appropriately, my thoughts on the matter underwent a kind of evolution. For this 
reason I wish to provide a short, somewhat personal account of how I came to my 
present interdisciplinary interest. 
At a point, Sita von Richthoven, a friend of mine, gave me a copy of the book The 
Selfish Gene by Richard Dawkins that I have been engaged with fundamental questions 
in the field of sociobiology and evolutionary biology – sometimes even in dreams. It 
was immediately clear to me that this provocative book had a bearing on many 
philosophical topics; but it was not until later that I realised the book itself warranted 
philosophical examination. Perhaps it was due to some critical prepartation I had 
received through the classical writings of Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, and particularly 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, that I had been resisting some of tacit assumptions of 
Darwinian metaphysics und gene-Darwinism. However, over the years the idea of the 
“selfish gene” did gain futher popularity. In fact, I would concede that this idea did 
have some positive effects: for instance, it provided a kind of intellectual inoculation 
against naïve utopias and outdated biological theories of altruism. And yet I think that 
the idea has proliferated so quickly that critical objections have not received due 
attention, not just by me but by the scholarly world in general, and hence gene-
Darwinism had become a major pest to our intellectual ecology. Although in this last 
decade the “selfish gene” idea has increasingly had to share the spotlight with other 
tendencies in biology and even in behavioural economics, what still remains to be 
worked out is a synthesis of these alternative approaches into a convincing paradigm. 
Although a large part of current work in the field is concerned with biological 
theories of gene-Darwinism and process-Darwinism, such theories do not touch on all 
areas of Darwinian metaphysics. It was clear to me, having studied philosophy and 
psychology, that there were structural similarities between the Darwinian process of 
mutation-and-selection and Thorndike’s psychological approach of trial-and-error 
learning. Moreover, the Darwinian metaphysic is fundamentally connected with 
philosophical issues linked to Hume’s problem of induction. While working on these 
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topics I became increasingly aware that this metaphysic is present in many other 
subject areas as well, such as the theory of science or of economics. Furthermore, 
across the globe it seems to have played a crucial role in the neo-liberal policies of 
unconstrained market-competition and privatisation at the turn of the millennium.  
My present work begins with a historical investigation of the background to 
biological Darwinian paradigms. This background is no irrelevant ornament to the 
main theme of systematically discussing Darwinism; rather, it provides the basis from 
which to establish differences between Darwinian paradigms and detect the 
conceptual core of universal Darwinism. The definition of this core in turn has an 
incontrovertible impact on the systematic critique of gene-Darwinism, process-
Darwinism and Darwinian metaphysics in general.  
Although I have done my best to address the different subject-areas, the broad 
scope of this work nevertheless has the disadvantage of not being able to treat all 
broached discourses in the depth they deserve. That being said, I still maintain that it 
would be more unfortunate, if not negligent, to underplay, at the expense of other 
discourses, the one long argument that acts as the constant thread throughout the 
book – that is the historically grounded explication and definition of  Darwinism and 
Darwinian metaphysics, enableing a systematic critique of biological as well as 
metaphysical Darwinism.  
In recent years I have worked at the University of Göttingen and now at the 
University of Heidelberg in psychology in a quite positivistic and technical manner on 
issues like Bayesian hypothesis-testing. Hence, I am inclined to reconsider this book, 
based as it is on earlier thought, and I can see that parts of the book are rather 
speculative. Moreover, I am aware that it could profit from further polishing and 
updating. This book is based on my PhD thesis in philosophy from 2001 and this 
edition has only partly been updated and shortened. I have elaborated the section on 
the problem of induction in more detail in a later PhD thesis in psychology and in my 
further research, but this later work has not been explicitly concerned with the critique 
of Darwininian metaphysics, but with logical, statistical and psychological issues. I had 
the opportunity to keep in touch with recent discussions in evolutionary theory and 
sociobiology in the Courant Research Centre Evolution of Social Behavior at the 
University of Göttingen, and therefore I am aware that the book does not account for 
many of the recent developments in evolutionary biology, sociobiology, and genetics. 
Nonetheless, the overall argument of this book still applies. On the one hand, 
since the time of my earlier work some of its claims – such as the advocacy of 
multilevel selectionism and the role of evolutionary constraints – have become hotly 
disputed topics in biology and the philosophy of biology. In this regard I appear to 
have come closer to the academic mainstream; yet even more daring claims are made 
in this book. For my ideas challenging Darwinian metaphysics, and in particular 
Darwinian process-monism, are still innovative, roughly 150 years after The Origin of 
Species first came out. And it may well be that many scholars will find these ideas are 
too innovative. Nevertheless, I am convinced that the evolution of ideas will go on 
and eventually question Darwinian process-monism, in biology as well as in other 
areas dominated by Darwinian metaphysics. Many lessons can and should be learned 
from Darwinian metaphysics, but I advocate here that such a metaphysic, postulating 
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the inalterable blindness of the evolutionary process, should be replaced by the idea of 
an evolution of evolutionary mechanisms themselves, with the potential or even the 
propabilistic inherent tendency to overcome the primordial blindness.  
Facts are not at issue; nor is the idea of evolution itself. The crux here is how to 
interpret evolution. The proposed interpretation of evolution is of course of no minor 
significance. First, it may contribute to a new framework that may allow for the 
integration of recent biological developments (concerning, for instance, system-
theoretical biology, morphological constraints, Bayesian genetics, and multilevel 
selection). Moreover, although it cannot be questioned that we can learn very much 
from Darwinism, it is claimed that Universal Darwinism as an interpretative 
framework can and should be replaced by an account of the evolution of evolutionary 
mechanisms – both in biology and in metaphysics. 
 
Momme v. Sydow, Heidelberg, 2011 
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Introduction: 
Nature of Philosophy and Philosophy of Nature 
This work proposes and elaborates a philosophy of nature that, although influenced 
by Darwinism, aims ultimately to transcend Darwinism. My particular focus is on two 
purified versions of Darwinism: gene-Darwinism ( pp. 138 f., 191 f., 215 f.) and 
process-Darwinism ( pp. 205 f.). The essential claims of these two approaches are 
first explicated and then subjected to criticism. This elaborated critique is not exo-
geneous to Darwinism, proposing another philosophy of nature from the outset; 
instead an immanent critique is developed, starting from within the investigated 
Darwinian paradigms ( pp. 243 f.). Focussing on internal inconsistencies of these 
paradigms, reveals tendencies that will lead us beyond Darwinism.  
But not only theories can transcend themselves, the central claim of this work is 
that Nature, due to inner or outer necessities, continually transcends itself, not only in 
its products but in its evolutionary mechanisms. As theories are moulded not only by 
external forces, but by inherent tendencies as well (where the rules of change may 
sometimes depend on the theory itself), also evolution may depend on evolved 
evolutionary mechanisms. It is defended that the emergence of new entities and orga-
nisational levels may have real causal impact. Hence, in contrast to gene-Darwinism, 
this work supports a hierarchical theory of evolution. Additionally, the emergence of 
new evolutionary processes is proposed. Please note, this view needs not to imply a 
Heraklitian philosophy of nature. Instead it is suggested that evolution and the 
proposed evolution of evolutionary mechanisms have the potential and even an 
inherent tendency to overcome blindness (the primordial Darwinian process of blind 
mutations and external retentions). Emphasising change even of evolutionary mecha-
nisms does not preclude that these changes may refer to or take part in – perhaps 
even eternal – Platonic forms (methexis). 
This work started as an investigation into what is called here ‘gene-Darwinism’, 
challenging its atomism, determinism and process-reductionism. More generally, 
Darwinian tenets can be found in other sciences as well, such as psychology, 
economics, and the theory of science itself. Moreover, Darwinism, implicitly or 
explicitly, has long become a Weltanschauung influencing Western culture to the point 
where it may justify the epithet “universal”. The explication of universal Darwinism 
led me ultimately to criticise Darwinism in general as incomplete and inconsistent. 
Although the biological and philosophical applications of Darwinism have undeniably 
yielded profound insights, Darwinism is closely tied to entity reductionism and 
process reductionism that are not only grossly simplifying, but, in my view, false. In 
particular, this work stresses that Darwinism, in its strict formulation, is process-
monistic. Correspondingly, Darwinism has sometimes been solely defined by the 
evolutionary process of natural selection (where, of course, much depends on the 
definition of natural selection). The process monism at the heart of Darwinism 
( pp. 102, 142, 216, 358) has at times been concealed by reasonable extensions of 
the Darwinian paradigm, such as the so-called evolutionary synthesis, often referred to 
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as Darwinian. In other cases, however, a purified, essential form of Darwinism has in 
fact been clarified, such as in radical gene-Darwinism.” Although this paradigm is 
severely criticised in this work, this paradigm and particular the clarification of the 
meaning of Darwinism has great merits. In any case, it would be inappropriate to 
define Darwinism by evolutionary change alone; doing so would mean that biologists 
in the Romantic Era, advocating an entirely different idea of evolution long before 
Darwin, would have to be called Darwinians as well. To the contrary, it is argued here 
that Darwinism – paradoxically still in a Paleyan manner – advocates one eternal law 
of nature: simple, predetermined and invariant. Despite the evident antagonism today 
between the two forms of adaptationism – on the one hand, the theological neo-
Paleyan religious adaptationism of the creationists, and on the other hand, the 
radicalised biological adaptationism of gene-Darwinians – there are paradoxically close 
historical connections between natural theology and natural selection. The new casting 
of the world as based on evolution did not change the fact that Darwinians conceive 
the mechanism of evolution as being static, as if it were God given. Like in a 
Newtonian universe, the laws of nature are taken as being given from the outset; the 
mechanisms of evolution are taken to be static. Hence, evolution itself does not 
evolve. These thoughts, with obvious theistic underpinnings, have not only eroded 
theology, but, even more crucially, in their current gene-Darwinian application to 
morals they erode other areas essential to the understanding of human life as well. 
It is proposed here that this metaphysic should be replaced by a more flexible and 
truely evolutionary picture of evolution. Moreover, it is suggested that evolutionary 
mechanisms (for instance, due to inner constraints and systemic feedback loops) may 
gain some autonomy from external determination by (external) selection pressures. 
Philosophically, however, the emphasis on evolution even of the evolutionary process 
needs not imply that there is no underlying “Platonic” necessity is involved in the 
unfolding of nature. Yet, no complete antithesis to biological or philosophical 
Darwinism is envisaged here, nor a concept of evolution purged of Darwinian tenets. 
Indeed, much use must be made of originally Darwinian concepts. For example, I take 
it as given that variational evolution plays an indispensable role in evolutionary theory. 
Nevertheless, I shall argue that a mono-mechanistic picture, central to the Darwinian 
paradigm, is inaccurate. The envisioned paradigm shift would indeed casts new light 
on many biological concepts, but it would also require to incorporate knowledge 
accumulated in part under the Darwinian paradigm – just as Darwinism incorporated 
results of originally non-Darwinian Mendelism. Perhaps the question of whether the 
resulting partly Darwinian view could still be called “Darwinian” is of secondary 
importance. More crucial is whether one can achieve a paradigm-shift that dismisses 
the radical substance-reductionism and process-reductionism at the core of traditional 
Darwinism.  
When a philosopher of biology dares to challenge such important biological con-
cepts, the underlying assumption is a specific understanding, both of the philosophy 
of nature and of the nature of philosophy. In this introduction, first, an account of the 
advocated nature of philosophy and its relation to science is given. What follows is a 
discussion of some underlying ideas for developing a philosophy of nature transcending 
the Darwinian paradigm. Finally, the “one long argument” of the book is outlined.  
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The Nature of Philosophy and Its Relation to Science 
a) Metaphysics as an Essential Task of Philosophy  
Although some forms of metaphysics have been the target of serious philosophical 
criticism (justified or unjustified), metaphysics per se is both indispensable and 
inevitable. Both in philosophy and common sense, metaphysics can be ignored, yet 
will nonetheless be acted upon and reveal itself, if only as a basic underlying tenet. 
Philosophers objecting to metaphysics generally target a specific traditional 
metaphysic, but in doing so they often unwittlingly preassume another metaphysics 
tacitly present in science or current philosophy.  Although (particular) metaphysical 
questions have been increasingly disapproved by a tradition reaching from Hume, 
over Kant, to positivism and analytic philosophy, this cannot change the fact that the 
original contexts out of which the authors wrote presupposed a kind of metaphysical 
basis. It is not objectable to adopt such a metaphysical basis, but to voluntarily or 
involuntarily obscure such commitment, as seems to be the case in some versions of 
Darwinian metaphysics. 
The progressive philosophical devaluation of metaphysics has many causes and 
served many understandable purposes. One of Kant’s reasons for criticising 
metaphysics was “to make room for faith”1, since the only possible metaphysic (in the 
context of science) was presumably a materialistic or mechanistic one. Kant still 
managed, however, to reconcile the Newtonian world of matter-in-motion with a 
strong individually binding ethics. In the case of positivism, the critical emphasis 
helped to eliminate the endless disputes about first principles and paved the way for a 
better reception of the sciences. Likewise, analytical philosophy renounced 
(traditional) metaphysics, but it also castigated some scientific claims as being 
metaphysical. However, although logical positivism considered itself anti-
metaphysical, it has now frequently argued that logical positivism itself introduced a 
particular metaphysic.2 In recent decades, some analytic philosophers paradoxically 
have been explicitly engaged in a rival of metaphysics, while still endeavouring to keep 
a distance from obscure speculations.3  
To delve into the problem further, however, it is useful to (re-)examine what today 
is meant by the term “metaphysics.” The concept is notoriously hard to define, and it 
may in fact be that a prima causa investigation exceeds the scope of scholarly appraisal. 
Postmodernism has announced ‘the end of metaphysics’ (and of politics and of 
history). This claim, however, may itself be deconstructed; that is, ironically, the 
presupposition of a kind of (postmodernist) metaphysics seems to be needed to 
advocate the impossibility of metaphysics.  
In the current context, “metaphysics” is taken to denote the study of the most 
basic, systematized principles or concepts of philosophy. These principles or concepts 
may indeed be fragmented and not fully consistent; nonetheless the goal of a more 
                                                     
1 I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1787/1781), Edition B, p. xxx,  footnote 249. 
2  Such a metaphysics is greatly exemplified by: R. Carnap‘s, Der Logische Aufbau der Welt. 
Cf. H. Putnam, Reichenbach’s Metaphysical Picture (1991/1996), pp. 100 f. 
3  E.g., J. Lowe, The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity and Time (1998).  
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systematic, unified and hence metaphysical understanding remains indispensable. 
Even if one opposes metaphysics because one wants to favour multiple perspectives 
or a more domain-specific approach presupposes a particular (pluralist) understanding 
of truth (or goodness), even this understanding seems to presuppose a metaphysical 
framework. Such a framework need not be fixed, but rather may evolve over time. 
Metaphysical approaches, as advocated here, should not degenerate into mere 
dogmas, but should be open to discussions and further refinements. Correspondingly, 
I do not commit myself to a particular metaphysical framework at this point. 
Although even metaphysics, and love of wisdom (philosophy) in general, in my opinion, 
ought to be, at least in part, grounded in fact, such an architectonic approach 
transcends the merely given. In this respect metaphysics resembles good theories, 
which go beyond being a mere summary of previous observations. Additionally, 
metaphysics, could – and should – go beyond particular sciences, to determine and 
reflect the relationship between them and the traditional philosophical disciplines 
(logic, epistemology, ontology and ethics).  
b) Metaphysics Entrenched in Science  
In my view, the traditional critique of philosophical metaphysics left a vacuum that 
has been partly filled by an implicit or explicit Darwinian metaphysic (despite any 
other intentions the critics themselves may have had). A large portion of the present 
work aims at explicating this individualistic (or even sub-individualistic), process-
monistic metaphysics. And despite ultimately criticising universal Darwinism, it is 
suggested here that this position deserves to be called a metaphysic. Universal 
Darwinism concerns the essence of becoming and claims to mould ontology, 
epistemology, and logic in a unified way. A version of this metaphysic is often 
implicitly adopted today, an explicit formulation of which is needed, not least to 
render it criticisable.  
In the positivist tradition, it has often been assumed that science ought to be and 
mostly is metaphysically neutral and value-free. I naturally uphold the ideal that 
scientific findings should be inter-subjectively testable instead of, for instance, 
committed to the idiosyncratic values of a particular group. One needs to keep in 
mind, however, that scientific findings are not completely free from metaphysical 
commitment, particularly in the case of fundamental or paradigmatic questions. For 
example, Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno elaborated that in fact the 
seeming neutrality of Enlightenment and science is ‘more metaphysical than meta-
physics’ itself.4 Alasdair MacIntyre even argues that the seeming neutrality of 
Enlightenment-metaphysics actually caused an insurmountable obstacle to the formu-
lating of a binding ethics, since it dismissed any teleology from the start.5 Neverthless, 
the history of science and the philosophical critique of positivism both revealed a 
pervasiveness of assumptions that are neither verifiable nor falsifiable.6 In science it is 
                                                     
4 M. Horkheimer, T. W. Adorno, Dialektik der Aufklärung (1944/1969), p. 29. 
5  A. MacIntyre, After Virtue (1981/2007).  
6  See, for instance, the work of Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, and the formalization a t-theoretic 
terms in structuralist accounts of philosophy of science. 
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of course difficult to disentangle empirical evidence from metaphysics; yet it may be 
argued that if underlying assumptions are not tested and general in character, they may 
be termed metaphysical. The disentangling becomes especially problematic for the so-
called theoretical core of highly general theories (such as Darwinism) that are often 
formulated abstractly, using a set of mutually defined theoretical notions. 
Even the history of physics (the prototypic science), although clearly based in part 
on empirical investigation, may be read substantially as the history of metaphysical 
commitment. Science is theory-laden and, in its more general structure, philosophy-
laden. The best scientists and philosophers were metaphysicians as well. It has been 
argued, for example, that Newton’s Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica appears – 
not just due to the title – to be based on a particular philosophical approach.7 There 
are for instance basic philosophical differences between the concept of idealised mass 
points and modern field-theoretic approaches.8 As well, Darwin, Dawkins and 
Dennett are great metaphysicians, whether or not they would welcome the epithet.963 
That is, while at times treating gene-Darwinism and process-Darwinism as merely 
empirically true, they also seem to suggest a conceptual and metaphysical necessity 
( pp. 207). 
When analysing Darwinism, moreover, many questions arise that surprisingly refer 
to old problems and disputes in philosophy: universals, induction, substance, 
reduction, explanation, supervenience, form and tautology. In fact the resemblance 
between some current disputes and disputes in other periods or subject areas may 
often not be sufficiently known even to philosophers of biology. 
c) Science as Philosophy and Art 
Biology (and science in general) ought to actively face the challenge that it is actually 
in part also philosophy or even a Geisteswissenschaft and art. Metaphysics, history of 
science, and ethics all have a role to play in interpreting the findings of science, at least 
as concerns the fundamental questions of nature. 
It is often assumed – I think wrongly – that metaphysics in science has rendered 
science irrational. In fact, the opposite is the case: it is only the absence of an explicit 
metaphysic that can render science irrational. In this absence, basic assumptions can 
be adopted without a rational discussion; thus irrationality indeed often plays a 
significant role in paradigm-shifts. Likewise, implicitly adopted ideologies are the most 
dangerous since they can neither be discussed nor criticized. Metaphysics as a 
discipline alleviates this problem (at least in principle), since it represents an 
institutionalised attempt to deal rationally with fundamental theoretical questions.  
The history of science can render implicit scientific assumptions explicit and can 
clarify how these assumptions are related to other fields of knowledge. Culture seems 
to play a crucial but underrated role in science. In philosophy of science, however, for 
instance methodological culturalism, elaborated by Peter Janich and collegues, has 
                                                     
7  G. Böhme, Philosophische Grundlagen der Newtonschen Mechanik, in K. Hutter (Ed.), Ende des 
Baconschen Zeitalters (1989/1993). See the excellent doctoral dissertation by K.-N. Ihmig, Hegels 
Deutung der Gravitation (1989).   
8  C. F. v. Weizsäcker, Aufbau der Physik (1985), pp. 219 f. 
Introduction: Nature of Philosophy and Philosophy of Nature 6 
emphasised that the sciences are to be understood as a continuation of the practical 
understanding of the everyday world.9 Likewise, within the hermeneutic framework 
even the sciences have long been taken to be embedded in a particular history with 
given horizons.10 Although this work is not based on strict cultural constructivism, it 
is assumed and argued that the intellectual and cultural history of biology can indeed 
deepen our insights into current biology ( pp. 160 f., pp. 202 f.). 
The philosophical discussion of scientific theories should aim at improving 
consistency, not only within a particular discipline, but between related disciplines as 
well. For example, if a statement within physics is inconsistent with facts or theories in 
biology, one may tend to modify the latter, since physics is concerned with a lower 
ontological stratum and since the most elaborated edifices of theoretical thought are 
found in physics. And yet there is no a priori reason to prefer physics over biology as a 
means to discover the truth. That is, the physical theory may itself need to be 
modified if it is inconsistent with biological observations. Likewise, biology has no 
more priviledged access to truth than has sociology. Overall, it may be said that top-
down consistency may be as important as bottom-up consistency; and that, as an 
epistemic virtue, consistency itself is preferable to reductionism.  
At the crux of this discussion, however, is that paradigmatic questions within a 
particular discipline – like biology – seem to have a bearing on moral beliefs and that 
sometimes paradigmatic issues are, and I think sometimes ‘justly’, influenced by 
ethical considerations as well. This is not to deny that scientific theories (like ethical 
arguments) obviously have some autonomy. Nonetheless, an inconsistency with 
ethical conciderations may reasonably for instance lead to an investigation of the 
adequacy of some theoretical assumptions as well. 
Given a context of fundamental scientific issues with relations to ethical or moral 
questions, it may hence be appropriate to advocate the need of a ‘hermeneutics of 
nature’11, involving scientific as well as ethical aspects. Thus, perhaps in contrast to 
the ordinary scientist, philosophers of science and scientists concerned with more 
general issues carry an additional burden of responsibility for dealing adequately with 
top-down consistency, sometimes even involving ethical concerns. In a hermeneutics 
of nature, the empirical and the rational should be coupled with ethical considerations. 
Only this would yield results based on reason, or, as the ancients called it, orthos logos.  
d) The Dialogue Between Philosophy and Science 
It is not claimed here that the way back to pure metaphysics would be cleared. Just as 
science deals with metaphysical questions – as in part it should – philosophy in turn 
                                                     
9  D. Hartmann, P. Janich (Eds.): Methodischer Kulturalismus. Zwischen Naturalismus und Postmoderne 
(1996). M. Guttmann; D. Hartmann; M. Weingarten; W. Zitterbarth (Eds.), Kultur – Handlung – 
Wissenschaft. Für Peter Janich (2002). M. Gutmann, Biologie und Lebenswelt (2005). Cf. the excellent 
recent doctoral dissertation, Th. Kirchhoff, Systemauffasungen und biologische Theorien: Zur Herkunft 
von Individualitätskonzeptionen und ihrer Bedeutung für die Theorie ökologischer Einheite (2007). 
10  H.-G. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik (1960/1990), 
pp. 270 f. See also: M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (1926/1993). 
11  E.g., F. J. Wetz, Hermeneutik der Natur – Hermeneutik des Universums (1995). 
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ought to consider scientific (empirical) findings. For although methods that abstract 
from an actual external world (such as counterfactual thinking,  thought experiments, 
generalisation, analogous reasoning, dialectical reasoning, first-person accounts, 
‘phenomenological reduction’, and Socratic debate) legitimate a fair amount of 
armchair philosophy12, philosophy has to take seriously the ‘facts’ of the sciences as 
well as the phenomena of art and religion.  
Although science and philosophy depend on each other, philosophy is not 
reducible to science, nor is science reducible to philosophy. History of Science can 
and should help to show that paradigm-shifts in science may sometimes have political 
underpinnings.13 Yet it would be dangerous, as well as incorrect, to argue that science 
is politics. Science obviously has its own inner empirical and theoretical approach to 
truth. And although it has been posited that “[n]othing signaled the emancipation of 
science from religion and philosophy more definitely than the Darwinian 
revolution,”14 this “emancipation,” in my view, not only led to progress in biology and 
liberation from the constrains of religious prejudice, it also ushered in a state of 
philosophical ignorance. Today the Philosophy of Science, not restricted mere 
analyses of sense-data or observation-protocols, must carefully treat theories 
belonging to specific sciences in a broader context than normally done by those 
sciences themselves. If Darwinism is taken as a metaphysic this suggests that 
philosophers may contribute something the discussion of the assumptions of this 
approach and the related systematic philosophical problems. Even knowledge of 
traditional ontologies of Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Hegel or Whitehead may 
be highly inspiring for present day discussions as well, although they clearly cannot be 
simply be recycled for use in the present-day scientific discussion. 
It must be said, of course, that philosophical proposals made from the “outside” 
of a particular science may be proven wrong by empirical or theoretical arguments. 
Yet after the long period of positivism, it needs to be stressed that scientists 
themselves may not be the ultimate experts in matters concerning philosophical 
interpretation. For this reason, I am convinced that philosophy and science should 
enter into a closer dialogue.  
The Philosophy of Nature – Universal Darwinism and Its Transcendence 
Although it is argued in this work that nature is to be interpreted partly in 
philosophical terms, the proposed philosophy of nature does not go so far as to 
present  something like a Aristotelian, neo-Platonian, or Whiteheadian antithesis to 
Darwinism. Despite being inspired by traditional philosophers and despite obtaining 
results that may be reminiscent of some philosophical traditions, here an immanent 
                                                     
12  Cf. T. Williamson. Armchair Philosophy, Metaphysical Modality and Counterfactual Thinking (2005), pp. 
1-23. 
13  For the 20th century, take the pertinent examples of the radical race-biology in Nazi Germany 
and Lyssenko’s anti-theoretical Lamarckism in the Sovjet Union under Stalin; today, both cases 
clearly reveal substantial influences of ideology on science. Rupnow, V. Lipphardt, J. Thiel, & 
Ch. Wessely (Eds.), Pseudowissenschaft (2006). 
14  E. Mayr, Growth of Biological Thought (1982), p. 14. 
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discussion of Darwinian paradigms is pursued. Here in the first place even a 
Darwinism is proposed purged of all other components in order to deepen and 
explicate its metaphysical foundation. After all, although biological gene-Darwinism, 
process-Darwinism, and Universal-Darwinism, point beyond themselves, I believe 
that it is only after a purging (such as I suggest) that one can emerge from the bottom 
of the Darwinian abyss and present fruitful alternatives. I do not intend to advocate 
an antithesis to Darwinism either, a “third way” of conceptualizing the very nature of 
nature, in which many aspects of Darwinian approaches are included. Despite starting 
from within the Darwinian paradigm, other biological and philosophical traditions 
contribute to the envisioned synthesis. The advocated position could in fact be char-
acterized as steering a middle course (1) between atomism and holism (as concerns 
evolutionary units); and (2) between the unalterable blindness of natural selection and 
a pre-ordained (omniscient) unfolding of nature (as concerns evolutionary processes). 
The view that I will propose ultimately goes beyond the (commonly acknowledged) 
Darwinian concept of a blind, cruel and wasteful law of nature, equally valid for 
bacteria as for humans. I will advocate that this view needs to be replaced by an 
understanding of nature that emphasises the evolution of new evolutionary processes.  
In the remainder of the Introduction I first relate my investigation to current 
discussions on today’s ecological and economic challenges, followed by a sketch of 
main topics discussed in the book (with reference to gene-Darwinism, process-
Darwinism and Darwinism in general). I conclude with some thoughts on the 
relationship between Darwinism and religion in light of a more general metaphysic to 
be developed within the book. Finally, I provide a more detailed outline of the 
chapters and the one long argument of this book. 
a) The Glory and Poverty of Gene-Darwinism – The Need for a Third Way 
One goal of this tome is to explicate the paradigm that has dominated sociobiology in 
its first decades. The central notion of this paradigm is ‘the selfish gene’ popularised 
by the gifted writer and biologist Richard Dawkins.15 Without denying that the 
contribution of the selfish-gene theory to the development of sociobiology, this 
paradigm needs to be distinguished from the discipline per se; in particular, since in 
recent years the theory has in fact come under criticism.16  In this work the paradigm 
will later be more strictly defined as ‘gene-Darwinism’.  
In many respects, gene-Darwinism represents Darwinism in its purest form. 
“Fundamentally, all that we have a right to expect from our theory is a battleground of 
replicators, jostling, jockeying, and fighting for a future in the genetic hereafter.”17  
First, with regard to the objects of evolution, gene-Darwinism is more radical than the 
individualist reductionism of Darwin’s Darwinism. In biology, gene-Darwinism 
focuses exclusively on the smallest thinkable potentially evolving unit: single selfish 
gene. And in opposition to main proponents of the evolutionary syntheis, gene-
                                                     
15  R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (1976/1989). 
16  E.g., E. O. Wilson, Kin Selection as the Key to Altruism: Its Rise and Fall (2005). E. Sober, 
D. S. Wilson, Unto Others (1998). 
17 R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (1989), p. 256. 
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Darwinism interprets the Weismann barrier in a way that renders phenotypes mere 
‘vehicles’ of selfish genes. Secondly, with regard to evolutionary processes, gene-
Darwinism also provides a more radical version of the original Darwin’s process 
reductionism (which Darwin himself did not carry through) and considers instead the 
exclusively the simplest conceivable evolutionary process: that of natural selection 
(blind variation and external elimination): “Anywhere in the universe, is Darwinian 
selection. [...] Never were so many facts explained by so few assumptions”.18  
In the end, the gene-Darwinian understanding of nature, focusing on selfish genes 
in a world of unending vicious battle, has been remarkably successful in explaining 
many aspects of animal and human behaviour  (parent-‘investment’, incest-taboo, the 
battle of the sexes and sexual bimorphism, the undermining of social-group behave-
iour, and so on). Thus a facile condemnation of all aspects of gene-Darwinism is un-
justifiable. Hence there is merit in separating wheat from chaff in this theory – which 
may interest and benefit both gene-Darwinians and their critics. 
I argue single genes are indeed the simplest conceivable units of biological 
evolution. Likewise, natural selection is the simplest conceivable evolutionary 
mechanism. Nevertheless, it is possible to posit the existence and the causal impact of 
higher levels of organisation as well as slightly less wasteful mechanisms of evolution. 
This approach does not require new facts but a reinterpretation of existing ones.  
Higher entities, considered in this reinterpretation, are no mere side-effects, but 
rather essential properties at the core of our ontology. Correspondingly, as concerns 
the structural necessity of single-gene competition (undoubtedly an important contri-
bution of gene-Darwinism), acknowledgement must be made as well of gene-inter-
actions and larger regulative systems. Exclusive focus on information (the so-called 
germ-line) must be supplemented by an emphasis on structure and the external deter-
mination of meaning for instance coded in genes (what is here call ‘exformation’). In 
other words, the hitherto exclusive focus on competition needs to be balanced by co-
operation as an essential (and not epi-phenomenal) aspect of evolution.19  
Likewise, the central Darwinian idea of an eternally and unrelentingly cruel 
mechanism that does not evolve must be replaced by the notion of evolutionary 
mechanisms that themselve unfold creatively. To sum up, in terms of the biology-
culture dichotomy, it must be acknowledged that biology has an essential role in 
enabling culture, and that culture likewise works “top-down” effects on biology (for 
instance, via partner-choice or what one may call ‘moral selection’).  
As a final comment, the current influence of gene-Darwinism in this sub-field 
amounts to a final (if Pyrrhic) victory of crude materialist monism, but even gene-
Darwinism contains germs to transcend itself. First of all, and quite generally, the one-
sidedness of the resulting resuctionism will elicit criticism. More specifically gene-
Darwinism has a tendency to shift emphasis from matter to information and thus 
undermines its own reductionist position. Moreover, although gene-Darwinism is 
correctly understood as a purified form of Darwinism, it does advocate an “active” 
nature of selfish genes and this undermines the passive Darwinian view of the 
                                                     
18  R. Dawkins, River Out of Eden (1995), p. xi. 
19  Cf. J. Bauer, Prinzip Menschlichkeit: Warum wir von Natur aus kooperieren (2006). 
Introduction: Nature of Philosophy and Philosophy of Nature 10 
organism as mere object of external selection. Hence, it will be argued that for such 
reasons gene-Darwinism will, in philosophical terms, ineluctably transcend itself.  
b) A Strict Definition of Darwinism and Process-Darwinism  
A spectre is haunting the intellectual world – the spectre of Darwinism. Although 
Darwin predicted that his theory “would give zest to [...] metaphysics,”20 even he 
would be astonished at the breadth of paths his theory has in fact taken – not only as 
regards gene-Darwinism, but also with regard to process-Darwinism found in many 
disciplines not obviously linked to biological Darwinism. 
Generally speaking, the term ‘Darwinism’ is usually understood as a biological 
theory. Nevertheless, processes, operating on different ontological levels, can 
justifiably be called Darwinian if they are analogous to natural selection. ‘Process-
Darwinism’ denotes approaches that exclusively allow for the existence of Darwinian 
processes as evolutionary mechanisms or, more generally, as processes of knowledge-
acquisition. Both process-Darwinism and gene-Darwinism, I shall argue, exhibit a 
static process-monism that is closely tied to the deist Newtonian understanding of the 
world as ruled by a set of simple, basic, eternal and universal laws of nature. 
A quotation from Darwin’s in one of his early notebooks (B) helps to demonstrate the 
connection between the two ‘philosophers’: 
“Astronomers might formerly have said that God ordered each planet to move in its 
particular destiny. – In same manner God orders each animal created with certain form in 
certain country, but how much more simple, & sublime power let attraction act according to 
certain laws such are inevitable consequen let animal be created, then by the fixed laws of 
generation, such will be their successors. – ”21  
That is, like Newton, “Darwin aimed at a theory that is universal and applicable to all 
aspects of all living organisms including man and his ‘higher faculties.’ ”22 This search 
for a universal law of evolution was influenced by Herschel, Lyell and Paley, who all 
argued for static or pre-ordained laws of nature. Paley natural theology also influenced 
Darwin’s adaptationism; and, Lyell’s uniformitarianism, Darwin’s gradualism ( pp. 
168 f.). Paradoxically the idea of immutable laws in nature (lex naturalis) goes back to 
the originally Platonic-Christian idea of a machina mundi ( pp. 74 f.)  
And although the idea of immutable laws in nature paradoxically goes back to the 
original Platonic-Christian machina mundi, Darwin nevertheless effectively transformed 
central aspects of the notion’s natural theology, producing his own theory of natural 
selection, replacing the benevolent God-figure with a process of unchanging cruelty 
and waste. 
In any scientific or philosophical pursuit, the act of ‘de-fining’ (lat. from 
de = down, finis = border), of drawing the line between a notion or thesis and its 
negation is not merely a matter of speaking (a flatus vocis in the dispute on universals), 
but often decides about the very truth of philosophical – and scientific – claims. This 
                                                     
20  Ch. Darwin, Notebook B (Ed. D. Kohn, 1987), orig. p. 228. 
21  Ibid, orig. p. 101. 
22  S. Schweber, The Wider British Context in Darwin’s Theorizing (1985), pp. 39, 49.   
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is the clearly case with the term ‘Darwinism,’ whose meaning, as I have indicated, has 
not only changed historically, but still no complete consensus on the most adequate 
definition has been reached. With regard to evolutionary processes, however, natural 
selection can for historical and systematic reasons be assumed to be the paradigmatic 
core of Darwinism. One may add, with regard to the objects of evolution, that 
Darwinism generally takes a reductionist stance (Charles Darwin favoured individual 
selection over group selection, and modern Darwinians favour individual genes over 
group of genes).23 Finally one might add further tenets, to a definition such as 
gradualism, and, generally a view of life that banishes purpose, direction and spirit.24 
In this work we particularly focus on natural selection (Darwinian process 
reductionism) and on single genes as evolutionary objects (recent gene-reductionism) 
which both can be taken to hallmarks of Darwinism. The most uncontroversial and 
essential definition of Darwinism is based on natural selection. 
But even in regard to natural selection one may question, whether Darwinism 
really tends toward process-monism or whether it allows for a limited process-
pluralism. Historically, different positions can be found. Whereas August Weismann 
purged Darwinism of other aspects, claiming thereby to reveal its true essence, 
George Romanes emphasised its essentially pluralistic nature. Darwin’s own Victorian 
Darwinism, in fact, was formulated in a guarded way. It was more pluralistic than 
most Darwinian and non-Darwinian approaches ever since. Darwin himself adopted 
the straight-forward Lamarckian theory of acquired characters as an integral part of 
his theory. In a modified way, both Weismann’s and Romanes’s interpretations can 
also be found today: Gene-Darwinians such as Dawkins have adopted Weismann’s 
(neo-Darwinian) process-monism as the true paradigmatic core; and several critics of 
so-called ‘ultra-Darwinism,’ such as Stephen Jay Gould, have advocated a slightly 
more pluralistic understanding of Darwinism, embracing other evolutionary factors 
than natural selection.25 The example of Gould is worth considering here, for in his 
recent work, The Structure of Evolutionary Theory, he convincingly argued that the 
Darwinian paradigm can and in fact needs to be substantially altered.26 And although 
Gould’s position – historicizing process-pluralism – is formulated in a more radical 
way, I nonetheless agree with the ultra-Darwinians that Darwinism needs to be 
defined in a strictly idealised way. Also the historical background shows that Darwin 
searched one universal law of nature. Correspondingly, the core of Darwinism is the 
idea that the evolution is governed by an immutable law of natural selection (in the 
broad sense) that includes two sub-processes: blind variation and environmental 
elimination (natural selection, in the narrow sense).  
 
                                                     
23  Gould, for instance, added a reductive attitude to the units of selection (and gradualism) as 
further definining features of Darwinism. St. J. Gould, The Structure of Evolutionary Theory (2005). 
24  E.g., St. J. Gould, Ever since Darwin (1973/1991), pp. 12 f.  
25  Ibid, pp. 268 f. 
26  Idem, The Structure of Evolutionary Theory (2005). Some of my ideas (v. Sydow, 2001) are similar to 
those elaborated by Gould (who clearly writes in a more elegant prose). Nonetheless, Gould 
advocates only a reformulation of Darwinism, whereas I posit that the Darwinian metaphysics 
needs to be transcended. Hence, I would like to carry Gould’s work one step further.  
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If we focus, for our definition of Darwinism, on the process of evolution (and ignore 
the question of the objects of evolution), several reasons can be provided defining 
Darwinism as the theory of evolution by natural selection: 
(1) Such a definition focuses on what was specific to Darwin’s evolutionary theory 
relative to previous theories of evolution. Undisputively, Darwin’s central novel idea 
was the concept of natural selection. Correspondingly, the title of his originally 
planned evolutionary magnum opus was ‘Natural Selection’.  
(2) Although Darwin still allowed for a degree of pluralism, over time Darwinism 
came to incorporate the Weismann barrier as well as the strictly blind character of 
variation; and, in gene-Darwinism, a strict process-reductionism. The use of 
‘Darwinism’ resulting from these changes may be restricted to a more purified theory 
than Darwin’s original version.  
(3) Only a strict definition of Darwinism and natural selection will allow us to 
disentangle the tautological from the falsifiable aspects of Darwinism ( pp. 358 f.). 
(4) Process-Darwinism and the metaphysics of Darwinism can only be properly 
understood when linked to the Popperian negative solution to Hume’s problem of 
induction. This negative resolution directly refers to natural selection (blind 
conjectures and external refutations). 
(5) Finally, a strict definition may enhance the conceptual resolution needed to 
make visible the claimed evolution of evolutionary mechanisms and a potential 
development from blindness to sight. 
On the other hand, however, a broader definition of Darwinism could be adopted, 
such as: “Darwinism is a theory of evolution in which variation of evolutionary 
entities (and their survival) plays a role”. Under such a definition I would be a 
Darwinian with regard to biology and even to culture. And in that case this book 
could not be understood as a critique of ‘Darwinism’, but only as a claim for a 
reformulation of Darwinism. In either case, however, the work would still serve as a 
critique of process-monism, which is here taken to be the core of Darwinism. 
In order to discuss evolution by natural selection one needs to determine the 
meaning of natural selection itself. This term has been characterised variously by: ‘the 
survival of the fittest’ ( 9.1 a); variational evolution as opposed to synthesis 
( 9.3 a); blindness of variation ( 9.3 b); the externality of natural selection 
( 9.3 c); and a law of egoistic survival ( 9.3 d). All these aspects seem to refer to 
essential aspects of the process of natural selection in the broad sense, each of them 
will be submitted to essential criticism in this work. Hence, the resulting philosophical 
view that I propose – despite huge debts to Darwinism – is clearly critical of a 
Darwinian view of life and justifies the assertion that we need to go beyond 
Darwinism, with its stress on an externally-given, unchangeably blind law of nature. 
c) From Darwinism to an Evolutionary Theory of Evolution 
It is a main aim of this work to help to transcend the static Darwinian understanding 
of evolution, in order to replace it with a evolutionary understanding of evolution 
itself. It is argued here that Darwinian process-monism could and should become 
overcome. Mere natural selection, blind variations and external retention, taken as an 
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epistemic search-process through an astronomically high dimensional property-space 
appears to be a very inefficient means to find optimal solutions. It is advocated, in 
fact, that the search-algorithm has changed throughout the course of evolution as well 
as throughout cognitive and cultural development. I further suggest that the 
evolutionary processes progressed from its blind, cruel and wasteful beginnings. These 
processes may become semi-autonomous.  
Nevertheless it must be said, in defence of the claimed blindness of Darwinian 
processes that, in the larger philosophical context, these ideas may indeed help us, for 
instance, with understanding problems of long-term planning in economics and 
politics. A metaphysic of radical blindness, however, goes against the (at least partial) 
predictability presupposed by any concept or ethics of sustainability (concerned with 
future needs and long-term development).27 Darwinism is right in its claim that there 
is a blind aspect to all knowledge-acquisition. But this differs fundamentally from 
process-Darwinians’ metaphysical claim that the blindness inherent in the process of 
knowledge-acquisition is complete. I stress once more that, rather than an antithesis, 
what I advocate here is a third way. To find such a way (or the golden mean, 
aurea mediocritas) between a purified Darwinism and numerous but not integrated 
alternative accounts one needs to cull the most useful contributions from conflicting 
sides. Such a position is advocated both with regard to evolutionary objects, and with 
regard to evolutionary processes. That is, a transformation of the facts and theories 
accumulated is needed, just as Fisherian Darwinism of the 1930s and 1940s 
( pp. 125 f.) historically integrated the anti-Darwinian theory of Mendelism into 
Darwinism.28 That is, there is no scarcity of well established theories that could 
fruitfully be re-interpreted. If Darwin is the ‘Newton of a blade of grass’ 
(an expression early coined by Kant), there is nothing to prevent, by extension, the 
notion of an ‘Einstein of a blade of grass’ is still needed. The proposal of an evolution of 
evolutionary processes differs considerably from the Darwinian idea of one eternal and 
universal algorithm (Dennett) of evolution.  
Let us take the process of sexual selection as an example that is still very close to 
the Darwinian paradigm, but that may be interpreted in quite different ways. This 
process was indeed introduced by Darwin later in his life. But he introduced this 
process as he was concerned with evolution of man and as he tried to moderate his 
more radical original position ( pp. 112 f.). However, strict process-Darwinism 
treats this process as an epiphenomenon or a mere short-cut of natural selection. 
Weismann in his pan-selectionist phase abandoned sexual selection as an own process. 
Paradoxically, sexual selection – almost totally neglected also by the evolutionary 
synthesis – reinstated itself as an academic topic under the aegis of gene-Darwinism. It 
appears inconsistent that this particularly radical form of Darwinism should have 
introduced some causal pluralism. Indeed closer investigation reveals, as shown in this 
work, that true gene-Darwinians have understood sexual selection as being reducible 
                                                     
27  H. Jonas, Prinzip Verantwortung (1978/1984), pp. 37 f. 
28  Interestingly, the main terms used in Darwinism have actually been coined by ardent opponents 
of Darwinism: ‘genetics’ by Bateson, ‘genotype’ by Johannsen and ‘adaptive radiation’ by 
Osborn. 
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to natural selection at the level of single genes. In contrast to this reductionist position 
it is argued here that one alternatively has to interprete sexual selection as a process in 
its own right. Although sexual selection is restricted by and based on the ‘lower’ 
processes of natural selection, it is here advocated not only to be a mere short-cut of 
natural selection. Here, sexual selection may well be an adaptation originally evolved 
by natural selection, but it is a new evolutionary process (of autoselection) with the 
potential of changing the trajectory of evolution itself. According to this view, there 
are no purely given adaptive landscapes, expressing the fit to an external environment, 
but rather evolutionary landscapes, themselves partly created by the evolutionary process 
concerned. In particular, it can be argued that sexual selection under certain 
conditions can retain its direction, even if natural selection “counter-selects,” and thus 
it gains a degree of autonomy from natural selection. Such autonomous tendencies 
may have led, for example, to the enormous antlers of deer, and may also have played 
a role in developing tendencies most of us would regard as more positive, such as the 
evolution of a biological basis of human morals. 
Moderation of evolutionary mechanisms in fact can be seen in a variety of areas. 
Palaeontology and genetics, for example, are full of phenomena that can be 
understood not just as the product of adaptation based on natural selection, but as the 
result of new processes that have changed the speed or the course of evolution itself. 
Similarly, the evolutionary synthesis in the first half of the 20th century provides a 
treasure-trove of mechanisms that have been largely overlooked by mono-mechanistic 
gene-Darwinism. We may think, for example, of numerous mechanisms linked to 
species (sexually interbreeding populations), such as genetic recombination, isolation, 
genetic drift, founder-effect, and so on. Gene-Darwinism consistently denied the 
existence or evolutionary relevance of species and sub-populations, in reducing them 
(and their corresponding mechanisms) to single selfish genes governed by natural 
selection. In the current work the existence of entities above the level of single selfish 
genes is advocated. The the ‘invention’ of species by evolution resulted at the same 
time in newly emerging evolutionary mechanisms. The evolutionary processes of a 
species allow an evolutionary line to cross valleys and to reach further peaks on the 
adaptive landscape. New properties of organisms that have again an evolutionary 
impact and that were previously inconceivable, such as inner-specific co-operation, 
could now evolve – and under particular conditions would be very likely to do so.  
Furthermore, a criticism of gene-Darwinism need not preclude making use of 
processes discussed in sociobiology, such as reciprocal altruism. In fact, it is argued 
here that these processes cannot be fully reduced to gene-selection ( p. 39). Taking 
novel processes seriously, as influencing the course of evolution, means seeing them 
not just as objects of evolution but also as in part being subjects of evolution. 
Although I distinguish evolutionary processes and evolutionary objects for 
methodological reasons, in this work this distinction is criticised a being ontologically 
fundamental. Metaphysically, a stance is suggested that resembles a Whiteheadian 
position, regarding objects as processes and, vice versa, processes as objects. Atomistic 
selfish replicators, the simplest conceivable evolutionary objects, may refer to the pure 
simplest (‘atomistic’) evolutionary process of natural selection ( p. 218). But species, 
for example, can be seen not only as objects of evolution, but also, as I have indicated, 
Introduction: Nature of Philosophy and Philosophy of Nature 15 
as evolutionary processes themselves. A particular new species may not imply an as 
hughe innovation of the evolutionary line, as involved in the ‘invention’ of the 
principle of species (involving sexual organisms, a common gene pool etc.). However, 
also, for instance, changes in the reproductive strategies (e.g., k-selection, systemic 
selection, gestation periods, reciprocial altruism) should not be understood as being 
results of evolution, but as changing the evolutionary process as well. Evolutionary 
innovations like warm-bloodedness or brood care may increase the autonomy of an 
evolutionary line from its immediate external environment and change the adaptive 
landscape of this line. Particularly in genetics there are several findings that may well 
be reinterpreted in the light of an account stressing the evolution of evolutionary 
mechanisms, but although these ideas need to be elaborated in the future, here it is 
argued that we may have to take the identity of objects and processes seriously. This 
would imply that the acceptance of emerging new entities may indeed suggest the new 
processes as well. The current revival of hierarchical theory of evolution, supported in 
this work, would allow for several levels of evolutionary organisation gene pools, 
demes, groups, and so on. It is argued that this needs to be supplemented by an 
acknowledgment of by a multitude of evolutionary processes. Hence, both 
fundamental tenets the selfishness of genes and the necessary blindness of 
evolutionary processes are subject to question. 
To apply my Whiteheadian stance to the rehabilitation of phenotyes, then, would 
necessitate regarding them in a way as being evolutionary processes. Organisms not 
only evolve according to fixed laws, but they actually constitute a part of the process 
by which they evolve. That is, body-plans, according to an old tradition in biology29, 
may be interpreted to bear certain possibilities or probabilistic tendencies (and 
constraints) for future evolution, and thus influence the course of evolution. In 
contrast to gene-Darwinism, this argument holds that phenotypes are not mere 
vehicles of genes, but evolutionary factors (even if minor). This gives some justice to 
the old morphological tradition, which long challenged the view that evolution is 
guided by adaptations to external environment alone rather than being additionally 
affected by an inner developmental ‘logic’.30  
The theory I present here, then, is that evolution is not only ruled externally and 
eternally by natural selection, but that evolutionary processes are taken to be at least 
partly a function of evolution itself (in philosophical parlance, the evolutionary 
process itself is taken to be not only natura naturata but natura naturans,  p. 72).  
An important question for future research is whether, underlying this theory, one 
may identify Platonic ‘forms’, as revealed in evolution and in cultural development. If 
evolution is understood – on biological and cultural levels – as a process of 
knowledge-acquisition, then Darwinian processes may indeed and even a priori be the 
simplest thinkable processes, and in an evolving world it may even be necessary that 
evolution be able to evolve from blindness to sight. 
                                                     
29  G. Webster, B. Goodwin, Form and Transformation (1996). 
30  See: S. J. Gould, E. Vrba, Exaptation – A Missing Term in the Science of Form (1982/1998). S. J. 
Gould, The Structure of Evolutionary Theory (2005). 
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The Darwinian focus on the simplest possible explanation of evolutionary change 
may epitomize an unwarranted application of William Ockham’s via moderna, which 
focus has the advantages of a simple explanation; and, of course a simple explanation 
is preferable to a complicated one. Nonetheless, overemphasising elementary 
explanations can lead to ‘unacceptable simplifications’31 – so that I must agree with 
Depew and Weber that in biology a transition from the “sciences of simplicity” to the 
“science of complexity”32 is needed ( also p. 158). Briefly put, simplicity as concerns 
Darwinism cannot afford to be simplistic.  
In regard of the political implications of the favoured biological approach, steering 
a middle course between the clean, reduced, simple, and the more complex – or 
between atomism and holism – would justify neither for an unrestrained laissez-faire 
economics nor a totalitarian theory that neglects the individual.  
Philosophically, there is a fundamental difference between seeing the essence of 
evolution as, on the one hand, selfish atomic replicators, struggling in an 
unchangeable, pitiless process of natural selection, and, on the other, the evolution of 
evolutionary mechanisms, where entities may in part become subjects instead of mere 
objects of evolution. For one thing, the latter view allows for a reduction of blindness 
and selfishness on relevant explanatory levels: And perhaps more interestingly, it 
suggests an active role for the evolutionary subject, as well as the potential 
improvability of the evolutionary process as it transcends the blind struggle for life.  
My work, then, amounts to a manifesto that evolution should be taken more 
seriously than is done in extant forms of radical Darwinism. Even if Darwin was right 
in pinpointing that a primordial evolutionary process of blind and wasteful natural 
selection, still ubiquitous today, there are yet other levels operating, revealing an 
evolution of evolutionary processes transcending this blind wastefulness and foster 
the possibility of the autonomy of higher aspirations.  
d) The Philosophy of Nature after Times of Ecological and Economic Crisis  
We now turn to some more general issues linked to the reception of philosophy of 
nature. Successful philosophical approaches naturally have to confront the problems 
of their age. Since at least the 1970s, for example, the need to address ecological 
problems (partly linked to globalisation) has been apparent.33 The problems have 
required not only technical improvements and political laws to restrict environmental 
pollution, but also suggested a modification of ethics to complement as well as give a 
foundation to requisite projects.34 There has been a critique that the homo oeconomicus 
approach, traditionally predominant in economics, is linked to capitalism and egoism, 
and hence, perhaps, to the exploitation of nature. Such exploitation, in fact, has also 
                                                     
31  A. Ch. v. Guttenberg, Biologie als Weltanschauung (1967), pp. 25, 35, 51. 
32 D. Depew, B. Weber, Darwinism Evolving (1995), p. 18. 
33  E.g., D. L. Meadows et al., The Limits of Growth (1972). E. U. v. Weizsäcker, Erdpolitik 
(1989/1990). A. Gore, Earth in the Balance – Ecology and Human Spirit (1992). 
D. Jamieson, A Companion to Environmental Philosophy (2003). 
34  E.g., D. Cooper, J. A. Palmer (Eds.), The Environment in Question: Ethics and Global Issues (1992). 
K. S. Shrader-Frechette (Ed.), Environmental Ethics (1981/1988). 
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been identified as the product of mainstream, anthropocentric Judaeo-Christian 
thinking.35 It has even been claimed that philosophy in general (including metaphysics, 
ontology, and especially philosophy of nature) ought to be re-cast as a ‘philosophy of 
ecological crisis’.36 Despite their many intrinsic differences, philosophers who 
emphasise the need for an environmental ethics often agree on human responsibility 
to care for the biological and social environment, to ensure sustainable development, 
and thereby also to protect future economics in the broadest sense. 
Sociobiology, particularly in its gene-Darwinian formulation, seems to provide 
ideas that directly explain our frequent tendency to exploit environments egoistically. 
Let us look in more detail, whether or how such an approach relates to ecological 
thinking. Sociobiology also gained influence during the 1970s and some proponent of 
sociobiology indeed raised questions concerning biodiversity.37 In its gene-Darwinian 
version, however, sociobiology mainly stressed the non-transcendable animal-
character of humans and thus presents an explanation for the ruthless exploitation of 
the Earth, the exponential Malthusian population explosion and the threats to 
sustainable growth. The result of gene-Darwinism’s the sub-individualist stress has 
somehow been not only a radicalisation of Darwinian individualism, but also its 
undermining, since the genic continuity with closely related organisms is stressed. 
Nonetheless, whereas, on the one hand, gene-Darwinism is reductionistic, 
stressing the unrestrainable egoism of each selfish gene and denying the causal 
relevance of any superstructure, on the other hand, ecological ideas in a rather holistic 
way have emphasized the oneness of the ecosystem, the human responsibility for the 
whole spaceship Earth and the optimism of cultural changeability as a basis for 
cultural and ethical reform.  
Gene-Darwinians do often regard information about our fundamental egoism to 
be the only solution – even to the ecological and social crisis.38 In contrast to this, 
philosophers of quite different credentials, including supporters of socialist, 
communitarian, conservative and theological positions (as well as so-called deep 
ecologists), have advocated the necessity for a “new morality,” seeing the crisis as 
partly the result of ‘ruthless application of the atheistic, egoistic materialism’ or of 
‘capitalist veneration of the mammon’. The latter view sees the gene-egoistic paradigm 
not as a solution to the problem but as one of its causes. Mary Midgley criticized early 
on this aspect of gene-Darwinism: “In this situation telling people that they are 
essentially Chicago gangsters is not just false and confused, but monstrously 
irresponsible”39 (Cf. Chapter 2,  pp. 41 f.).  
All in all, however, pinpointing the antagonistic relationship between gene-
Darwinian and ecological thought does not lead us very far. I myself oppose gene-
Darwinism because it has gained unbalanced predominance, but I agree that we need 
to acknowledge the dark side of human nature as well. Nonetheless, we must leave 
                                                     
35  See, for example, the L. White debate,  footnote 227) 
36  V. Hösle, Philosophie der ökologischen Krise (1991/1994). 
37  E. O. Wilson, Biophilia (1984); The Diversity of Life (1992). 
38  T. Mohr, Zwischen genetischer Statik und Dynamik der Lebensbedingungen (1996). 
39  M. Midgley, Gene-juggling (1979), p. 455. 
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open the possibility for “higher” aspirations as well, and work toward a framework 
that might acknowledge if not engender them in principle  
Lastly, I touch here only briefly on Darwinism and the many crises and downturns 
that have shaken the fundaments of the global economy. These crises have at times 
shed doubt on the radical neo-liberal theory of economics – the most dominant 
school of thought in recent decades, promoting globalization, privatization and 
deregulation as universal solutions to secure progress. Interestingly, some proponents 
of laissez-faire capitalism were strongly inspired by Darwinian economics 
( pp. 191 f., pp. 236 f.). I suspect that the biological and philosophical study of a 
purged Darwinism and of the evolution of evolutionary mechanisms may well bear 
fruit in suggesting a crticisim of both a state assumed to be omniscient and a 
veneration of egoistic pursuits of atomic individuals.  
e) Darwinism, Religion and Philosophy 
This work is not committed to religion (either per se or in an instiutional form). 
Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that the view proposed here has implications of 
importance, not only for enlightened metaphysics, but also for moderate religious 
stances. That is, in transcending the mere egoistic struggle for life, and vindicating 
evolutionary subjects from external determination; palatable space may be created for 
a dialogue that includes not only ethics and metaphysics, but faith as well.  
Moreover, a radical, reductionist Darwinian metaphysics of egoistic struggle 
appears to be inconsistent not only with Christian faith, but with most religions 
(monotheistic, polytheistic or pantheistic) as well as with most received systems of 
enlightened ethics. For if on accepts this modification of ethics and religion, this 
biologization may destroy the core of these two disciplines. This seems to be the case, 
although evolution itself needs not to be inconsistent with religious beliefs.40 
In this perspective the essence of Darwinism appears to be neither philosophically 
nor religiously neutral. This is not to say that the relation between Darwinism and 
religion is a simple one. And in this respect one may bear in mind that Darwin himself 
was strongly influenced by Paley’s religious adaptationism and by the deist belief in 
the existence of universal and eternal laws of nature ( pp. 168 f.). Indeed, he had 
early on even aimed at becoming an Anglican priest, and later he had difficulties – as 
seen from his notebooks – coming to terms with the materialist and atheist (or 
agnostic) inclinations of his Malthusian explanation of evolution.41 
The engagement of Christian religion and what has been called ‘Darwinism’ has 
been not only multi-faceted but also volatile.42 Particularly rich examples exist of the 
clash been science and religion in Victorian days:  on the one hand, the oft-cited 
                                                     
40  Cf. D. Cooper, World Philosophies (1996). D. Sedley, Creationism and Its Critics in Antiquity 
(2007/2009).  
41  J. H. Brooke, The Relations Between Darwin’s Science and his Religion (1985). M. v. Sydow, Charles 
Darwin: A Christian Undermining Christianity? (2005). ( p. 181 f.) 
42  J. H. Brooke, G. Cantor, Reconstructing Nature: The Engagement of Science and Religion (2000). 
D. M. Knight, Sience and Spirituality: The Volatile Connection (2004). D. M. Knight, M. D. Eddy 
(Eds.), Science and Beliefs: From Natural Philosophy to Natural Science, 1700-1900 (2005). 
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anecdote of the encounter between Thomas Henry Huxley and Bishop Samual 
Wilberforce (son of abolitionist philanthropist William Wilberforce) is normally taken 
to epitomise the mid-Victorian conflict between science and religion43; and on the 
other, some Victorian ‘Darwinians’, like the American biologist Asa Gray, who aimed 
to harmonise Darwinism with religion. But it has to be noted that many of these self-
proclaimed Victorian ‘Darwinians’ were, at least from the present viewpoint, ‘pseudo-
Darwinians’ or Lamarckians.44 One is at least left unconvinced that these historical 
examples provide a strong argument against the claim that Darwinism (if defined in a 
strict way) is incompatible with religion. 
Darwin himself, although very cautious and polite in public, was aware that his 
theory will presubably clash with traditional religion; he even refers to himself as “the 
Devil’s chaplain,” using working on “the clumsy, wasteful, blunder law and horrible 
cruel works of nature,” (FN 44). If random variation and external elimination is 
regarded as the true core of a Darwinian research program, this may be indeed a valid 
explication of this law of nature, claimed to be immuntable and universal. After 
Darwin had read Malthus, he scribbled in his notebook: “[…] since the world began, 
the causes of population & depopulation have been probably as constant as any of the 
laws of nature with which we are acquainted.”45 Depite not aiming to undermine 
Christianity, Darwin was led by the logic of his own deductions to introduce some-
thing like a rather “diabolic” principle of conservation of cruelty and wastefulness. 
“To prevent the recurrence of misery, is, alas! Beyond the power of man.”46 This 
principle indeed served as an antidote against radical utopian ideas about the 
improvability of mankind that have led to some improvements, but have also caused 
much harm (the terror and brutality unleashed by the French Revolution, with its 
original claims to lead the way to a better society, were of course familiar subjects to 
Malthus and Darwin.  
Nonetheless, Darwin, who had political symphathies for the Whigs and who was 
critical of conservative paternalism as well as of revolutionary radicalism, clearly did 
not aim to undermine religion. However, involuntarily Darwinism, as world view, 
turned out to be incoherent with the belief in a benevolent Creator. The chaplain 
Darwin himself (influenced by another chaplain, Malthus) had actually difficulties to 
come to terms with these implications of his own biological theory.47  
Lateron, the Darwinian materialism and biologism played a role in some of the 
most disastrous developments of the 20th century.48 And yet there have indeed been 
ideologically disengaged forms of Darwinism, and clearly Darwinism (in a less strict 
definition) and religion have coexisted independently of one another. Over the last 
                                                     
43  Although Huxley is usually reported to have emerged as the clear winner of this encounter, 
recently some evidence has been provided that this may have been a founding myth of scientific 
professionalism. F. A. J. L. James, An 'Open Clash between Science and the Church'? (2005). 
44  Cf. P. Bowler,  esp. footnote 404. 
45  Ch. Darwin, Notebook E (Ed. D. Kohn, 1987), orig. p. 3.  
46  Th. R. Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population (1798), p. 98,  also footnote 724. 
47  M. v. Sydow, Charles Darwin: A Christian Undermining Christianity? (2005). 
48  R. Nachtwey, Der Irrweg des Darwinismus (1959), Kap. 1, 6, 7, 8. A. Ch. v. Guttenberg, Biologie als 
Weltanschauung (1967), e.g., pp. 27, 35, 53. 
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decades, however, a new wave of radical gene-Darwinism and pure Darwinian 
metaphysics have pervaded many domains of Western thought, challenging other 
forms of metaphysics (both secular and religious).  
During this latest stage, in fact, Darwinism (and particularly gene-Darwinism), with 
its rather critical stance towards religion, has become almost a religion in itself. It is 
worshipped as the “universal solvent”49. Darwinian processes have replaced divine 
processes in the narrative explaining adaptations. Adaptation is often assumed to be 
ubiquitous, almost in a Paleyan way. Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin have 
pointed out that Darwinian adaptive ‘explanations’ are often post hoc “just-so stories”. 
Reminescent of the influence of Paley’s and Malthus’ theodicy on Darwin, Darwinism 
may be taken to justify cruelty, not only in nature but in society as well: Alas, isn’t the 
elimination of the weak and wounded a natural necessity? The God of radial 
Darwinism is in fact grimmer than Descartes’ ‘deceitful demon;’ he is at best a ‘blind 
watchmaker’50. In the words of Richard Dawkins: if “there is only one Creator who 
made the tiger and the lamb, the cheetah and the gazelle, what is He playing at? Is He 
a sadist who enjoys spectator blood sports?”51  
Gene-Darwinists have claimed that even human love, sexuality, ethics and religion 
can in principle be understood in gene-egoist terms.52 It is aimed not only to explain 
the evolution of altruism from simple beginnings but to reduce altruism to egoism. 
This is in sharp contrast to the earlier paradigm in evolutionary biology – the 
evolutionary synthesis – which had at least left open the possibility of authentic 
mutual care within species and hence a basis for authentically pursuing a common 
good.  In gene-Darwinism, however, one is left with an egoistic world of struggle 
beyond improving. In such a world, the “Lord of all Creation” becomes a malevolent 
or impervious source of evil, devoid of ethics or love, and deaf to the hope that the 
world could improve in any way whatsoever. This view not only touches the core of 
Christian faith that “God is love” (1 Johannes 4:16), but also brings into question all 
Enlightened philosophy as well as the Platonic idea of the Good. 
Without abandoning all aspects of Darwinism, which has no doubt proved to be a 
highly fruitful paradigm, a more optimistic understanding of nature is in fact offered 
in the idea of an evolution of evolutionary processes. It would be broadly compatible, 
for instance, with neo-Platonic philosophy, with the idealists’unfolding of nature, and 
perhaps even with process-theology.  
When religous tenets take the form of a Creationist fundamentalism, however, 
their opposition to Darwinian fundamentalism yields an unfortunate set of basic 
problems. Thus I present a third way here, which may be palatable to the ‘silent 
majority’ of the educated public. Although critical of Darwinian metaphysics, as 
mentioned above, I clearly do not question evolution per se. The evidence is too 
                                                     
49 D. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995), p. 521.  
50 R. Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker (1986).   
51  Idem, River out of Eden (1995), p. 109. 
52 R. Dawkins, The God Delusion (2006). D. C. Dennett, Breaking the Spell (2006). Cf. A. McGrath, 
J. C. McGrath, The Dawkins Delusion (2007). 
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overwhelming.53 I do argue, however, that the interpretation of evolution itself is yet 
open to debate. In fact, and rather paradoxically, it is in part the radical reductionism 
of gene-Darwinism that has provided fuel for launching the theological crusade 
against ultra-Darwinian metaphysics. It may be conceded that the intelligent-design 
movement provided a number of noteworthy critical arguments against Darwinism; 
religiously inspired approaches, with their various metaphysical commitements, may 
actually help to identify flaws in Darwinian naturalism. Nonetheless, advocates of the 
intelligent-design movement seem not to have managed to formulate a positive 
alternative explanation of evolution.54 Moreover, despite pious intentions, the 
literalism of many Creationists, as well as their sometimes antediluvian scientific 
positions, ultimately discredit their religious goal. Interestingly enough, however, radial 
literalism and ultra-Darwinism may have co-evolved and even supported one another. 
These antagonistic positions are similar in some respects. Religious literalism 
resembles naïve materialistic realism concerned with material, or ‘given’ facts and 
sense-data, ignoring the importance of interpretation. As a result, although such 
literalism may be a morally and theologically driven reaction to positivist materialism, 
it nonetheless works, in its naiveté, to prevent a deeper philosophical or theological 
understanding that would in fact be necessary to overcome the positivist approach. As 
a result, despite the fact that science and religion each may be based also on sources of 
evidence of their own, it is purported here that both need to reflect their premises and 
in this respect both must become truly philosophical – in effect, a third way.55 
 
To sum up, this book provides a discussion of the Darwinian transformation from 
faith in a universal, eternal divine law into the conviction of a universal, eternal rule of 
blind variation-and external elimination. The shift of viewpoint produced a somewhat 
imbalanced metaphysic of unalterable struggle, blindness and wastefulness. What I 
propose is a more balanced account of the nature of nature in order that social 
sciences and philosopy may acknowledge more easily the true aspects of Darwinism 
(and even Dawkinsism). Hence, even to disseminate true aspects of Darwinism, what 
is required is a move beyond strict Darwinian metaphysics. That is, we must abandon 
the concept of a static evolution, and develop instead a view that evolution itself is in 
constant change, an ongoing creatio continua, producing entities and processes which 
have a causal impact in their own right. In turn this permits a theorizing on the 
                                                     
53  I not hesitate to agree, in this respect, with R. Dawkins, The Ancestor’s Tale (2004/2005).  
54  E. Sober. Evidence and Evolution (2005). 
55  Even if those Cassandras among the philosophers, like the philosopher Mac Intyre, were right, 
who advocate that the enlightenment project to formulate a rational ethic were doomed to fail-
ure, they demand only a modification of metaphysics, not it abolishment. Philosophical reflec-
tion is not necessarily in contradiction with religious belief. For example, the traditions of Kant, 
Schelling, and Hegel, albeit critical of traditional dogma, aimed to make room for renewed 
forms of ethics and faith. Although such ideas may have flourished particularly well on 
Protestant humus, the idea of a ratio recta is as old as philosophy itself, and, has not been alien to 
any of the world’s major religions. Pope John Paul II, for instance, in the Encyclica Fides et Ratio 
(1998), § 17, emphasised the role of ratio recta and the necessity of a mutually inspiring dialogue 
of science and religion. 
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possibility – if not tendency – to reduce the wastefulness and cruelty evinced in ultra-
Darwinism. Such an account of evolution, finally, may pave the way for viable philo-
sophical and perhaps even religious interpretations of nature. 
One Long Argument – Outline of the Book 
After presenting the advocated conceptions of the nature of philosophy and the 
philosophy of nature, I will present in detail how my ‘one long argument’56 will be laid 
out. I am of course aware of the weaknesses of this ‘long argument.’ I nonetheless 
publish it, since I am confident that at least some of the ideas and the ultimate 
message may contribute to the paradigm-shift in the overall philosophy of nature – a 
step that I think is urgently needed. 
Chapter 1 provides a first account of the discipline of sociobiology and its main 
theories. Even in this early stage of the book it is pointed out that the theories of kin-
selection and reciprocal altruism, often treated as direct implications of the selfish-
gene view of evolution, need not be linked to a pure version of gene-Darwinism. 
Chapter 2 discusses possible ethical implications of gene-Darwinism, since its 
ontology (implicitly or explicitly) involves the goal of biologicizing ethics. It is argued 
that the actual ethical proposals by gene-Darwinians, however, make use of other 
traditions as well. It is shown that even proponents of a selfish-gene view shrink from 
drawing extreme gene-Darwinian conclusions. This does not present a problem in 
itself, but it will be seen to point toward the incompleteness of the gene-Darwinian 
position. In this chapter it is aimed to present a purer version of such an ‘ethics’. The 
latter will then be shown to be ethically unsatisfactory, and therefore to provide 
justification for further investigation into the the problems and the historical and 
philosophical background of the paradigm.  
Part II of the book has a historical thrust. Beginning with Chapter 3, the general 
philosophical background of Darwinism is discussed, in which a history of the 
philosophy of nature provides the context for the idea of eternal laws (related to the 
notion of a machina mundi, a divinely inspired world-machine). Furthermore, pre-
Darwinian schools of biology are considered, such as materialist, essentialist and 
romantic: Understanding these trends of thought can help shed light on today’s 
evolutionary debate. Moreover, an adequate understanding of these may be a 
necessary prerequisite to defining Darwinism in a historically adequate way. 
Chapter 4 continues the historical focus, with a history of the internal workings of 
Darwinian paradigms. Structural distinctions and similarities between different sub-
paradigms are indicated, with reference to Darwin’s Darwinism, the two phases of the 
evolutionary synthesis, and gene-Darwinism. From this discussion will emerge a 
preliminary working definition of Darwinism based on natural selection. Whereupon 
it will becomes apparent that these paradigms, often called ‘Darwinian,’ are far from 
monolithic. For instance, they have emphasised different units of selection; and they 
havehave either emphasised Darwinian process-monism or process-pluralism. Yet 
given that Darwinism is strictly defined, the assumption that the evolutionary 
                                                     
56  See Ch. Darwin, The Origin of Species (1859), Chapter 14.  
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synthesis is a thoroughly Darwinian paradigm is open to challenge – not because the 
evolutionary synthesis has drawn historically from non-Darwinian Mendelism, but 
because in the ‘second phase of the synthesis’ (Mayr, Dobzhansky, etc.), an atomistic 
‘beanbag-genetic’ account of evolution has partly been abandoned, replaced by a 
certain autonomy of populations, macro-evolution, a kind of salutatory speciation, and 
some causal pluralism. Gene-Darwinism, it contrast, is characterised by gene-atomism, 
germ-line reductionism, and process-monism. The chapter finally refers to some 
traditions and recent proposals in micro- and macro-biology are critical of ultra-
Darwinism (involving recent multi-level approaches, morphological accounts etc.). It 
is argued that these account may contribute to a non-Darwinian – or at least a not-
completely-Darwinian – synthesis. 
Following this, Chapter 5 presents the ‘external’ history of the sketched Darwinian 
paradigms, discussing their interaction with the respective cultural environments. It 
will be seen that the paradigms were moulded by particular ideas of the time, as well as 
by socio-economic influences. With regard to Darwin himself, for instance, several 
influences are considered: the paradoxical influence of Paley’s theological 
adaptationism; the impact of the Newtonian-Herschelian belief in eternal laws; and 
the effect of Malthus’s ideas on population-growth, harsh conditions for the poor, and 
laissez-faire economics. In additional, the chapter reveals some historical roots for the 
similarities between biological Darwinism and broadly Darwinian theories in other 
subject-areas to be treated in Part III.  
Chapter 6 signals the beginning of Part III, in which focus is turned to universal 
process-Darwinism, which then leads to Darwinian metaphysics, connecting logical, 
epistemological and ontological concepts. The Darwinian turn in parts of Western 
philosophy is more profound than generally assumed affecting even subject areas that 
were in part developed in opposition to biological Darwinism. 
This chapter begins with an account of universal process-Darwinism, in which 
three main points are made. First, that some advocates of process-Darwinism make 
not only empirical claims, positing the existence of Darwinian processes on several 
ontological levels, but also metaphysical claims forprocess-Darwinism as universal 
principle. 
The second main point is a proferred philosophical justification for Darwinism as 
metaphysical approach. That is, knowledge-acquisition lies at the foundation of 
evolutionary processes, both in the biotic world and in socio-cultural settings. But this 
understanding recalls the epistemological and logical problem of induction – going 
back to Hume and further. This problem now becomes equally applicable to such 
ontological questions. The problem of induction together with Popper’s negative 
‘solution’ implies process-Darwinism. Popper’s negative solution inevitably involves 
the denial of induction. Furthermore, if this solution is adopted, the two procedural 
facets – blindness of trials and externality of selection (defining aspects of process-
Darwinism) – necessarily completely account for any process of knowledge 
acquistion. Consistently, advocates of process-Darwinism have advocated that all 
processes of knowledge acquisition are reducible to such Darwinian processes. And 
even the ‘knowledge’ itself does not truly allow to make justified predictions. If we 
belief that the sun will rise tomorrow, this claim only has not been falsified in the past, 
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but – according to falsificationism – this provides us with no increased probability 
whatsoever that the sun will rise in the future as well. Moreover, it follows from such 
a radical eliminative process-reductionism that the existence of other or ‘higher’ 
processes of more rational use of knowledge and more rational ways of knowledge 
acquisition are not possible or causal, but only apparent. 
The third and final point of this chapter concerns objections to these general 
metaphysical foundations of universal Darwinism. Two Darwinian claims are 
considered. The first claim is that knowledge-representations (such as a theory or an 
organism itself) are in principle blind with respect to any new situation, and thus have 
no predictive value. At the base is a facile tautological truism that new situations by 
definition cannot be known beforehand. However, this truism, of course, was never 
the matter under dispute between the Darwinians (or Popperians) and its opponents. 
The decisive question is whether there could be a rational justification for induction, 
and the predictive transfer of knowledge from past to present to future. Despite its 
problems, this second proposition is advocated here. Philosophically, this view denies 
the premise that the problem of induction can only be solved negatively. An 
alternative solution to the old fundamental problem of induction is outlined. 
I advocate – partly elsewere – a knowledge-based use of rational models. This 
involves the justification of the premisses necessary to for any inductive inference (like 
the assumption that the nature of the investigated process does not change during the 
induction) by other inductive inferences. Essentially induction can only take place in a 
knowledge-based way, in a web of knowledge. Our knowledge is fallible justifies 
rational beliefs about the future. Knowledge is acquired a posteriori, but the basic 
standards of rationality are taken to be given a priori, like logic or the probability 
calculus. (I have discussed this knowledge-based solution of the problem of rational 
knowledge use and knowledge acquisition in much more detail in another work.57)  At 
the end of the chapter we come back to the biological debate, clarifying why the 
notion of a replicator (genetic or memetic) is logically at the heart of Darwinism.  
In the second chapter of this Part III, Chapter 7, local process-Darwinian 
approaches are considered – that is, those found in particular disciplines. These 
include the trial-and-error theory of operant conditioning in psychology, Popper’s 
falsificationist approach in philosophy of science, and analogous theories (for 
example, in immunology and economics). The process-Darwinian claim that all 
processes (whether general or in a particular subject-area) are Darwinian needs to be 
distinguished from the actual advocating of the existence of a particular Darwinian 
process. Some objections to Darwinian processes and process-Darwinism, made by 
other authors, are sketched. It is notable in this regard that the adaptationism in 
operant conditioning and falsificationism has been criticised along similar lines as 
some definitions of natural selection. The tautological interpretation of the survival of 
the fittest (if fitness is interpreted in terms of survival) resembles the tautological 
interpretation of the claim that reinforcement increases the probability of the oc-
curance of a behavior (if reinforcement is defined in terms of this this probability). To 
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(2006). 
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be clear, one may well argue with respect to operant conditioning that the cognitive 
turn in psychology has introduced a multitude of processes that replace process-
monism. Finally, it is argued that multi-level process-Darwinism is preferable to gene-
Darwinism, but it is also pointed out that the former still places too strong an em-
phasis on both a universal war of entities and the irreducible blindness of evolution.  
In Part IV the metaphysics of gene-Darwinism and of process-Darwinism is 
criticised. In order to do this, a distinction is made between substance- and 
process-reductionism.  
Chapter 8 discusses different types of substance-reductionism at the heart of 
gene-Darwinism: downward reduction in general, gene-atomism, and 
germ-line reductionism.  
In the first section, it is argued that, for various reasons a thoroughly downward 
reductionist position is an inadequate and incoherent epistemological or ontological 
approach. After exploring the difference between the idea of explanation and the idea 
of downward reduction, the downward reductionist physicalism is criticised partly 
using insights from physics itself. Then several arguments are presented that it is 
impossible to explain a property, apparently given on the level of a system, only by 
referring to its constituent elements and its effects (causa materialis and causa efficiens), 
without making use of notions like form, relation or higher-level explanations. 
Subsequently, it is argued that biological reductionism either needs to adopt a principle 
by which one can stop the reduction at a certain level (like that of single genes) or it 
ends up in physicalism as well. In the former case, the required principle is identified 
as the informational notion of a replicator. But it is then argued that this notion is not 
limited to a particular ontological level. Hence, the argumentation of this section 
suggests the ontological or epistemological reality of different interacting levels.  
In a second section, arguments are presented to counter the claim that gene-
atomism necessarily follows from the meiotic shuffle; whereupon a probabilistic 
understanding of the existence of higher genetic units is developed. In contrast to the 
gene-Darwinian assumption that atomic genes (relatively short bits of DNA) are the 
only units of selection possible, here probabilistic higher-level genes are posited. 
I argue that, under certain conditions, interaction-effects of allele combinations at 
different loci can be evolutionarily stable. On the basis of the latter, I conclude the 
fallacy of claiming gene-atomism in a tautological way. If any stretch of DNA that is 
causally relevant could be defined as a gene (short or long; in one place or distributed 
over many places of the genome), the claim that only single genes are causally relevant 
is worthless, as it yields the empty proposition: “only causally relevant genetic units are 
causally relevant genetic units”. Ironically enough, such tautological arguments may 
have played a vital role in immunising the gene-atomistic research-program. From the 
discussion of higher-level genes expressed intra-individually, we turn to emergent 
genetic properties that may be adaptive inter-individually, being good for a group, a 
gene-pool or a species. In contrast to gene-Darwinism, a spectrum of different ways is 
considered, by which the good of a group may be achieved even on a biological level 
– with and without group selection. What is here called ‘systemic individual selection’ 
is based on interactive effects of genes at several loci of different organisms. Such a 
system, normally based on frequency-dependent fitness-curves, may potentially cause 
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a stabilisation of properties that are good for the group. If such properties are 
generally in place, it is argued, such systems can be stable in the face of egoistic sub-
version in the absence of group selection. My discussion of group selection in struc-
tured populations follows in the wake of E. Sober and D. S. Wilson’s basic model, 
with the added suggestion of how to extend its applicability. Interestingly, the model 
does not require the wiping-out of whole groups, but rather allows for altruism on the 
group level. With regard to the selection of whole groups or species, it is pointed out 
that properties for the good of the group or species may be evolutionarily stable, not 
requiring a permanent selection of whole groups or species, if a regime of systemic 
individual selection is in place. This is the case even if only very few events of group 
selection occur and if these events are not linked. Further to this, ecological wholes 
may be possible as well, which I will outline. Under specific conditions, by a kind of 
ecological selection, they also may be stable, resisting subversion of ‘selfish’ species. 
In a third section, I consider another type of substance-reducationism – germ-line 
reductionism – claiming that phenotypes are mere vehicles of genes. This will be 
criticized, even though the Weismann barrier is accepted as a working-hypothesis. It is 
argued that phenotypes (organisms, groups and populations) are based not only on 
‘information’, but also on ‘exformation.’ Phenotypes, I shall argue, are not reducible to 
the germ-line, but they constrain or direct the pathways evolution could take. They are 
thus regarded evolutionary factors as well. Moreover, I shall posit that these structures 
(or forms) may interact and co-evolve with other morphological structures. In order 
to justify the common-sense conception that phenotypes are in some sense real, new 
terminology is proposed to counter the challenge of gene-Darwinism. In this mainly 
philosophical part, therefore, I will risk introducing some new notions. At first sight, 
this may appear a bit speculative; however, as intimated above, underlying ideas are 
needed in order to refute the much more counterintuitive implications of radical 
germ-line reductionism. These interacting phenotypic structures are treated as proba-
bilistically dependent ‘morphological fields’ that influence each other. In this context 
the above term, ‘ex-formation’ as well as the concept of ‘external memory’ are 
introduced. These notions resonate with some aspects of hylemorphism that 
dominated classical Greek philosophy. Since I shall advocate that the morphology of 
phenotypes (in its broadest sense) is causally relevant, and that exformation (at least in 
a certain limited sense) can be stored outside of the informational germ-line of a 
particular organism, it would be false to consider phenotypes as mere vehicles. 
Although this argument is developed here for the biological stratum, it holds even 
more especially for Homo sapiens sapiens’ second nature – culture. 
Chapter 9 concerns Darwinian process-reductionism and its critique. 
Process monism is taken to be essential to pure gene-Darwinism, process-Darwinism 
and for Darwinism in general. At the beginning of this important chapter, possible 
tautological aspects of Darwinism are discussed. In fact, two process-Darwinian 
tautologies are delineated: one linked with pan-adaptationism and the other with pan-
selectionism. If the idea of ‘survival of the fittest’, if combined with a definition of 
fitness based on survival, this yields a tautological claim (as alluded to earlier in this 
Introduction). Such vacuous understandings may implicitly sometimes have acted as 
an immunization against criticism. Survival of the fittest has often been taken as 
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synonymous to natural selection. Nonetheless, natural selection may be defined in 
non-tautological way.  
I therefore propose a stricter definition of natural selection, purged of all tauto-
logical aspects. The definition, as I have already mentioned, is designed to spot 
changes within the evolutionary mechanism itself. Natural selection is thus strictly de-
fined as a two-step process of blind variation and external elimination. In this one can 
see a scale of approaches between, on the one hand, the strictly Darwinian pole, inter-
preting organisms as passive objects to an unchangeable, blind, wasteful, and external 
law of evolution; and on the other hand, the Lamarckian or Okenian poles, where 
organisms are active agents of a changing, directed, not-wasteful, unfolding evolution. 
If these positions represent only two extremes of a broad spectrum of possibilities, it 
is becomes possible, within that analogy, to counter both of them. This makes clear 
that there is no necessity to embrace a strictly Lamarckian understanding (which ap-
pears largely refuted by biology at least), in order to criticise the claims of a radicalised 
Darwinian or Dawkinsian understanding of biological and cultural evolution. 
Using this stricter, but non-tautological, definition all essential aspects of 
Darwinism and universal Darwinism will be put to scrutiny in this chapter. The 
discussion will deal mainly with biological Darwinism, which is more advanced than 
cultural versions of Darwinism. The sections deal with the claim that (a) 
epistemological processes are variational, (b) variation is blind and (c) selection 
(in the narrow sense) is external. 
First, arguments are provided that sexual reproduction can be understood in part 
as a true synthesis. This challenges the view that sexual reproduction is only 
concerned with variation.  
Secondly, the Darwinian tenet of the blindness of variation is challenged. It is 
argued that one should interpret biological evidence in a way that allows for a kind of 
directed and adapted process of variation – though this process is of course fallible 
and not omniscient. Paradoxically, this follows from pursueing a Darwinian approach 
up to its limits. Darwinism thus again demonstrates that it contains the seeds of its 
own destruction. A further tentative argument will be that certain kinds of adaptive 
variation are plausible reactions to specific environments.  
Thirdly, it is argued that Darwinism interprets selection ultimately to be external 
(natural) and an opportunistic response to the moment. This claim is systematically 
criticised. After refuting a tautological definition of natural selection (in the narrow 
sense), I shall argue that hetero-selection can be supplemented by ‘auto-selection’. It is 
a claim that comes closer to an active understanding of organisms and a truly ‘evolu-
tionary’ understanding of phylogenesis than the originally passive, Darwinian under-
standing of organisms that is taken as being passively adapted to a given environment.  
Finally, it is discussed how evolutionary processes may acquire a momentum and 
‘life’ apart from the evolutionary process by which they were generated. Self-
referentiality, is considered a possible criterion for the emergence of these new 
processes (even if based on previously existing ones), with some examination of the 
problems involved in such a theory.  
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In Chapter 10, the general principle of entity egoism is briefly discussed. Based on 
the foregoing investigation, I propose an alternative approach, which I call 
‘ecological idealism’. 
At the end of this work a more detailed summary is provided, particularly 
focussing on Part IV.  
Part I: Sociobiology and Its Ethical Implications –  
The Cause of  this Investigation 
“We do not have a science of nature, we have a science of our descriptions of nature.” 
 
W. Heisenberg, 1960. 
 
 
The notion of sociobiology seems to refer in a fairly neutral manner to an existing 
subject matter, like, for example, biochemistry. Such a subject matter apparently could 
be defined in several ways. Firstly, it could refer to the science concerned with group 
behaviour (socio) of living beings (bios). Secondly, it could refer to the branch of socio-
logy, which tries to contribute to an explanation of human social behaviour by ana-
lysing its biological or evolutionary basis. Although it would be preferable to use the 
term ‘biosociology’ to refer to the second meaning, to distinguish these two meanings, 
the actual usage of ‘sociobiology’ includes biosociology and sociobiology in the 
narrow sense. Another possible meaning of these terms would be the sociological or 
cultural study of the intellectual background of biology. This issue is largely neglected 
in biology itself and consequently not part of the common definition of sociobiology. 
Here this issue shall be addressed later on ( pp. 203). Besides its rather neutral 
meanings the term ‘sociobiology’ has sometimes been used to denote a school of thought, 
which at this point might be roughly signified by the selfish-gene point of view.  
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In Part 1, Chapter 1 is concerned with a provisional biological characterisation of 
basic aspects of this discipline which were also important in the paradigm and Chapter 
2 considers the explicit or implicit ethical inclinations or implications of sociobiology. 
The part has an introductory character, where we start with sociobiology as it has 
normally been presented in the early decades after the birth of this discipline. 
Philosophical discussions are largely excluded. The implications of radical versions of 
sociobiology are shown to be incoherent with common sense and provide a motive to 
scrutinise the historical, empirical and logical premisses of these implications more 
closely. After we will have explored the historical roots of Darwinism, its sub-
paradigms, and, in particular the current paradigm of gene-Darwinism, it will become 
possible to criticise these premisses.  
The distinction of a subject area on the one hand and a – philosophically more 
interesting but more disputable – paradigm on the other hand entails that not all 
scientists who work in the subject area need to advocate the paradigm. In regard to 
the biosociological application of sociobiology, especially its application to ethics, the 
opinions of biologists indeed diverge as widely as the opinions of philosophers do 
( pp. 41 f., 144 f.). Moreover, although nearly all sociobiologists see the importance 
of gene-level explanations, a relevant portion of sociobiologists are critical or have 
become critical of a purely selfish-gene paradigm. I am here going to present only 
some basic aspects of sociobiology. Later on, I present a more purified paradigm, 
‘gene-Darwinism’ ( pp. 138 f.). A strict definition of gene-Darwinism will allow me 
to argue that the idea of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies may well be inconsistent with 
this paradigm ( p. 39). 
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Chapter 1: 
Sociobiology as Discipline and Paradigm  
The impressive tome Sociobiology, The New Synthesis, published in 1975 by the known 
American entomologist Edward O. Wilson, is often regarded as the first 
comprehensive and eminent manifesto of sociobiology. Earlier Wilson had published 
important works on eusocial hymenoptera (in particular on ants). In Sociobiology he has 
incorporated concepts like kin selection and reciprocal altruism into a generalised 
account of animal and human group behaviour.  
Wilson has in fact been much more guarded in his biological theory than others 
following in his wake. But since he had the term ‘sociobiology’ in a recognised 
textbook and since he started to promulgate central concepts of sociobiology, he is 
one of the main founding fathers of sociobiology (as a discipline).  
However, Wilson has not advocated the selfish-gene paradigm as wholeheartedly, 
as some advocates the ‘paradigm of sociobiology’ which gained dominance in the 
discipline in its early decades.  R. Dawkins has even called Wilson the last advocate of 
‘the old benevolent regime’58. Wilson in turn regards Dawkins approach as 
reductionistic.59 In my opinion, Wilson’s position indeed has to be placed somewhere 
between Dawkins’ radical selfish-gene account and the account of the so-called 
synthetic theory, focusing on population biology and biogeography ( Chapter 4). 
Wilson seems to have wavered between a more reductionistic60 and a more holistic 
view, allowing for the possibility of group selection.61. In contrast to Wilson, Richard 
Dawkins and other spokesmen of the gene-egoistic paradigm have banished that level 
of selection from the realm of scientific respectability.62 Interestingly, Wilson explicitly 
came back to support group-level selection more recently, even with regard to ants 
and termites, which have been taken to be paradigmatic examples for a gene-
Darwinian explanation.63 
Nevertheless, Wilson clearly has layed down a radical biosociological research 
programme, claiming that sociology should be reduced to biology. This idea has 
profoundly influenced sociobiology and its reception in the larger public. Because of 
his claims to ‘biologicize’ culture and even ethics64 and the changes in evolutionary 
                                                     
58  R. Dawkins, The Extended Phenotype (1982/1989), pp. 56, 193. 
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pp. 4, 114-115, 191 f. See also G. C. Williams, Adaptation and Natural Selection (1966). 
E. Voland, Grundriss der Soziobiologie (2000).  
63  E. O. Wilson, Kin Selection as the Key to Altruism: Its Rise and Fall (2005). 
64 E. O. Wilson, Sociobiology (1975), p. 562,  footnote 89. 
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biology, which he at least co-provoked, sociobiology was soon singled out for 
criticism ( pp. 144 f.). But this challenge to other subject areas also inspired inter-
esting new theories for instance in psychology65 or in philosophy66 ( pp. 160 ff.). 
However, there are several founding fathers of sociobiology. The famous British 
biologist and popular science author Richard Dawkins67 is not only the most gifted 
populariser of sociobiological theories, but he also has been much more marked in his 
atomistic zeal than Wilson. He became the true metaphysician of this movement (this 
is truly complementary remark). He was able to distil the gene-Darwinian essence only 
partly visible in early sociobiology. Whereas Wilson adopted the level of single genes 
only as an important level of explanation among others, Dawkins in The Selfish Gene 
(1976) indeed radicalised and purified this approach by advocating the selfish-gene 
view as the one and only type of evolutionary explanation. Many biologists and even 
more non-biologists reading his popular books have followed in Dawkins’ footsteps. 
Although Dawkins based his writings on empirical findings, he mainly contributed to 
the development of theoretical interpretations of these finding. This does not 
diminish his role as leading metaphysician of a particularly reductive approach to 
evolutionary biology. It was Dawkins who took the step to focus completely on the 
concepts of the selfish gene and natural selection.68 
As a third main founding father one may well name the American evolutionary 
biologist George C. Williams’. In Adaptation and Natural Selection (1966), William, 
previous to Dawkins’ The Selfish Gene, advertised the idea that group selection could 
play no significant role in evolution. He clarified that natural selection is the only true 
mechanism of evolution and that one should not misinterprete this blind process as 
being truly progressive (cf. his work on antagonistic pleiotropy). Adaption and Natural 
Selection provides a crucial step in the development of a general selfish-gene paradigm, 
but it lacks the (metaphysical) clarity and radicality of Dawkins’ Selfish Gene. 
Dawkins’ and William’s selfish-gene approach within evolutionary biology 
combined with Wilson’s uncompromising demand to biologise the social sciences and 
ethics moulded sociobiology, at least in its first decades. Whether this mixture of ideas 
is coherent or not, it has become highly influential. Later on I will contrast this ‘new 
synthesis’ with the older ‘evolutionary synthesis’ ( pp. 123 f.) and with classical 
ethology.69 Of course many more authors played a role in the creation of this new 
                                                     
65 E.g., H. Plotkin, Darwin Machines and the Nature of Knowledge (1994). J. H. Barkow, L. Cosmides, J. 
Tooby, The Adapted Mind (1992). D. Buss, Evolutionary Psychology (2004). But see also: D. C. Penn, 
Holyoak, K. J., D. J. Povinelli, Darwin’s Mistake: Explaining the Discontinuity Between Human and 
Nonhuman Minds (2009).  footnote 890 and  pp. 221 f. 
66 E.g., D. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995). 
67  Until 2008 Dawkins has been Professor for the Public Understanding of Science at the 
University of Oxford. 
68 Although Dawkins radically advocates gene-reductionism, he paradoxically has expressed a 
creed of an independence of the cultural – memetic – sphere.188 Interestingly, even the concept 
of the ‘Extended Phenotype’ may not only be interpreted as a radicalisation of this paradigm, 
but in some respects as transcending the replicator-vehicle ideology, see The Extended Phenotype 
(1982/1989), pp. 4 f., 115, 117, Chapter 4, 12, 13. But see also Chapter 3, esp. p. 35. 
69  Cf. E. Voland, Grundriss der Soziobiologie (2000), pp. ix, 65. 
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paradigm. The scientific and popular literature on sociobiology is monumental. 
Likewise, the issues raised by sociobiology have contributed to create an expanding 
field of philosophy of biology. Although I have covered much literature in this book, 
at this point, I confine myself to mention only a few further programmatic writings of 
the publicly most perceived exponents, Dawkins and Wilson: 
Dawkins’ The Selfish Gene (1976) remains the most important biological manifesto of what 
I am going to call ‘gene-Darwinism’. In the The Extended Phenotype (1982), a more 
academic book, he defends his biological positions slightly more guarded and additionally 
works out the concept of the extended phenotype. In The Blind Watchmaker (1986), 
Dawkins has argued in an interesting way that Darwinism is not only actually, but in 
principle, the only possible theory of evolution. Dawkins wrote several further books on his 
specific evolutionary theory or the broader implications of his naturalistic view of life: The 
River Out of Eden (1995), Climbing Mount Improbable (1996), Unweaving the Rainbow 
(1998), A Devil’s Chaplain (2003), The Ancestor’s Tale. A Pilgrimage to the Dawn of 
Evolution (2004), and The God Delusion (2006). I have mainly focused on his three early 
books which have set forth Dawkins biological position most clearly. 
E. O. Wilson’s main early contribution, besides Sociobiology (1975), was Genes, Mind and 
Culture (1981), co-published together with the physicist Charles J. Lumsden. There he 
provides a balanced and detailed mathematical account of the co-evolution of genes and 
culture. Wilson’s most influential book, however, was On Human Nature (1979), where he 
radically favoured a biologistic understanding of human society and culture. Consilience 
(1998) is in my view a much more balanced book. Recently, Wilson published, together with 
B. Hölldobler, a biological work on the sociobiology of insects. The Superorganism: The 
Beauty, Elegance and Strangeness of Insect Societies (2008). 
1.1 Two Basic Postulates 
Within the mainstream of early sociobiology two postulates or presuppositions have 
to be distinguished. They may be considered as the core of the paradigm of 
sociobiology. One may call these presuppositions basic postulates, though often 
implicit, since they are basic starting points of argumentation and normally not 
challenged within the paradigm itself.  
a) The Postulate of ‘Selfish’ Genes as the Only Units of Evolution 
The concept of the ‘selfish gene’ is, in my view, the most central concept of paradigm 
under discussion. Later I shall formulate the closely related concept of ‘gene-
Darwinism’ and I shall unfold this theory in three aspects: gene-atomism, germ-line 
reductionism and Darwinian process monism. Here I only provide a first impression 
of this approach. 
When G. C. Williams launched his attack against group selection in 196670 and 
turned especially against the proposals of V. C. Wynne-Edwards,71 he urged that the 
burden of proof would rest with group selection and that, in fact, apparent group 
                                                     
70  G. C. Williams, Adaptation and Natural Selection (1966). 
71  Wynne-Edwards argued that populations appear to regulate their sizes sometimes to levels well 
below the present environment’s carrying capacity. V. C. Wynne-Edwards, Animal Dispersion in 
Relation to Social Behaviour (1962). 
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adaptations could better be construed in terms adaptations of individuals (or genes). 
Group altruism, he held, was completely reducible to the fitness of entities at a lower 
level. The original notion of fitness, applicable to individuals, has been extended by 
W. D. Hamilton, who introduced inclusive fitness including positive effects on rela-
tives as well. Though Williams argued enthusiastically for explanatory individualism, 
the concept of inclusive fitness had already left an individualist biology behind, 
pointing in the direction of a more radical, sub-individualistic, gene-based evolutionary 
biology. Selection at the genic level appears to explain seemingly cooperative 
behaviour among closely related organisms, whereas “[o]ther apparent examples of 
altruism are explained as misplaced parental behaviour.”72 In some respects, a selfish-
gene viewpoint indeed seems to have been implicitly present in the texts of 
Hamilton73 and R. L. Trivers in particular (but cf.  p. 37 f.). But only Dawkins 
coined and popularised the metaphorical phrase in his book The Selfish Gene, while 
clarifying and radicalising this position.74 
In the postulate of selfish genes it is posited that only single genes, not cooperative 
groups of genes, whole genomes, organisms, or species, are the entities which are 
ultimately selected.75 Single genes, which appear to be the only persisting replicators, 
build up phenotypes. The notion of a phenotype has been extended in a consistent 
and inspiring way, including an organism’s behaviour and its products, like a bower-
bird’s bower or a human’s house.76 In any case, phenotypes (or extended phenotypes) 
are regarded as mere means of the survival of single genes: they are ephemeral 
‘survival machines’77. Accordingly, we humans are regarded to be puppets of our genes, 
which have only the one ‘goal’: the replication of our genes. 
Dawkins, like Williams, dismissed concepts like group selection and group altruism 
as clearly mistaken. According to Dawkins, “‘altruistic groups’ will be over-run by 
selfish individuals”78. Altruistic groups were not evolutionarily stable and hence would 
not evolve. Like “Chicago gangsters, our genes have survived, in some cases for 
millions of years, in a highly competitive world. This entitles us to expect certain 
qualities in our genes. I shall argue that a predominant quality to be expected in a 
successful gene is ruthless selfishness. This gene selfishness will usually give rise to 
selfishness in individual behaviour.”79 
                                                     
72  G. C. Williams, Adaptation and Natural Selection (1966), Table of Contents, Chapter 7. 
73  But Hamilton had not been an exclusive gene-Darwinian, since he, in certain cases, still 
acknowledged group selection. Cf.: E. Sober, D. S. Wilson, Onto Others (1998), p. 42, 
 footnote 1035. 
74  R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (1976/1989). Dawkins generously attributes the founding of this 
view to W. D. Hamilton. But Dawkins mentions that it was he himself who took this approach 
to the limit. Dawkins abandoned even Hamilton’s notion of inclusive fitness, which, as pointed 
out by Dawkins, is still related to the ontological level of the individual. R. Dawkins, Replicator 
Selection and the Extended Phenotype (1978), p. 61 f. 
75 R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (1976/1989), pp. 7, 24f, 33, 39, 40, 55. G. C. Williams, Adaptation 
and Natural Selection (1966), e.g., p. 57. 
76  Idem, The Extended Phenotype (1982/1989). 
77 Idem, The Selfish Gene (1976/1989), pp. 48 ff. 
78 R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (1976/1989), p. 8. 
79 Ibid, p. 2. 
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b) The Postulate of Genic or Biological Determinism 
Many proponents of early sociobiology advocated that organisms, and also human 
beings, were to a great extent (or completely) determined by their competing single 
genes, since they were the only factors systematically controlling man’s biological 
makeup. Consequently, culture is understood as a biological phenomenon as well.  
The reductionism of the selfish-gene account of evolution has reinforced the 
tendency in science and even more in the tabloid press to use terms like ‘gene for 
homosexuality’ in a grossly simplified way. I cannot help but wonder why nobody has 
yet proposed a gene for Darwinism. Stephen Jay Gould turned against the 
reductionism of the selfish-gene paradigm and the suggested genetic determinism, 
instead strengthening the idea of genetic potentiality.80 After having written The Selfish 
Gene, Dawkins actually conceded that his emphasis on single genes, albeit still the only 
ultimate units of selection to him, may have caused misinterpretations. He did not 
intend to deny ontogenetic variability, flexibility and complexity of gene-expressions.81 
Nonetheless, the selfish-gene account of sociobiology has from early on and 
widely been interpreted as a claim that humans and other animals are at least in some 
sense determined by single genes in their general conditions as well as in their special 
inclinations.82 I think that at least in several respects such a charge – or description – 
is justified, because it is essential to Dawkins position, and the later discussed 
paradigm, to treat organisms as mere vehicles of their genes (‘gene machines’)83 and 
because single, selfish genes are claimed to be the only possible units of selection.84 In 
any case, many followers of Dawkins have regarded culture as being a mere part of 
our extended phenotype, again indirectly at the service of selfish genes.85  
Correspondingly, sociobiology from early on has been concerned analysing human 
social behaviour and culture in biological terms. In well pronounced versions, 
sociobiology was explicated as an “uncompromising application of evolutionary 
theory to all aspects of human existence”86. Cultural phenomena are ultimately seen as 
epiphenomena, explainable in purely biological terms, with no own causal power of 
their own. In any case, the have often been taken to be at least indirectly explainable 
in terms of natural selection and the survival of the fittest. For instance, some 
sociobiologists have argued that consciousness is a ‘real but evolutionarily irrelevant 
                                                     
80 E.g., S. J. Gould, Ever since Darwin (1973/1991), pp. 251 f.  
81 R. Dawkins, The Extended Phenotype (1982/1989), pp. 9-29. Cf. R. Dawkins, A Devil’s Chaplain 
(2003/2004), pp. 123-126. 
82 Cf. M. Midgley, Gene-juggling (1979); Selfish Genes and Social Darwinism (1983), pp. 366 f. 
S. J. Gould, Ever since Darwin (1973/1991), pp. 253 f. 
83   Germ-line reductionism pp. 311 f.  
84   Gene-Darwinism in general, pp. 191 f.; on gene atomism in particular, pp. 264 f. 
85  R. Dawkins, The Extended Phenotype (1982/1989). Cf.  Sociobiology and ethics, pp. 41 f. 
Dawkins’ concept of memes may provide a remedy against gene determinism. Nonetheless, 
Dawkins’ pervasive reductionism suggests to interprete memes as mere means of genes on a 
longer leash,  pp. 57 f., footnote 191. 
86 E. O. Wilson, On Human Nature (1978/1995), p. x.  
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property of a system’87. E. O. Wilson has advocated that the basis of our emotions, 
which “are consulted by philosophers who wish to intuit the standards of good and 
evil”, are the hypothalamus and limbic system, which were also formed by natural 
selection.88 Wilson concluded that “the time has come for ethics to be removed 
temporarily from the hands of the philosophers and biologicized.”89 According to 
such a position, “the humanities and social sciences shrink to specialised branches of 
biology; history, biography, and fiction are the research protocols of human ethology; 
and anthropology and sociology together constitute the sociobiology of a single 
primate species.”90  
This war cry of downward reductionism has not been met by all sociobiologists 
with the same enthusiasm, but at least in the first decades after the birth of 
sociobiology, this reductionist spirit has ruled widely perhaps till today. In Chapter 2 
possible ethical consequences of such a paradigm will be considered. Later on, new 
biological developments will be outlined, which may have changed the character of 
sociobiology as a discipline at least to some extend and which, I think, may well 
change it in the future. 
1.2 The Main Theories of the Evolution of Apparent Altruism – 
 Sociobiological Theorems? 
Subsequently, two quite specific theories shall be outlined that are traditionally closely 
related to the core of sociobiology. These theories are often interpreted as explaining 
phenotypic ‘altruism’ in terms of egoism at the genotypic level of the single 
‘selfish’ genes.  
The evolutionary notion of the ‘selfishness’ (Dawkins) or the ‘morality’ of genes (Wilson) is defined 
in a ‘behaviouristic’ sense in terms of outcomes or consequences.91 M. Midgley has objected 
that “Genes cannot be selfish or unselfish, any more than atoms can be jealous, elephants 
abstract or biscuits teleological.”92 I agree that the notion of ‘selfishness’ in its common 
vernacular or psychological usage has a conscious and intentional meaning, whereas in 
evolutionary biology its meaning presupposes a behaviouristic viewpoint and perhaps a 
consequentialist position. Biologists need to be aware of problems of this specific usage of 
the term ‘altruism’.93 Nevertheless, this usage of ‘selfishness’ has its merits and for the 
purpose of the present investigation I adopt it here. 
The theories of kin-selection and of reciprocal altruism had a huge impact on the 
development of sociobiology as a discipline. Moreover, they are often perceived as the 
                                                     
87 H. Mohr, Freiheit und die biologische Natur des Menschen (1984), p. 48. Mohr in fact has regretted this 
result of his analysis. Dawkins appears to hold a similar position. R. Dawkins, Genes and 
Determinism (An Interview  by J. Stangroom) (1998). 
88 E. O. Wilson, Sociobiology (1975), p. 3. 
89 Ibid, p. 562. 
90 Ibid, p. 547.  
91  R. Dawkins, In Defence of Selfish Genes (1981), pp. 557 f. 
92  M. Midgley, Gene-juggling (1979), p. 439; Selfish Genes and Social Darwinism (1983), pp. 368-372, 
 footnote 131. 
93  D. S. Wilson, Definitions of Altruism and Selfishness (1992/1998). E. Sober, What is Evolutionary 
Altruism? (1988/1998), pp. 460-462.  
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two main pillars of the selfish-genes paradigm. The two theories appear to be 
coherent with the ideas that genes are the only units of selection and that phenotypes 
are mere survival machines of these genes. However, please note that an interpretation 
of these theories as only coherent with a selfish-gene paradigm is not uncontroversial.  
First, a genic level of selection does not a priori exclude other levels, and the 
applicability of these two theories of apparent altruism does not exclude that further 
explanations of altrusistic behaviour do not have their share. This may refute a strict 
and universal validity of the selfish gene-paradigm even if these two theories have 
some domain of applicability. Actually many additional biological theories of altruism 
have flourished in recent years ( p. 144 f.).  
Secondly, advocates of a pure selfish-gene paradigm need to treat these theories as 
theorems that are completely reducible to the main postulates of the paradigm. In 
analogy to mathematical usage, theorems are propositions which deductively follow 
from basic mathematical axioms or postulates. Additionally, the theorems need not to 
mean anything above these postulates. Hence, based on the postulates of ‘selfish 
genes are the only existing entities’ and ‘natural selection is the only existing 
evolutionary process’ ( p. 102) one should be able to derive these theorems. 
Moreover, they should add nothing to these postulates (no new emergent properties). 
Hence, the theorems should be reducible eliminatively to these postulates. However, 
this eliminative reduction has been called into question.94 In my opinion, even these 
theories constitute a partly autonomous level of explanation ( following pages and 
pp. 138 f., 215 f.). It even may be possible to turn the force of these theories, often 
taken as supporting the reductionism of the selfish-gene paradigm, against this 
paradigm itself. Such move may appear peculiar, but it would for instance resemble 
the use of Mendelian genetics as as a central plank of Darwinism, although Mendelism 
had been built as bulwark against Darwinism in the first place ( cf. pp. 255 f., 399). 
In the next two sections I do not dwell on these issues in any great detail, but 
mainly introduce the theories as if they were theorems exclusively based on the basic 
postulates of the selfish-gene paradigm.  
a) The Theory of Kin Selection 
The wording ‘kin selection’ was coined by the influential English biologist J. Maynard 
Smith95, but the formalised concept had been developed earlier by W. D. Hamilton.96 
The appealing, basic idea of the theory of kin selection is that it has an equal survival 
value for a gene to ‘support’ an identical other gene as to ‘support’ itself. 
By supporting another organism, the information a gene has, does not survive in 
the gene itself but in the copy present in that organism ( p. 255). This ‘altruism’ can 
be evolutionarily stable, because the gene which has been helped to survive will still 
carry the information to ‘help’ its identical copy. 
                                                     
94  See: E. Lloyd, The Structure and Confirmation of Evolutionary Theory (1988/1994), pp. 86 f. 120 f. 
E. Sober, D. S. Wilson, Onto Others (1998). 
95 J. Maynard Smith, Group Selection and Kin Selection (1964), pp. 1145-1147. 
96  W. D. Hamilton, The Evolution of Altruistic Behaviour (1963); The Genetical Evolution of Social 
Behaviour (1964). 
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Normally this idea is only applied to directly related organisms. The probability of 
an organism to pass on a particular gene to one’s decendant, and hence the probability 
that this organism shares this gene with this descendant, is normally expressed by the 
coefficient of biological relatedness, the so-called kin-coefficient r.  See Figure 1 for 
details. Diploid organisms, like humans, have two copies of each chromosome in each 
(or almost each) cell, one from the mother and one from the father. Hence, for 
diploid organisms there is generally a probability of 50% for genes that parents pass 
them on to their direct descendants. There is only a probability of 25% that these 
genes are found in grandchildren, and so on.  
Behaviour which is phenotypically altruistic can, according to this theory, only 
spread within a population if the following inequality, named after the biologist 
William D. Hamilton97, is fulfilled: 
c1 < r1,2 × b2 
 
For an ‘altruistic’ organism (1) the costs (c) have to be lower than the benefit (b) for an 
organism which receives help (2), multiplied by the probability for the genetic 
relatedness of the two organisms (r).98 Dawkins, as advocate of a radical selfish-gene 
view of evolution, consistently proposed to give up the term ‘kin selection’ and 
advocating the reducibility of kin selection to gene selection. “If we accept neo-
Darwinian gene-selectionism, kin selection necessarily follows.”99  
Opposed to Dawkins, for instance, E. O. Wilson discusses the theory of kin selection even 
under the heading of group selection.61 Though largely ignored by gene-Darwinians, also 
Hamilton himself in his later publications rather tended to a multilevel interpretation of his 
concept of inclusive fitness.100 
b) The Theory of Reciprocal ‘Altruism’ 
The second biological theory explains apparent ‘altruistic’ behaviour as based on the 
old idea of reciprocity, now applied to evolutionary biology. Robert L. Trivers coined 
the term ‘reciprocal altruism’.101 The theory posits that behaviour which is pheno-
typically ‘altruistic’ can only evolve, if the altruist also profits by it. An ‘altruistic’ indi-
vidual or gene will only survive, if it finally supports other individuals or genes 
‘in order to’ support itself. 
Axelrod and Hamilton have shown convincingly that, under certain conditions, 
reciprocal ‘altruism’ may evolve and will not easily be invaded by organisms or genes 
with ‘cheating’ strategies.102 Reciprocal altruism is hence, under certain mathematical 
                                                     
97 W. D. Hamilton, The Genetical Evolution of Social Behaviour (1964), pp. 1-16, 17-32. 
98 E.g., E. Voland, P. Winkler, Aspekte der Hominisation aus Sicht der Soziobiologie (1990). 
99  R. Dawkins, Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype (1978), pp. 62, 67,  footnotes 579, 859. 
100  W. D. Hamilton, Innate Social Aptitudes in Man (1975).  footnote 1035. 
101 R. L. Trivers, The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism (1971), pp. 35-57. 
102  R. Axelrod, W. D- Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation (1981), 1390-1391. Cf. R. Axelrod, The 
Evolution of Cooperation (1984). Confer models going beyond reciprocial altruism, e.g., R. L. Riolo, 
M. D. Cohen, R. Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation Without Reciprocity (2002) ( cf. p. 144 f.). 
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preconditions, an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) – a concept generally introduced  
by Maynard Smith.103 This theory has often been used to explain apparent human 
altruism or some cases of animal altruism that cannot be explained by kin selection 
(e.g., food sharing in vampire bats). 104  
                                                     
103  J. Maynard Smith, Evolution and the Theory of Games (1982). See e.g., the concise overview of 
A. Rosenberg, Altruism (1992/1998), pp. 453-458. 
104  E.g., E. Voland, Grundriss der Soziobiologie (2000). 
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Figure 1: The kin-coefficient r plays a central role in the theory of kin selection. r is a measure of 
the relatedness of two organisms. From the ‘gene’s viewpoint’ the r values reflects the probability of 
a gene being present in another organism (actually assuming that the parents of an organism share 
no genes at all). The figure is valid for diploid organisms (like human beings). The thickness of the 
arrows indicates the probability for a gene of the focused organism (‘I’) to be transferred in a 
process of replication by specific relatives (Cf. R. Alexander. Darwinism and Human Affairs, 1979). 
 
Part I. Chapter 1: Sociobiology as Discipline and Paradigm 40 
In my opinion, one may well doubt whether the concepts of ESSs and specifically 
of reciprocal altruism can smoothly be integrated into a radical selfish-gene view, as 
adherents of the selfish-gene paradigm propose: 
The concept of an ESS may even support the approach of emerging evolutionary 
mechanisms advocated here. The evolution of an ESS, for instance of reciprocal altruism, 
needs certain non-reducible preconditions beyond the existence of mere selfish genes. 
Besides, for example, the ability to ‘recognise’ co-operators, a minimum proportion of genes 
need to be in place from the outset so that the strategy of reciprocal altruism may become 
dominant. These starting conditions may be caused by mechanisms on the population level 
( pp. 130 f.). Moreover, an ESS could itself be interpreted as a mechanism working on the 
level of the population. The frequency dependence of an ESS implies that an individual 
strategy depends on what the majority of the population is doing. But if a population 
determines the individual gene and not vice versa, it become inappropriate to claim that 
evolution is only the result of single genes and not the result of properties of gene pools as 
well ( also pp. 246 f., 264 f.). This view is in accordance with J. L. Mackie, who interpreted 
the concept of an ESS as an irreducible mechanism in its own right.105 Although Maynard 
Smith, according to autobiographic notes, has increasingly tended to a reductionist 
interpretation of his work, he remained open for a more holistic approach and, I speculate, 
if not pressed to decide between reductionism and holism, Maynard Smith would prefer a 
middle course.106 I agree with Mackie that even such a moderate interpretation of EESs, 
would be critical to Dawkins’ strictly gene-Darwinian interpretation. 
In any case, proponents of a pure selfish-gene paradigm need to claim that these 
theories are completely reducible to the idea of single selfish genes. Additionally, all 
forms of apparent ‘altruistic’ behaviour need to be explainable by such theorems. 
                                                     
105  J. L. Mackie, Law of the Jungle: Moral Alternatives and Principles of Evolution (1978), pp. 460-463.  
106 See: J. Maynard Smith, Shaping Life (1998), pp. 42-45. 
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Chapter 2: 
Ethical Implications – The Morality of the Gene? 
Many – albeit not all – influential sociobiologists have explicitly drawn, or have been 
inclined to draw ethical, political, and religious conclusions from the view that single 
selfish genes were the only ultimate basis of biology, culture and ethics. The historical 
and systematical investigation in the main part aims to unveil the biological and meta-
physical inadequacy of the simplistic genetic and cultural reductionism of the outlined 
paradigm. This preparatory chapter only provides further motives for such an inve-
stigation, arguing that the outlined biological paradigm would yield insatisfactory re-
sults even if one managed to biologize ethics based on a ‘morality of the selfish gene’.  
As mentioned, Wilson in his foundational monumental tome Sociobiology has 
claimed prominently that ethics ought to become ‘biologicized’.107 ‘The Morality of 
the Gene’, the title of the first chapter of that book, became the credo of a bio-ethical 
research programme. In the next generation of sociobiologists many followed in his 
wake, indeed aiming to remove ethics from the hands of the philosophers. 
Additionally, his followers, coherent with the selfish gene paradigm in sociobiology 
often skipped Wilson’s reference to the possibility of a true ‘benevolent’ altruism 
within species and aimed to posit a purified morality of selfish genes.108 
First, I shall address some basic problems of any biologization of ethics, 
considering the relation of biology and ethics. Secondly, some actual proposals how 
moral, ethics or religion may be biologised will be sketched. It appears these proposals 
often make use of concepts from different philosophical traditions that are not 
coherent with pure gene-Darwinism. Thirdly, I try to develop a proposal for a more 
truly gene-Darwinian moral or ethics based on the idea of the selfish gene. Then I 
shall extend this proposal by taking the concept of memes seriously. However, even for 
this account the outlined reductionistic paradigm seems to lead to results that appear 
to fall short of most traditional ethics. Assuming that consistency is a general 
epistemological virtue, one should not only optimise top-down-consistency (here the 
consistency of ethics with biology), but overall consistency involving bottom-up 
consistency as well (here the consistency of biology with ethics). There is no a priori 
reason to think that evidence at some lower level is to be preferred to that at some 
higher level. The inconsistency between many implications of the idea of a radically 
biologised ethics and basic ideas of most – traditional and current – ethical systems 
provides us with another motive for investigating whether it is possible to construct a 
less reductive biology that may leave a possibility of true altruism and of an autonomy 
of evolutionary and cultural processes that may go beyond natural selection. After this 
we embark on a historical and systematic journey in search of an alternative biological 
and metaphysical view of life. 
                                                     
107  E. O. Wilson, Sociobiology (1975), p. 562,  footnote 89. E. O. Wilson, On Human Nature 
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2.1 Biology and Ethics: Different but Not Unrelated 
There is a growing debate on the role of evolutionary arguments in ethics not only in 
popular science but in philosophy as well.109 On the one hand, biologizing ethics 
seems to be an impossible task. At least any philosophy of nature that is not ethical 
from the outset will not be able to formulate an ethics, which, by definition, goes 
beyond what is factually given. On the outher hand, evolution seems to provide at 
least the basis for our actual moral attitudes. 
First of all, there is clearly some kind of difference between descriptive and 
prescriptive claims or propositions. This respectable old idea seems to be part of the 
philosophia perennis. In the last century, G. E. Moore has prominently emphasised the 
distinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’. In his Principia Ethica he radicalised the objection 
of his teacher H. Sidgwick against Spencer’s naturalistic ethics110, and firmly opposed 
any ‘naturalistic fallacy’ (even Sidgwick’s hedonism).111 Moore argued with logical 
rigour that the predicate good could not be reduced to any other term, like more evolved, 
or pleasure. To him being good is simple, unanalysable and indefinable.112 Moore 
considers any definition of good by another notion a naturalistic fallacy. Even if one 
argues that the very logic of moral statements entails that they instruct our actual 
behaviour (cf. precriptivist positions, like R. M. Hare’s), we cannot argue the other 
way around that our moral and ethical statements were mere summaries of actual 
behaviour. From a descriptive ‘is’ premises it is not possible to draw prescriptive 
‘ought to’ conclusions. The traditional separation between descriptive and prescriptive 
claims reaches back to I. Kant’s113 – and already D. Hume’s114 – distinction of 
Praktischer Vernunft and Theoretischer Vernunft (practical and theoretical reason) and 
might be ultimately traced back to Descartes ( pp. 73 f.). Likewise, it is 
psychologically evident that people distinguish between the use of normative and 
descriptive rules.115  
Even in Antiquity, philosophers distinguished is and ought, but it should be noted 
that advocates of the philosophical traditions of natural law (like Plato, Aristotle, or 
Aquinas) saw the ‘nature’ of man (not meant biologically, but rather teleologically) to 
be good. Man naturally strives to be good or, in other words, to be close to God. 
Hence, human nature was conceived to be ethical itself.116 Alasdair MacIntyre has 
argued forcefully that only an ontology, which is not devoid of values and teleology, 
                                                     
109  G. Kahne. Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (2010).  
110 G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (1903/1994), pp. 113 f. Cf. R. J. Richards, Darwin and the Emergence 
of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior (1987), pp. 322 f. 
111 G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (1903/1994), directly on Spencer sections 29-35, on Sidgwick 
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112 Ibid, sections 5-14, 23-24. 
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Kant in his Critique of Judgement tried to unify the separated parts of reason. ( already p. 78.) 
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115 E.g., M. von Sydow, Testing Descriptive or Prescriptive Conditionals and Differential Effects of Frequency 
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allowed for proper formulation of ethics.117 In any case, the hyle-morphistic 
philosophy influential in ancient Greece posited that a kind of ultimate good (or at 
least a good that is intrinsic to a particular situation) can be found in the factually 
given. Nonetheless, the ancients would have agreed with Moore that we cannot simply 
identify the term ‘good’ with what we would today call the factually given, since this 
would render ethics completely affirmative and vacuous.118  
In philosophy several different approaches to ethics have been developed over the 
centuries. One may distinguish three main types. A Platonic type of ethics (which in 
its general outlook may well differ strongly from Plato’s own ethical proposals) 
searches for ultimate and eternal ethical forms or ideas (eidos) objectively underlying 
the factual being. There is a Kantian type of ethics that aims to ground ethics in 
necessary rational principles, again advocating general necessity, but rather emphasing 
categorical consequences of following the internal demands of reason than that of an 
external ethical reality. A third type, which one might perhaps call Aristotelian type, is 
not concerned with eternal ‘ethical forms’ found outside of matter, but with forms or 
laws arising from matter itself. Another related class may be called romantic or 
historical type. This type aims to discover prescriptive assertations that are 
normatively valid only relative to a given system or a given time, not eternal ethical 
laws. So this class can normally be understood as a specification of the Aristotelian 
type. But note, ethical claims are assumed to be necessarily valid in a particular 
historical (or evolutionary) context even such an approach will inherit at least some 
aspects of the Platonic tradition. Hence, reminiscent of neo-Platonism, this approach 
may be concerned with the emanation or ‘revelation’ of eternal ethical truth in time. 
In any case, all these approaches to ethics go beyond the investigation of factual moral 
beliefs. They aim for consistency and, if they should not only vacuously reiterate that 
we should behave like we do behave, any ethical system has to transcend what is 
factually given by definition. 
Additionally, independently of whether ethical values are judged to be eternal 
truth, truth a priori, or only necessary in a given context, our knowledge about ethics 
clearly has developed the course of time. In my view, all formulations of ethics, 
whether they follow Plato, Aristotle, Kant, ulititarianism, or intuitivism are and need 
to be preliminary. In this respect our understanding of ethics resembles our 
conception of physics or even mathematics. Even if we aim at finding eternal truth 
our understanding remains necessarily incomplete. Otherwise, no further 
investigations would be needed. 
It is known beyond reasonable doubt that the human species, in one way or 
another, has evolved from ‘simple origins’. This is the case, even if one may well argue 
that these simple origins in some sense involved the potency or at least the possibility 
of all the visible complexity today. Hence there might be some kind of hidden 
complexity in these simple origins from the outset. Likewise, and perhaps 
counterintuitively atoms of silicon in some way need to comprise the possibility that 
semiconductors could be made out of them, otherwise silicon semiconductors would 
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not be possible ( 248 f.). But even if it may well be possible to formulate or uphold 
a metaphysics emphasising this hidden and successively explored or revealed 
complexity, ‘simple origins’ cannot be denied today. But if this is accepted, Moore’s 
defence of the autonomy of ethics against naturalism may paradoxically turn against 
ethics as such. If one assumed that the account of evolutionary beginnings only 
involves descriptive propositions and if every change could be reduced to simple 
evolutionary mechanisms, how should one ever derive prescriptive conclusions? 
Although Moor’s convincing warnings against naturalistic fallacies have to be taken 
seriously, in my view, ‘is’ and ‘ought’  need to be reconstructed in a way that avoids 
their complete separation. Ethics and ontology may at least be related because they are 
sometimes unified by a common underlying metaphysics.  
The evolutionary and historical record makes clear that the ‘ought’ – or at least the 
knowing of the ‘ought’ – was not always given or obvious, but has at least in some 
sense come into being (assuming a perspective of mortals). In this sense, the 
endeavours to build an evolutionary ethics may not necessary deny the ethical 
perspective from the outset, but they may (partly) be driven by the genuine demand to 
reconstruct ethics (or moral behaviour) in an obviously evolving world. Corres-
pondingly, some supporters of evolutionary ethics have argued that the boarder 
between normative and descriptive proposition may not be impermeable. For 
example, Vollmer has made clear that facts inform us which ethical statements are 
possible.119 Obviously, and coherent with modal logics, one cannot ethically demand 
what is biologically, physically or logically impossible. Moreover, even critics of the 
sociobiological paradigm concede that philosophers “cannot really complain if 
somebody tries to fill the vacuum they leave”120. Currently, much interdisciplinary 
research in philosophy, sociobiology, biology and psychology is taking place on the 
human origin of morals and the intuitive basis of moral thought.121 Although 
empirical research on this issue might tend to ignore problems like the naturalistic 
fallacy, it may help to reveal the essentially ethical character of human nature. That 
such a moral animal evolved in turn may shed light on evolution. 
However, disappointingly the originally demanded biologisation of ethics by 
sociobiology was often not intended to be a mutually inspiring interdisciplinary 
research programme. Instead it was often intended to be a hostile takeover of ethics 
by evolutionary biology. The very ethical question whether moral (or immoral) 
leanings should be taken as ethical norms (which could have substantial normative 
implications beyond the tautological claim that ‘morals should be like morals are’). 
Instead biologization has widely been understood as a war cry that a particular 
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biological paradigm and its basic principles should be the only basis to understand 
human culture, including ethics. 
The ethical ‘implications’ of any biological paradigm are difficult to access, since 
they depend not only on how we define this paradigm, but on  our ontological, 
metaphysical, and ethical framework as well. This framework may differ individually 
or collectively, and it has been moulded in a long and complicated historical process 
of learning, reflection and discussion. Nonetheless, the situation may appear radically 
simpler from the viewpoint of the outlined biological position. Accordingly, one has 
to give up the universes of old unwarranted ideas and build a system of ethics 
completely from sketch, based exclusively on the advocated biological basis.  
2.2 Philosophical Reactions and Some Accounts of a ‘Sociobiological Ethics’  
Several sociobiologists and philosophers of biology recoil from drawing ethical or 
moral conclusions from their biological theory and have resisted Wilson’s harsh claim 
that ethics should become a branch of evolutionary theory. Perhaps, the ethical impli-
cations of the pure selfish-gene paradigm may appear too much in contradiction with 
ethical common sense. For example, would there be any reason to care for the bodily 
or mentally incapable? Many philosophers regard the claim that ethics is a branch of 
evolutionary biology as too absurd to merit a considerable response. Even P. Singer, 
although indeed advocating a biologically informed ethics, has actually dissociated 
himself from approaches that aim to bridge the “gap between facts and values”122.  
Similarly, Dawkins, a main proponent of the selfish-gene paradigm, states “I am 
not advocating a morality based on evolution”. He has explicitly distanced himself 
from “elevating meanness and selfishness to the status of ideology”.123 I may well 
believe that Dawkins personally embraces this position, but it remains highly 
questionable how far he is justified to argue in this way, based on his own utterly 
reductionistic view of life ( cf. Section 2.4). Dawkins’ high-profile polemics against 
any form of religion – whether true or not – takes his own selfish-gene paradigm as 
unquestionable explanans to account for phenomena like religion. These phenomena 
are taken to be only epiphenomenal explananda, bereft of their own explanatory or 
normative power.124 In this perspective, however, it becomes questionable why moral 
behaviour should be exempted from being reducible to the only ultimate ultra-
Darwinian explanation: natural selection among selfish genes.   
But what does such a biologization of ethics actually imply? The long and 
controversial history of evolutionary ethics, not necessarily based on the same 
assumptions about ontology, metaphysics and evolutionary biology, has provided a 
manifold of different answers to this question (confer, for instance, the work of 
H. Spencer, J. Huxley, or P. T. de Chardin). Here I only outline some responses to the 
more recent demand of a ‘sociobiologization’ of ethics. 
Heated disputes concern the biological premisses of the early ‘sociobiological 
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123 R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (1976/1989), pp. 2, 267-268. 
124  R. Dawkins, The God Delusion (2006).  
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paradigm’ as well as the way ethical conclusions are drawn from this paradigm.125 At 
this point I will not get involved with the debates on the biological paradigm, since 
most of this book is concerned with this issue. I here only mention criticism by some 
philosophers. While several philosophers ignored the sociobiological paradigm, others 
met it with a broad range of criticism. This spectrum ranges from approaches 
favouring completely different philosophies of nature – often linked to ‘continental’ 
philosophy – to the detailed analysis of problems of Darwinism or the selfish-gene 
paradigm – often linked to approaches related to ‘analytical’ philosophy. Robert 
Spaemann and Reinhard Löw, for instance, have formulated a neo-Aristotelian, or 
even neo-Thomistic critique of Darwinian biology, involving a harsh criticism of the 
early sociobiological paradigm and even of Darwinism in general. They have 
demanded a rehabilitation of a teleological view of nature.126 Likewise, Alaistair 
MacIntyre has argued that a revival of Neo-Aristotelianism may contribute to solve 
fundamental problems of the ‘is-ought’ dichotomy inherent to the enlightenment 
metaphysics.127 Hans Jonas has advocated that a theory of evolution, if it should lead 
to acceptable ethical results, must incorporate the concept of freedom from the 
outset.128 Michael Weingarten criticised the passive understanding of organisms as 
mere vehicles and tried to reinterpret organisms as creative, form-giving evolutionary 
agents.129 Anthony O’Hear and Thomas Nagel have objected to the reductionism of 
the selfish-gene paradigm and have bolstered the classical argument that the second 
nature of man is to overcome his biological first nature.130  
Closer to the actual biological debates, Mary Midgley, who has always emphasized 
the evolutionary nature of man, was among the first critics who trenchantly resisted 
the claim to biologise ethics along the egoistic lines of the selfish-gene paradigm.131 
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Journal of Philosophy Midgley in Gene-juggling (1979) formulated one of the most acrimonious 
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Since then philosophy of biology has provided many careful and detailed analyses of 
several aspects of this paradigm.132 The selfish-gene paradigm sparked (or fired) many 
debates in the intersection of biology and philosophy, for instance, concerning the 
units of selection, the nature of altruism, the definition of Darwinism, the meaning of 
adaptation, the relation of form and function, and the notion of progress. Although 
some criticism may have been formulated in an ill-considered way, it appears mistaken 
to me to dismiss all criticism as a reaction of those who were “over-excited by political 
misunderstanding”133. I shall come back to some of these topics later on 
(e.g.,  pp. 144 f.). 
We now return to the question, how some main supporters of the early 
sociobiological paradigm have actually proceeded in formulating a biologized evolu-
tionary ethics. I content myself to briefly outline three influential works, excluding 
works based on classical ethology or group selectionism, like those by R. Richards or 
F. de Waal, stressing the plausibility of true altruism within species.134 However, it will 
become clear that even the mentioned works are all not exclusively tied to the selfish-
gene paradigm. They all make use of an enriched biological basis or of common-sense 
considerations not fully justified by the advocated biological paradigm. 
 
(1) In his influential book The Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology Peter Singer 
largely accepted the outlined ontological commitments of early sociobiology.135 Later 
he argued (reminiscent of Moore) that facts and values are unbridgeable. Moreover, he 
claimed that ethical decisions would still have to be based on reason and they could 
only be additionally informed by sociobiology.136 
Although I do share Singer’s belief in a partial autonomy of reason, I think that 
this conviction could not be warranted solely on the basis of the outlined paradigm.137 
To the contrary, if the reductionism of this paradigm was taken seriously, it would be 
more plausible to deny any autonomy of reason. It would be more in line with this 
kind of evolutionary approach to treat ‘reason’ as a mere adaptation to an external 
                                                                                                                                 
own account has been based on the work of the Nobel laureates K. Lorenz and N. Tinbergen, 
who have regarded truly altruistic behaviour a usual inner-specific trait (Beast and Man, 
(1978/1995), pp. xv, 19, 23, 138, cf. The Ethical Primate (1994/1995), pp. 130-132). She 
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132  E.g.,: D. L. Hull, M. Ruse (Eds.), The Philosophy of Biology (1998). C. Allen, M. Bekoff, G. Lauder 
(Eds.), Nature’s Purposes. Analyses of Function and Design in Biology (1998). D. S. Bendall (Ed.), 
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134 R. J. Richards, Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior (1987). F. de Waal. Primates and 
Philosophers: How Morality Evolved (2006). Critically cf. M. Ruse, Evolutionary Ethics (1995), pp. 273-
280. 
135 But P. Singer mentioned the possibility of group selection. Expanding Circle (1981), pp. 18-22.  
136 Ibid., pp. 77, 90 f. 
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environment at the service of egoistic genes, neither committed to an inner 
consistency nor to the traditional norms of logic or ethics.138 
Singer gives an example of the autonomous decision of foster parents to bring up children 
from a poor economic and social background (pp. 170 f.). A photo of these children may 
indeed mobilise our tribal instincts. According to the outlined paradigm the emotional 
inclinations to help people have evolved in groups of very close relatives. At first it may 
seem possible to build a more universally orientated ethics on such basic tendencies. But 
foster parents who had become adherents of gene-Darwinism, would, I think, abandon their 
benevolent views. Understanding themselves now as ‘gene machines’ they would come to 
the conclusion that their former impulse to help these poor children does not lead to the 
maximal reproduction of their own genes. So why should they trust their ‘misled feelings’? 
Thinking of cuckoos in the nest is not motivating to continue the involvement as foster 
parents.  
However we evaluate this example, Singer clearly bases his moral judgments not only 
on sociobiological premisses but on premisses from other traditions. But if genes built 
the only relevant ontological stratum, rationality would be part of the organismic 
vehicle serving nothing but the replication of selfish genes. In this framework any true 
independence of reason seems impossible. No ‘logic of justice’ would be able to 
mould rationality, but it would only be influenced by the selfish interests of competing 
genes. In difference to Singer, I advocate that the possibility of emergent and indepen-
dent properties needs to be build already into the core of our ontology ( Part IV).  
 
(2) Michael Ruse has reasonably argued that Darwinism, and especially the sketched 
sociobiological paradigm, has to be taken seriously.139 Ruse in principle allowed for 
explanatory levels above genes and he even admitted that the ‘overall perspective of 
sociobiologists’ has hidden metaphysical or ideologically commitments towards 
methodological reductionism. Nonetheless, in several works he adopted a stance in 
favour of an exclusive focus on genic selection, since this had turned out to be a 
highly fruitful scientific strategy.140 To Ruse the advocacy of group selectionist 
models, on the other hand, was linked to a cultural bias.141 In some writings, Ruse 
indeed claimed to be an ‘ultra-Darwinian’, who takes “adaptation to be the all-
pervasive fact” and “natural selection to be the beginning and the end of 
causation”.142 Ruse advocated that “ethics is an adaptation, put in place by our genes 
as selected in the struggle for life, to aid each and every one of us individually”.143 
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There is neither an ideal mathematical moral truth nor an “extrasomatic moral truth”. 
Instead “moral premises [...] are the result of an idiosyncratic genetic history”. Hence, 
ethics would be “without justification” and a “collective illusion of our genes”.144  
Although Ruse in these writings seems to be one of the most thorough advocates 
of applying the outlined biological paradigm to ethics, he sometimes moderated his 
position. Ruse argued that “biology shows that internal moral premises do exist”, they 
would be feelings about ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, which “in fact brought about by ultimately 
biological processes.”145 Ruse even argued that on this basis a universal moral might 
be build, which forbids killing and even commands to love your neighbour as your-
self.146 In my view, such strong ethical claims could not be warranted, given that Ruse 
would truly base ethics solely on the outlined selfish-gene paradigm, exclusively cen-
tred around egoistic survival. A thorough ‘gene-Darwinian’ would have to argue that a 
benevolent attitude towards groups does today not serve ones gene’s survival – as we 
do not live in groups of close relatives – and hence nothing would speak against 
dropping this attitude (apart from hypocrisy). In a slightly different context, Ruse 
actually stated that it will weaken our morality, if we find out that the genes have only 
deceived us by letting us think hat there is an objective morality.147 Ruse might have 
noticed this problem, since in Evolutionary Ethics (1995) he seems to have modified his 
biological position. Although still favouring adaptationism, he seems in some passages 
to have become a constructivist with remaining Darwinian leanings, stressing not the 
adaptation of evolutionary lines to an external environment, but an inner dynamics of 
the communities themselves.148 I share this view, but I think it is in contradiction to 
strict gene-Darwinism and even to the core of what is known today as Darwinism 
( pp. 102, 358 f.). Ruse, who is historically versed, has often described the essence 
of Darwinism to be ‘natural selection’.149 Corresponding to this definition, I think that 
Ruse, even in the mentioned works, has adopted an extended biological basis too. 
 
(3) In Darwin’s Dangerous Idea Daniel C. Dennett has elaborated a radically Darwinian, 
and even Dawkinsian, philosophy of nature. Nonetheless, in some passages he warned 
us that some authors may overemphasise biological determinism.150 However, 
Dennett ultimately favoured a Darwinian explanation of our biological and cultural 
being and he has committed himself to the reductionist selfish-gene approach. He 
concluded that there is “no denying, at this point, that Darwin’s idea is a universal 
solvent, capable of cutting right to the heart of everything in sight.”151 Consistently, 
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Dennett has applied this reductive Darwinian approach to different fields, aiming to 
‘break the spell’ of popular delusions of consciousness, morality, or religion.152 In the 
chapter The Evolution of Moral Agency Dennett has provided an evolutionary explanation 
of seemingly moral behaviour in terms of gene egoism, stressing that in evolution the 
welfare of others is never an end in itself 153. However, similar to Darwin’s 
moderation when writing his Decent of Men ( p. 112), Dennett appears to be more 
moderate when concerned with moral agency. He seems to have emphasised 
phenotypically altruistic behaviour and even conceded that based on some refined 
models people may demonstrate a firm moral commitment (although they should 
always profit from it at least indirectly). At some point I have almost been 
disappointed that I might loose a valuable intellectual opponent (any antithesis may 
lose its zest, if the original thesis gets less extreme). Indeed Dennett considered long-
term orientation of self-interests (despite the myopia of Darwinian evolution), he 
based central arguments on ‘design choice’ (although this and ‘constraints’ have been 
anathema to ultra-Darwinsm). Finally, he provided an account of the evolutionary 
stability of a selective kind of altruism (which I would describe as a partly autonomous 
process, different from natural selection or – more generally – external selection). In 
my view, such proposals are indeed worth pursuing, but they clearly go beyond the 
original selfish-gene paradigm.154 Hence, the closer Dennett had come to address 
questions of moral judgments, the more distant he got from the reductionist biological 
paradigm he had embraced at the outset. Dennett’s proposal in this chapter does not 
claim to provide any ethics, but it is obvious that such ‘descriptive theories’ have 
effects on moral behaviour. Many will be inclined to combine such proposals with the 
old ethical postulate that we ought to live according to our true nature – an idea 
influential through the millennia at least since Plato. But if one reintroduced this 
valuable idea, moral agents (phenotypes) would not be inspired to continue on their 
path of virtue, since the phenomena are here woven in a narrative concerned with 
selfishness and reductionism. Acting according ones true nature would mean to act as 
a prudent egoist and to overcome the vestiges of misled moral intuitions and moral 
norms like Kant’s categorical imperative. Hence, although Dennett’s brings this 
paradigm to its limit, and even beyond, his general advocacy of this paradigm, in my 
view, contributes to destructing not only naïve common-sense religion, but 
enlightened ethics as well. 
 
In conclusion, even apparent proponents of a biologization of the humanities appear 
to use biological or philosophical concepts which go beyond strict gene-Darwinism 
( pp. 138, 215). Before analysing the historical background of this paradigm and 
before explicitly challenging this paradigm, I shall try to develop a proposal how a 
                                                     
152 Idem, Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon (2006); Freedom Evolves (2006). 
153 Idem, Freedom Evolves (2006), Chapter 7. 
154  In my opinion some proposals (like true altruism between altruists, a tendency to overcome 
blindness, a central role of constraints, or the existence of autonomous processes) are worth 
considering. However, such proposals should not be formulated as ad hoc claims to explain an 
anomaly, but require a reformulation of core aspects of the discussed paradigm. See Part III and 
IV.  
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biologization of ethics would actually look like if it was truly only based on two central 
notions of the investigated paradigm, the selfish gene and natural selection. 
2.3 The Moral of the Gene? – 
‘The Currency Used in the Casino of Evolution Is Survival’ 
How would a biologization of morality or ethics look like that is exclusively based on 
the outlined biological paradigm? Intuitively one may think of proposals close to 
common sense: rehabilitation of reproduction as important value, acknowledgment of 
differences in dominant sexual strategies of the sexes, acknowledgement of the family 
as a central place of cooperation155, or an acknowledgment of the continuity between 
animals and humans. Such, perhaps helpful, proposals may indeed be inspired by 
some interesting results of sociobiology. But this will not be sufficient if the outlined 
paradigm informs ethics only with some supplementary facts. Instead the outlined 
paradigm would have to replace other traditions of ethics, because its formulation 
does not allow for anything above biology that is not reducible to the natural selection 
of selfish genes. Given that this provides an exhaustive basis for an evolutionary 
ontology, what ‘ethical’ conclusions would have to be drawn? In my view an approach 
that is truly and exclusively based on selfish-gene Darwinism (and eliminative 
reductionism) would either have to abandon ethics or at best to reformulate this 
discipline as the science of prudent egoism. 
Bayertz has distinguished in how far approaches in evolutionary ethics claim that 
the assumed evolutionary theory build an exclusive basis for ethics. In accordance 
with her results, I think that versions that are based solely on the sociobiological 
paradigm are not capable of formulating a satisfying ethics. It is questionable how a 
strong version based only on gene-Darwinism could even provide any prescriptive 
standards, due to the involved naturalistic fallacy. The weak version, which only claims 
to explain the evolutionary roots of morality and which does accept a certain freedom 
as a basis of our moral decisions, seems to be much less inconsistent with common 
sense or traditional schools of ethics.156  
Although I sympathise with the weak version of a biologically informed but still 
autonomous ethics, this approach and the concept of autonomy is in contradiction 
with a strict interpretation of gene-Darwinism.157 An extension of the metaphysical 
basis of gene-Darwinism would be needed to render an ‘ethics’ with a certain 
autonomy possible and plausible ( p. 54).  
Here the goal is to sketch a strong version of ‘morality’ based solely of the outlined 
paradigm. Moore’s resort of regarding the predicate good as something ‘simple, 
unanalysable and indefinable’ is not open to a paradigm, according to which 
                                                     
155  Cf. G. Vollmer, Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer evolutionären Ethik (1993), p. 127. 
156  K. Bayertz, Evolution und Ethik. Größe und Grenzen eines philosophischen Forschungsprogramms (1993), 
pp. 24-33. Kitcher has distinguished – and criticised – four ways to biologicize ethics. 
P. Kitcher, Vier Arten, die Ethik zu biologisieren (1993). 
157  Cf. K. Bayertz, Autonomie und Biologie (1993), pp. 334, 336, 337, 347. On naturalist theories of 
evolution in general: H. Krings, Sokrates überlebt: Zum Verhältnis von Evolution und Geschichte (1984), 
p. 174. 
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everything has to be explained in terms of gene survival. In this view an emergent 
autonomous property of intrinsic goodness could not exist. The approach also 
excludes an inner logic of rationality, an autonomy of reason or our own emergent (or 
revealed) purposes which again may influence our behaviour (downward causation). 
Hence, only two unpromising ways are open to radical advocates of the outlined 
paradigm: 
The first option is to abandon ethics. In this interpretation of evolutionary theory 
there is only an ‘is’; an ‘ought to’ simply does not exist. This standard interpretation 
differs from for instance a ‘neo-Platonian’ interpretation that an ‘ought to’ may has 
been hidden, but was present from the outset. Moreover, although the this interpre-
tation of evolutionary theory seems to allow for the evolution of true novelties, the 
posited reductive evolutionism does not allow for new kinds of entities over and 
above genes and above natural selection.158 This paradigm is not burdened by the 
problems of deriving ‘ought to’ from ‘is’, but it hence does not solved any ethical 
problems.159 Still one may ask what else would fill the ethical vacuum left by uni-
versalised gene-Darwinism. We would have neither reason to combat the process of 
natural selection – as demanded by T. H. Huxley442 – nor to try to channel this 
process to get more ethical. Truly unselfish altruism or an honest appeal even to ab-
stract moral principles, like justice or equality, would be discredited. Moreover, as in 
the case of Nietzsche, a non-ethic may, of course, influence actual moral attitudes. 
Although it is not demanded by this non-ethic, many would actually try to act accor-
ding to their true nature, and this leads us back to the strong approach, discussed next.  
The second option is linked to ideas of an evolutionary morality. The other 
unpromising possibility for gene-Darwinians is to assume – surprisingly a bit similar to 
the utterly different pre-modern conceptions – that there is no unbridgeable gap 
between ‘is’ and ‘ought’. According to the outlined paradigm the ‘ought to’ has to be 
understood as having evolved only by the mechanism of natural selection; the 
seemingly independent ‘ought to’ is actually an ‘is’. At the first sight, this may be a 
promising approach. But what does such an idea imply in the context of the outlined 
highly reductive paradigm of gene-Darwinism? 
(1) First, treating ‘ought to’ as an evolved ‘is’ may serve as an affirmation of any 
possible ethical system that has actually evolved, paradoxically equally justifying 
enlightened or religious systems. Taken to its limit one may argue that all moral tenets 
are justified, simply because we hold them. They have evolved and hence have proved 
to be evolutionarily (biologically or culturally) stable. Obviously this is close to a 
tautology: we should do what we anyway belief that we should do – whether it is 
cannibalism or ‘love thy neighbour’. Radical relativism allowing for any possible moral 
                                                     
158  R. Dawkins consistently argued against the “unspoken but never justified implication that since 
science is unable to answer ‘why’ questions, there must be some other discipline that is qualified 
to answer them.” R. Dawkins, River out of Eden (1995), p. 95. 
159  Eve-Marie Engels correctly pointed out that the early advocate of an evolutionary ethics, 
Herbert Spencer, did not commit the naturalistic fallacy, since he had indeed not been interested 
in the intrinsic good anyway. E.-M. Engels, Herbert Spencers Moralwissenschaft – Ethik oder 
Sozialtechnik (1993), p. 272. 
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tenet leads to similar consequences as to assume that there exists no ethics at all: in 
any case, our ethics would provide no guideline how we should conduct our lives. 
(2) One may try to put a deeper tendency or principle of evolution at the core of 
ones ethics. In classical terminology, one may try to identify the ‘essence’ either of 
evolution in general or of a part of evolutionary history, e. g. of human evolution. 
Julian Huxley thought that progressive integration is the proper characterisation of 
human evolution. One may argue that an ethical system that is best for a group and 
will be beneficial for the long-term survival of its members. R. Richards has proposed 
that men in their normal “structured context” essentially strive “to enhance the 
community good” and hence “each ought to act altruistically.”160 Such a proposal 
comes close to a Kantian ethics (by which Richards seems to be influenced) informed 
by biological facts. However, I think this way is not open to pure gene-Darwinians, 
who regard the care for the common good of a group to be evolutionary impossible 
and at best to be an evolutionary side effect. 
(3) The most plausible option for gene-Darwinism would be to claim that 
evolution has had only one essence: selfish genes and an unalterable process of natural 
selection. If one regards this as the only essence of evolution, one may well be 
intuitively inclined to draw the conclusion that one should follow the ‘selectionist 
imperative’ and multiply by any means.  
An orthodox believer in a gene-Darwinian ethics, if purged of all other 
components, would in my opinion act as a prudent ultra-egoist. The gene-Darwinian 
would cooperate as long as there is a direct profit. But he or she would whenever 
possible avoid helping the weak and wounded or previous cooperators that are not of 
any use any more. The gene-Darwinian would not even try to be a ‘fair egoist’, as, for 
example, envisioned by Adam Smith. A radical and consequent follower of such a 
view would betray, exploit and kill whenever a profit is expected and no punishment 
or retaliation has to be feared. Morals would be reconceived as nothing but 
manipulative means of some genes manipulating other genes.161 There would be no 
true justice but only different strategies of reproduction. Who wants to blame the 
cuckoo in the nest, who wants to blame the rapist following his specific strategy of 
reproduction? Blunt gene-Darwinism indeed has to be taken seriously! Taken to its 
conclusions this approach may free the rapist from any bad conscience – the only re-
maining problem for the rapist would be a fear of being caught. If the beautifully au-
stere metaphysical starting point of gene-Darwinism was not extended, the rapist – on 
this evaluative basis – would be as right as those who would condemn him. A judge, 
of course, may personally see this differently, but this would not be a question of 
ethics or justice, but just one of power. The rapist would differ from the judge only in 
regard of being less powerful to enforce a particular reproductive strategy. On the 
                                                     
160  R. J. Richards, Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior (1987), pp. 613, 
620, 622. 
161  E. Voland, Moral durch Manipulation? Ein evolutionäres Szenario (1996), pp. 1119-1122. 
See: R. Dawkins, The Extended Phenotype (1982/1989), Chapter 5. R. Dawkins, J. R. Krebs, 
Animal signals: information or manipulation? (1978). 
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battleground of reproduction, justice would be the first victim, conceived as 
epiphenomenon reducible to the will of power and egoistic manipulations. 
Definitely proposals favouring a sociobiological ethics were made with higher 
intentions. Some have argued that we have to take the selfish essence of humans into 
account to solve the most pressing global demographic, ecological and social 
problems.162 I do agree that we need to acknowledge the existence of our ‘lower’ all 
too human inclinations. It is unproblematic to acknowledge some egoistic tendency 
(of genes or of individual humans), if some room is left for higher aspirations. For this 
reason, this radical approach has been highly stimulating, even for debates on morals 
and ethics. But taken to its limits, this radical approach appears to me to be even 
dangerous, leading to the denial of all higher values, like justice, truth, happiness and 
cultural refinement and leaving nothing but the selfish genes’ bleak tactics in the 
unrestrainable struggle for life. 
It is a problem of pure and unextended gene-Darwinism that it will have the ten-
dency of disavowing any state of justice or truth in a way that is not reducible to single 
egoistic genes. Without discussing these complex matters in detail, I now mention 
three pivotal aspects of a strict application of the sociobiological paradigm to morals. 
(a) Culture. If culture is also seen as a part of the biological process, ethics would 
be understood as a specialised branch of biology of a single primate species.90 
Despite its complexity and plasticity this biological phenomenon of culture is, 
according to a strict version of this paradigm an adaptation of single egoistic genes 
evolved by natural selection. E. O. Wilson writes that our emotions, upon which we 
base our moral thought, are formed in the limbic system and the hypothalamus and 
that these brain structures “evolved by natural selection”. He concludes that hence 
our morals evolved by natural selection.163  Bridging the old gap between the two 
cultures is done exclusively in a ‘bottom-up way’. Ethics gets ‘biologicized’ from 
below. What was traditionally the ‘higher’ realm of freedom is simply explained by the 
‘lower’ processes of biology. According to this approach the resulting morality would 
not be based on freedom, since the human subject would be regarded as a mere 
product of the environment and a mere ‘vehicle’ of genes.164 A vehicle is not free; it is 
an object instead of a subject.165 Even if culture is not understood as being directly 
controlled by genes, it appears consistent to claim that any renunciation of an 
advantage in reproduction by emancipation from “the biological imperative to 
                                                     
162  E.g., Th. Mohr, Zwischen genetischer Statik und Dynamik der Lebensbedingungen (1996), p. 1115. 
Even M. Ruse and E. O. Wilson in Moral Philosophy as Applied Science (1986), p. 192, have been 
interested in improving the possibility for human long-term survival, though Darwinism itself in 
principle is only concerned with blind momentary survival. 
163 E. O. Wilson, Sociobiology (1975), p. 3; On Human Nature (1978), p. 6. Cf.  footnote 147.   
P. Kitcher in Vier Arten, die Ethik zu ‘biologisieren’ (1993), pp. 225, 228 f., has pointed out that this 
argument – against the intentions of Wilson – would also absurdly render mathematics, biology 
and other sciences to be reducible to natural selection. Kitcher also challenged the assumption 
that ethics could completely be understood in terms of emotional reaction.  
164  See: G. Vollmer, Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer evolutionären Ethik (1993), pp. 125-126. 
165  E.g., K. Bayertz, Autonomie und Biologie (1993), p. 346. M. Weingarten, Organismen, Objekte oder 
Subjekte? (1993).  
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maximise the genetic fitness”, will be immediately punished and eliminated by natural 
selection of the seemingly ‘free’ behaviour would again directly be put under a more 
specific control of the genes.166 Wilson argued: “Can the cultural evolution of higher 
ethical values gain a direction and momentum of its own and completely replace 
genetic evolution? I think not. The genes hold culture on a leash. [...]”. He sees culture 
as the “circuitous technique by which human genetic material has been and will be 
kept intact. Morality has no other demonstrable ultimate function.”167 Our meaning of 
life seems to be closely linked to such a biological imperative.168 Likewise a gene-
Darwinian reconstruction of history’ consequently sees no other ultimate function. 
For instance, concentrating wealth “must once have been (or must still be) the means 
to a reproductive end. No other currency counts in natural selection.”169 
(b) Ruthless selfishness. The paradigm excludes anything above the competition 
among egoistic genes. It is a main tenet of the sociobiological paradigm that all 
altruistic phenomena have to be explained by ‘egoism’ on the level of the genes 
( pp. 33, 138, 264 f.). Nature is largely conceived to be red in tooth and claw, more 
than ever before. Even proponents agree that a special unsentimental dog-eat-dog 
language came to dominate the new paradigm.170 “Fundamentally, all that we have a 
right to expect from our theory is a battleground of replicators, jostling, jockeying, 
fighting for a future in the genetic hereafter.”171 Consistently it has been argued that 
“so long as DNA is passed on, it does not matter who or what gets hurt in the 
process. […] Genes don’t care about suffering, because they don’t care about 
anything.” Generally the “Universe we observe has precisely the properties we should 
expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil and no good, nothing but 
blind, pitiless indifference. [...] DNA neither cares nor knows. DNA just is.”172 Above 
this phenotypes are mere vehicles, which are only means to promote the ruthless 
selfish interests of single genes. In a purely gene-Darwinian approach, morality is to be 
understood as manipulation of phenotypes by some genes to the disadvantage of 
others.161 Saints (anyone pursuing something beyond gene-egoism) would be 
considered to be either lunatics or sanctimonious hypocrites. This approach would 
provide an excellent excuse for those not in the least pursuing any higher aims. The 
actual result for morals based on this paradigm would either be a final erosion of 
traditional morals or the veneration of competition, without the least constraint. To 
introduce a higher level is problematic, since this paradigm and hence the resulting 
morality is committed to the struggle for life, gene against gene, and, as an 
approximation, individual against individual.173 Perhaps, this moral seems consistent 
                                                     
166 H. Markl, Natur und Geschichte (1983, translation by the author), quoted in E. Voland, P. Winkler, 
Aspekte der Hominisation aus Sicht der Soziobiologie (1990), p. 19. The term ‘biological imperative’ 
has previously been used by E. O. Wilson, On Human Nature (1978/1995), p. 166. 
167  E. O. Wilson, On Human Nature (1978/1995), p. 167. 
168  Th. Junker, S. Paul. Der Darwin Code (2010), pp. 189 f. 
169 M. Ridley, The Red Queen (1993/1995), p. 242. 
170 R. Dawkins, The Extended Phenotype (1989/1982), p. 56.   
171 Idem, The Selfish Gene (1989), p. 256. 
172  Idem, River Out of Eden (1995), pp. 131, 133. 
173 R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (1976/1989), p. 2. 
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with the demands of competitive pure capitalism and globalisation, but even any 
capitalist utopia requires some ideal of justice. Any veneration only of barbaric 
struggle does not provide us with a moral to create a world that is worth living in.  
(c) Survival. In any case this radically reductive paradigm favours only one 
‘currency’ – survival. Dawkins has stated explicitly: “The currency used in the casino 
of evolution is survival, strictly gene survival, but for many purposes individual 
survival is a reasonable approximation.”174 Correspondingly, Dawkins has argued that 
all utility functions of all living bodies reduce to one. “Darwinian theory tells us that 
all survival is just a means to the end of gene propagation”. “God’s utility function” is 
maximising the survival of single selfish genes.175 I think the focus on gene-survival 
may be the most important aspect of this approach if applied to ethics. E. O. Wilson 
has conceded it as an unpleasant unavoidable result that “no species, ours included, 
possesses a purpose beyond the imperatives created by its genetic history.”176 Hence it 
is the “biological imperative to maximise the genetic fitness” 166. It could be doubted 
whether this view, if it dominated common sense morality, would allow for a world-
wide sustainable population development. In any case, if getting normative at all, it 
appears consistent if gene-Darwinism would actually favour only one commandment, 
one moral principle: “Thou shalt survive in the struggle for life.” Or put more 
precisely: “Thou shalt strive to maximise the replication of thy genes with all thy 
means and thou shalt not ever have any scruples towards thy neighbours in achieving 
this purpose.” This principle, whether explicitly postulated by the experts of ethics or 
not, would tend to replace traditional religious and philosophical values, like love, 
piety, goodness, benevolence, eudaimonia, happiness, courage, justice, duty, respect, 
beauty and truthfulness. Such an understanding of morals or ethics would not only be 
in fundamental contradiction with almost all religious beliefs but as well with all tradi-
tional philosophical schools of ethics, from Platonism and Aristotelianism, over 
Kantianism177 to Hedonism and Utilitarianism. In particular this view would be in 
stark contrast to any form of ethics based on freedom or on rational consideration of 
what is good. “In a universe of blind physical forces and genetic replication, some 
people are going to get hurt, other people are going to get lucky, and you won’t find 
any rhyme or reason in it, nor any justice [...]”178 Likewise, a consequentialist act-
utilitarian ethics which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers of 
people seems to be at odds with such an approach. Why should one care for happi-
ness? Why should one care for others at all? The only ‘normative’ purpose of evo-
lution would be the unchangeable tendency to survive, a tendency of genes acting as 
maximally selfish as possible. Even if promoters of an ‘ethics’, which is purely based 
on the selfish-gene paradigm, might by far surpass my imagination in their ability to 
develop a more complex and satisfying moral system, how would such an ‘ethics’ 
focusing only on biology, competition and survival, if popularised, affect our lives? 
                                                     
174 Ibid, p. 55. 
175  R. Dawkins, River Out of Eden (1995), pp. 104-106, 124. 
176 E. O. Wilson, On Human Nature (1978/1995), p. 2. 
177 In the light of Kant’s own writings, a biologistic interpretation of his a priori is inappropriate.   
178  R. Dawkins, River Out of Eden (1995), p. 133. 
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2.4 Meme ‘Altruisms’? – A Further Extension of the Sociobiological Paradigm 
a) Memes – A Limited Comeback of the Idea of Logos 
After the concept of memes will be introduced, I shall propose two additional 
memetic mechanisms, in order to then access the ethical implications of this 
extended approach. 
As outlined, conventional sociobiology tries to reduce apparent biological forms of 
‘altruism’ to the concept of genetic ‘egoism’, dismissing altruism of groups or species.  
Dawkins in The Selfish Gene has briefly introduced another basic concept, that of so 
called memes.179 Memes – analogous to genes – are replicators on the cultural level, 
“the smallest elements that replicate themselves with reliability and fecundity.” They 
are claimed to be bits of knowledge, of human practices or, in my view, they could be 
objectified in an object. They jump from brain to brain or can be photocopied. 
Memes are defined as standing in competition and as evolving solely by natural 
selection.180  
Although the concept of a meme (‘the meme of a meme’) seems not to be very 
common in sociobiology, it has itself clearly become a prolific replicator in the texts of 
philosophers, like D. Hull181, or D. Dennett182, and psychologists, like H. Plotkin.183 
There is an often ignored history of similar ideas. One aspect of the concept of 
memes is that it (seemingly) refers to an independent higher level of information above 
biology. The many aspects of the concept of a meme have a much longer history than 
its new name, reaching back at least two and a half thousand years to the concept of 
nous (partly also to the concept of logos), presumably best translated as spirit, or in an 
individualistic sense as mind. Note the same etymology of mind and meme. Germanic 
muni had meant spirit as well (I am perhaps aware of it, since my own forename, 
‘Momme’ is derived from this word) and is related to Greek mimneskein and French 
même. Nous often referred to the largely independent process of culture, with emphasis 
on the history of ideas.  
In Christian philosophy, spirit (lat.: spiritus) spirit proper (spiritus rectus) was individually and 
supra-individually directed towards God. In Greek philosophy nous and logos were often 
conceived as a process of teleological rational unfolding. Though nous also was understood 
in the sense of static Platonic ideas, which could be grasped by individuals, neo-Platonic in-
fluences (as in the reception of Aristotle) seem to have contributed to a more dynamic and 
collective interpretation. 
To Hegelians – here resembling neo-Platonists – philosophy as a whole is centred 
around the notion of spirit (Geist). Geist to Hegel is processual, already in nature but mainly 
in history. Hegel distinguishes between the subjective spirit, focusing on individual reflective 
processes, the objective spirit, focusing on the supra-individual historical reflective 
                                                     
179 R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (1976/1989), Chapter 11, pp. 189-201; The Extended Phenotype 
(1982/1989), pp. 110-112.  
180 D. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995), pp. 344-345. 
181 E.g., D. Hull, The Metaphysics of Evolution (1989), p. 7. 
182 D. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995), pp. 341-370. 
183 H. Plotkin, Darwin Machines and the Nature of Knowledge (1994), pp. 215-227 (esp. p. 218). 
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processes, and finally the absolute spirit, reflecting freely the highest values and the process 
of reflection itself. 
At the turn of the 20th century Dilthey tried to re-establish the concept of a cultural 
objective spirit (objektiver Geist). Ideas can be objectified for example also in architecture. In 
the following philosophical movement the Geist was concerned not with individual psycho-
logy but intellectual and cultural history. Correspondingly, becoming a true person was 
understood as adopting culture, as the cultivation of mind. The biologism at the time of the 
Nazis did deemphasis any independence of the spirit (culture). Today, one of course needs 
not to be a Hegelian in order to argue that there is a partly autonomous history of ideas. 
 
Types of ‘Altruism’ Based on Memetic ‘Egoism’ 
Meme-‘Altruism’ based on Relatedness 
or Similarity 
Corresponding to kin selection on the biological level, 
memes might ‘egoistically’ support their ‘relatives’ in the 
same ‘brain’ or in different ‘brains’, if they were identical (or 
similar enough). One might formulate a mathematical 
inequality analogous to Hamilton’s ( p. 38), in which 
memes would replace genes.  
One might even go one step further. In principle one may 
think of Meme-Similarity Altruism, where similarity replaces 
relatedness. But this transcends the Darwinian stress on a 
branching descent without synthesis. Nonetheless, infor-
mation would support a copy of itself outside of itself. In 
academia, for example, the support of adherents of the same 
school may – apart from more idealistically considerations – 
be based on such a process. 
Reciprocal Meme-‘Altruism’ Corresponding to genetic reciprocal altruism, this theory 
would predict reciprocal ‘egoistic’ support of memes. 
Analogous to the biological case this could only evolve in a 
meme pool where reciprocal altruism of some sort becomes 
an evolutionarily stable strategy and is not overrun by 
concepts which do not reciprocate the support. 
Table 1. Basic Types of Meme Altrusism 
 
 
Though Dawkins’ concept of a meme seems to revive the venerable concept of nous 
or spirit in claiming a process of cultural transmission of immaterial information184, it 
strongly differs from it in several respects. 
First, the original notion of nous is narrowed down by the notion of memes, 
abandoning its rational, normative and teleological connotations.  
Secondly, memes are normally conceived in an atomistic way as totally separate, 
stable and independent entities.  
Thirdly, memes are taken to be ‘selfish’ by only ‘aiming at’ their self-reproduction. 
They are claimed to evolve in a Darwinian way by blind variation and external 
selection, resulting in a tree of conceptual decent.185 
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185   pp. 57 f.   
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These novel aspects, especially the second and third point, have been criticised.186 
For example, how could one in such a Darwinian framework account for the crucial 
role of intellectual synthesis in the history of ideas? 
 However, such a memetic extension of the selfish-gene paradigm, leads us from 
simple gene-Darwinism to a simple kind of (universal) process-Darwinism.187 Crucial 
question in the context of ethics are: Does the concept of memes reintroduce an 
independence of culture, on which the selfish-gene paradigm actually had declared 
war? Does this concept allow to reintroduce the concept of an independence of the 
cultural level from the biological level? If this was the case, one would transcend, and 
I think improve, the biologistic gene-Darwinian research programme. Some kind of 
ontological dualism would be revived in a monistic framework and Descartes entered 
through the back door. Before discussing this proposal, I want to go one step further 
by adding two types of apparent ‘altruism’ based on memetic ‘egoism’ (cf. Table 1). 
Although I have not found this proposal elsewhere, it follows obviously by analogy 
from the biological theories of kin selection and reciprocal altruism.  
Comparatively to gene-Darwinism a memetic account seems to provide a positive 
extension, including a modified reintroduction of the concept of nous. Although 
memetic kin selection and memetic reciprocal ‘altruism’ seem to relate to the 
viewpoint of ‘selfish memes’, I would suggest – as I have done for the biological 
stratum – that it actually requires further irreducible conditions to effect these 
processes (starting conditions, recognition of kinship, etc.). 
In the next section it will become apparent that the ethical results remain 
problematic in any case.  
b) Problems of the Extended Genetic-Memetic Approach as a Basis for Ethics 
Although we seemingly have left gene monism behind us, I am going to argue now 
that the meme concept is not reconcilable with strict gene-Darwinism, even if 
restricted to the biological sphere. In any case, this approach – without further 
modifications – would still deteriorate common morals to a tactic to best ensure the 
survival of one’s genes and memes.  
(1) Biological determinism. The meme concept initially seems to overcome biological 
determinism. Even Dawkins indicates in The Selfish Gene that he regards an 
independence of the memetic level to be possible.188 I would appreciate a certain 
independence of nous from its biological basis and the meme approach may contribute 
to such an account. Nevertheless, in two regards an interpretation as independent 
appears to be inconsistent with gene-Darwinism. 
(a) Gene-Darwinism is essentially an enterprise of thorough downward reduction. 
I will later discuss gene-atomism, germ-line reductionism and process reductionism as 
different aspects of this downward-reductionist attitude. Within this generally reduc-
                                                     
186  E.g., D. Holdcroft, H. Lewis, Memes, Minds and Evolution (2000). 
187  The historical parallels of Darwinism with other subject areas (pp. 154 f.), universal process 
Darwinism (pp. 209 f.), and the critique of process reductionism (pp. 333 f.). 
188 R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (1976/1989), pp. 191-193, 201, 331; The Extended Phenotype 
(1982/1989), pp. 110-112. 
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tive paradigm an autonomy of higher levels seems implausible.189 Within an 
individual, selfish genes would be regarded to be more basic than memes (though I 
think this is not necessarily so). In this framework memes are plausibly understood to 
replicate only at mercy of genes. This would imply that humans would still normally 
only propagate ideas that directly serve the survival of the propagator’s genes. Since 
the idea of an inner logic of rationality (one decedent of the old concept logos) is alien 
to a selectionist account, memes, like any other adaptive organs, would at the outset 
be understood as being only vehicles for genes in their struggle for life. Consistently 
human communication has been proposed to be mainly at the service of the genes, 
coresponding to Dawkins’ and Krebs’ understanding of “all of animal communication 
as manipulation of signal-receiver by signal-sender”190. At this point it seems that one 
is forced to join the advocates of orthodox gene-Darwinism, who reproach Dawkins 
for being inconsistent and a turncoat considering the autonomy of memes.191  
Nevertheless, if we neglected the downward reductionist framework, I think, it is possible to 
argue that even the simple process of natural selection could in principle ‘bring life’ into the 
ontological level of concepts. However, there is no reason to assume that life has been 
restricted to this simple process. But within the gene-Darwinism framework, I consider this 
meme concept as not being stable yet.  
(b) The autonomous conception of memes appears to unstable also because a certain 
cultural autonomy would undermine the radical gene-Darwinian polemics in human 
biology and culture. Moreover, if downward reductionism would be weakened by 
introducing another level, it may become more questionable within biology as well. 
In addition, human phylogenesis would have to be conceived differently as it is by 
the standard reductionist account. The polemics that our emotional and our limbic 
system evolved by ‘natural selection’ would then be an unwarranted simplification. 
Our emotional system indeed may partly have evolved by ‘cultural selection’ or even 
‘moral selection’, partly via sexual selection (generally by autoselection) rather than by 
natural selection (hetero-selection). But allowing for cultural influences on gene 
survival, our genes may not necessarily be as selfish as they might be. The resulting 
view would be quite different from the popularised selfish gene approach.192 
In summary, it will be at least difficult to sustain the independence of memes on 
gene-Darwinian grounds. However, if this were possible, this might undermine gene-
Darwinism. This line of argument, like several others in this book, may suggest a 
tendency of gene-Darwinism to transcend itself. 
Moreover, one of the main epistemological motivations to develop evolutionary naturalism 
has been the hope of resolving the modern epistemological problem of truth and reference, 
dominating philosophy since Descartes, by an objective theory of correspondence. But as far 
as an independence of the meme-level would be conceded, evolutionary epistemology would 
                                                     
189  E.g., K. Bayertz, Autonomie und Biologie (1993), p. 336. 
190 Ibid, p. 57. 
191 R. Dawkins, The Extended Phenotype (1982/1989), p. 110. 
192  E. O. Wilson, On Human Nature (1978/1995). Wilson together with C. J. Lumsden in a 
profound work, Genes, Mind, and Culture (1981), have provided a differentiated account of the 
co-evolution of genes and memes.  
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need to become a truly evolutionary and historical epistemology. Hence, the traditional 
epistemological problem would arise again. One would again lose the correspondence of the 
appearances to the things in themselves, which one hoped to gain by the concept of adapta-
tion. Accordingly, the discourse on evolutionary epistemology has started to reduplicate a 
whole range of traditional epistemological positions, from realism to non-realism.193  
(2) Competition. Even if some autonomy of memes would be consistent with the 
outlined paradigm, competition among atomic entities would remain the only driving 
force of biological and cultural evolution. Certainly, an extended meme approach 
leaves more room for cooperation on the level of individuals. Nevertheless, 
cooperation would still not be based on the notion of the common good, but would 
be pursued only to reproduce ones own genes and memes regardless of their content. 
It will be shown that the radicalness of this emphasis can be challenged even within 
the biotic stratum and, of course, even more in the cultural stratum.194 
Moreover, the notion of intrinsic goodness is completely missing. Each entity 
simply strives for its own survival. The Thou (e. g. in the sense of Buber) or the Other 
(e.g. in the sense of Levinas) have no intrinsic value in this conception at all 
( pp. 418 f.), as far as they do not benefit the survival or the reproduction of the 
entity in question. Based on the ‘principle of egoism’ living entities are defined by a 
caring for themselves, altruism by definition is explained by egoism.  
Additionally, all aspects of atomistic and Darwinian meme conception may be 
questioned and will be questioned in this work. It is questionable whether there are 
atoms of thought that do not change in their contexts. There seems to be interrelated 
conceptual levels, from single notions over theories to world views, each may perhaps 
be influenced by its context. It is questionable whether a replicator-vehicle dichotomy 
is really applicable to ideas. It is questionable whether these concepts evolve only in a 
Darwinian way of blind variation and external selection, without a crucial role of 
synthesis. Although the meme concept has positive sides, I prefer to speak of logoi. 
Logoi is the Greek diminutive of the old philosophical notion of logos, referring to the 
development of ideas with a certain life of their own. However, in contrast to memes, 
logoi are not interpreted in a purely atomistic and Darwinian way. 
(3) Blindness. As outlined, the only measure which exists for Darwinism, for genes 
and memes alike, is short term survival ( pp. 358). The notion of sustainability 
appears to be opposed to any Darwinian concept of evolution. Darwinian biological 
and cultural evolution, by definition, cares in an unchangeable way only for the 
                                                     
193 On evolutionary epistemology and Universal Darwinian Processism,  pp. 205 f. 
D. T. Campbell and K. Lorenz introduced the notion of hypothetical realism, which has found 
several followers: K. Lorenz, Die Rückseite des Spiegels (1973), pp. 17-20, 303. G. Vollmer, 
Evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie (1975), pp. 34-40; Was können wir wissen? (1988), pp. 285-290. R. G. 
Meyers, Evolution as a ground for realism (1990). R. Millikan, Language, White Queen Psychology and 
Other Essays for Alice (1993) [Quoted in B. Pollard, The Nature of Rule-Following (1996)]. Recently 
non-realist positions have been formulated. E.g., D. Campbell, Epistemological Roles for Selection 
Theory (1990). M. Ruse, Does Evolutionary Epistemology Imply Realism? (1990).  
194 The critique of gene-atomism  pp. 264 f.; on the melting of ideas,  e.g., p. 364. Also process 
reductionism and a missing concept of goodness are linked to this approach  pp. 57; 333.  
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moment ( pp. 396 f.). The concept of an invariant blindness of the process will be 
challenged in this work ( pp. 371 f.).  
 
Despite the improvements of the extended gene-meme theory (of which I will make 
use in my own ontological proposal), I think it is not possible yet to build up a 
satisfying ethical system on these still atomistic and Darwinian grounds. The meme 
concept may be helpful to overcome biologism, but in this case, I think, it becomes 
inconsistent with biological gene-Darwinism.  
2.5 The Need for a New Paradigm in Biology 
It has been shown that the ethical and moral consequences of a pure gene-Darwinian 
philosophy appear untenable and at odds as well with common sense as with many 
well established ethical systems. Of course it may turn out that the common good of 
our society, our established ethical principles, and the concept of free individuals may 
all be illusory – at best they would be some epiphenomenal or ephemeral phenomena, 
“like clouds in the sky or dust-storms in the desert.”195 A consistent unification of 
different subject areas, as demanded by E. O. Wilson, is a formidable claim: “It may 
not be too much to say that sociology and the other social sciences, as well as the 
humanities, are the last branches of biology waiting to be included in the Modern 
Synthesis.”196 Such an unification would have its merits, but if a theory makes such 
strong claims we do have to scrutinise it as critically as possible.  
In science a bottom-up explanation based on postulated elements may predict a 
behaviour on the compound level. But if the phenomena on the compound level are 
not well explained, one may not only question the validity of the phenomena on the 
compound level but also the theory at the elementary level. Bottom-up consistency is 
a virtue, but top-down consistency is a virtue as well. Correspondingly, I think the 
situation obviously demands to search for a different biological foundation that may 
be more in line with our basic ethical beliefs. Since biology and ethics have not been 
treated as isolated fields one cannot regard this as an exogenous argument. If one 
accepts the epistemic value of overall consistency and sees the ethical challenges of 
this paradigm, the search for another paradigm seems to be the only responsible and 
reasonable strategy. 
When we are going to scrutinize the biological and philosophical debate, it will 
turn out that evolutionary biology is far from being monolithic. The selfish-gene 
paradigm has to face several anomalies. This will provide us with additional reasons 
for the goal to formulate a refined interpretation of what one may call ‘facts’ of 
evolutionary biology. However, I shall mainly try to transcend gene-Darwinism 
from within ( pp. 243 f.). 
Dawkins wrote that “philosophy and the subjects known as ‘humanities’ are still 
taught almost as if Darwin had never lived. No doubt this will change in time.”197 I 
                                                     
195  footnote 1053. 
196 E. O. Wilson, Sociobiology (1975), p. 4. 
197 R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (1976/1989), p. 1. 
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agree with this criticism to some extent, but I would add conversely: “Biology and 
especially sociobiology is still taught almost as if these disciplines would not have any 
historical roots and would not have made any philosophical presumptions. No doubt 
this will change in time.” For discussing possible problems of a biologistic selfish-gene 
paradigm we first aim to understand its history and its underlying 
philosophical structure. 
 
Part II: The Unfolding of  Logos in Regard to the 
Conceptions of  ‘Physis’ and Darwinism 
“Each succeeding age discovers that the primary classifications of its predecessors will not work. In this 
way a doubt is thrown upon all formulations of laws of Nature which assume these classifications as 
firm starting points. A problem arises. Philosophy is the search for its solution.” 
 
A. N. Whitehead, 1934. 
 
 
In our search for a new biological paradigm, I am going to discuss the historical 
construction198 of the selfish-gene paradigm and of Darwinism in general. In this part 
the used approach to the history of science seeks to provide a deeper historical-
genetic understanding of the discussed theories and at least to point out 
constructional alternatives.  
Within the historiography of science – and therefore also within the historiography 
of biology – some types of approaches are often distinguished.199 
(1) Internalism, which is often held by scientists working as historians in their own 
field, is the view that science or a particular scientific theory is completely distinct 
from any external social or intellectual influence. Hence internalists focus on 
developments within a particular science. For instance, the zoologist Ernst Mayr, one 
of the founders of the so-called evolutionary synthesis, has been one of the most 
profound internalist historians of biology.200 Philosophical positivism will usually 
favour an internalist position, but internalist accounts may be reasonable even from 
other perspectives.  
                                                     
198  Cf. P. Bowler, Charles Darwin (1990), Chapter ‘The Problem of Interpretation’; Evolution (1984), 
pp. 341-342.  
199 Similar: E. Mayr, One Long Argument (1991), p. 39; The Growth of Biological Thought (1982), p. 13. 
200 E. Mayr’s main work is The Growth of Biological Thought (1982). A popularised but informative 
short version is: E. Mayr, One Long Argument (1991). 
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(2) Externalism emphasises that science and any scientific theory is embedded in 
and determined by its more general intellectual and cultural context. This position is 
primarily held by historians, sociologists and philosophers working in history of 
science. Within externalism one has to distinguish two approaches: one group of the 
historians rather focuses on the socio-economic, the other rather on the intellectual 
context of a theory. In practice of course, most externalist historians could be placed 
somewhere between these extreme positions. 
(a) Some externalist historians of science emphasise the socio-economic context. They 
often have a sociological background. These accounts of the history of science justly 
take sociology and economics seriously. Some socio-economic accounts implicitly or 
explicitly reduce the role of ideas and belief systems to nothing but mere 
epiphenomenal superstructure built on a given socio-economic basis, like individual 
economic interests or class interests. This may, for instance, philosophically be linked 
to a postmodern approach, a Marxist approach, or even a radical neoliberal approach. 
Analyses based on this methodology have led to revealing insights, but in my view a 
complete reduction of ideas to interests clearly goes too far, because it ignores the 
inherent compellingness of evidence and arguments themselves. Other advocates of 
the socioeconomic approach have convincingly tried to reconstruct in detail the whole 
Lebenswelt of a scientist in question (for example, A. Desmond and J. R. Moore in their 
brilliant biography of Charles Darwin201). 
(b) On the other hand there are historians of ideas (e.g., J. C. Greene202), who 
focus mainly on the intellectual context of certain concepts. This is based on the two 
assumptions that knowledge is not a mere epiphenomenon, and that the different parts of 
knowledge or human logos interact with one another. The tradition of world-views, 
into which a scientist is ‘thrown’, determines or at least influences the way he or she 
builds up theories and experiments and thus perceives the World. Theories are 
regarded as both affecting and being effected by the temper of an age. Within this 
framework historians again have very different approaches. They may be for example 
implicit or explicit followers of Fichte, Schelling or Hegel, and will focus on the 
unifying logic within the whole logos or what these philosophers called ‘Spirit’. Or 
they might e. g. be influenced by very different ‘postmodern’ philosophers, like 
Derrida and Foucault, who similarly focus on ‘discourses’ shaped by a general 
‘episteme’ of a time. 
 
The internal-external distinction in historiography is a relative one. A treatment could 
be internal or external in regard either to a specific theory or to a whole scientific 
discipline in question. Moreover, it is difficult to subsume historians of science under 
the outlined categories. This holds even for the mentioned historians, and is even 
                                                     
201  A. Desmond, J. Moore, Darwin (1991/1992), pp. xvi-xviii. 
202 John C. Greene tries in Science, Ideology, and World View (1981) to show the impact of ideology 
and World Views on the Darwinian Revolution. In the essay The Kuhnian Paradigm and the 
Darwinian Revolution in Natural Selection (first publ. 1971) he outlined his methodology in contrast 
to the one of Th. S. Kuhn.  
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more difficult for instance for S. Kuhn203, P. J. Bowler204, or D. J. Depew, and B. 
Weber205. Indeed it seems to be fruitful to regard the mentioned approaches to history 
of science not as exclusive, but as complementary. In my view, especially in phases of 
scientific revolution, both internal and external reasons for the process of scientific 
construction have to be taken into account. It would be false to exclude history of 
ideas or socio-economic history from historiography. History in general and the 
history of a certain science or even of a theory will sometimes be interwoven with 
each other. History, according to this position, can only be understood by looking at 
the partly autonomous subhistories; and the partly autonomous subhistories are only 
understandable by relating them to history as a whole.206  
This historiographic position mirrors my general epistemological assumptions. In historiography 
there is no strictly isolated theory, no completely unrelated ‘Sprachspiel’, no discourse totally 
on its own, no isolated logoi; but neither is there a completely homogeneous temper of an 
age, a completely consistent Zeitgeist, logos or ‘episteme’. We are concerned with a 
historiographic whole-part problem and, in my view, only a middle position can reasonably 
be advocated. 
In regard to epistemological or ontological part-whole problems I shall later develop a 
middle position in more detail. The epistemological part-whole problem could be exemplified by 
Wittgenstein’s ambiguous picture of a duck-rabbit207. This simple picture shows, I think, 
that both extreme positions are one-sided – at least if we are concerned with our actual 
cognition: a) If there were only bottom-up perception, then we would not be able to switch 
voluntarily between the perception of a duck or a rabbit. b) Our perceptions could neither, 
the other way round, be exclusively rely on top-down assumptions, here on abstract 
concepts of a duck or a rabbit. (Otherwise one could equally make us belief that there is an 
elephant.) I. Kant favoured a balanced solution: “Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, 
Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind.”208 Also in my ontological approach wholes and 
parts are interacting.209  
 
                                                     
203 Thomas S. Kuhn’s influential book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) is in large parts 
concerned inner-scientific explanations and a specific scientific community, which are part of 
the science in question and in this sense internal. His theory, however, left the explanatory gap 
why paradigm shifts occur, and hence may even mark a trend of historiography towards 
externalist approaches, trying to close this gap. Moreover, Kuhn called attention to factors, like 
the scientific community, which are at least external to the theory in question. 
204 P. Bowler, Evolution (1984/2009); The Non-Darwinian Revolution (1988); Charles Darwin (1990); 
Life’s Splendid Drama (1996). 
205  D. J. Depew, B. Weber, Darwinism Evolving (1995). 
206 The romantic view of history has been described along similar lines: ‘The development of the 
natural sciences is genetic, possesses an internal logic and depends on economic and social 
factors. Internal and external dimensions do not have to be mutually exclusive.’ 
D. v. Engelhardt, Historical consciousness in the German Romantic Naturforschung (1990).  
207 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen (1953/1958/1976), p. 194. 
208 I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781/1787), p. A 51/B 75. (“Thoughts without content are 
empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.”) 
209  Part IV, Chapter 8. I oppose substance (pp. 245 f.) and process reductionism (pp. 333 f.) and 
advocate a more holistic position, top-down causation (pp. 272 f.) and exformation (pp. 316 f.). 
However, I intend to pursue a middle course between atomism and holism.  
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Consequently, both approaches to the history of biology, the internalist and the 
externalist approach, will be pursued. Nonetheless, I use two separated chapters to 
develop each of them, so that each gets the deserved attention. In Chapter 4, ‘From 
Darwin to Dawkins’, the internal logic of different Darwinian subparadigms will be 
explored. I shall support the hypothesis that there have been certain distinct, but 
minor, paradigm-shifts within the main theory of Darwinism, and I shall thus challenge 
the assumption often found in popular science that perceived Darwinism is a 
monolithic theory. I will try to show how, with these subparadigms, central notions 
(like ‘gene’, ‘unit of selection’, ‘species’ etc.) underwent a change of meaning.  
In Chapter 5, on ‘Darwinism – from Whig Biology to Neoliberal Biology?’, a survey of the 
external influences on Darwinism and of the Darwinian influences on other external 
theories will be given. I try to show that Darwinism and Dawkinsism are not only 
reactions to empirical ‘facts’, but partly influenced by general theories and 
philosophical beliefs. For example, it is broadly acknowledged that Darwin was 
influenced by Malthus and the classical liberal economic theories. Without denying the 
importance of a moderately socio-economic account, this chapter focuses on the 
intellectual external history. 
Based on the historical interrelations of Darwinism with other academic 
disciplines, I shall develop in the following Chapters 6 and 7 systematically what I call 
‘Universal Darwinism’ and especially ‘Process-Darwinism’. 
Before we consider the internal and external history of different Darwinian 
subparadigms, Chapter 3 on the ‘Unfolding of the pre-Darwinian Philosophical Conceptions of 
‘Nature’’ provides a sketch of the philosophical traditions on which modern biology is 
built – or from which it has distanced itself. In this first chapter of the historical part 
internal and external history are not separable, because biology still is, quite directly, 
part of the general intellectual and philosophical development.  
Part II. Chapter 3: Unfolding of Pre-Darwinian Philosophical Conceptions of Nature 69 
Chapter 3: The Unfolding of the Pre-Darwinian 
Philosphical Conceptions of Nature 
If a biologist today, not long after the turn of the twentieth century and roughly 150 
years after the publication of the Origin of Species, worked within a Platonic or Aristote-
lian framework, this would not be in accordance with the general paradigm of today’s 
biology and hence this would place her or him outside of the scientific community. 
Still, our historical investigation is not beginning with the rise of Darwinism and its 
sub-paradigms, but with ancient, mediaeval and modern philosophical predecessors in 
the philosophy of nature.  
This approach is obviously opposed to the historically innocent, almost ignorant, 
view uttered by an important author of the present debates that “all attempts to 
answer the question before 1859 are worthless and that we will be better off if we 
ignore them completely.”210 Many historians, like, for example, Bowler, Cunningham, 
Depew, v. Engelhardt, Greene, Jardine, Rehbock, Richards and Weber, and also 
philosophers and biologists, like Weingarten and even Mayr, seem to have a 
different opinion.  
By an historical account which goes back much further than 1859 we will gain a 
deeper understanding of Darwinism, for example its distorted Christian-Newtonian 
underpinnings and its Pan-Adaptionism. Moreover we may broaden our horizons in 
regard to alternative biological accounts. The Darwinian paradigm-shift had no doubt 
brought improvements, but did it improve evolutionary theory in all respects? Even 
the early history of the philosophical notions of nature may enrich us by its great 
variety of concepts, from which we perhaps could learn something. A historically 
informed view may be advantageous when defining controversial notions and when 
aiming to understand larger contexts of current debates. 
In this chapter, as already mentioned, we will not differentiate between an external 
and an internal history, because biology only later becomes separated as a discipline. 
3.1 The Ancient Views of φύσις – Nature as Organism 
Western thought rises in ancient Greece. There are, of course, also interesting non-
Western conceptions of nature. For example, earlier than all western accounts the 
book I Ching, the Chinese ‘Book of Change’, handed down to us by Confucius 
(c. 551-479 BC), gives a dynamic account of Nature, Cosmos and Humankind.  
I concentrate on Western philosophies, first, because of the limited space of this overview, 
secondly, because of my lack of knowledge of non-Western philosophies and, thirdly, 
because of the predominant influence of Western thought on science. Nonetheless, a more 
complete treatment would need to cover other traditions as well. 
                                                     
210  G. G. Simpson, quoted in R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (1976/1989), p. 1. This corresponds to 
the view that ‘the growth of biological thought’ is largely the story of Darwinism’s triumph over 
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a) From Myth to the Pre-Socratics – The Development of Basic Notions 
Greek thought dawns in a world of magic and myth. In its beginning all ‘things’ were alive 
and animate. The Greek tribes (like presumably most other tribes of prehistoric and 
early recorded historic) were surrounded by forces and ghosts of nature, present in the 
earth, the sea, the trees and the wind. In Greece these primordial dark forces became 
more and more personified, firstly in the pre-Olympian, still matriarchal goddesses 
like Gaia (goddess of the earth), then in the bright, heavenly, anthropomorphic 
Olympians. This living and animate nature (hylozoism) could still be studied in the 
writings of Thales’ (c. 624-546 BC): “pánta plére theon eínai” (all is full of goddesses). 
To Anaximander (c. 610-545 BC) the abstracted essence of being was the Apeiron, the 
indefinite, infinite, and unlimited origin of the universe, which is taken to be the 
source of all properties and all becoming.211 The magic and mystical forces at the 
dawn of Greek thought were believed to be dynamic and ‘fluid’.212 
Although today’s neo-Darwinian view of nature is also dynamic, the magic and 
mystic intuition at the dawn of Greek philosophy does not only differ in the 
methodological respect, but was a dynamics of an ‘enchanted’ nature, alive as a whole, 
including storms and planets. It was not a dynamics of mechanical clockworks or 
puppets of ‘selfish genes’, which in turn are programmed by an eternal law of nature 
or a simple algorithm of mutation and selection.  
It appears that the very first philosophical approaches to φύσις (physis = nature) gave 
direction to the further intellectual development. This might to a certain extent be 
interpreted as an unfolding of ideas which in a different way has already been present 
in the beginning. I will formulate these ideas as three antitheses spanning the 
coordinate geometry of western philosophy of nature.213 
(1) Matter and form: the mentioned philosophers of Miletus in Asia Minor, Thales, 
and in a way also Anaximander, focus on the ‘material’, ούσία, as the essence of being. 
The Phythagoreans in contrast have formulated an antithesis by focusing on the laws 
of number and form, ordering matter.  
(2) Being and becoming: Heraclitus (c. 544-484 BC) believed that everything is 
flowing (πάντα ρεί); whereas the Eleatic Parmenides (c. 540-470 BC) stated that there 
could be no change at all, but only permanent being.  
(3) A resulting third primordial antagonism already present in pre-Socratic thought 
could be found in the conceptions of Democritus (c. 460-370 BC) opposed to those of 
Anaxagoras (c. 500-428 BC): the mechanistic philosophy of Democritus could be 
interpreted as a specific synthesis of the being-becoming and the matter-form an-
tagonism mentioned before. To him the world is built up out of basic elements, out of 
indivisible ‘atoms’. On the one hand elements (matter) appear in a Parmenidian way to 
be eternal, on the other hand he assumes their combination (form) in a Heraclitian 
                                                     
211 A primordial unity of all opposites became a reoccurring motive in the history of philosophy. 
Cf. J. Hirschberger, Geschichte der Philosophie (1948/1991). 
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way to be always in flux. In a similar frame of mind Empedocles (c. 483-425 BC), a 
predecessor of Democritus, stated an early mechanistic theory of evolution. 
Anaximander had pronounced a hypothesis of evolution earlier, assuming a 
development of human beings out of fishlike creatures. Empedocles, and later the 
Roman Lucretius (97-55 BC), more specifically advocated the survival of viable 
random combinations as cause of evolution and may hence be regarded as early 
predecessors of Darwin’s specific theory of evolution. 
Anaxagoras tries to solve the ‘ούσία versus form’-problem and the ‘being versus 
becoming’-problem in different way. He claims that the basic primordial substances, 
out of which the world is build, are σπέρματα (spermata), germs which have the same 
essence like their resulting end-product. So although phenomena obviously do change, 
their essence stays the same. Anaxagoras differed from the later mechanistic monism 
of Democritus in another way: to him the Spirit (νους) is the origin of motion 
of the Universe. 214 
After the stage is now set, two main different basic meanings of the concept of 
nature or φύσις can be detected: firstly the notion ‘nature’ is used for an all-including 
Oneness, understood either holistically or atomistically. Secondly, nature is also 
regarded as a part of this Oneness, and is contrasted with τέχνη (techne = culture, art), 
νους (nous = spirit, reason) and νόμος (nomos = law, moral).215 Today we are still 
aquaintant with these two notions of nature and these antagonisms. 
We will see that Plato and Aristotle built their highly influential philosophical 
systems as a solution of the developments and basic tensions mentioned before. 
b) Platonism – Physis as ‘Techne’ 
Plato (427-347 BC) states his philosophy of nature in the Timaeus, which was highly 
influential during the early medieval period and during the renaissance. Although 
today some aspects of his work may appear shallow or obscure,216 today’s reader 
could still be impressed by his metaphysics, particularly by his theory of ideas, which is 
layed out in the influential dialogues, Politeia, Phaidon, Phaidros and Symposion. 
Plato, like Anaxagoras, opposes a mechanistic and materialistic metaphysics. 
Instead he advocated a synthesis for the matter-form antagonism, for the being-
becoming antagonism and for the physis-nomos antagonism: Behind the actual world, 
which is changing, he assumes the existence of forms, or ideas (ειδος), which are 
eternal. The world is molded not by matter in motion but by these forms. The actual, 
changing world is formed by participating (metexis) in an unchanging world of ideas. 
Later on the actual world has been called mundus sensibilis and the world of ideas 
mundus intelligibilis. The factual world is formed rather in a teleological (causa finalis) 
than in a ‘causal’ (causa efficiens) way. All things are striving to reach their end, their telos 
(τέλος), preformed by these eternal forms. 
                                                     
214  Anaxagoras has even been interpreted as having written a first Greek manifesto of rational 
‘creationism’. D. Sedley, Creationism and Its Critics in Antiquity (2007/2009). 
215 L. Honnefelder, Natur-Verhältnisse (1992), p. 11.  
216 Plato stated that men who have been cowards will be born in their next life as women.  
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Since the nature (as a whole) is ordered by primordial forms, Plato discusses in the 
Timaeus not only ‘nature’ (φύσις) but ‘cosmos’. This cosmos is created by a demiurge. 
The demiurge is not the almighty Christian God, who is creating ex nihilo, but he is 
confronted with eternal matter in the state of chaos. This chaos is transferred into the 
state of order (cosmos) by eternal forms, by the eidos of the demiurge. In this sense, 
nature is harmonious, a thing of art (τέχνη όν), and designed in a rational way.  
Throughout European history of thought, Platonism was not only employed 
within Christian philosophy to harmonise belief with philosophical thinking, but even 
the whole European philosophical tradition has been characterised as a series of 
footnotes to Plato.217 
c) Aristotelianism – Physis as ‘Autopoiesis’ 
Aristotle solves the outlined tensions of the early ancient thought in a modified way. 
With Aristotle (384-322 BC) the form (eidos/morphe) came into being within the world. 
Aristotle accused Plato of dividing the actual world and the eternal world of 
forms/ideas by a gap (chorismos): The one World is doubled in a perceivable and a true 
world. Aristotle hence tried to bridge this gap, or even to unite these two worlds 
again. To him the ideas or forms are immanent within the actual things (eíde en hýle) and 
not transcendent or outside of the actual things (eíde choristá). 
Thus, Aristotle has often been contrasted to Plato. Aristotle is generally regarded 
as a proponent of a nature, active and creative in itself, a self-organising, autopoietic 
nature (αυτο = self, ροίεσις = making), whereas Plato is seen as a proponent of a made 
nature (τέχνη όν). In the terminology of the scholastics the former proposes a creative 
nature (natura naturans), whereas the latter proposes a created nature (natura naturata). 
Although the different emphasis of Plato and Aristotle is not in question, it some authors 
have stressed that similarities of these most influential ancient philosophers are too often 
neglected: Aristotle, but also Plato, for instance, regarded the whole nature or cosmos as an 
organism.218 
Aristotle’s concept of ideas or forms immanent in nature, sheds light on his notion of 
entelecheia (έντελεχεία): A thing which has reached its telos, within its ‘natural’ form. 
The notion ‘entelecheia’ is also used for a possibility, a tendency of a thing to reach its 
form. Aristotle advocats a immanent, not a transcendent teleology. 
This conception of telos is only understandable in the light of Aristotle’s 
aetiology219. Aristotle distinguishes four causes, or better aspects of explanation220: 
(1) causa materialis, the cause of the matter, (2) causa formalis, for example, all notions of 
                                                     
217  A. N. Whitehead. Process and Reality (1929), Part II, Chapter 1, Section 1. 
218 It is being discussed whether this opposition is artificially build up by Aristotle. Aristotle may be 
seen as a completer of Plato instead. (K. Gloy, Das Verständnis der Natur. Die Geschichte des 
wissenschaftlichen Denkens (1995), Volume 1, pp. 108 ff.) 
219 Aristotle, Physics (e.g., Ed. W. D. Ross, 1936/1960), Book II, Chapter 3. The atiology is also 
expounded in the Metaphysics D, 2 and outlined in his zoological books, for example at the 
beginning and the end of the De generatione animalium (e.g., Ed. A. L. Peck, 1943).  
220 The different causes, aitia, are not separable causes, but could only in union furnish a complete 
explanation of natural processes. Ross, Aristotle’s Natural Philosophy (1936/1960), pp. 35-36. 
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species and genera, (3) causa efficiens, closest to modern billiard ball causality, and 
(4) causa finalis, the end, goal or telos (τέλος) of something.  
It is often assumed that modern science rejects the concepts of causa formalis, and causa finalis. 
I am not going to grapple with the fundamental question, whether this assumption is 
correct, but it seems at least questionable whether this assumption is true. Clearly, scientists 
from Francis Bacon onwards have often opposed formal and final causation. However, one 
may question whether this suffices for a general claim; for instance, it is not completely 
implausible that the periodic system in chemistry implicitly makes use of the concept of 
‘ideal forms’ or even of some concept of ‘teleology’ when defining a stable ‘state’. Moreover, 
in some ‘subcultures’ of biology there have even been explicit attempts to employ 
Aristotelian philosophy as a source for evolutionary theory. For example, Hans Driesch221 
(a disciple of Haeckel) in the 1920s focused on the concept of entelecheia. 
Humberto R. Maturana and Francisco J. Varela222 have, since the 1970s, put emphasis on 
the concept of autopoiesis or Rupert Sheldrake223 has, since the 1980s, developed the concept 
of morphogenetic fields. 
Aristotle, coming out of a family where the medical profession was hereditary, was 
very much interested in philosophy of nature and philosophy of science. In his physics 
(φύσικης), he expounded the aetiology outlined and also critically discussed the notion 
of chance224. Moreover, Aristotle (despite again having predecessors) can justly be said 
to have founded biological taxonomy or even biology. His main biological books are 
the Historia animalum; De partibus animalium and De generatione animalium 225. He collected 
many species of animals and by building up a taxonomy he also built up biological 
theories. Aristotle, for example, focused on reproduction as a major feature to 
distinguish species226 and in this respect anticipates schools of modern biology.  
We shall touch upon the influence of Aristotle on modern taxonomy again later on 
( p. 87). In any case, Aristotle’s metaphysics has been highly influential for the 
Western history of ideas.  
3.2 Medieval Philosophy – The Divine De-enchantment of Nature 
In medieval Europe the ideas of the Judaeo-Christian tradition have become 
combined with the described Greek traditions into a fruitful philosophical-religious 
syntesis. This process had several stages: first, the assimilation of Plato’s Timaeus, then, 
in the 13th century the influence of Aristotelianism and, finally, a new influence of 
Plato’s rediscovered works.  
Instead of discussing the details of these stages, the following subsections focus on 
important aspects medieval synthesis. Firstly, I shall point out why the combination of 
Christian and Greek thought had a tendency to undermine itself. Secondly, it will be 
                                                     
221 H. Driesch, The Science & Philosophy of the Organism (1929). 
222 H. R. Maturana, F. J. Varela, Der Baum der Erkenntnis (1984/1987). 
223 R. Sheldrake, Das Gedächtnis der Natur (1988/1991). 
224 Aristotle, Physics (e.g., Ed. W. D. Ross, 1936/1960), Book II, Chapter 4-6. 
225  Other zoological works of Aristotle are: De incessu animalium; De anima; Parva naturalia; De motu 
animalium. It should be noted that it has been argued that some of the zoological books 
attributed to Aristotle, e.g., parts of the Historia Animalium, show traces of other authors. 
226  Aristotle. De Generatione animalium (Ed. A. L. Peck, 1943). 
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shown that Christian thought, despite the decline of medieval scholasticism, still has 
substantially influenced modern Western thought, perhaps even in a dangerous 
way.227 
a) The World as ‘Machina Mundi’ 
Although it may well seem paradoxical, Christianity presumably was a main driving 
force for the demystification of nature: Christianity, as a monotheistic religion, banned 
the goddesses who – according to pagan religions – had animated the trees, the wind 
and the earth. Even the sun and the moon lost their godlike properties.228  
Philo of Alexandria (c.20 BC - c. AD 50) and later on Saint Augustine (354-430) 
harmonised the Judaeo-Christian myth of creation of the Genesis with Platonism, 
equating God’s ideas (which created the world in seven days) with the Platonic 
concept of eidos.229 God, in this perspective, is the transcendent Creator (natura 
naturans), the actual world and what we call nature a mere result of this creation (natura 
naturata). This modified Platonic view is linked with the idea that we could read the 
‘book of nature’ as one may read the Bible. The phrase ‘the book of nature’ was 
coined by Augustine and has given support to design arguments as a potentially 
rational basis for belief in the existence of God. Nonetheless, Augustine likewise 
strongly emphasised theological arguments based on revelation.230 
Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-1274) was predominantly influenced by Aristotelian 
thought. Nonetheless, nature was not godlike to him either. But nor was nature 
machinelike to him: nature is autopoietic, but not created out of itself, but made by 
God, who is the prima causa and the summum bonum.231 
As Platonic thought became revived at the end of the medieval period, the concept 
of eternal forms (one might say paradoxically) often was regarded to be coherent with 
the rise of mechanistic explanations, also referring to eternal, repeatable patterns. 
The living nature of the Greeks had by then died. In the translation of Plato’s 
Timaeus by Chalcidius, which had a huge impact on medieval thought, the term for the 
living cosmos was falsely translated as the “beautiful machine of the world”.232 Despite 
such perhaps contingent facts, the demystification of nature seems to follow the inner 
logic of the synthesis of Greek thought and transcendent Judaeo-Christian 
monotheism. The world as we enter the period of scientific discovery ( pp. 76 f.) 
                                                     
227 Lynn White stated as early as 1967 that Christianity is responsible for the environmental crisis. 
An overview on the controversial discussion about this and its further developments is given by: 
E. Hargrove, Beyond the Lynn White Debate (1986). Without being able to engage in this debate, in 
my view it is as absurd to assume that the present ecological crisis is a monocausal result from 
Christian tenets of the 15th century, as it is to assume that Christianity was not presumably the 
most important underlying and changing driving force which moulded both humanism and 
mechanicism. See e.g., R. Groh, D. Groh, Religiöse Wurzeln der ökologischen Krise (1990/1991), esp. 
pp. 15-16, 35. 
228 Similar: M. Brumlik, Die Gnostiker (1992), p. 15. 
229 R. Groh, D. Groh, Religiöse Wurzeln der ökologischen Krise (1990/1991), p. 18. 
230  Ibid, pp. 22-23.  
231 Th. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (1266-1273/1963-1975). 
232 K. Gloy, Das Verständnis der Natur (1995), Volume 1, pp. 157-158, 166. 
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had already increasingly been seen as a machine (machina mundi) following the eternal 
laws of a transcendent God.  
b) The Human as ‘Alter Deus’  
One of the characteristics of Christianity – and one might cynically add, perhaps one 
of the main reasons for its wide dissemination in the species of homo sapiens – is that its 
ethics is anthropocentric. ‘Love thy neighbour’ refers to interhuman ethics, not to 
ecosystems. But Christianity, of course, does not only advocate the uniqueness of 
mankind because of an egoistic ‘speciesism’. Humans gain this unique position 
according to the Christian framework, because they are regarded as creatures between 
angels and beasts. Man is made “in the image of God and after his likeness”.233 Only 
humans are endowed with some divine properties, like freedom, the ratio recta etc.  
In late scholasticism, for instance Nicholas Cusanus (1401-64) proclaims man to 
be an ‘alter deus’, to be similar to God, especially in his creative abilities. This 
forecasted the modern idea of the creative genus, although throughout the medieval 
period it was also taught that one ought to be humble and content with one’s 
providence. Nevertheless, taken a human being as an alter deus builts one of the 
foundations of the modern emphasis on the individual with unlimited technical 
abilities. Combined with the demystified nature, this may have been a basis of the 
often one-sided and destructive realisation of the biblical instruction “subdue the 
earth and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and 
over every living thing.”234. 
c) Universalia – From Realism to Nominalism 
The emphasis on the creative powers of the individual human is paralleled by an 
important epistemological ‘individualisation’: A traditional realist understanding of 
universalia would regard types (species), like ‘squarehood’ or ‘doghood’235, as existing 
general entities. In contrast, the nominalism predominant in the late medieval period, 
advocated for instance by William Ockham (c. 1285-1348), regarded species as unreal 
(neither ante rem nor in re). Universals were taken to be only abstract notions, merely 
build up in our mind (universalia in intellectu).  
One may call this an ‘individualisation’ in two respects: First, the human being now 
individually constructs the world. Accordingly, traditions are less important than 
before. Secondly, the single individual entity or token is real, not the general 
principle or type.  
The outlined concepts of machina mundi and alter deus, combined with the rise of 
nominalism, provided the raw material from which most modern philosophical 
approaches were constructed. 
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3.3 Modern Philosophy – Nature as Clockwork; Creator as Watchmaker 
During the Renaissance the thought of the ancients was rediscovered in all its 
colourfulness: The books of Plato and Aristotle were again read in their original 
versions, not only their medieval commentaries. The pre-Socratics, like Democritus, 
the Greco-Roman traditions of Epicureanism and Stoicism, but also occult traditions, 
like Cabbalism, gained influence. Within this great motley of Renaissance thought two 
broad intellectual movements stood out, humanism on the one hand and the rise of 
natural science on the other.236  
We will see that these movements still carried on the Christian hidden agenda of 
the human as alter deus, and the universe as machina mundi. This is the case although 
God became less and less important in the course of modern philosophy. 
a) The Rise of Science – 
The Alter Deus Explores the Clockwork of God: Copernicus, Bacon, Newton 
The rise of science corresponded with an increasingly mechanistic account of nature. This 
account was made possible – albeit its differences – by the revival of Platonic thought 
in the late medieval period and in the Renaissance, combined with an increasing 
nominalist materialistic understanding of substance. 
At least most of the early mechanists, like Newton, still thought that they were 
completely consistent with theology, because they had revealed mechanisms that were 
taken to be eternal patterns, the eidos, representing the eternal ideas in the mind of 
god.237 Driven by the notion of the machina mundi of the late medieval period and by 
the monotheistic de-enchantment of nature, the mechanistic understanding of nature 
celebrated one victory after another.  
In the year of his death, Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543), a Polish astronomer 
and orthodox ecclesiastic, published De Revolutionibus Orbium Caelestium, where he 
elaborated the hypothesis that the earth revolves the sun. Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) 
gave a unifying mechanical account of falling bodies and of inertia. Johannes Kepler 
(1571-1630) showed that the movement of the planets is elliptical, which was seen as 
evidence against the Aristotelian (and Copernican) conception that movement is 
naturally circular. But in Kepler’s view still the Platonic-Pythagorean aspect was more 
important than the materialistic one; hence he as an astronomer could regard himself a 
priest of God’s book of nature238. 
Francis Bacon (1561-1626), himself Lord Chancellor of England, formulated the 
subliminal ideology of the flourishing mechanistic science. He banned teleological 
explanations (causa finalis) from science and thereby gave way to modern thought, 
focusing mainly on causa efficiens (causality) and causa materialis (matter). “Inquiry into 
final causes is sterile, and like a virgin consecrated to God, produces nothing.”239 
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Bacon became the highpriest of the new science. Bacon turned against Aristotelianism 
and gave support to Platonism, which then moulded the English philosophy of 
nature.240 He continued and accentuated the Christian zeal of the god-like scientist, 
the alter deus, to read in the ‘book of nature’ and to explore the machina mundi so as to 
change this world. But by dismissing teleological explanations, still central to Platonic 
schoolmen, Bacon contributed to the transformation of English Platonism into a 
mechanical Platonism and finally into mechanical materialism. 
This outlined early scientific, and philosophical241, development culminated in 
Isaac Newton’s (1643-1724) paradigmatic book Philosophia Naturalis Principia 
Mathematica (1687). Nature now had become “this vast Machine of the Universe, the 
wise Production of Almighty God, consisting of a great number of lesser Machines, 
every one of which is adjusted by the same Wisdom in Nature, Weight and 
Measure”242. The metaphor of the machina mundi, which referred at first, in the 
translation of Plato’s Timaeus by Chalcidius ( p. 74), to the living whole of the 
universe – ‘zoon’ –, has changed its meaning to a dead machine, once made by a divine 
constructor and now running without any intervention. 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth century the plain metaphor that the universe is a 
clockwork once made by a divine watchmaker became increasingly common.243 
Kepler for example wrote in a letter that his aim is to show that “celestial machinery is 
not something like a divine living organism, but like a clockwork”244. To him, as to 
Newton and Leibniz these metaphors refer to both a mechanistic universe, but also to 
the eternal harmony once created by a deistic God, who does not interfere with the 
actual world after its initial creation. 
New science, in its early reading, was taken not to undermine theology, but on the 
contrary as providing evidence for a more rational theology. In those times of 
religious struggles, basing theology on a scientific argument of design also seemed to 
prevent dangerous religious disputes.245 Accordingly early modern scientists were still 
often vigorous believers in a deistic, but omniscient, watchmaker, which was much 
more than today’s neo-Darwinian belief in only a ‘blind watchmaker’246.  
                                                     
240  Mentioned by R. Groh, D. Groh, Religiöse Wurzeln der ökologischen Krise (1990/1991), p. 36. 
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b) Humanism – The Alter Deus Replaces the Christian Deus 
The second aspect of Christian dogma shaping modern thought is its humanism. The 
humanistic belief in the value of the human being has been linked to the Christian 
belief in the inherent worth of the human, as being created in the image of God. 
Accordingly humans are regarded as creatures between beasts and divinity. In the 
Renaissance the notion of the human as the alter deus had even be radicalised, by em-
phasising the free and god-like human ability to create and change the physical world.  
Mankind has the right and the duty to understand and to creatively change the 
mechanical world, to make use and even to exploit nature. Correspondingly early 
scientists and engineers explore nature and, based on this knowledge they invent 
machines. Between 1550 and 1750 there was a flood of so-called machine books, 
optimistically linking descriptions of constructions with theological or philosophical 
instructions. Here the argument of design was used the other way round, the 
mechanist, the engineer is constructing machines in analogy to the creating God.247 
Hence as early modern science is linked to the Christian notion of machina mundi, 
the technical construction of machines is linked to the notion of the alter deus. These 
two developments are in the further course of history still interacting: on the one hand 
the understanding of the laws of God’s nature built the basis for building machines, 
on the other hand the metaphor of machina mundi will become reformulated in terms 
of machines current at certain times (e. g. clockwork and today, perhaps, computers). 
Moreover, the predominant belief in the value of the human being served and still 
serves as a basis of most systems of Western ethics. Although the notion of God 
through Reformation, deism, agnosticism and atheism had been increasingly removed 
from the modern Weltbild, the idea of human value is still with us. The alter deus, with 
all his creativity and freedom, replaced the deus of Christianity. Humankind has 
followed the Christian demand and became almost god-like. We learned to create 
nearly everything: materials, machines, artificial environments like houses and, today, 
by genetic engineering even organisms and, in principle, humans themselves. Hence, 
there seems to be less and less need for the notion of God as creator. 
By means of this removal of the Christian god, modern philosophy became 
confronted with two fundamental problems: 
(1) Ethics increasingly emphasised the notion of the alter dues, the human 
individual. Today the partly divine human nature, and therefore its ethical value, has 
come under attack ( already pp. 51). We recognise an irony of history: The Christian 
belief in human value is, by realising its consequences and by replacing God, in danger 
of undermining itself. – It is one main modern task to build an ethical system not 
based on God, but on reason. This can be seen as trying to build humanism 
independently of its own original basis. The alternative would be to build it on 
reasoning, which is of course itself a very humanistic notion with its own religious 
inhertance. Paradoxically, philosophers of the enlightenment, often involuntarily, 
saved and carried on the Christian (and modern) hidden agenda to emphasise the 
unique human value. 
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(2) Ethics is under attack from the – also Christian based – belief in a mechanic 
universe. If the first problem, to give reason for the value of the human and humane, 
is not solved, an inclination arises for the mechanistic view of nature to be also 
applied to humanity itself. Hence the balanced dichotomy of mechanistic nature on 
the one hand and partly divine human nature on the other is in danger of collapsing 
into a mechanistic monism. This mechanistic approach would exactly destroy that 
value, which it once aimed to support. It was especially Darwin who will move the 
boundaries between machina mundi and alter deus, as he gave a largely mechanistic 
account of biology and at least the origin of humankind.  
Early modern philosophical accounts have still tried to keep the balance of the 
concept of human uniqueness and the concept of a mechanistic universe. Descartes’ 
dualistic philosophy can be regarded as the first modern attempt to combine, on the 
one hand, the increasingly mechanistic assumptions of physics and astronomy, and, 
on the other, the uniqueness of the human and humane. 
c) Descartes and Kant – Dualism of Human Freedom and the Clockwork of Nature 
René Descartes (1596-1650), educated at the Jesuit college of La Flèche, is normally seen 
as ‘the father of modern philosophy’, and, despite generations of further predecessors, 
I think rightly. His first, and he thinks undeniable premise after all his Cartesian 
doubt, is the ‘cogito ergo sum’ – not God. Although Descartes ‘proves’ the existence of 
God in the second step, it is important that in the first step it was possible for him, to 
start with the assumption of an evil deceitful demon, who was using his powers to 
voluntarily mislead the one how seeks for the truth. 
The absolute certainty of the cogito, of the “I doubt, therefore I think, therefore I 
am”, paradoxically carries on the Christian belief in the uniqueness of the human 
being. However, in its modern subjectivist form this belief is completely altered, we 
cannot be sure in our individual value because of God, but because we daubt 
everything including God. Following his argument, the first thing one can conclude 
from the cogito is that there is a sum, in Latin this means ‘I’ characterised by its 
thinking. If we are thinking, the first thing which is necessary given is a ‘thinking 
thing’ (res cogitans). It is crucial that this thinking thing is defined completely 
independent from the body. 
The second key notion of Descartes’ dualism is the material ‘extended thing’ 
(res extensa). Descartes gives the example of wax, which loses its qualities when it is 
heated. According to Descartes this example shows that qualities are changing and 
only matter, whose essence is extension, persists. Descartes, himself also a significant 
mathematician and scientist, shared the mechanical and deterministic view at which 
the physics and astronomy of his time had arrived. In Le Monde an early treatise of him 
on physics, he had already abandoned the scholastic concept of form. The complete 
transformation of Platonism resulted in a mechanistic, atomistic approach applied to 
all ‘things’ apart form the human res cogitans. Descartes “regarded the bodies of men 
and animals as machines; animals he regarded as automata, governed entirely by the 
laws of physics, and devoid of feeling or consciousness. [...] If we knew enough, we 
should be able to reduce chemistry and biology to mechanics; the process by which a 
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seed develops into an animal or a plant is purely mechanical.”248 By this the 
Aristotelian idea of entelecheia and self-organisation (autopoiesis) had been ruled out – as 
is important in this context – also in biology.  
The Cartesian position, like other dualist philosophies of a free mind and a 
determined body, implies – driven by the dyadic notions of the alter deus and the 
machina mundi – two of the most grave modern philosophical problems.  
(1) Starting from the side of alter deus or res cogitans, how could the gulf to the 
machina mundi or res extensa be bridged? This is the radicalised modern question of 
epistemology and truth.  
(2) Starting from the side of machina mundi or res extensa, how could the gulf to the 
alter deus or res cogitans be bridged? This is the main modern question of ontology, 
anthropology or, more precisely, the modern mind-body problem. 
 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), the most significant philosopher of the enlightenment, 
carried on Descartes’ approach to save ethics in a deterministic Newtonian 
phenomenal world, by giving it a subjectivist turn. Kant “found it necessary to deny 
knowledge, in order to make room for faith”249. He went on with David Hume’s 
(1711-76) sceptical answer to the epistemological question, which Hume applied even 
to causal explanations in general, the core of the prevailing Newtonian physics. Kant 
agreed with Hume that we could not conclude from mere associations on a causal 
structure of reality. He states that although there is something out there, it is basically 
not possible to get knowledge about the ‘thing in itself’ (Ding an sich).  
But Kant again retained some features of the world of appearances by his 
conceptual shift, similar to the shift of Copernicus, who found that we should seek 
“the observed motions not in the heavenly bodies, but in their observer”250: To Kant 
space and time are still existent in the sense that they are necessary conditions of our 
sensibility. Causality, likewise, is a necessary notion to make our experience possible. 
Kant calls this type of notion ‘category’ (‘Kategorie’ or ‘Verstandesbegriff a priori’).251 With 
his subjectivist stance, at least in an epistemological sense, Kant is part of the 
individualistic current of his time, which has – as we have seen – reaches back to the 
veneration of the human being as alter deus. However, by his subjectivist stance Kant 
distances himself from the deist Newtonian view, that the eternal mathematical clock-
work of nature is created by God, as clockmaker. To Kant the rational being – the 
human – ‘creates’ God, as an ‘idea of reason’ only imposed by us to the world. These 
ideas of reason could neither be proved, nor disproved. 
Besides the subjectivist approach Kant also shares with Descartes some sort of 
dualism. In his third critique ‘Kritik der Urteilskraft’ he gave an outline of his whole 
‘transcendental’ philosophy: Accordingly philosophy is divided into two distinct parts; 
                                                     
248 B. Russell, History of Western Philosophy (1946/1961/1991), pp. 545-546. 
249 I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781/1787), B, p. XXX. Original: “Ich mußte also das Wissen 
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251 Ibid, A, p. 80, B 106. 
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practical philosophy, which is based on our knowledge a priori of the moral law and 
our freedom and theoretical philosophy, which is based on our knowledge a priori of 
nature.252 The border between the worlds of practical and theoretical reason now cuts 
through the single subject: the totally causally determined self within the physical 
world and the self as a completely free rational being. 
Kant in the second part of the Critique of Judgement tries to bridge the gap of these 
two approaches in his philosophy of biology. Although Kant in his theoretical 
philosophy had come, despite his subjectivist-logical turn, to similar results to 
Newton’s, and phenomena (not noumena or Dinge an sich) were regarded as moving 
causally determined (causa efficiens) and machine-like in space and time, Kant in the 
third critique – at least to some extent – also re-established the notion of teleology 
(causa finalis) as an organising (regulative) principle, which connects our knowledge of 
nature and of moral truth.253 Hereby Kant’s philosophical account of biology, partly 
inspired by the reading of J. F. Blumenbach, turned against an exclusively mechanistic 
picture of the organism. Organisms are both their own cause and effect. The parts of 
an organism are according to Kant only understandable when referring to the whole: 
different from a clock they exist not only for the other parts of the whole, but because 
of the other parts.254 Teleology, in Kant’s view, helps us to structure our perception of 
the deterministic nature for the use of practical philosophy. But to Kant this regulative 
principle is only a useful intellectual tool to structure the multitude of appearances, 
not like causality a constitutive necessary one.255 (For example, – according to Kant – it 
is reasonable to say that the photosynthesis is a means to the end of supplying energy 
for the plant’s metabolism. Nevertheless any understanding will be fundamentally also 
be causal.)  
In summary then, in Kant’s transcendental philosophy, with his great new answer 
to the epistemological problem, the concept of machina mundi is carried on within 
theoretical reason by the mainly causally determined universe of appearances, and the 
concept of the alter deus is in a sublime way carried on by the freedom within practical 
reason. He tries to make both realms compatible by introducing teleology as a 
regulative idea. Hence, it has been possible to Kant to be impressed by both, “the 
starry heavens above me and the moral law within me”256. 
                                                     
252 I. Kant. Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790/1793/1799), pp. XVI-XX. 
253 Ibid, Part II. 
254  Mentioned in: M. Weingarten, Organismen – Objekte oder Subjekte der Evolution (1993), pp. 18, 21-
22. R. J. Richards, The Meaning of Evolution (1992), pp. 22 f. 
255 I. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790/1793/1799), p. 270. 
256 Idem, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (1788), pp. 288-289. Original: “der bestirnte Himmel über mir 
und das moralische Gesetz in mir” (translation by the author). 
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d) Idealism and Romanticism – The Dynamic Trial of a Unification 
 
“It is One force, One interplay and weaving. One drive and impulsion to ever higher life.” 
 
Schelling, 1800-1801. 
(i) ‘Naturphilosophie’ and Idealism 
Building on Kant’s conception that all appearances (phenomena), are formed by our 
own sensibility, understanding and reason, and on Kant’s conception of the freedom 
of (practical) reason, the philosophers of German Idealism changed and radicalised 
Kant’s approach completely. Inspired by Spinoza, they tried to give a unified account 
of what Kant had torn into two pieces. They eliminated the ‘thing in itself’, and built 
up a pure (transcendental) Geistesphilosophie, which should comprise both parts, nature 
and what we might call human logos or nous. 
Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) starts in his main work, Wissenschaftslehre, with 
the I (Ich). The first necessary distinction is that the absolute I sets the ‘Non-I’ 
(Nicht-Ich), and by this also a ‘remaining’ I.257 This is the distinction of world and self, 
which all of us experience within ourselves.  
Friedrich Wilhelm J. Schelling (1775-1854) turned this subjective Idealism of the 
young Fichte, into an ‘objective’ one. Influenced by Spinoza’s pantheistic idea of the 
Deus sive Natura, God is to Schelling the absolute I. This ‘I’, the ‘I’ of God or of the 
whole of primordial nature, develops against its own resistance, in opposed forces of 
productivity (natura naturans) and inhibition (natura naturata), throughout all stages of 
nature and human reason. To Schelling nature has been alive from its very beginning, 
and it is rather the permanent than the change which needs to be explained. Nature is 
not a machine but an organism and a soul. This approach radicalised Kant’s criticism 
of an exclusively mechanistic account of the biological world, a criticism also present 
in the accounts of the early Naturforscher Blumbach, Wolf and Kielmeyer.258 Schelling 
already advocated an unfolding of nature, an evolution in the much more original sense 
of the word (ex-volvere), although he emphasised an idealised, theoretical and partly a 
prioric conception, and not an empirical one. This (ideal) development culminates and 
has its end in humanity, where nature comes to consciousness.259 
Schelling’s objective idealism and also Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s (1749-1832) 
holism strongly moulded the idealist or romantic understanding of nature. The poetic 
movement of romanticism was also influenced by Kant and the romantic 
philosophers. For example, the English romantic poets Blake, Wordsworth, Coleridge, 
                                                     
257 J. G. Fichte, Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre (1794), I., p. 104. 
258 T. Lenoir, The Göttingen School and the Development of Transcendental Naturphilosophie in the Romantic 
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philosophie were: Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur (1797), Von der Weltseele (1798/1806/1809), 
Erster Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie (1799).  
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Keats, Byron, Shelley and Scott – albeit speaking a more poetic language – share many 
views with these philosophers.260 
The notion of romanticism, like most interesting abstract notions, is at once indispensable and 
misleading. There are many different meanings of the term, slightly differing from literature 
to the sciences, from country to country. Often especially in the English speaking countries 
‘Romanticism’ is used in a quite broad sense, closely linked to the work of Rousseau, the rise 
of objective idealism, to the work of Schelling, Hegel and Goethe. Historically speaking the 
period between 1790-1830 and into the 19th century is meant.  
But although I am also going to use ‘romanticism’ in this broad sense, it has to be noted 
that Goethe, for example, never considered himself a Romantic. German history of 
literature traditionally distinguishes between Klassik, and Frühromantik, Hochromantik, 
Spätromantik. Kant although often subsumed under romanticism in this broad sense261, 
conceptually and in stile was at odds even with the idealists who abandoned any ‘thing in 
itself’. Also his sober style contrasts with the rather poetic romantics. Also Hegel actually 
turned against Romanticism in its more strict sense. There are also other terms to cover a 
more specific meaning not so closely linked with the strongly poetic attitude of the 
Romantics, like Naturphilosophie, German idealism, morphology etc.  
Still the broad meaning of Romanticism, is useful to contrast the sketched 
Naturphilosophie against a purely mechanistic approach to Nature. Later on we will distinguish 
different schools of biology ( see also pp. 92 f.). 
Also some scientists had been strongly influenced by idealist or romantic approach to 
understand nature. Romantic Naturforscher (literally: investigators of nature) actually 
played, as historical research has shown, an important role in the so-called ‘Second 
Scientific Revolution’.262 Romantic scientists, like the physicists Johann Wilhelm 
Ritter263 (1776-1810) and Hans Christian Ørsted264 (1777-1851), the chemist 
Humphry Davy265 (1778-1829) and to a certain extent his assistant Michael Faraday, 
the biologists ( pp. 95 f.) Lorenz Oken (1779-1851) and Joseph Henry Green (1791-
1863), the geographer Alexander von Humboldt (1769-1859) and many others were 
crucial in founding and inspiring many of our today’s disciplines. “We can no longer 
simply assent to Justus von Liebig’s view that Naturphilosophie was the Black Death of 
the nineteenth century.”266 
Besides a new scientific approach, the ideal of Bildung was the other basis of the central role 
of Romanticism in the Second Scientific Revolution. Especially in Germany there was a 
“radical call for ‘die Neuerschaffung der Universität aus dem Geist des deutschen Idealismus’ (‘the new 
                                                     
260 There is much material on this topic. E.g., M. Sherwood, Undercurrents of Influence in English 
Romantic Poetry (1934/1971). 
261 A difference in usage is annotated e.g., in D. v. Engelhardt, Wissenschaft und Philosophie der Natur 
um 1800 (1994), p. 257. For examples of a broad usage see: A. Cunningham, N. Jardine, 
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creation of the university out of the spirit of German idealism’).” The discussion about the 
new creation of the university started from the “first principles, and extended from the 
nature of Bildung”267. The philosophers, Schelling, Fichte, Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-
1834), Wilhelm v. Humboldt (1767-1835), Friedrich v. Schiller (1759-1805) and also Kant, 
most of them at least associated with idealism or romanticism, played the leading role in this 
movement, also in practical terms, founding the new Humboldt University of Berlin. 268 
Romantic ideas have also been influential on the founders of London University and within 
the United States.269 
Some of the previously mentioned scientists, like Ørsted, are utterly critical of the 
obscure and sometimes, in their view, false way Schelling used empirical 
propositions.270 Because of this and because of their at least partly empirical 
orientation, it seems sensible to distinguish Romantic Naturforschung and 
Naturphilosophie271. Apart from this, the romantic scientists share with romantic 
philosophers their basic tenets. By introducing these tenets into science, they have 
already favoured evolutionism ( pp. 95 f.) and paradoxically at least prepared the 
ground for Darwinism, which then vigorously attacked the remaining Romantics. 
(ii) Unity, Dynamism and Organicism 
Now three defining aspects of Romantic Naturphilosophen or Naturforscher shall be 
outlined.272 
Unity: To Romantic philosophers and Romantic scientists, following Spinoza’s 
conception of one substance, the idea of ultimate unity of the world (and by this of 
the absolute I, of god) was central: they claimed that there is an unity of nature and 
culture, a unity of mind and body, a unity of forces, a unity of body plans and a unity 
of the scientific and the artistic enterprise. 
Nature and culture are not the opposed realms of necessity and freedom. Nature 
and culture are both alive and organic, they are one unity, developed out of the same 
origin, understandable with the same historico-genetic method. Advocates of 
objective idealism advocated a necessary ‘logical’ unfolding of logos. Corresponding to 
these tenets the Romanticists and Idealists also tried to unify the subjective 
(knowledge) and objective (nature) side of consciousness.273 Owing to this urge for 
unity many of the leading Romantic scientists were both scientists and artists or 
philosophers, like Davy, Goethe, Oken and Ritter. One of the features which 
commonly drove the romantic scientists was this urge for unification and the search 
                                                     
267 E. S. Shaffer, Romantic Philosophy and the Organization of the Disciplines [...] (1990), p. 38 (both 
quotes). 
268 In the ideas of university and Bildung the other romantic tenets are recurring: the concept of 
freedom of thought recurs in the concept of scientific freedom; the ultimate unity of all 
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270 H. A. M. Snelders, Oersted’s Discovery of Electromagnetism (1990). 
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for a uniting force behind different forces. With the discovery of electromagnetism 
Ørsted united the previously separated physical forces electricity and magnetism; 
Ritter discovered that ultra-violet rays belong to the electromagnetic spectrum; Davy 
could introduce the fundamental conception of chemistry that chemical affinity and 
electricity are manifestations of one power. The tenet that all force is one “led some 
men of science in the next generation towards the conception of conservation of 
energy”274.  
In all fields of thought, and also in applied areas as education and politics the Romantic 
tenet of unity was present. For example in politics Fichte was one of the main promoters of 
the unity, still limited, of Germany and the biologist Oken got involved in the Wartburgfest, a 
political feast for German freedom and unity. 
Dynamism: The unity of nature and culture is essentially complemented by the idea of a 
new and common history of nature and culture.275 The “unfolding of a generative 
history of nature through an ‘original intuition’”276 is the aim of Schelling’s 
Naturphilosophie. Similar approaches were taken by the late Fichte, Friedrich Hölderlin 
(1770-1843), Novalis (Freiherr v. Hardenberg, 1772-1801) and Johann Gottlieb 
v. Herder (1744-1803).  
Although Schelling had not built up an empirical but an ideal or transcendental 
evolutionary scheme, this ideogenesis or ‘dynamic evolution’ built the intellectual 
foundation for the application of the historical-genetic method in science and art, and 
the theory of descent within biology and for evolutionism and transformism in 
general: “The eighteenth century begins to perceive nature as subject to change.”277 
Many cosmological and geological studies state the transformation of nature, which 
suggests the transformation of the animated nature as well.278  
Idealist and romantic biology emphasised both the notion of form or body plan 
and the notion of transformation (for details  pp. 95 f.). Many idealist and romantic 
authors (e. g. L. Oken, C. G. Carus, G. R. Treviranus, F. Tiedemann, J. F. Meckel and 
E. R. Serres, and already K. F. Kielmeyer and J. H. F. Autenrieth) combined these two 
notions within the concept of a recapitulation, that embryos of higher animals pass 
through stages of lower animals. Embryogeny repeats zoogeny. This concept of 
recapitulation, the ‘law of parallelism’ or Meckel-Serres law became closely bound to 
the notion of ‘evolution’.279 
In 1801 Henrik Steffens (1773-1845) explicitly speaks of “a ‘theory of evolution’, 
but in the sense of an idealist”280. The romantic palaeontologist Georg August 
Goldfuss (1782-1848) argued 1826 in favour of an actual metamorphosis of the 
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animal kingdom, “similar to that of the foetus, its periods being contemporary with 
the formation periods of the globe.”281 “It cannot be overemphasised that the task of 
Naturphilosophie was primarily historical, and Oken’s definition makes this patent. 
Naturphilosophie had to demonstrate how the universe originated, and to reconstruct its 
development or Entwicklung from the original Idea thought by God to its highest 
manifestation as man.”282 This concept of an Entwicklung, of an ‘evolution’ is a deeply 
romantic one, which Darwin, surely did not invent but only changed and connected 
with other concepts ( pp. 163 f.). 
Organicism: A third important tenet of romantic Naturforschung is the analogy 
between Nature and developing organisms: the gestation of nature. The romantics 
certainly were hostile to the enlightenment’s mechanical account of nature. The whole 
is taken to be more than an accumulation of parts. In morphology, Naturforscher 
emphasised the notion of the archetype (present in Kant’s Critique of Judgement) search-
ing, like Goethe, for unifying body plans. To Kant and even more to the idealist and 
romantic Naturforscher organisms are their own sources of activity, with a formative 
active striving, a Blumenbachian-Schellingian Bildungstrieb. Nature is not a mechanism, 
but alive, or a “slumbering spirit”.283 In the poems of the great romantic chemist 
Davy “nature is not ‘it’ but [...] ‘she’; personified and active, ‘natura naturans’ rather 
than ‘natura naturata’, in progress rather than complete: God is working his purpose 
out.”284  
(iii) The Breakdown of Romantic Science 
Apart from the massive sublime influence of Romanticism on science, generally 
Romanticism has finally failed its quest to build up a unified, holistic framework of 
human knowledge. The positivist account seized power in science in general and also 
in biology. Of course, we know today – and this has been long ignored285 – that even 
positivist accounts were strongly influenced by Romanticism. Especially the belief in 
the ultimate reality and unity of forces and also the dynamic account of nature and 
culture became accepted basic assumptions in science and art. Still, apart from these 
influences, the different positivistic, mainly mechanistic paradigm took over. 
But why then had Romanticism and Objective Idealism failed? Although the 
answer is presumably highly complex, I will try to provide a provisory one: I think 
Romanticism and Objective Idealism were from their beginning basically one-sided. 
Despite the romantic aim to unify, to synthesise the (seemingly) opposed realms of 
subject and object, of ‘I’ and world, of nature and culture, Fichte and later Schelling 
built their systems only on one of Kant’s ‘two worlds’: they mainly built their system 
on the side of the freedom of reason, on the side of the transcendental I. Although it 
might be their merit to emphasise the necessity of (a priory) rational construction 
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within science, at least some proponents of this approach underestimated the 
importance of empirical testability. Because of this, many concepts, especially the trans-
cendental constructions of the genius Schelling, ‘lost ground’ and became cryptic. 
Romanticism became dominantly “poetic and aesthetic”286 and in parallel many 
different creative ideas arose. Even Science was pluralistic and speculative. Novalis 
declared: “The ways of contemplating nature are innumerable”287. At its worst, ‘facts’ 
of science were ignored: D. H. F. Link, “a most respected Naturforscher [...] complained 
that the Naturforscher had been advised to forget everything he had learned.”288 
Because of these reasons Th. H. Huxley – the bitter enemy of Owen –, who became 
“probably the single most influential and destructive English-speaking critic of the 
‘metaphorical mystifications’ of ‘Naturphilosophie’ opposed sharply the ‘wild-eyed 
speculations’, ‘oracular utterances’ and general verbal gymnastics of the 
unruly Romantics”.289 
Still, Objective Idealism and Romanticism founded an impressive body of 
speculation and knowledge, and in my opinion it was wrong to dismiss this current 
altogether. True, I do not see a straight way back to this paradigm, but we may still 
regard this paradigm as an old sunken treasure, containing perhaps not only false 
strings of pearls. Especially in biology we might find conceptions ( pp. 95 f.), which 
have been neglected by the mainly mechanistic account of the positivist successors.  
Moreover, ideas of romanticism moulded the epochs to come, even long after the 
end of the Romantic era.290 However, on the side of philosophy romanticism got 
deprived of its central idealistic assumptions and was changed to a hollow dynamism, 
found in the philosophy of will and then in the philosophy of life. On the side of 
science the concept of evolution was carried on, but in an increasingly different 
positivistic and mechanistic framework. 
3.4 The Rise of Biology as Science – 
Torn between Eternal Form and Evolution 
Aristotle founded European biological taxonomy and biology two thousand years 
earlier than Linnaeus and he was highly influential not only during the medieval ages 
but at least till the 18th century. For example, only Lamarck renamed Aristotle’s 
classification of all animals into ‘blooded’ and ‘bloodless’ as ‘vertebrates’ and 
‘invertebrates’.291 Aristotle’s general philosophy has already been mentioned before 
( p. 72), and here only his influence on taxonomy will be mentioned. 
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Aristotle had already described more than 500 species and arranged them in his 
Historia animalium (History of Animals) hierarchically along what was later called the 
scala naturae (Great Chain of Being). He had also included man among the quadrupeds.  
After translations of Aristotle’s zoological works from Arabic292, scholastic 
‘biologists’ from the thirteenth century on were strongly influenced by Aristotle. But 
they passed over the dynamic and reproductive aspects of Aristotle’s theory. The 
scholastics emphasised our proximity to angels and removed humans from nature.293 
So it is important to distinguish between the ancient, and the mediaeval Aristotle. The 
scholastics transformed Aristotle’s hierarchical taxonomy into a linear Great Chain of 
Being, with its origin rather in God than in matter, normally conceived in a 
completely static sense.294 
It was only in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century that biology emerged as a 
specialised science. Although Linnaeus and Buffon made important steps in building up 
this science, they were both still general naturalists, also working on the kingdom of 
minerals and on geological development.  
Around 1800 several authors independently announced the birth of ‘biology’ as a 
new scientific discipline. The term ‘biology’ emphasised a specific methodology for 
studying organisms and was coined in contrast, on the one hand, to mere descriptions 
or classifications of nature and, on the other hand, to the exclusive mechanistic 
account predominant in physics: In 1797 Roose and in 1800 Burdach295 coined this 
term. In 1802 Treviranus announced the birth of a new scientific discipline296 and 
almost in parallel, Lamarck made a similar application of the term ‘biology’.297 
It is difficult to structure the manifold different biological theories of that time – a 
time before the regime of Darwinism gave biology a unifying framework. Although 
many disputes are often described dichotomically, I think it is reasonable to 
distinguish at least the following three dominant groups:298 
 
(1) Romanticising Materialistic Biology, focusing on the transmutation of species or 
organisms. 
(2)  Transcendental Biology, with the central concept of a necessary form or structure of 
an organism. 
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(3) Romantic (and German Idealist) Biology, with the concept of the unfolding of nature 
(evolution in the literal sense). This concept combines an emphasis on structure 
and on development of nature. 
 
After a section on Linnaeus these groups will be described successively (section b, c 
and d). In conclusion I will once again give a comparative overview to justify this 
classification. 
a) Hierarchical Taxonomy instead of ‘Scala Naturae’ – Linnaeus 
Carl Linnaeus (1707-1778), also called Carl von Linné, is often regarded as the ‘father’ 
of modern biological taxonomy. Of course there were also ‘grandparents’ in the early 
modern era, who could not be treated here.299 
Linnaeus worked on all three classical kingdoms of nature, vegetable, animal and 
mineral. His hierarchical taxonomic ‘tree’ (each entity is only part of one higher entity) 
had five levels: class, order, genus, species and variety. Since Philosophia botanica (1751) 
Linnaeus gave organisms generally two-word names, denoting their genus and species. 
He overcame the habit of longer and transient phrase-names, which themselves gave a 
short description and contrasted the animal with other animals300. Certainly, he did 
not always display a ‘natural’ order, but at least he founded a stable, communicable 
and internationally accepted system of classification, which became a common basis 
for modern biology. 
Linnaeus’ system was by no means created ex nihilo. He adopted parts of his 
structure and many names from Aristotle. For example, the names of the classes in 
which he divided the animal kingdom (Aves, Amphibia, Pisces, Insecta, Vermes and 
Quadrupedia) are derived from the Latin translations of terms used already by Aristotle. 
Linnaeus himself only coined the class label ‘Mammalia’, replacing the Aristotelian 
term ‘Quadrupedia’ in later editions of his Systema Naturae.301 
In his first and canonical 10th edition (1735/1758) of his Systema naturae he 
classified men very closely to monkeys. In the first edition he lumped men together 
with them under the Anthropomorphia division of the Quadrupedia and later he put Homo 
sapiens together with Homo troglodytes (orang-utan) under the genus Homo.302 
It is obvious that such a mere classification is not free of any implicit theory. The 
way Linnaeus described and ordered nature has many theoretical and even socio-
political303 aspects. Linnaeus believed in the rational order of God’s creation, in the 
fixity of species (in his later days at least in the fixity of major groups) and because of 
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this in the possibility of an adequate taxonomy of clearly distinguished taxons. On the 
other hand, this taxonomy could also be seen as a preparation for the overcoming of 
the idea of a linear order of a scala naturae: his hierarchical tree-formed taxonomy is the 
basis for the scientific conception of phylogenesis as a branching process with a com-
mon descent, stated by transformists like Geoffroy St. Hilaire and later on by Darwin. 
b) Romanticising Materialistic Biology – Buffon, Lamarck 
I call this school – in an apparent contradiction in terms – ‘Romanticising’ Materialistic 
Biology, because the father of this school, Buffon, who could be regarded as the first 
modern ‘biologist’ who proposed evolutionism, is not only commonly regarded as a 
materialist, but had also been strongly influenced by Spinoza, a favourite of the 
German Romantic philosophers. 
Gorges-Louis Leclerc Comte de Buffon (1707-1988) was the first influential modern 
naturalist who speculated about the transformation of species. He not only very early 
introduced some philosophical concepts to biology, but he also gave an example of 
great scholarly work, especially with his main work Histoire naturelle (1749-1789), which 
when completed, consisted of 36 volumes.  
Buffon disputed Linnaeus’ system304and focused himself not so much on the 
abstract and fixed definition of animals, but studied living animals in their natural 
surroundings, focusing on geographical differences.305 He defined species in terms of 
the possibility of interbreeding rather than morphology.306 He realised differences of 
species in different ecosystems which led him to speculations about why these 
differences arise: species can, according to him, to a certain extent adapt to their 
environment, but they could also degenerate and become extinct. At first, he believed 
that all of today’s species derived from 40 prototypical species, while the late Buffon 
even played with the idea of common descent. 307 When Buffon in 1749 proclaimed 
his theory of the formation of the earth, he called forth a strong critical response, 
particularly on religious grounds. But in 1778, when he published Les époches de la nature 
(The Epochs of Nature), a supplementary volume to his Histoire naturelle, he was only 
perfunctorily criticised for his claim that human history is only the last of seven 
epochs of the development of nature.308 
Buffon’s philosophical background is – as mentioned earlier – not sufficiently 
described by simply calling him a materialist. It is indeed true that he dismissed the 
doctrine of final causes: “Those who believe they can answer these questions by final 
causes do not perceive that they take the effect for the cause”309. But unlike Denis 
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Diderot (1713-1784) and Paul Baron d’Holbach (1723-1789), his ultimate constituents 
of Nature were living and active. Although Buffon used a deistic language, he had a 
pantheistic philosophy, originating in Spinoza’s ‘deus sive natura’ (God or Nature). Even 
more explicitly Jean Baltiste Robinet (1735-1820) presented a view of 
cosmic vitalism.310 
Jean-Baptiste de Lamarck (1744-1829) stated his explicit theory of evolution at the 
Muséum National d’Histoire Naturelle (National Museum of Natural History) in Paris, 
which was founded during the French revolution with the commission to build up a 
rational biology “that would mirror the rationality of the new France and would 
distance it from the chaotic medievalism of the ancien régime”311 
Lamarck was influenced by Buffon, whose son he tutored and who had, in pre-
revolutionary times, been the administrator of the Jardin du Roi, which in 1793 was 
reorganised partially by Lamarck as the new museum.  
Like Buffon, Lamarck was a convinced evolutionist. Lamarck thought of a time 
scheme of millions of years for earth history and continental changes. He was 
convinced of the transformation of animals as a consequence of his geological 
theory,312 through his biological studies of the mollusc collection of the Paris 
Museum313. Corresponding to his optimistic revolutionary zeal he strongly believed in 
an ‘upward’ progression also in nature. Despite this and although later in history 
saltationist theories were subsumed under the term Lamarckism, Lamarck himself 
was, like Darwin, not an advocate of essentialism and was convinced of the 
gradualness of evolutionary change.314 In this sense he has to be, along with Darwin, 
contrasted with the essentialism of transcendental and romantic biology.  
In his early writings Lamarck assumed only one scale315 of rising complexity. By 
this he (implicitly) took over the Christian idea of the Great Chain of Being and 
‘dynamised’ it. Because of this unidirectional process, extinction does not play an 
important role in his system. Although the branching remained less central to him 
than later on to Darwin, from 1800 to 1815 he progressively replaced the picture of a 
linear upward progression by that of a branching tree.316 
But to Lamarck the organisms were not objects but agents of this upward directed 
evolutionary process. Active individuals – like revolutionaries – “take their fate into 
their own hands”.317 First in his Discours d’ouverture (1800), then in his Système des 
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animaux sans vertèbres (1801) and in his Philosophie Zoologique (1809) species “transformés 
en une espèce nouvelle, distincte de l’autre”318. Animals are able to face the change of 
the environment, by actively changing their behaviour, which in turn causes a change 
of their physical properties. In this sense new characters were not directly introduced 
by the environment, but produced as a response to the environment by the internal 
activities of the organism. Acquired properties are not lost in each generation, but they 
are inherited. 319 
Although Lamarck was a materialist to whom nature was mainly “a law-bound sys-
tem of matter in motion”320, who did not believe in essentialism or teleology, I think it 
is still correct and necessary to describe him also, like Buffon, with the adjective ‘ro-
manticising’, because his materialism was not based on Newton’s mechanical vision, 
but on the idea that matter has “self-creating powers and self-developing energies”321.  
c) Transcendental and Essentialist Biology – Cuvier, (early) Owen, Agassiz 
The term ‘Transcendental Philosophy’ is normally applied to Kant and his followers. 
It also refers in general to a philosophy built on philosophical knowledge a priori.322 
Knowledge a priori is a necessary precondition to our understanding and is not 
empirically but in a logical sense true. ‘Transcendental Biology’ would consequently 
mean the basic biological knowledge derived from such concepts a priori. 
Kant, especially to his Critique of Teleological Judgement, tried to give a unifying 
account of mechanistic and teleological principles. Apart from a certain rehabilitation 
of teleology as a regulative idea, he also formulated the (regulative) concept of a 
fundamental uniting ground plan of an organism.323 Kant already at least considered 
the possibility of evolution with common descent.324 Still Kant’s main focus is on 
necessary structure (now in an aprioric sense), whereas biologists in the wrake of 
German idealism and then romanticism focused on the evolutionary unfolding of 
structure in time. Although structure is taken to unfold dynamically, it is, in this 
tradition, often taken to unfold with some structural necessary. Due to the relations 
between these schools of thought, the line between transcendental and romantic 
biology is blurred. Here transcendental biology, however, is grouped together with 
essentialist biology, due to its stress on necessary structure.  
Romanticism in the broad sense, particularly in the Anglophone world, has been used to cover 
biological accounts, including transcendental biologist as well as romantic biologists 
( p. 82). Transcendental biologists and romantic biologists may be distinguished by 
referring either predominantly to Kant or to Schelling. But Schelling built his system of 
Naturphilosophie on some aspects of Kant’s more rigorous transcendentalism, and some 
biologists also have changed their views along these lines. Moreover, although many 
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biologists of that time had a considerable knowledge of philosophy, they sometimes have 
drawn from Kant, Schelling or Goethe in a rather eclectic way.  
Because the notions of transformation and morphology are crucial to early evolutionary 
theories, I separate these two approaches arbitrarily: romantic biology is here defined with 
reference to the notions of transformation and form, whereas transcendental biology here 
refers to an a prioric reinterpretation and elaboration of concepts like essentialism, form, and 
body plan. 
Classical essentialist biology may also be mentioned under the heading of essentialism. 
As already outlined, Platonists, Aristotelians and scholastics have believed, actually in 
quite different ways, in the existence of an essence of entities. Normally the 
underlying, defining and indispensable ‘core’ of an entity is meant. These more 
directly ontological currents and the later essentialism of the French biologist Cuvier 
are here lumped together with transcendental biology, more based on epistemology. 
Despite differences in their foundations, all have advocated unity of plan and often (at 
least in the limited sense of a regulative idea) made use of the concept of teleology.  
In biology we come across terms like transcendental morphology or anatomy, which can 
refer to both a biological discipline and a school which focuses on a unifying plan of 
the parts of an organism.325 Proponents have been influenced by Kantianism or by 
classical essentialist schools. 
Biologists like Caspar Friedrich Wolff (1734-94) and Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752-
1840) emphasised the historical-genetic method as biological methodology and that 
biological phenomena such as “ontogenesis, growth and reproduction could not be 
reduced purely and simply to physico-mechanical forces.”326 Recently also this role of 
Karl Friedrich Kielmeyer (1765-1844) had been stressed.327. By their account these 
Naturforscher hoped – like Kant – to “chart a course between the Scylla of 
reductionistic mechanism and the Charybdis of vitalism”.328  
Blumbach and Kielmeyer also influenced Schelling and have also adopted some 
transformationalist approach.329 Hence, it might have also been reasonable to class them as 
romantic Biologists. They provide good examples how difficult a distinction between 
transcendental and romantic biology is. Blumbach has even coined the notion ‘Bildungstrieb’, 
crucial for romantic biology.  
The most important biologist focusing on the unity of type argument was Georges 
Cuvier (1769-1832). He gained influence in the time of the Napoleonic Empire and 
also in postrevolutionary France after the defeat of Napoleon. Like Lamarck and 
Geoffroy St. Hilaire he worked at the Muséum National d’Histoire Naturelle. Probably he 
was more influenced by (the medieval conception of) Aristotle than by Kant, because 
                                                     
325 Ph. Rehbock, Transcendental Anatomy (1990).   
326 W. Lefevre, Die Entstehung der biologischen Evolutionstheorie (1984), pp. 26-68. Referred to in: 
T. Lenoir, Morphotypes in Romantic Biology (1990), pp. 119-120. 
327 K. T. Kranz (Ed.), Philosophie des Organischen in der Goethezeit: Studien zu Werk und Wirkung des 
Naturforschers Carl Friedrich Kielmeyer (1994). Th. Bach, Kielmeyer als ‘Vater der Naturphilosophie’? 
(1994); Biologie und Philosophie bei C. F. Kielmeyer und F. W. J. Schelling (2001).  footnote 331. 
328 T. Lenoir, Morphotypes in Romantic Biology (1990), p. 120. 
329  R. J. Richards, Meaning of Evolution (1992), pp. 25-29. D. v. Engelhardt, Wissenschaft und Philosophie 
um 1800. (1994), p. 262. 
Part II. Chapter 3: Unfolding of Pre-Darwinian Philosophical Conceptions of Nature 94 
it seems that teleology was more to him than only a regulative idea. Cuvier had spent 
his youth at the Karlsschule in Stuttgart where he had “been steeped in 
essentialism”.330 There he was a fellow student of and tutored by Kielmeyer, who – 
methodologically influenced by Kant – turned against an exclusive mechanistic 
account of nature.331 
Influentially Cuvier advocated the concept of body plans: In his great work Le règne 
animal332 (1817) he reduced the basic types of Aristotle and distinguished only four 
basic body plans or embranchements: radiata (e. g., jellyfish and starfish), articulata 
(e. g., bees and lobsters), mollusca (e. g., clams and octopuses) and vertebrata (e. g., fish 
and men). By this he focused not on the ‘vertical’ linear series of evolution333, like 
Lamarckism did, but on ‘horizontal’ unbridgeable differences between taxa, say 
between the exoskeleton of articulata and the inner skeleton of the vertebrata.  
He stated the so-called ‘principle of correlation’: the parts are coadapted to the 
whole of the organism. This corresponds to Aristotle’s idea of the principle unifying 
the parts of an organism (soul) or Kant’s regulative idea of ‘the whole structuring the 
part’. Because to Cuvier there is no part of an organism which can independently 
change on its own and because of the huge differences of the embranchements he, like 
Linnaeus, was normally considered an advocate of the concept of fixity.  
But even Cuvier adopted the concept that within the embranchements species could 
accommodate their particular structure.334 Himself famous for his research on fossils, 
Cuvier had to face the empirical fact that not all fossils, which he found around Paris, 
corresponded to living species. As also the theory of migration did not seem to 
explain the problem, he saved the hard-core of his indeed rather static paradigm by 
adopting geological catastrophism. He believed (like Buffon) that species could 
become extinct. To him there are whole series of extinct faunas, especially caused by 
geological catastrophes.335 Because there had been also newer fossils which could not 
be found in older strata, he also assumed that “new species, based on existing body 
plans, are inserted by God into a vacated ecological slot”.336  
In any case, Cuvier was regarded rather as a strong advocate of the concept of 
fixed form, in Mayr’s terms ‘essentialism’, than of transformation.  
Because of his rather static world-view, Cuvier has sometimes been associated with 
reactionary politics opposing in the field of biology the radical, democratic ideas of the 
French Revolution of his opponents Lamarck and Geoffroy St. Hilaire. 
Richard Owen (1804-1892) is often regarded as ‘the British Cuvier’. He was as 
influential in Britain as Cuvier was in France, especially with his main works On the 
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Archetype and Homologies of the Vertebrate Skeleton (1848) and On the Nature of Limbs 
(1849). He took over the methodology of comparative anatomy and the concept of 
body plans. Like Cuvier he also was engaged in a dispute against the (mainly 
materialistic) theory of evolution.  
Robert Edmond Grant and Robert Knox brought mainly Lamarck’s materialistic, 
but also Geoffroy’s and Oken’s romantic ideas, to Edinburgh. The emerging conflict 
of Owen versus Grant and Robert Knox in the 1830s mirrors the conflict between 
Cuvier versus Lamarck and Geoffroy St. Hilaire. The result of the conflict was also 
similar. Owen, at that time a non-transformational essentialist, at the end of the 
conflict gained dominance over the romanticising materialist Grant. 
But from the 1840s Owen himself became strongly influenced by later rather 
evolutionary romantic currents of German Naturphilosophie. Because of this we might 
not only call him ‘the British Cuvier’, but also – later in his life – ‘the British 
Geoffroy’, 337 and because of this we will treat him once more in the next section on 
romantic biology.338 
Louis Rodolphe Agassiz (1807-1873), called ‘the American Cuvier’, was a Swiss-born 
palaeontologist and the founder of academic biology in the United States. Although he 
was influenced by Oken’s Naturphilosophie, while studying with him at Munich, he 
advocated the fixity of species. Hence he is not treated here in the section ‘romantic 
biology’, but we deal with him here directly after Cuvier.  
To Agassiz, opposite to today’s biology, only genera and all higher taxa have real 
existence. The forms of higher taxa outlive the individual and they are like Platonic 
forms – more real than the individuals that exemplify them. Like Cuvier he believed 
that species could become extinct and are separately ‘created’.339 Also like Cuvier he 
focused on a ‘horizontal’ aspect. Agassiz not only saw the differences of body plans of 
different species, which could not be ordered in one linear Scala naturae, but he also 
focused on different – we would now say – ‘ecological systems’. To Agassiz each 
zoological region is separately created.340 
d) Romantic Biology – Oken, Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, (late) Owen 
In response especially to Schelling ( pp. 82 f.) objective idealism and romanticism 
also gained an early influence in biology. Later on, at the end of the 19th century, when 
there was an eclipse of Darwinism, similar ideas had their second heyday in biology, 
corresponding to a world wide revival of idealism in philosophy ( pp. 121 f., 187 f.). 
Here we are concerned with pre-Darwinian approaches. 
In Lorenz Oken’s (1779-1851) book ‘Lehrbuch der Naturphilosophie’ (1809-11) Natur-
philosophie is to him – as to Schelling – a historical as well as a structural enterprise. 
Man and Nature have both one Entwicklungsgeschichte, with its highest manifestation in 
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the human being. But for the process of unfolding, the aspect of form or structure is 
central. Even more, differing from the Linnaean-Cuvierian tradition, structure is 
dictating function, not function form.341 Many scholars emphasise that Oken ‘only’ 
believed in an ideal transformation, not in actual transformation;342 whereas other 
authors seem to have different opinions.343 Anyway, in the tradition of Oken “it 
became the custom to look upon the different forms of animals as developed out of 
one another”344 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, poet and naturalist, was influenced by Spinoza, Schelling 
and even by Erasmus Darwin345, Charles Darwin’s grandfather. In Versuch die 
Metamorphose der Pflanzen zu erklären (1790) Goethe argues that the organs of plants, 
though seemingly dissimilar, could be understood as transformations of one 
underlying structure – that of the ideal leaf. He advocated the Blumbachian 
Bildungstrieb, an inherent drive to perfection, although he also accepted the importance 
of external conditions to evolution, on which Darwin would later on rest his theory. 
Goethe believed that repetition and transformation are crucial aspects of evolution. 
Goethe, like Oken, proposed a vertebral theory of the skull, meaning that the skull is 
composed out of transformed vertebrae. His search for a common archetype, basic to 
all organisms, led to his discovery of the human intermaxillary bone.  
Romantic biologists, like Oken, Carl Gustav Carus (1789-1869) or Geoffroy St. 
Hilaire, are characterised by the focus on the unity of the morphology of an organism, 
on a common archetype, on necessary serial development, on an inner tendency to 
progress346, on parallelism of ontogenesis and phylogenesis, on (ideal) transformation, 
and on the phenomenon of homology, which shows that certain ideal types of forms 
are reached in different lines of evolution. 
The theory of recapitulation became very important for the notion of evolution, linking the 
notion of individual (embryological) and species development (or even ecological 
development). In early versions the theory of embryological recapitulation referred to stages 
of now-existing species, in the later to stages of now-extinct species.347 
Étienne Geoffroy St. Hilaire (1772-1844), who could be referred to as ‘the French Oken’, 
was influenced via Oken and Carus by Schelling. Organisms are not only natura 
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naturata like in Platonism, but to him also natura naturans.348 He was clearly convinced 
of actual transformation. Still he believed like his German predecessors in an inner 
logic of development, in the explanatory force of concepts like serial development, 
parallelism and homology. To him the structures of the parts of an organism have to 
correspond with the whole in a necessary way (unité de plan). In this respect he is in 
accordance with Cuvier, whom he worked with for a long time. Still, Geoffroy 
abandoned teleology and even also introduced concepts of elimination and 
adaptation349. In 1820, still following the research programme of uniting body plans, 
he found parallels which united the mollusca and radiata, and the articulata and vertebrata. 
In 1830 he even proclaimed the unity of the whole animal kingdom. This 
transformational unification of the embranchements brought Geoffroy into conflict with 
Cuvier’s fixism.350 
Geoffroy’s alignment with Lamarck in the Cuvier versus Lamarck debate is due to 
their common belief in transformation. But because of their co-operation, conceptual 
differences between them have often been ignored. Geoffroy did not believe in one 
‘ladder of nature’ where every species has to climb up from the bottom, but in 
common descent. Moreover his explanation of evolution was mainly structural along 
idealist/romantic lines rather than being mechanistic, so that Goethe even in his last 
works still tried to support him. 
After the death of Lamarck in 1829, Cuvier managed, because of his reputation 
and some reasonable points in the debate, to finish the dispute in his own favour. On 
the solemn occasion of Lamarck’s funeral, Cuvier, according to the tradition of the 
academy, gave a memorial lecture. He presented this lecture in the way that it seemed 
that he buried not only Lamarck, but also Lamarck’s and Geoffroy’s theories. Cuvier’s 
ideas dominated French biology after Cuvier’s death in 1832 till about 1850. 
Since the 1840s Owen ( also p. 94) was increasingly impressed by the Romantics 
and even by their concept of an immanent divine unfolding of nature, although he 
had before vigorously attacked Grant’s rather materialist Lamarckian 
evolutionary approach.  
In his conceptual change, Owen was especially influenced by Joseph Henry Green 
(1791-1863), who himself studied under Oken and was affected by the thought of the 
romantic poet and philosopher Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834). Green seemed 
to have come to the belief that the old argument from design must be “replaced with 
a new argument based on divine self-expression”; hence the origin of species was to 
him, as to the German romantic idealists “the creative self-externalisation of a divine 
mind immanent in nature, rather than as a collection of highly rigid, if well-adapted, 
machines produced by a quaint eighteenth-century Deist designer.”351 Green already 
argued that Evolution was not linear but treelike352. Coleridge played an important 
                                                     
348 D. J. Depew and B. Weber in their usually very scholarly book Darwinism Evolving (1995) 
designate this current as ‘neomedievalizing obscurantism of Naturphilosophie’, which might be 
a bit one-sided, p. 55. 
349 E. Mayr, Growth of Biological Thought (1982), p. 363. 
350  R. J. Richards, The Meaning of Evolution (1992), p. 52. 
351 D. J. Depew, B. Weber, Darwinism Evolving (1995), p. 55. 
352  R. J. Richards, The Meaning of Evolution (1992), pp. 74, 77.  
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role in introducing the thoughts of Kant and the idealists to a larger public, 
particularly since translations did not begin to appear well into the 1830s. His mainly 
poetic approach did much for the accessibility of these thoughts, but in England gave 
them a reputation of flights into vague spiritual realms.353  
Although the young Owen, the ‘British Cuvier’, had led the campaign against some 
materialist evolutionists, the later Owen, the ‘British Geoffroy’ came to believe in a 
romantic concept of transformation. In his On the Nature of Limbs (1849) he considers 
the possibility of an actual unfolding of the divine creation and although in the 1850s 
he was guarded enough to largely evade mentioning this issue in print, he still made 
suggestions about the branching process of natural development354. 
Owen’s biography might force us to distinguish even more periods of his intellectual 
development. After reading von Baer’s critique of the principle of recapitulation, Owen 
dismissed this central romantic principle.355 
Despite Owen´s positive attitude towards evolution in general he opposed the 
mechanistic Darwinian account of evolution. There was for example a clash between 
Owen and T. H. Huxley, Darwin’s bulldog, at the meeting, where the famous 
anecdote of a clash between Huxley and Bishop Samuel Wilberforce (1805-73) took 
place.356 That Owen really believed in actual evolution, apart from his dislike of 
Darwin’s Origin, is supported by his welcome to Robert Chambers’ (1802-71) Vestiges 
in 1844, which had popularised romantic evolutionism in England.357 
e) Conclusion: Overview of the Preceding Three Schools 
In Table 2 a more formalised (and thereby, perhaps, a more simplified) overview of 
the different characteristics of the previously described schools is given. The two 
middle columns of the table justify the distinction that there are three groups of partly 
concurrent biological theories.  
Despite possible doubts about details of such a classification and although it is 
transparent that the actual positions of the mentioned philosophers or scientist will 
actually differ in many more respects, this simple classification of pre-Darwinian 
theories of nature in (at least) three types highlights important aspects of any 
discussion on Darwinism. Moreover, this simple classification is at least more helpful 
than dichotomous classifications that are often employed, at least implicitly. In the 
previously mentioned conflicts of Linnaeus versus Buffon, or of Cuvier versus 
Lamarck and Geoffroy St. Hilaire, or of the early Owen versus Knox and Grant there 
normally seem to be only two camps: the biologists, who believed in the fixity of 
species (see Table 3: ) versus the biologists who believed in the transformation of 
                                                     
353  S. M. d. Otter, British Idealism and Social Explanation (1996), p. 22.  
354  E.g., P. Bowler, Charles Darwin (1990), pp. 25, 30-31. 
355  See: R. J. Richards, The Meaning of Evolution (1992). 
356 D. Knight, Ordering the World (1981), pp. 170 f. R. J. Richards, Darwin and the Emergence of 
Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior (1987), pp. 549-551. 
357 Ibid, p. 168. On the popularity of the vestiges: J. Secord, Introduction to Chamber’s Vestiges (1994), 
pp. ix f., xxvi f. 
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species ( and ). In such treatments of these dispute the difference within the 
transformationalist camp between Oken and Geoffroy St. Hilaire on the one side and 
the Lamarckians on the other side is overshadowed by their alliance against the 
dominant third Cuvierian group emphasising the fixity of species.  
 





(mainly: definition  





Plato fixation eternal form (eidos) in the medieval interpretation the 
form is an idea of God 
Aristotle fixation360 form (eidos) causa finalis, causa efficiens (also 
materialis and formalis) 





 Buffon transformation 
(limited), 
degeneration 
interbreeding362 influenced by Newton, Spinoza, but 
mainly c. efficiens, multiple descent 
(later: common decent) 
 Lamarck transformation, up-




no common descent, minor role of 
extinction, gradual upward evolution, 
active adjustment 
() Grant transformation 
 
 largely Lamarckian, partly Geoffroy-
ian gradual upward development, 
unity of form 





catastrophism, new species in old 
forms, teleology (Aristotle) 
 Owen   














separate creation of whole zoological 
regions; teleology 
 Schelling transformation 
(ideal) 
form (eidos) deus sive natura; differentiation of 
Oneness, development towards self-
consciousness 




deus sive natura; development of 
nature towards self-consciousness 
 Geoffroy  
     Saint-   
     Hilaire 
transformation 
(actual) 
morphology (form) common descent, deus sive natura, 
development of nature towards self-
consciousness 
                                                     
358  See annotations of Table 4. 
359  St. J. Gould, The Structure of Evolutionary Theory (2005), e.g., pp. 64 f., 159, 283, 289, 313, 329 f. 
360  But see: R. J. Richards, The Meaning of Evolution (1992), p. 63. 
361 D. Young, Discovery of Evolution (1992), pp. 55-56, 61. 
362 Ibid, p. 63. 
363 E. Mayr, One Long Argument (1991), p. 17. 
364 Darwin mentioned that Owen (in Nature of the Limbs) took a critical stance towards the concept 
of teleology. C. Darwin, Origin (1859), p. 416. 
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 Green transformation morphology (form) common descent, development of 
nature towards man 
 Chambers transformation morphology (form) popular science; development of 
nature towards man 
 Owen   





development of nature towards man 
     Paley  creationism, fixity  function mechanistic approach 
 
     Darwin  
     (after    






causa efficiens; gradualism; common 
descent; natural selection 
Table 2: Simplified overview of some of the important biologists and naturalists from around 1800 
to the time before Darwin’s Origin (1859). The numbers refer to what can be regarded as the three 
main types of fundamental biological theories:  (Romanticising) materialistic biology, 
 essentialist and transcendental biology,  romantic biology. The column headings ‘vertical’ and 
‘horizontal aspects’ are referring to our today’s picture of an evolutionary ‘tree’. The vertical 
dimension is concerned with change of lineage throughout time. The horizontal aspect is concerned 
with differences at one time and their explanation. (Also  the sections b, c and d of this chapter.) 
 
 
Another dichotomic simplification lumps all biologists focusing on form, i. e. both 
transcendental biologists and romantic biologists advocating idealist evolution into 
one big group ( and ). This combination indeed mirrors the historical connection 
between Kant and the German idealists. The relation to a traditional essentialist view 
is that necessary ideas/forms and even notions like teleology became reintroduced on 
the basis of Kant’s ‘subjective’ turn. Likewise, Geoffroy for example was influenced 
by Oken () but worked also a long time together with Cuvier (), who himself 
studied in Germany. Owen, the British Cuvier, a prototypic proponent of 
(transcendental) fixity of species (), later also took a rather dynamic stance (). 
Hence the distinction between these two groups becomes blurred. 
Also for the debates today, it is of interest that not only Darwinism postulated a 
transformation of species and that not only theories of fixism advocated an 
importance of form (cf. Table 3).  
 
In the next chapters an account of the development of Darwinism will be given. 
Darwinism in Britain had already gained influence in the 1860s, although evolutionists 
like Owen and Knox turned against this type of explanation of evolution,365 and 
although Victorian ‘Darwinism’ differed considerably both from Darwin’s theory and 
modern Darwinism366. Chapter 4 will focus on the internal history of the development 
of Darwinism, introducing three main sub-paradigms of its theoretical development. 
Discussion of which currents Darwinism and its sub-paradigms have been influenced 
by will be addressed in Chapter 5, on the external history of Darwinism.  
                                                     
365  Ph. F. Rehbock, Philosophical Naturalists: Themes in Early Nineteenth-Century British Biology (1983), 
pp. 192, 195. 
366  P. Bowler,  footnote 404. 











Table 3: The three types of pre-Darwinian Biology. But please note: Certainly,  is not the logical 
conjunction of  ∧ . The notion of evolution in  is mechanical and in  it refers to an 
‘organismic’ unfolding of nature. Moreover the notion ‘morphology’ in  focused on function, in 
 on structure; and in  we may today regard form or morphology as an indicator of a ‘horizontal 
aspect’, whereas in  form – thinking of the parallels of zoology and embryology – is not necessarily 
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Chapter 4: 
The Internal Logic of Evolutionary Theories – 
From Darwin to Dawkins 
In this chapter on the internal history of evolutionary theories, the main claim is that 
there have been structurally different subparadigms within the main Darwinian 
framework. Only in Chapter 5, when dealing with an external history of these 
subparadigms ( pp. 160), will it for example be discussed how Darwin had come to 
his theoretical synthesis out of Newtonian and Romantic thought and how this 
synthesis was influenced by theories of Malthus and by the economic situation in 
Britain. Here, the main differences of these sub-paradigms will be investigated. 
If we want to trace the subparadigms of a Darwinian research tradition through 
history one has to make clear what is meant by the term ‘Darwinism’. The way we 
define ‘Darwinism’ is crucial, because it determines, what and who is to be regarded as 
Darwinian. Even several aspects of Darwin’s own theory, the theory of acquired 
characters (which he took over from Lamarck) and his theory of pangenesis would 
today certainly not be regarded as an example of Darwinism ( pp. 106). Hence, we 
need at least a working definition of Darwinism to exclude such notions.367 E. Mayr 
describes a whole range of meanings of the term ‘Darwinism’:368 Darwinism is seen as 
‘Darwin’s theory of evolution’, as evolutionism, as anti-creationism, anti-ideology, as 
selectionism, as variational evolution, as creed of the ‘Darwinians’, as new world-
view369 and as a new methodology. 
At least for use in an internal history of Darwinism I think, in accordance with 
authors like E. Mayr and others370, that it is reasonable to regard evolution by natural 
selection as the conceptual core of the Darwinian research tradition. During the 
further course of the work it will become clear that this notion is central to Darwinism 
and contrasts best with other views of evolution. However, if we give so much 
importance to natural selection this notion needs further specification.367 Normally 
the term ‘natural selection’ has a double meaning which is clarified by regarding 
natural selection (in its broad sense) as a two step process371 (or as a two step 
                                                     
367 Later on we will define Darwinism in an even stricter way,  pp. 153, 358 f. 
368 E. Mayr, One Long Argument (1991), pp. 90-106. In Darwin’s Five Theories of Evolution (1985) and in 
Weismann and Evolution (1985), pp. 297-305, Mayr gave a list more confined to the biological 
meanings of the term ‘Darwinism’: (1) again evolution as such, (2) theory of common descent, 
(3) multiplication of species, (4) gradualism, (5) natural selection. 
369 For example J. C. Greene defines ‘Darwinism’ more generally as the world view that seems to 
have been arrived at more or less independently by Spencer, Darwin, Huxley, and Wallace. J. C. 
Greene, Darwinism As a World View, in: Science, Ideology and World View (1981), pp. 128-130. 
370 E. Mayr, One Long Argument (1991), pp. 68, 107; Darwin, Intellectual Revolutionary (1983), p. 33; 
Growth of Biological Thought (1982), p. 510. Also D. J. Depew, B. Weber, Darwinism Evolving (1995), 
p. 2. 
371 E. Mayr, Diversity of Life (1978/1979), p. 19; Darwin, Intellectual Revolutionary (1983), p. 34; 
One Long Argument (1991), p. 68.  
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algorithm372). This two step process consists (a) of a blind chance process373 of 
overproduction of varying entities, and (b) of natural selection in the narrow sense, 
the differential elimination of these varying entities (according to their degree of fit to 
a given environment). Following these basic theoretical principles the scarcity of 
resources follows and the ‘struggle for life’ will be severe. This process, which is an 
“opportunistic response to the moment”374, should lead to an evolution by common 
descent and to the ‘survival of the fittest’. 
If Darwinism is understood as the above two step process, it is also easily 
contrasted to other historical concepts of evolution which have advocated a less 
wasteful and more directed evolutionary mechanism. In this work I mainly give an 
account of the Darwinian sub-paradigms. By doing this I mostly neglect the parallel 
development of a Lamarckian or romantic evolutionary research traditions.  
For several reasons a closer scrutiny of these currents would also be important: These 
schools of thought are not simply replaced by the ‘Darwinian Revolution’, but they also 
form a research tradition which still exists and which has interacted with and sometimes 
challenged the Darwinian tradition. It may be even difficult to disentangle the traditions:  
Some Darwinians might be not as thorough Darwinians as they suppose themselves to 
be, using e. g. the notion of body plans. Romantic and romanticising materialist biology 
seems even to have played a role already in the formation of Darwin’s quite different theory 
( pp. 163 f.). P. J. Bowler has pointed out that it is a historical myth, created by modern 
Darwinists, to assume that with the ‘Darwinian Revolution’ a pure version of Darwinism 
already became predominant in the late nineteenth century.375 At the end of the 19th century, 
Darwinism was even supposed to be on its deathbed ( pp. 121 f.). The succeeding so 
called ‘evolutionary synthesis’ also draws largely from non-Darwinian Mendelian sources. 
Even gene-Darwinism which seems to be the most thorough version of Darwinism 
paradoxically may in some regards be influenced by romantic aspirations. Moreover, despite 
the empirical and theoretical defeat of romantic biology by the accepted evolutionary 
synthesis ( pp. 134 f.), parallel to the hardening of the synthesis a little new bloom could 
be observed. Not only radical advocates of a morphological account should be counted to 
this tradition, but – to be historically fair – partly also those, who emphasise inner 
constraints and direction ( pp. 144 f.). 
Later on in the light of a strict definition of Darwinism one may disentangle the 
Darwinian and Non-Darwinian aspects present in many partly syncretic ‘Darwinian’ 
subparadigms. 
If we regard natural selection as the unifying core of Darwinism, it becomes clear that 
Darwinians have differed (and still do differ) considerably in many respects. Darwin’s 
writings and what is to be taken as Darwinism has been recepted in different ways 
even within Europe, with different implications for our self-understanding as human 
beings.376 But even if one focuses on the dominant line of reception, Table 4 provides 
a first impression that Darwinism has been far from being monolithic.  
 
                                                     
372 D. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995), pp. 48-60. 
373 J. Monod, E. Mayr, K. R. Popper, R. Dawkins, D. Dennett,  footnote 1173. 
374 E. Mayr, One Long Argument (1991), p. 44. 
375  P. Bowler, The Non-Darwinian Revolution (1988); Darwin (1990), particular Chapter 1, 4, 9. 
376  E.-M. Engels, Th. F. Glick (Eds.), The Reception of Charles Darwin in Europe (2008). 
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377 But Huxley seems to have had at least some scientific doubts about the adequacy of natural 
selection, and mainly favoured ‘Darwinism’ because of its naturalism. E. Mayr, Growth of 
Biological Thought (1982), pp. 510-511 [refering to E. B. Poulton. Thomas Henry Huxley, in his 
Essays on Evolution, Clarendon: Oxford (1908), pp. 193-219]. Also mentioned by e.g., P. Bowler, 
Darwin (1990), pp. 156-157, 161. 
378 S. Wright, Evolution in Mendelian Populations (1931). On the matter of the unit of selection Wright 
slips back and forth. M. Ruse, Are Pictures Really Necessary? The Case of Sewall Wright's 'Adaptive 
Landscapes (1996), p. 326. 
Part II. Chapter 4: The Internal Logic of Theories – From Darwin to Dawkins 105 
























































G. G. Simpson natural selec-
tion, genetic 
drift, etc. 


























higher levels  





R. Dawkins gene 
selection  








Table 4: Tentative summary of some ‘characteristic features’ of theories and authors usually 
regarded as largely being Darwinian. 
 
 
Focusing on the most important authors it is, for our purposes, reasonable to focus 
on the following three sub-paradigms within the Darwinian research tradition: 
• The subparadigm of individual-Darwinism, focusing on the struggle between 
single individual organisms. In particular, Darwin’s Darwinism in his middle 
period, which is of high historical importance, falls into this class. However, it 
would be wrong to assume that individual-Darwinism united all early Darwinians. 
Darwinism in this early period was very diverse. A. Weismann, the founder of so-
called ‘neo-Darwinism’, may also be treated as an example of this sub-paradigm. 
• The subparadigm of probabilistic population genetics. This paradigm is also often 
denoted as the ‘evolutionary synthesis’. We here will distinguish two phases of this 
synthesis: In its first phase R. Fisher and J. B. S. Haldane introduced the 
                                                     
379 E. Mayr, One Long Argument (1991), p. 145. 
380 H. W. Ingensiep, Zur Kontroverse zwischen Soziobiologie und philosophischer Ethik (1990), p. 55. 
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probabilistic aspects into the synthesis and put emphasis on single genes within a 
panmictic gene pool. In the second phase S. Wright, Th. Dobzhansky, E. Mayr 
and others finished the evolutionary synthesis by introducing population structure 
into these models and by emphasising additional other evolutionary mechanisms 
(although natural selection still played a very central role). 
• The subparadigm of gene-Darwinism or of the selfish-gene viewpoint. This 
viewpoint is advocated e. g. by R. Dawkins, G. C. Williams and in some respect by 
E. O. Wilson. It focuses on single ‘egoistic’ genes. 
The notion of sub-paradigms should be understood here only in a loose sense, allowing for 
some change within a subparadigm. Actually it is argued that the sub-paradigm of the 
evolutionary synthesis was formed in two phases and that gene-Darwinism already bears 
germs to transcend itself. The notion subparadigm should emphasise that within the 
Darwinian tradition one can distinguish relatively coherent (with a ‘correlation of parts’) 
approaches that may not be fully commensurable. These sub-paradigms are claimed to be 
under different ‘ontological regimes’381 and organised by specific central ideas, which are as 
essential to them as natural selection is to Darwinism in general. The subparadigms occurred 
mainly diachronic but they may also be advocated by different authors synchronically. Gene-
Darwinism became influential in sociobiology, but the evolutionary synthesis remained 
influential as well and some proponents even strongly attacked gene-Darwinism as 
‘unfortunate misunderstanding by certain outsiders’382.  
Now the internal history of Darwinism will be expounded discussing the differences 
between these Darwinian sub-paradigms in detail. Finally, an outline of some recent 
approaches developed in contrast to the radicalised gene-Darwinian view or in the 
wrake of other traditions will be given. 
4.1 From Darwin to Weismann – The Birth of Darwinism 
a) Darwin – Not a Darwinist in the Strict Sense 
Charles Darwin (1809-82)383 himself was not the founder of Darwinism, or better, not the 
founder of the theoretical building blocks which compose Darwinism. Apart from the 
                                                     
381 D. J. Depew and B. Weber have argued that the first two of these three sub-paradigms are 
under different ontological regimes, roughly Newtonian and Bolzmannian (see text), Darwinism 
Evolving (1995), p. 24.  
382 E.g., E. Mayr, Darwin, Intellectual Revolutionary (1983/1985), p. 35; see also: E. Mayr, One Long 
Argument (1991), pp. 141-164. E. A. Lloyd, Structure and Confirmation of Evolutionary Theory (1993), 
p. viii. D. J. Futuyma, Evolutionsbiologie (1986/1990), pp. 498 f. (D. Futuyma in his textbook 
advocates the orthodox evolutionary synthesis, only with little extentions). 
383  Today libaries could be filled with books on Darwin’s life and influence. An overview of his 
biographies is given in: R. Colp, Charles Darwin’s Past and Future Biographies (1989). Here I 
mention only two bibliographies embedding Darwin in a larger context: A. Desmond, J. Moore, 
Darwin (1991/1992) and P. Bowler, Charles Darwin (1990).  
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cultural and philosophical influences, which may at least be seen as ‘co-authors’ of the 
‘Origin’ ( Chapter 5 on the external history), nearly all components of the theory 
had first been proposed long before 1859: 
The general idea of an actual ‘evolving’ biological world, was stated in modern 
times earlier by Buffon (1749), Lamarck (1809) and Geoffroy (1818), and also, by less 
known authors, Erasmus Darwin (1794), Treviranus (1805), Tiedemann (1808) and 
others, and later, but still prior to the publication of the Origin, by Grant, Chambers, 
(the late) Owen and Spencer H. Spencer in 1851 even calls it “a trite enough remark 
that change is the law of all things”384. Darwin in his first edition of the Origin was 
rather reserved in mentioning advocates of evolution before him.385 But since the 
second edition, Darwin himself listed over thirty-four predecessors, and he was still 
accused of lack of generosity.386 
The concept of common descent has already been considered by Buffon, at least 
for close relatives, such as horses and asses,387 and in an idealistic sense by L. Oken. 
Actually a number of authors has developed this idea prior to Darwin, like 
Kielmayer388, Geoffroy, Unger389, Green390, von Baer and Chambers391.  
Gradualism was advocated by Lamarck and, e. g., by Meckel, Grant or 
Chambers392. The role of geographically isolated populations, which played a certain 
role for Darwin and later was stressed by the advocates of the ‘evolutionary synthesis’, 
had been asserted earlier by von Buch  and Wagner.393  
The mechanism of natural selection was largely formulated by Malthus (1798), and 
at the time of Darwin it was applied to origin of species by A. R. Wallace as well.394 
But it was Darwin who had the unique “brilliant mind, great intellectual boldness, 
and an ability to combine the best qualities of a naturalist-observer, philosophical 
                                                                                                                                 
A range of direct sources to Darwin’s personal development has been made available by the so-
called ‘Darwin industry’. Besides scholarly editions of Darwin’s publications, also his notebooks 
and full correspondance are being published in exemplary editions ( Bibliography). P. Bowler 
has pointed out even some decades ago that the focus of the on Darwin in history of 
evolutionary biology has lead to the neglect of other aspects. The Non-Darwinian Revolution 
(1988), pp. 14-19. This comment would still apply today. 
384  H. Spencer, Social Statics (1851), p. 32. 
385  D. Hull stresses Darwin´s differences in his conception of science as a reason for neglecting 
them, Darwin and the Nature of Science (1983), pp. 63 f.  
386 J. W. Burrow, Editor’s Introduction to Darwin’s Origin of Species (1968), p. 27. See the ‘historical 
sketch’ in the editions after 1859. They were not very respectable in the scientific pantheon. 
387 E. Mayr, One Long Argument (1991), p. 23. 
388  Cf. Th. Bach, Biologie und Philosophie bei C. F. Kielmeyer und F. W. J. Schelling (2001). 
389 E. Mayr, Growth of Biological Thought (1982), pp. 390-391. 
390  R. Richards, The Meaning of Evolution (1992), pp. 74-75. 
391  Ibid, pp. 133-134. 
392  Ibid, pp. 54, 145. 
393 E. Mayr, One Long Argument (1991), p. 32. See also: Darwin’s Notebook D (Ed. D. Kohn, 1987), 
orig. p. 69. 
394 Additionally, one may mention the Scottish naturalist P. Matthew who already published the 
concept of natural selection in his book Naval Timber and Arboriculture (1831). However, Matthew 
did not work out this idea, because, curiously, it seemed to him to be only ‘a self-evident fact’.  
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theoretician, and experimentalist”395 to merge all those parts396 into a coherent 
theoretical whole around the central notion of natural selection and provide a great 
amount of empirical evidence. For these reasons Darwin indeed deserves to be 
regarded as main founder of what today is called Darwinism. 
But apart from not being the only founder of Darwinism, throughout most of the 
different intellectual phases of his life Darwin was not a Darwinist according to 
today’s sense of the word ( working definition, p. 102).  
Before 1836/1837 Darwin was even a creationist of the brand of W. Paley 
(1743-1805), who believed in the fixity of species. 
However his notebooks and his autobiography show that in 1837 he adopted the 
belief of transformation397 and he quickly – though perhaps not directly ( p. 167) – 
dismissed what Mayr called the ‘typological concept’ of species and replaced it with 
the so-called ‘biological’ concept, which is based on the possibility to reproduce. He 
soon embraced a theory of common descent and of a tree of life.398 It was only in 
September 1838, influenced by reading Malthus, that he adopted his concept of 
natural selection.399 One might say that, at this point of his life, Darwin almost 
became a Darwinian, but even he first seemed to continue to believe in a teleological 
conception of evolution or at least speaks in terms of “a final cause of all this 
wedgings”.400 In addition, in his first unpublished systematic outlines of his theory, 
the sketch of 1842 and the ‘Essay’ of 1844, Darwin still saw transmutation as an 
“episodic rather than a truly all-pervasive process”.401 
By 1859, when Darwin published the Origin of Species, or in full On the Origin of 
Species by Means of Natural Selection or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life, 
he had abandoned any teleological and saltationist concept. For ‘the Darwin of the 
Origin’, who has been the one of the best-known of the ‘different Darwins’, natural 
selection indeed played a crucial role and is even mentioned in the title of the Origin. 
However, in Darwin’s theory of natural selection, his theory of variation and 
environmental elimination, Lamarckian use and disuse still played an important role in 
producing variation.402 In this respect Wallace was more Darwinian in today’s sense 
than Darwin was. Additionally, Wallace was the first of the early selectionists to 
endorse Weismann’s thesis that there is no soft inheritance.403  
                                                     
395 E. Mayr, One Long Argument (1991), p. 11. 
396 Ibid, Chapter Ideological Opposition to Darwin’s Five Theories, pp. 35 ff. 
397 S. Herbert in her introduction to Darwin’s Red Notebook (1836-1837/1980) supports Darwin’s 
account that he indeed arrived at the concept of transformation (at least roughly) in March 
1837, pp. 7-11. In his autobiography Darwin himself only mentions opening the first note-book 
exclusively devoted to the question of the Origin of Species in July 1837. Autobiography 
(Ed. F. Darwin, 1887, Charles’ org.: 1876), pp. 68, 83. 
398  Ch. Darwin, Notebook B (Ed. D. Kohn, 1987), orig. pp. 21, 26, 36, 97. 
399  Idem, Notebook D (Ed. D. Kohn, 1987), orig. p. 135e. 
400  Ibid, org. p. 135e. See also: D. Kohn, Introduction to Notebook D (1987), p. 330.  
401  P. Bowler, Charles Darwin (1990), p. 99 (refering to D. Ospovat, 1981),  footnote 686. 
402 Ch. Darwin, Notebook D (Ed. D. Kohn, 1987), pp. 173 ff. 
403 E. Mayr, The Growth of Biological Thought (1982), p. 586. 
Part II. Chapter 4: The Internal Logic of Theories – From Darwin to Dawkins 109 
Also, most of the Victorian early followers of Darwin still believed in several 
mechanisms of evolution and favoured orthogenesis or Lamarckian evolution. 
Although the influence of Darwinism was increasing in the 1860s and 1870s, 
Darwinism was often not very strictly interpreted. Also E. Haeckel (1834-1918), the 
most influential early German advocate of ‘Darwin’s theory of descent’, was at odds 
with Weismann’s pure doctrine of neo-Darwinism and furthermore argued in favour 
of a more directed evolution. Even Th. H. Huxley and A. Gray were even less strict 
Darwinians than Darwin himself was. P. J. Bowler has worked out that many early 
self-proclaimed Darwinians were still only “pseudo-Darwinians”, and that at least 
many – if not most – of the post-Origin nineteenth century evolutionists retained a 
developmental, more “orderly, goal-directed, and usually progressive” understanding 
of evolution. According to Bowler not only Darwinians but often non-Darwinians 
also played a role in building up a “creation myth” of evolutionary theory, thus 
overestimating the immediate influence of Darwin.404 
The tolerant stance of Darwin and his early followers in regard of other 
evolutionary mechanisms is not only due to the fact that the moral consequences of a 
pure theory of natural selection were so unpalatable, but this attitude was at least 
partly borne out of the general ignorance of Darwin’s time concerning the process of 
inheritance. Accordingly Darwin in the Origin treated the process of inheritance like a 
black box. 
In Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication (1868) Darwin gave an account 
of his theory of inheritance, the ‘provisional hypothesis of pangenesis’: Particles 
present in all cells of the body, so-called ‘gemmules’, are modified according to use 
and disuse and are transported throughout the body. They accumulate in the sexual 
organs.405 Thus, especially Darwin’s later theory became less Darwinian in assuming 
that the inheritance the phenotype does directly affect the genotype.  
Moreover, as Darwin worked on non-sexual plants, he also became confused again 
concerning the definition of species and returned to a rather typological definition.406 
In the The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex (1871/1874) Darwin still 
adheres to the theory of pangenesis.407 He even concedes that he “perhaps attributed 
too much to the action of natural selection or the survival of the fittest”408 and 
because of this he also altered the fifth edition of the Origin. Although he even at that 
time did not gave up his central concept of natural selection, he at least gave room for 
sexual selection, correlation of growth, use and disuse, and even abandoned a strict 
adaptionism ( pp. 113). 
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To summarise, Darwin in opposition to modern neo-Darwinism ( pp. 118 f.; 
p. 102) advocated other mechanisms than selection. Even in the Origin of Species, 
Darwin’s most ‘Darwinian’ book, he is – expressed in a modern way – convinced of a 
flux of information from the ‘phenotype’ to the ‘genotype’. Darwin on the one hand 
still could be regarded as the main founding father of Darwinism, because it was he, 
who first gave natural selection its central place in a theory of evolution, on the other 
hand Darwin was not a pure Darwinist in the today’s understanding; in our today’s 
understanding he was both a Darwinian and a Lamarckian. 
b) Darwin’s Biological Theory – Focus on the Individual Organism 
Darwin, because his emphasis on natural selection could still be regarded – despite the 
above qualifications – as the main proponent of the first ‘subparadigm’ of Darwinism 
(For an account on the external influences on Darwin’s theory,  pp. 152 ff.).   
At the very heart of Darwinism in general, closely linked to the notion of natural 
selection, which is – roughly speaking – common to all different subparadigms of 
Darwinism and even only seldom questioned in the recent unit of selection debate, is 
Darwin’s concept that natural selection works “solely by and for the good of each 
being”409. Thereby Darwin implicitly introduces what I want to call the ‘principle of 
egoism’. This metaphysical principle may be stated explicitly in the following way: Any 
entity is by definition egoistic because an entity which shows the property of caring 
for itself is by definition an existent entity and not only an epiphenomenon or a side 
effect of another entity. We may express this principle in the statement ‘no entity 
without egoism, no egoism without entity’. We come back to this point in the more 
philosophical part of this work ( pp. 418 f.). 
But based on the notion of natural selection and the principle of egoism different 
levels of existence could still be proposed, like Nature or God as a whole (like in 
Spinoza’s one substance ontology), ecosystems, species, groups, organisms or single 
genes. We will now outline Darwin’s theory, emphasising the differences of Darwin’s 
own theory compared with Wallace’s selection theory or to later schools of 
Darwinism, especially in regard to the focused evolutionary entity.  
The differentia specifica of Darwin’s subparadigm of Darwinism, apart from his still 
present Lamarckian tenets, is his focus on the individual organism.410 E. Mayr claims: “The 
importance of the individual became the cornerstone of Darwin’s theory of natural 
selection”411.  
Correspondingly, Darwin, at least at the time of the Origin of Species defined species 
and even varieties in a nominalistic way. Darwin advocated a continuous variation of 
forms of the same descent. Type or form could be explained by common descent. 
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Darwin at that time clearly was a nominalist and all genera and even species and 
varieties are artificial and arbitrary notions: 
“[...] I look at the term species, as one arbitrarily given for the sake of convenience to a set 
of individuals closely resembling each other, and that it does not essentially differ from the 
term variety, which is given to less distinct and more fluctuating forms.”412 
Therefore – in contrast to proponents of the later synthetic theory of evolution – to 
Darwin species and varieties are as unreal as higher genera are. The similarity of 
representatives of species and of genera is due to common descent. The species of the 
large genera are related to each other, in the same manner as the varieties of any one 
species are related to each other. 413 
In the 1860s, Darwin’s interests have turned to botany and he came back to an at least 
slightly more typological definition of species.414 It has been argued that he even then 
retained his view that evolution selects only for the good of the single organism.415 
Only individuals are selected and only properties beneficial to individuals can evolve. 
Something can evolve, “[...] only so far as it profits the individual in its complex 
struggle for life [....]”.416  
Since Darwin emphasised the individual and individually inherited variations, he 
comes to the conclusion that the competition mainly takes place among individuals 
within a population. It has to be conceded, that in the Origin Darwin in the one case of 
sterile castes of insects was forced to assume something like group selection.417 
Despite this, the obvious essence or core of his subparadigm is the struggle between 
individuals of the same species: 
“[...] the struggle almost invariably will be most severe between the individuals of the same 
species, for they frequent the same districts, require the same food, and are exposed to the 
same dangers. In the case of varieties of the same species, the struggle will generally be 
almost equally severe [...].”418 
In the Descent of Man – as will be shown in the next section – Darwin appears to have 
been only a bit more positive towards the concept of group selection. Although being 
more ambivalent on this matter, especially in regard of humans, Darwin still generally 
held a rather individualist stance. 
 
Darwin’s individualist view may seem a necessary pre-Mendelian view of Darwinism. 
But this is not the case. It is interesting that the co-founder of the theory of natural 
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selection, Alfred Russell Wallace (1823-1913) – who generously introduced the term 
‘Darwinism’419 –, in many respects drew different conclusions. For Darwin, 
competition takes place among individuals within groups of closely related individuals; 
Wallace (a later socialist and then spiritualist) by contrast, stressed competition between 
closely related species. Darwin thought that individual competition favours only the 
very fittest, whereas Wallace thought it eliminated those varieties that were totally unfit. 
Hence, the main disputes within Darwinism were introduced by its first proponents, 
Darwin and Wallace: competition versus co-operation; individual selection versus 
group selection; and positive versus negative selection.420 
c) Darwin’s Descent of Man – Social Darwinism? 
In the Origin, Darwin guardedly and mysteriously forecasted that “[l]ight will be 
thrown on the origin of man and his history”421 – in the Descent of Man and Selection in 
Relation to Sex (1871/1874) he actually applied his theory to the origin of mankind. We 
(1.) point out some changes in Darwin’s biological theory, as he applied it to humans, 
and (2.) look how far he assumed that the theory will also explain, higher human 
faculties, culture and ethics.  
(i) Ambivalence about the Universality of Natural Selection  
In the ‘biosociological’ ( p. 29) book Descent of Man he presumably found difficulty 
in confining himself to his own paradigm, although Darwin earlier could “not avoid 
the belief that man must come under the same law”422. This book is ambivalent about 
the universality of natural selection and – as will be shown afterwards – towards the 
individualist focus of natural selection. 
On the one hand, it appears that Darwin wanted to maintain his belief of one 
universal law governing the process of evolution ( also p. 163). Thus he stated that 
the development of the human being obeyed “the same general laws, as with the 
lower animals”.423 This conception was stated repeatedly in this work.424 Hence, to 
Darwin “the difference in mind between man and the higher animals, great as it is, 
certainly is one of degree and not of kind.”425 
On the other hand, being concerned with the evolution of man, it seems that he 
had tried to a certain degree to change his view on the universality of the 
mechanisms of evolution.  
First, Darwin was an exceptionally humane man, and from the time when Darwin 
became largely a Darwinian in the modern sense of the word, he was shaken by the 
‘remorseless struggle’. His moderate changes of his genuinely mono-mechanistic 
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approach might partly be due to his wish to reach what were morally at least 
bearable results. 
Secondly, Darwin’s own theory had at that time already largely undermined his 
own deistic underpinnings, which might be seen as the main cause of his former belief 
in an ubiquitous eternal law of nature.  
Thirdly, Darwin’s belief in the progress in nature by the simple process of natural 
selection (which was still present in the Origin) was shattered. As he himself concedes, 
he had to abolish his strict adaptationist view.426 
In fact, it seems controversial whether Darwin’s account is essentially progressionist or not. For 
example Bowler and Gould have argued that Darwin’s theory – although often 
misinterpreted by early Victorians – does not allow the concept of a progression of po-
pulations because they always adapt only to local environments. Richards shows that in the 
Origin a belief in a progression at least based on environmental forces could be found and 
that progress was the intended consequence of Darwin’s theory.427 
These views may be reconciled if we argue that Darwin first built his pan-selectionist, 
pan-adaptionist and hence progressionist and mono-mechanist theory on what was still a 
partly theological Paleyan basis. Darwin, at the time of the Origin, like Adam Smith, still 
optimistically and undiminishedly believed that by the egoistic individualist mechanism he 
found, still “all corporeal and mental endowments will tend to progress towards 
perfection.”428 But later on, Darwin on the basis of the selection theory he himself had 
developed, could neither sustain a theological basis for these tenets nor the biological claims 
in their wake ( ‘external history’, pp. 162 f.). 
Hence, connected with his doubts about pan-adaptionism he emphasised, more than 
before, a certain causal pluralism. He even explicitly stated that he might have 
overemphasised the importance of natural selection.429 It is still the case that natural 
selection was a more important mechanism of evolution of man to Darwin than for 
example for Wallace430 and Spencer431. But compared with the Origin, he is less 
Darwinian in the Descent of Man. He did not only give up his belief in adaptationism, 
but largely replaced natural selection by sexual selection. To explain variation he again 
employed the concept of use and disuse432 and now also an originally romantic 
concept, that of the correlation of parts433.  
Moreover, in regard to the ‘object’ of the mechanisms of evolution, Darwin – as 
we have seen above – still largely seems to have advocated selection of individuals, but 
is less clear about his position and wavered between the concept of individual 
selection and the additional concept of group selection at least in the exceptional case 
of the development man and morality.  
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Apart from the question concerning the mechanisms of evolution, Darwin also 
changes his view on the question which entity is the ‘object’ of these mechanisms in this 
later writing. Darwin – as we have seen – in the Origin had focused on the individual 
organism as the only real entity, as the source of variation and as the sole agent in the 
struggle of life.  
In the Descent of Man he appears to be a bit more positive towards the concept of 
group selection, although he admittedly stayed ambivalent and still largely took an 
individualistic stance.434 
As in the Origin, he clearly advocated group selection, discussing group behaviour 
of ants and bees: 
“With strictly social animals, natural selection sometimes acts on the individual, through the 
preservation of variations which are beneficial to the community. A community which 
includes a large number of well-endowed individuals increases in number, and is victorious 
over other less favoured ones; even although each separate member gains no advantage over 
the others of the same community.”435 
But Darwin now additionally advocated the conception of group selection not only in 
regard to castes of sterile insects, but in regard to the development of mankind and 
the gain of mental powers.436 But even in regard of mankind Darwin was still 
wavering between his original concept of individual selection and an additional 
acceptance of group selection. Darwin already discussed the problem that egoistic 
individuals could override a group of more socially orientated individuals. Darwin in 
some remarks quite clearly stated a predominance of the individual level: with “the 
higher social animals, I am not aware that any structure has been modified solely for 
the good of the community, though some are of secondary service to it.”437 
However, in many cases it is not clear whether Darwin only stated his former 
confident belief that the action of self-interested individuals fighting for their own 
survival would also lead to the benefit of the group or species as a whole, or if he 
actually believes in something like group selection, where the group is an entity in its 
own right.438 
Thus in the Descent of Man Darwin, while abandoning pan-adaptionism and 
allowing some causal pluralism, was, at least in the exceptional case of mankind, 
wavering between the concept of individual selection and the additional concept of 
group selection.  
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(ii) Explaining Man, Culture and Ethics? 
In correspondence with Darwin’s ambivalence in regard to the universality of the 
evolutionary mechanism and in regard to group selection, there is a general 
ambivalence as to how far his theory of evolution could be applied to explain even 
higher human capacities. Here we only deal with the question in which way and how 
far Darwin intended to apply his theories to human beings as well; whereas the social 
influences on Darwin and Darwinism will be treated in Chapter 5 
( particularly, pp. 173 f.).   
Darwin’s belief in a tree of life and in a common decent of all human races seems 
to have been consonant to his abolitionist political position.439 But it should be noted 
that such positions also have been held without evolutionist leanings.440 
We are here concerned more specifically with the notion of natural selection. 
Within the history of science, the question whether Darwin’s approach to culture goes 
so far to be called socio-Darwinian, is quite controversial.441 T. H. Huxley, for 
example, who, like Haeckel, was regarded as one of Darwin’s ‘bulldogs’, much more 
clearly than Darwin in his later development turned against natural selection and 
struggle for life as a prescription for human culture and ethics: “Let us understand, 
once for all, that the ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmical 
process, still less in running away from it, but in combating it.”442 Scholarship has 
shown that Huxley should anyhow rather be regarded as a ‘pseudo-Darwinian’.443 
However, Darwin, in contrast, in the Descent of Man had given reason to assume that 
he was at least ambivalent towards the question of whether ‘higher human capacities’ 
could also be explained by his (modified) biological theory: 
 
(1) On the one hand, from time to time Darwin (the former student of theology) 
sounds relatively moderate or guarded. Darwin does not state clearly that he thought that 
morals and ethics ought to be ‘biologised’. This might be partly due to his social 
background and to the fact that he did not want to evoke more dismay than necessary 
in public and to his sincerely pious wife, Emma. Sometimes he even seems to refer to 
an independent cultural sphere and to an own inner logic of reason and religion: 
“For the moral qualities are advanced, either directly or indirectly, much more through the 
effects of habit, the reasoning powers, instruction, religion, & c. than through natural 
selection.”444  
To refer to an inner necessity of reasoning powers may be seen rather as reminiscent 
of a romantic, structualist view, than of a Darwinian one. It seems almost ironic, that 
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Darwin states that moral development relies also on religion, which he himself had 
involuntarily at least partly undermined.445 
Moreover, as outlined before, he tried to explain the Origin of Man not by natural, 
but by sexual selection, which he had only briefly mentioned in the Origin.446 It has 
been argued that even this emphasis, to a certain extent, was forced on him in 
countering Wallace, who had argued that the human development calls for 
explanations above the process of natural selection.  
Sexual selection “depends on the advantage which certain individuals have over 
others of the same sex and species solely in respect of reproduction.”447 The struggle 
is focused on the “males for the possession of the females”.448 The reason that sexual 
selection comes into being is that it serves survival in terms of natural selection: 
“It has been shewn that the largest number of vigorous offspring will be reared from 
the pairing of the strongest and best-armed males, victorious in contests over other 
males, with the most vigorous and best-nourished females [...]”449. Although Darwin 
often sounds as if sexual selection in principle could be reduced to natural selection, 
he still pointed out that practically “[s]exual selection acts in a less rigorous manner 
than natural selection”450. 
 
(2) On the other hand, Darwin sometimes seems to have taken a more rigorous 
biologistic stance. In this regard he is mirrored by parts of today’s sociobiology and also 
by the so-called ‘socio-Darwinians’. 
Early ‘socio-Darwinians’ gave a naturalistic biologistic account of human activity and applied 
Darwin’s theory of evolution, especially his theory of natural selection also to humans. But 
some of them, like Spencer – like even Darwin himself – still believed in an important role 
also for acquired characteristics, so that we today would regard them to a certain extent also 
as ‘socio-Lamarckians’451.  
Darwin argued that genius and insanity is inherited.452 This is according to Darwin 
also the case in regard to the intellectual differences of the sexes: 
“The chief distinction in the intellectual powers of the two sexes is shewn by man's attaining 
to a higher eminence, in whatever he takes up, than can woman – whether requiring deep 
thought, reason, or imagination, or merely the use of the senses and hands. If two lists were 
made of the most eminent men and women in poetry, painting, sculpture, music [...], history, 
science, and philosophy, with half-a-dozen names under each subject, the two lists would 
not bear comparison. We may also infer, from the law of the deviation from averages, so 
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well illustrated by Mr. Galton, in his work on 'Hereditary Genius', that if men are capable of 
a decided pre-eminence over women in many subjects, the average of mental power in man 
must be above that of woman.”453 
Although Darwin concedes that this mental inferiority of women could be 
superseded; to him this is mainly a biological problem – problem a breeder has with 
its cattle: 
“All women, however, could not be thus raised, unless during many generations those who 
excelled in the above robust virtues were married, and produced offspring in larger numbers 
than other women.”454 
Because of this biologistic views, Darwin even sometimes takes a prescriptive ‘socio-
Darwinian’ view, in the sense that he draws far-going normative conclusions from his 
biological conception: 
“We civilised men, on the other hand, do our utmost to check the process of elimination; we 
build asylums for the imbecile, the maimed, and the sick; we institute poor-laws; and our 
medical men exert their utmost skill to save the life of every one to the last moment. [...] 
Thus the weak members of civilised societies propagate their kind. [...] but excepting in the 
case of man himself, hardly any one is so ignorant as to allow his worst animals to breed.”455  
But – perhaps because of his former Christian background – Darwin in this context 
shrunk back from directly calling for the abolition of the Poor Laws, as Malthus456 
and Spencer457 – for maybe different reasons – in fact did. But on other pages Darwin 
indeed considered that “it might be argued that the struggle for existence had not 
been sufficiently severe to force man upwards to his highest standard”. 
J. C. Greene, also looking through Darwin’s annotations of books and articles, has 
shown, that Darwin, at the time he wrote the Descent of Man, was to a large extent 
convinced that his ideas of struggle for life have to be applied to culture as well and in 
this sense could be said to have shared socio-Darwinian ideas. 458 Already Hofstadter 
in his canonical book on socio-Darwinism has pointed out that the term ‘Socio-
Darwinism’ had been used with meanings besides laissez-faire capitalism, i. e. struggle 
between nations or artificial breeding policy.459 Bowler even pointed out that it was 
possible to associate almost every social and political position to biological 
‘Darwinism’ – but I think this had only been the case if we take the wide Victorian 
understanding of ‘Darwinian’ biology into account, which Bowler himself has 
illustrated.460 Apart from this, I think Greene is right in arguing that Darwin, based on 
his biological theory, Spencer, Th. H. Huxley and Wallace on partly indeed different 
                                                     
453 Ch. Darwin, The Descent of Man (1874), Chapter XIX, pp. 857 f., see also p. 847. 
454 Ibid, p. 861. 
455 Ibid, Chapter V, pp. 205-206. 
456   On Malthus  pp. 174 f.. 
457 H. Spencer, Social Statics (1851), pp. 311-329. 
458 J. C. Greene, Darwin as a Social Evolutionist (1977/1981), pp. 95-127. 
459 R. Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought (1955). 
460 P. J. Bowler, The Non-Darwinian Revolution (1988), pp. 152-173, esp. 155, 161, 165, 171; 
Evolution (1984), pp. 266 f. Also: M. Hawkins, Social Darwinism in European and American Thought, 
1860-1945 (1997). 
Part II. Chapter 4: The Internal Logic of Theories – From Darwin to Dawkins 118 
grounds, by 1860 had reached a world-view focused on the idea of competitive 
struggle and survival of the fittest.461 However, the specific way Darwin argues, – 
I think – is not only due to an arbitrary construction on top of his theory, but is at least 
partly born out of the construction of his biological theory. 
Still one might imagine Darwin even more vigorously arguing against poor laws 
and the like. In my opinion, Darwin’s still detectable ambivalence in applying his 
original struggle-for-life-view of nature also to humans partly refers us to his 
ambivalence in regard to the universality of natural selection, his Lamarckian tenets 
and the modifications of his theory, which is vice versa connected with his attempt to 
apply his theory to mankind. In conclusion, Darwin became a ‘Socio-Darwinist’ not in a 
purely Darwinian sense, not even in the sense of the Darwin of the Origin of Species, but 
– here I agree to Greene – still in the sense of his own, a bit more moderate, 
biological theory of the Descent of Man. 
  
In summary, Darwin in the Descent of Man put more emphasis on use and disuse, 
correlation of parts etc. than in the Origin and he also emphasised the concept of 
sexual selection. Yet, Darwin generally can be said to have remained quite steadfast in 
his basic faith that natural selection and struggle for life play at least a crucial role, 
even if this theory is applied to mankind.   
Already in the Origin of Species Darwin was not a Darwinist in today’s strict sense of 
the word, but still to some degree was e. g. a Lamarckist. Nevertheless, he introduced 
the concept of natural selection as a central mechanism of evolution. Besides his still 
vague view on inheritance etc. his subparadigm in the Origin is characterised by his 
focus on the individual organism as the source of variation, as the only real entity and 
therefore the unit of selection, of evolution and of the struggle for life.  
In the Descent of Man, Darwin introduced a limited causal pluralism, but he seems 
still to have explained the evolution of ‘lower’ animals and of man by an unchanging 
universal set of laws. He generally estimated natural selection to be less important and 
also considered group selection at least for humans. Still at least in this moderated 
sense he applied his theories also to human capacities and culture. 
d) Neo-Darwinism: Weismann Turns Darwin’s Theory into ‘Darwinism’ 
At Darwin’s times, the mechanisms of inheritance were still totally obscure. Linked to 
this ignorance was Darwin’s problem of how variability could arise on which natural 
selection then could act. “With respect to the causes of variability, we are in all cases 
very ignorant”462. Correspondingly, – as we have seen before463 – Darwin in the Origin 
and even more in the Descent of Man still relied on inheritance of acquired characters 
and correlation of parts. 
                                                     
461 J. C. Greene, Darwinism as a World View. In J. C. Greene, Science, Ideology and World View (1981), 
pp. 148-150. Even P. J. Bowler concedes that the struggle metaphor was at variance with a 
formerly more directed and purposeful notion of evolution, The Non-Darwinian Revolution (1988), 
pp. 156, 165. 
462 Ch. Darwin, The Descent of Man (1874), Chapter II, p. 41. 
463 In this respect Darwin was not a Darwinist,  106 f.. 
Part II. Chapter 4: The Internal Logic of Theories – From Darwin to Dawkins 119 
August Weismann (1834-1914) was an ardent supporter of the theory of natural 
selection and since 1882 rejected the concept of use inheritance. Because of this, 
George Romanes, a disciple of Darwin, who himself did not want to abandon the 
Lamarckian elements in Darwin’s theory,464 coined the term ‘neo-Darwinism’ for 
Weismann’s radicalisation of Darwin’s original more moderate theory. Neo-
Darwinism later on, after the crises of Darwinism and neo-Darwinism at the turn of 
the century, only became dominant under the again quite different regime of the 
evolutionary synthesis. As there were almost no original Darwinians left, people 
started to use ‘Darwinism’ for short, instead of the literally more correct terms ‘neo-
Darwinism’ or ‘Weismannism’. 
 
In Weismann’s intellectual development three main periods could be distinguished:465 
• Already from 1868 to 1881 Weismann ardently supported natural (and sexual) 
selection. But nevertheless he believed at the same time in inheritance of acquired 
characteristics. Like Darwin, he thought that use inheritance produces the 
variability on which natural selection could act. 
• From 1882 to 1895 Weismann had dismissed the theory of use-inheritance and 
offered an alternative theory of inheritance. At that time he was almost totally a 
panselectionist on the level of the individual organism. 
• From 1896 to 1910 Weismann deviated from his panselectionist view. Despite 
having found a theory of inheritance which made the inheritance of acquired 
characters impossible, he still failed to give a convincing account of how variation 
is sustained. Lacking theories of mutation and population genetics, he had to 
accept that a mere chance combination and blending inheritance could not provide 
enough variation. Hence he had to introduce other mechanisms, mainly his theory 
of cell selection, germinal selection and even a theory of ‘induced germinal 
selection’. At this time he revoked his former strictly neo-Darwinian beliefs and 
again emphasised sexual selection and also other mechanisms. 
 
In Weismann’s middle period he stated in his theory of inheritance, that there is only one 
direction of information flux: we today would say ‘from the genotype to the 
phenotype’. Besides his theoretical considerations he also refuted inheritance of 
acquired characters by experiment: Selective breeding of the largest and the smallest 
individuals of pure lines, which are only due to environmental conditions of different 
height, should produce progressive results. Such experiments, which were conducted 
till the 1930s and 40s, came uniformly to negative results.466 
In Das Keimplasma: Eine Theorie der Vererbung (1892) he gave a full account of his 
theory, called germ-plasma theory of inheritance, based on the cell nucleus theory of 
M. Schleiden, T. Schwann and R. Virchow. 
                                                     
464  E.g., R. J. Richards, Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior (1987), pp. 
334 f. 
465 See: E. Mayr, Weismann and Evolution (1985), pp. 296 f.; One Long Argument (1991), pp. 111 ff.  
466 E. Mayr, Growth of Biological Thought (1982), p. 700. 
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Weismann advocated a continuity of the germ plasma (Keimplasma) which, 
according to him, is unaffected by any change of the soma plasma (Somatoplasma). This 
conception could not only be applied to the nucleus and soma of single cells, but to the 
relation of whole germ cells and somatic cells (cf. Figure 2). 
Weismann’s much more complicated theory of inheritance got, from the 
viewpoint of today’s biology, something wrong. He did not approve an ‘activation’ 
theory of the germ plasma but a ‘dissection’ theory: he thought that “the chromatin 
which controls them [the cells] cannot be the same in every cell but must differ 
according to the nature of the cell”.467 Here Weismann was corrected by the research 
of Spemann, Driesch and others who emphasised the role of the location of cells in 
the whole organism. Despite this, Weismann has to be regarded as founder of what 
was later called the central dogma of molecular biology: no information could be passed 





By doing this he ruled out inheritance of acquired characters and also Darwin’s theory 
of pangenesis, and by this the way was prepared for his version of panselectionism. In 
his middle period he also became critical towards sexual selection.468 Natural selection 
was to him, at that period, although still not totally breaking with developmental 
constraints, almost the only mechanism of evolution. In the beginning this was 
accompanied by a belief in panadaptionism, and only after he became an ardent 
selectionist he realised (as had Darwin before him) that natural selection does not 
necessarily lead to perfection.469  
Another aspect concerning our comparison of Darwinian subparadigms is that 
Weismann in his middle period – like Darwin in the Origin – focused on the level of 
the individual as an object of selection, while the individual is either seen as phenotype 
or as holistic genotype.470  
Although Weismann should be seen as clearly Darwinian arguing against a 
romantic understanding of a preformed ‘evolution’, he in a limited sense not only 
undermined, but continued this tradition which was especially strong in Germany: he 
applied preformationism now with a materialist spin only to the problem of 
                                                     
467 A. Weismann, Keimplasma (1892), p. 43, quoted in E. Mayr, The Growth of Biological Thought (1982), 
p. 702. 
468  E. Mayr, Weismann and Evolution (1985), p. 309. 
469  Ibid, p. 308. 







Figure 2: Flux of information in Weismann’s Keimplasmatheorie. 
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ontogenesis and exactly by this he made the phylogenetic preformationism impossible, 
which had been central to romantic biology and had been based on causa formalis.  
Weismann became Darwin’s executor in finding a theory of inheritance which 
allowed an exclusive focus on Darwin’s theory of natural selection; he radicalised 
Darwin’s theory by ruling out causal pluralism still employed by Darwin himself and 
replaced it by his own panselectionist theory.  
Hence Weismann with even more reason than Darwin himself, could be called a 
Darwinian in the sense of our working definition. Because Weismann focused on the 
individual or on the genotype as a whole he has been treated here under the 
subparadigm of individual-Darwinism.  
After Weismann had refuted romantic biology and Lamarckian inheritance of 
acquired characters, his panselectionist theory had the majority of supporters 
during the 1880s. 
4.2 Darwinism on Its Deathbed 
In the 1890s the influence of Weismann, and with this the influence of Darwinism, 
faded again and was not dominant until the occurrence of the evolutionary synthesis 
in the 1930s and 1940s. Victorian ‘Darwinism’, as P. J. Bowler has shown, had anyway 
not been a pure form of Darwinism. At any rate, after the short success of 
Weismann’s mono-mechanistic purer brand of Darwinism, most biologists at the end 
of the century turned against this radicalised form of Darwin’s theory. This might 
partly be due to the perhaps over-ambitious attack of Weismann upon other forms of 
explanation. At the time Weismann overcame the concept of use-inheritance, he was 
still not able to provide another explanation of how variance is sustained, a necessary 
precondition if the mechanism of natural selection was to be accepted. 
Although natural selection was still one among other discussed factors of 
evolution – and no doubt still had some (subliminal) influence on other areas of 
human activity even at that time –, Weismann’s attack on causal pluralism ended in a 
strong backlash in biology. During about 40 years the majority of biologists regarded 
themselves as followers of (1) neo-Lamarckism, (2) a theory of orthogenesis or 
(3) a Mendelian kind of saltationism.471 
(1) Neo-Lamarckism in the narrow sense mainly focused on use inheritance. Often 
this term is used as in the broader sense as umbrella notion also for the other non-
Darwinian schools.  
Social-Lamarckism, in the narrow and in the broad sense, was present in the works of Joseph 
LeConte, Lester Ward,  the psychologist G. Stanley Hall and the playwright George 
Bernhard Shaw. Apart from Spencer who at least partly was an early ‘social-Lamarckist’ 
                                                     
471 This division of different schools is adopted from E. Mayr, The Growth of Biological Thought 
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these conceptions were often linked with the goal of social reform and state education and 
an opposition towards laissez-faire.472 
(2) The conception of orthogenesis resembles the tenet of romantic biology to focus 
on an inner tendency, a necessary unfolding of nature. The romantic idea culminates 
in the gain of self-consciousness of nature or God. In the second half of the 19th 
century the concept of orthogenesis was either combined with physicalism or with 
finalism, interestingly both turning against the turning against the Darwinian surrender 
to chance. Among the proponents of orthogenesis were Carl von Nägeli (a former 
student of Oken), Theodor Eimer, Leo S. Berg, Edward Drinker Cope, Henry 
Fairfield Osborn, as well as the Jesuit and palaeontologist Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. 
In this context the vitalists Hans Driesch and Jakob von Uexküll should also be 
mentioned, as these authors emphasised the non-reducibility of biology to physics. 
They referred – often in a somewhat mystical way – to vital forces. Driesch also 
reintroduced the teleological Aristotelian concept of entelecheia. Generally vitalism was 
influenced also by German Gestalt-psychology.473 Like this school they were opposed 
to reductionism and atomism. Also the process philosophy of A. N. Whitehead – 
although different in form and background – resembles this general position. 
(3) Saltationism was also already a tenet of romantic biology. Romantic biologists 
favoured this concept largely because of their belief in given forms. Today this idea 
might be easier to understand, if we use the term ‘ecological niche’, into which a 
species only suddenly ‘slip’. However, saltationism traditionally has corresponded to 
the belief in an essence of a species.474 Darwin, in contrast, had favoured a species 
nominalism and a gradualist view of evolution.  
In 1900 three European biologists, among them Hugo de Vries (1848-1935), 
rediscovered the laws of heredity already developed and published in the year 1866 by 
the Austrian monk Gregor Mendel (1822-84). 
Mendel, as historians of science recently have pointed out, was not the lonely originator of 
modern population genetics ‘whose only associates lived in the next century’, but in a 
historizised view Mendel should be seen as part of a tradition founded by the plant 
geographer and pre-Darwinian evolutionist Franz Unger, who was Mendel’s teacher at 
Vienna University, and who had himself been influenced by A. v. Humboldt and by idealist 
morphology.475 
To de Vries the rediscovered laws provided evidence for the existence of sudden 
changes in species (which he named ‘mutations’). Although this has not necessarily to 
be interpreted along the lines of romantic biology, in de Vries’ view this also provides 
support at least for a saltationistic speciation as opposed to Darwin’s gradual one. The 
                                                     
472 P. J. Bowler, Evolution: The History of an Idea (1984), p. 278-282. G. B. Shaw, Back to Methuselah 
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English scientist who had coined the term ‘genetics’, also opposed Darwinism: 
William Bateson (1861-1926), after being influenced by de Vries, focused even more 
strongly than de Vries on evolution by mutation pressure. The first phase where 
Mendelism became influential runs from the 1900 to 1910 and is dominated by Vries, 
Bateson and Johannsen. The second phase of Mendelism beginning in 1910 was 
dominated by the Morgan school, focusing on more specific genetic questions.476 
However, even in the early times of the evolutionary synthesis e. g. the geneticist 
R. Goldschmidt and the palaeontologist O. H. Schindewolf (like most other German 
palaeontologists) supported saltationism. Today’s palaeontological theory of 
punctuated equilibrium may in a way be seen as a revised form of saltationism477. 
Although the opposition against Darwinism was predominant till 1930, the 
different directions and disciplines were unable to build up one coherent synthesis. In 
1929 the philosopher of science J. H. Woodger wrote: the “general theoretical results 
which have been reached by investigation along the lines of physiology, experimental 
morphology, genetics, cytology, and the older descriptive morphology are extremely 
difficult to harmonise with one another [...].”478 He even described the basic biological 
principles of his time in terms of antitheses, like vitalism and mechanism, structure 
and function, organism and environment, preformation and epigenesis, teleology and 
causation, mind and body. He predicted a fundamental change in biology, which 
would incorporate all these aspects. And indeed another paradigm was really in the 
making, although Woodger would probably have regretted that not all these notions 
found entrance in this synthesis. The so-called evolutionary synthesis was at least 
mainly a revival of a moderated form of Darwinism. However, it is still difficult to 
decide if Darwinism had changed its conceptual hard core and assimilated other ideas, 
or if it had changed only its ‘protective belt’. Here a middle position is held; a new 
subparadigm was born, which still is at least largely a Darwinian one, though it is in 
some respects less radically Darwinian than Weismann’s pan-selectionism. Thus, if we 
look back, it seems adequate to state that the time between 1890 and 1930 was only a 
short ‘eclipse of Darwinism’, which then gained dominance again479. 
4.3 Evolutionary Synthesis 
In 1943 Julian Huxley (1887-1975), grandson of Thomas Henry Huxley, pronounced 
in his book Evolution, the Modern Synthesis the birth of a unified, mainly Darwinian, 
biology. The basis of the so-called evolutionary synthesis was built in the 1920s and 
1930s and its elaboration was largely finished in the 1940s and early 1950s.480 It was a 
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synthesis of different theoretical approaches, as well as of different fields – which 
often correspond to different approaches. 
In the following four subsections the main aspects of this impressive convergence 
of views and the main characteristic of the resulting paradigm will be elaborated. The 
influences on this synthesis external to biology are worked out later on. Here the 
internal history of the synthesis is treated. In the first and second section we will 
introduce the main contributiors and main tenets of the first and second phase of the 
evolutionary synthesis. In section three the main different features of this Darwinian 
paradigm, its focus on additional evolutionary – largely Darwinian – factors and its 
focus on the level of populations will be worked out. Finally it will be discussed 
whether advocates of this view were inclined to be more guarded in applying their 
approach towards man as well. 
The synthesis generally was neither solely based on the developments in 
genetics481 nor solely on the development of population thinking; it seems that both 
contributed to it.482 Nevertheless the synthesis always has been far from being 
monolithic.483 
I think, one might even challenge the often held assumption that the resulting evo-
lutionary synthesis has itself in its different wings or phases been purely Darwinian.  
On the one hand many proponents of the synthesis have quite clearly stated 
something like: “All known evolutionary rules can be explained by mutation 
and selection.”484  
On the other hand, it must firstly be acknowledged that population genetics was 
already a Mendelian-Darwinian synthesis (see below) and Darwinism had to some 
extent to give up its own emphasis on the continuity of variation and hereditary 
change. Secondly, as we will see, Darwin’s exclusive focus on the individual organism 
was abandoned, and concepts like population, isolation and species were developed 
which, according to Mayr, were in Darwin’s day still rather nebulous.485 Thirdly, it has 
been argued that earlier developments in phylogenetic research, by proponents who 
did not yet see mutation and selection as the sole mechanisms of evolution, still paved 
the way for population genetics.486 Fourthly – which in my opinion is of most 
importance –, in the later period of the synthesis some tenets such as Lerner’s concept 
of genetic homeostasis, which is rooted in rather non-Darwinian traditions, had been 
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incorporated into the synthesis.487 Sometimes, for example, Waddington, who is nor-
mally contrasted to Darwinism, has also been declared to have contributed to the 
synthesis.488 
What we call Darwinism is in any case a function of our definition and our own 
theoretical position. I personally think that the notion Darwinism, especially as it 
expands to other fields, is used too broadly. Whether this also applies to the synthesis 
cannot be discussed here. A more precise definition of Darwinism would be needed 
( p. 358). For the time being, according to our working definition ( p. 102) and 
because the synthesis no doubt owes much to the concept of natural selection,489 here 
we will treat the synthesis simply as another Darwinian paradigm. 
In this treatment of the evolutionary synthesis I shall try to give reason to the 
hypothesis that the evolutionary synthesis was logically and historically achieved in 
two relatively distinct phases.490 Although the term ‘phase’ should indeed indicate a 
logical succession, I have to concede that they actually existed in parallel for a while 
and could in this respect also be seen as the two wings of the synthesis. Still, the 
second wing – at least for a while – gained predominance. 
E. Mayr normally used the term ‘evolutionary synthesis’ to refer only to the 
proponents of the second phase,491 whereas other authors have emphasised the 
contributions of the first phase492. Historical positions might reflect biological 
viewpoints, that is, which wing of the synthesis an author belongs to. In history and 
philosophy of science Mayr’s viewpoint – possibly also because of his own 
contributions to these fields – seems to prevail. By arguing that the synthesis has taken 
place in two phases, one apprehends a certain unity of both views, the necessity of 
early contributions and – largely acknowledged and only recently challenged – the 
superiority of the second phase of the evolutionary synthesis.  
a) First Phase – Synthesis of Genetics and Population Statistics 
Early Darwinism had the problem of explaining how there could be enough variability 
on which natural selection could work. In particular since Weismann had refuted the 
concept that variance is sustained by properties aquired during an organism’s lifetime 
this problem became pressing and even challenged Darwinism in general. Natural 
selection would quickly weed out any variance. 
Moreover, Darwin and most of his followers advocated blending inheritance, 
which even without any selection pressure, would in each successive generation lead 
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to a diminution of individual differences. The variance of populations would fade and 
would quickly tend to centre closely around the mean.493 
The saltationistic school, at odds with Darwinism, was continued after 1910 
predominantly by the late Mendelian Thomas Hunt Morgan (1866-1945), who had 
founded the work on Drosophila494 in the famous fly room at Columbia University. 
Morgan and his school stressed the independence of individual genes and 
discontinuous variation. The discontinuity given by Mendel’s laws seemed 
inconsistent with a gradualist Darwinian view. 
Only the evolutionary synthesis was able to highjack this concept and integrate it 
as a central building stone for the still – largely – Darwinian framework, which at that 
point could explain how variability is sustained on a higher level, the 
level of population. 
The core of this synthesis was the development of population genetics, including both 
the genetic level and the level of statistical analysis of the population. In this context, 
the term population is defined as all individual organisms which could freely interbreed 
with each other. The sum of all genes of such a population is called gene-pool. Alleles are 
different genes at the same locus (on the same or on corresponding chromosomes). 
The Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium  is the equation which builds the heart of popu-
lation genetics. This ‘law or principle’495 had already been formulated in 1908 by the 
British mathematician Godfrey H. Hardy and the German physician Wilhelm 
Weinberg independently. It says that, if mating between individuals occurs at random 
and there are no external influences, the relative frequencies of two alleles would re-
main constant in a gene pool. Hence, the variance of a population does not fade with-
out any external cause, as would have been the case in models of blending inheritance. 
Given a diploid genetic system, where chromosomes correspond to each other in pairs. 
Provided that for the discussed gene locus (or more exactly, for the two corresponding loci), 
there are only two different kinds of genes (=alleles) present in the population. These 
possible gene expressions, A and a, have a relative frequency in the gene pool, p and q. In 
this two allele case the equation p + q = 1 is valid by the definition of relative frequencies.  
During (sexual) reproduction two reproductive cells, which both have a reduced 
(haploid) set of chromosomes, unite. This results again in a cell with a proper set of pairs of 
chromosomes (diploid set). If a random mixing of alleles is taken for granted ( below) 
than the probability that on the corresponding loci is one of the two alleles A or a 
corresponds to their relative frequencies p and q in the gene-pool.  
Hence, the allele combinations AA should have the relative frequency p × p = p2, Aa 
should have the relative frequency (p × q) + (q × p) = 2 pq, and aa finally should have the 
relative frequency q × q = q2. If we now check the new overall relative frequency of the 
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alleles p and q in the gene pool, we have to sum up the relative frequencies of the alleles of 
the different combinations: p2 + 2pq + q2= (p + q)2. Because of the definition of relative 
frequencies (p + q)2 is equal to 1 which is consistent with the definition that p + q equals 1.  
In conclusion, the relative frequency of two alleles in a gene pool could remain constant. 
The resulting combinations on the two chromosomes of the organisms is, as we have seen, 
distributed according to a binomial distribution. The Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium could be 
generalised also for cases of n alleles and m chromosomes and is distributed as a multinomial 
distribution: (p + q+...+n)m.496 
The Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium is valid only under the precondition that there is an 
‘ideal population’. A population is ideal if it is panmictic (all reproductive 
combinations of the same individuals have the same possibility); if it has an endless 
(or at least sufficient high) number of organisms; and if it is not exposed to either 
mutation, selection, migration, or inner isolation. The artificial character of these 
assumptions is at least partly intended, because the equilibrium provides a yardstick 
against which evolutionary change, e. g. the strength of selection, could be measured.  
Still, such a measurement is of course only valid when we do know from other 
considerations that all other preconditions are fulfilled. Otherwise the different influences 
would be attributed to the measured factor. 
The biologists Ronald A. Fisher (1890-1962), also an important contributor also to 
modern statistics, and John Burdon Sanderson Haldane (1892-1964) made far reaching 
mathematical contributions, based on this framework. Both believed that natural 
selection is the predominant force which causes changes in the above equilibrium and 
thus leads to gradual evolution. 
Philosophically this perspective seems to me to be a synthesis of two extreme 
aspects, the macroscopic and the microscopic aspect. On the one hand, this view 
introduced the macro-level of a whole population (or better: ‘gene pool’) into the 
Darwinian research tradition. On the other hand, they have combined this with a 
genetic perspective. Fitness in this view becomes defined by the changes of 
frequencies of a given gene at a given locus compared with its alternative genes – its 
alleles – on that locus in a given population. Hence, fitness is now in one aspect a 
property of a single gene, in another only definable in relation to a distribution of 
alleles in its population. 
Fisher, in particular, did not treat the phenotypic individual organism or visible 
population, but arrays of genes.497 Fisher largely based his work on the three 
assumptions which were later disputed: the exclusive importance of the genotype, the 
neglect of interactions of individual genes and the concept of complete 
random recombinations. 
b) Second Phase – Population Structure and Macroscopic Mechanisms 
The second step of the evolutionary synthesis is mainly characterised by the 
conceptual introduction of population structure into the theoretical mathematical 
                                                     
496 For example: D. J. Futuyma, Evolutionsbiologie (1986/1990), pp. 95 f. H. Knodel, Linder Biologie 
(1948/1988), p. 315. 
497 D. J. Depew, B. Weber, Darwinism Evolving (1995), p. 246. 
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models, which had been based on the assumption of total panmictic ‘ideal’ 
populations. This was paralleled with a stronger focus on the actual situation in which 
naturalists find populations, and by an introduction of additional evolutionary factors. 
Proponents of the second step of the evolutionary synthesis, in particular Mayr, 
have often emphasised that nothing in the evolutionary writings of Fisher and 
Haldane could explain the process of multiplication of species.498  
We will now outline the contributions of only three of the main figures of the 
second phase of the evolutionary synthesis, before we give a more systematic account 
in the following section.499 
The American geneticist Sewall Wright (1889-1988), who together with Fisher and 
Haldane was one of the founding fathers of mathematical population genetics, took 
already the real, complex structure of what he called “adaptive landscape”500 into 
account. Wright was the first, who focused more on the concepts of gene-inter-
actions501, of subpopulations and of ‘interdemic’ selection. In very small subpopu-
lations it is more probable that a different subset of genes becomes fixed than in the 
underlying distribution of the whole population, independent from any selection pres-
sure. In terms of the probability theory this is an obvious effect and had already been 
recognised by Fisher, who thought it a deviation from the main process of natural 
selection. Wright on the contrary regarded this process as an essential part of evo-
lution and called it ‘genetic drift’. The fixation of a combination of genes in small po-
pulations by chance and not by natural selection, is an additional (we might say macro-
scopic) way in which variance, now not within but between subpopulations, is sustained. 
Till then this had continued to be a problem. Although the Hardy-Weinberg 
equilibrium gave an answer to the question why the variation will not diminish with-
out selection pressure, it was still difficult to explain how variation can be maintained 
if there is selection pressure. In this situation, in his ‘theory of shifting balance’ Wright 
stated that genetic drift plays a central role in producing variance between small, 
interbreeding subpopulations, which are partly isolated from the total population.  
The Russian geneticist Theodosius Dobzhansky (1900-75), who had emigrated to the 
USA, but was already influenced by a Russian school of genetics based around Sergei 
Chetverikov, followed Wright’s argument that drift plays an important role in 
sustaining variation. Even more than Wright, he emphasized in his book Genetics and 
the Origin of Species (1937) the adaptation of whole populations, and that a gene’s fitness 
is always context related.502 Presumably because of this Mayr has praised him – and 
                                                     
498 E. Mayr, One Long Argument (1991), p. 133. Also e.g., R. Lewontin, Theoretical Population Genetics in 
the Evolutionary Synthesis (1980), p. 61. 
499 I have to neglect some founders of the synthesis, like e. g. the zoologist Bernhard Rensch and 
George Gaylord Simpson, who with their book Tempo and Mode in Evolution (1944) brought 
palaeontology into the new synthesis. 
500 On this metaphor: M. Ruse, Are Pictures Really Necessary? The Case of Sewall Wright's 'Adaptive 
Landscapes' (1996). 
501  R. C. Lewontin, Theoretical Population Genetics in the Evolutionary Synthesis (1980), p. 61. 
But  footnotes 502, 503.  
502 Th. Dobzhansky, Genetics and the Origin of Species (1951), p. 254. 
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not Wright – as the founding father of the synthesis.503 (Wright, although 
mathematically also concerned with structured populations, did not yet focus so much 
on the actual populations observed by the naturalists. In this sense he can be located 
somewhere between the first and second phase of the evolutionary synthesis.) 
In Dobzhansky’s model of ‘balancing selection’ (partly opposed to Wright’s 
‘shifting balance’) he proposed that the variation within heterozygotes is an adaptation 
which allows populations to ride over large maladaptive valleys. In this emphasis, he 
mirrors his former teacher Sergei S. Chetverikov who came to the conclusion that, “a 
species, like a sponge, soaks up heterozygous mutations, while remaining from first to 
last externally (phenotypically) homozygous”504. I think, that the concept of 
accumulated variability, which is adaptive, not in the short but in the long run, 
foreshadowed the later anti-selectionist claim of genetic neutralism (Kimura).505 
Mayr (1904-2005) worked in a similar framework but in Systematics and the Origin of 
Species (1942) stressed the actual circumstances in which populations and individual 
organisms are found by the naturalist. Among the proponents of the evolutionary 
synthesis it was mainly he who highlighted the phenotypic side of the evolutionary 
process. This, I suppose, is due to a radicalisation of the concept of the context 
relatedness of genes, already emphasised in Dobzhansky’s work. Mayr strongly 
advocates that genes “not only act but interact”, that there is a “harmoniously 
integrated” “unity of the genotype” and hence opposed what he has called beanbag 
genetics.506 Pushed to its extreme it does not make sense any more to look at single 
genes or gene pools, but phenotypic individuals and populations or species.507 
According to Mayr genes mutate, organisms are selected and species evolve. 
Mayr focused on the concept of allopatric speciation and geographical isolation. 
Like other proponents of both phases of the synthesis he used a definition of species 
and populations based on reproduction (the so-called biological concept of species), but 
by these conceptions he focused on phenotypic conditions which are, according to 
him, important, if not necessary, for speciation. He also established the recognition of 
a similar chance effect like genetic drift, namely the founder effect (1954). Genetic drift 
focuses on the fact that in small populations, elimination of individuals is largely due 
to chance and not to natural selection. The founder effect states the same process not 
in the case of existent small groups, but in the case of the founding of a new group; 
for example a pregnant bird which starts a settlement on a remote island.508 
Corresponding to his focus on the phenotypic aspects Mayr uses a term for this 
mechanism denoting the phenotypic level. 
                                                     
503 E. Mayr, The Growth of Biological Thought (1982), p. 568. 
504 S. S. Chetverikov, On Certain Aspects of the Evolutionary Process (1926, engl. translation, 1961), 
p. 105, p. 178, quoted in E. Mayr, The Growth of Biological Thought (1982), p. 557. 
505 The matter is actually more complicated. Kimura was vigorously criticised by R. C. Lewontin, 
who because of his emphasis on allelic polimorphism is often counted amoung the main 
defenders of Dobzhansky’s legacy. 
506  E. Mayr, Animal Species and Evolution (1963), Chapter 10, pp. 263 f., 295. 
507  E.g., E. Mayr, Evolution und die Vielfalt des Lebens (1978), p. 242. 
508 See E. Mayr, Growth of Evolutionary Thought (1982), pp. 602 f. 
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c) Evolutionary Factors and the Importance of Populations 
The evolutionary synthesis, although most of its proponents were self-proclaimed 
Darwinians, – especially after its second phase – had properties which had been 
missing in or even contradicted Darwin’s and Weismann’s Darwinism. Although to 
the proponents of the evolutionary synthesis natural selection and also individual natural 
selection was still the main driving force of evolution, they enriched evolutionary 
theory with several additional factors. After this has been shown, the stress of the 
synthesis on the population level will be worked out. 
 
Now, mutations were regarded as source of new variability, and in a way as an additional 
factor. The Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium had explained only the stability of a given 
variance if there are no external influences, especially no selection.  
Mutations were now understood as sudden random changes in the nucleotide 
sequence of the DNA. Mutations provide for the emergence of entirely new genes, a 
concept necessary for evolutionary change above the change of mere gene-frequencies 
in a gene pool. Mutations exist on all ‘levels’ of the genome, from single base pairs of 
a gene (point mutations) to full chromosomes.  
The concept of mutation was originally reintroduced to biology by de Vries, who – 
although natural selection played a role in his theory – was rather a Mendelian.509 
Mendelians, like Bateson favoured a theory of mutation pressure. Correspondingly 
this conception was originally rather allied with anti-Darwinian orthogenetic theories. 
But Mendelism at the same time also undermined the analogy of evolution and 
growth, even more than Darwin did, and separated genetics from embryology.510 
Hence the evolutionary synthesis was able to transform the concept of mutation into 
a process of blind chance511, fitting neatly into a Darwinian frame of mind, since 
Darwin had also sometimes written of chance variation at the individual level.512  
Although this factor was new, one may hence argue that in principle this – 
transformed – concept of mutation modernised but did not add much to the theory.  
Today the notion of a total chance character of mutation central to population genetics 
comes under pressure from genetics. In genetics one speaks of so-called mutation genes 
making certain mutations more probable than others. I personally think, it is largely up to 
our interpretation, to argue whether on an imagined continuum between Darwinism and 
Lamarckism, we move by this insight more towards Lamarckism again.513 
Moreover, the evolutionary synthesis in its second phase was mainly inspired by 
contributions of the naturalists, which also statistically led to slight change in focus. 
The crucial point is the subdivision of the ‘ideal’ population in many sub-populations. 
This macrobiological concept has resulted in several new evolutionary factors: 
                                                     
509 See: G. E. Allen, The Evolutionary Synthesis: Morgan and Natural Selection Revisited (1980), p. 366 f. 
510  P. Bowler, The Non-Darwinian Revolution (1988), pp. 106, 114, 117-120, 123-125.  
511 See: F. Wuketits, Evolutionstheorien (1995), p. 71. 
512 Still, the word ‘mutation’, which could be found seven times in the Origin of Species, there just 
means change. 
513  pp. 146 f, and pp. 363 ff. 
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• Isolation (reproductive) is regarded as necessary precondition for the development of 
sub-populations, and thus as a prerequisite for speciation.  
• Migration between partly isolated subpopulations increases the regional variability. 
• Genetic drift takes place among small populations, where mere chance can play a 
role in fixing certain gene-combinations. 
• The founder effect similarly states that the sample of genes which a founder of a new 
population contributes influences the gene-distribution considerably. This effect is 
also largely due to chance and is understood as directionally blind. 
 
According to the Evolutionary Synthesis, all these factors, adding to the mechanism 
of individual chance variation and elimination, in the first place play an important role 
in sustaining the necessary variability within the population as a whole, and, secondly, 
enable the change of gene distribution in a gene pool necessary for speciation. The 
acknowledgement of macrobiological preconditions for speciation also led to the 
distinction of cladogenesis, branching, and anagenesis, phyletic evolution514. 
Despite the novelty of the factors, they may be seen as pointing to the concept of 
natural selection, except on the level of populations. Natural selection, in its broad 
sense, is normally regarded as composed out of two sub-processes: chance variation 
and elimination of the unfit.515 In my opinion the evolutionary synthesis seems to 
have introduced this process on the level of populations as well. The factors of 
reproductive isolation, genetic drift and founder effect are all mainly regarded as chance 
processes which increase the variance between sub-populations. Migration and other 
forms of gene flux increase the variability within subpopulations. This parallel is not 
always made explicit; but, for example, Mayr – in disagreement with J. Huxley – has 
argued: “Every new species is an ecological experiment, an attempt to occupy a new 
niche [...], species, in the sense of evolution, are quite comparable to mutations.”516 
But under closer scrutiny that analogy might be too simplifying, because these 
mechanisms also change the working of phylic evolution. However, I think one can 
conclude that despite the many concrete mechanisms the evolutionary synthesis was 
mostly perceived as only introducing a slight causal pluralism, which in its mechanism 
still essentially resembles Darwinism. Linked to these new mechanisms is the philo-
sophical innovation of the introduction of the importance of the population level.  
A side-effect of the application of the concept of natural selection (in the broad sense) to the 
population level is that individual organisms are not necessarily highly adapted. If organisms 
act for the good of the species they do not necessarily act for their own good. Hence the 
                                                     
514  E.g., Th. Dobzhansky, Mankind Evolving (1962), p. 220. R. Lewontin, Theoretical Population Genetics 
in the Evolutionary Synthesis (1980), p. 61. This distinction refers to the distinction between micro- 
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population level of adaptation may also have reduced the strong adaptionism on the level of 
individual organisms. 
Correspondingly, populations (groups of interbreeding organisms), or gene pools are at 
the very centre of evolutionary biology: “Evolution is a change in the genetic 
composition of populations”517  
Nearly all advocates of the evolutionary synthesis have defined species in terms of 
reproduction, i. e. the so-called ‘biological’ concept of species.518 Strictly speaking a 
definition, fitting to the second phase of the evolutionary synthesis, has to mention 
partly isolated sub-populations. Hence, in textbooks one will usually find a definition 
like: a species is “a group of interbreeding natural populations, which are 
reproductively isolated from other such groups”519.  
Only G. G. Simpson slightly differs from the other main proponents of the synthesis in this 
respect and has defined a species generally differently. “An evolutionary species is a lineage 
(an ancestral-descendent sequence of populations) evolving separately from others and with 
its own unitary evolutionary role and tendencies.”520 
This predominant definition of species is linked to species realism.521 “The Species is the 
real unit of evolution, it is this changing entity, which specialises and adapts”522. The 
species nominalist Darwin had largely assumed that species are only convenient 
notions, which artificially describe a close similarity between individual organisms.523 
According to the synthesis species and gene pools, unlike individual organisms and 
single genes, are long lasting. A precondition for genetic recombination in sexually re-
producing organisms is the existence of a common gene pool. Based on the outlined 
evolutionary factors the units of evolution (not necessarily of selection) are structured 
populations or gene pools. Dobzhansky goes farthest when he speaks of the 
‘organism-like integration’ of interbreeding populations.524 
This realism of species or, better, of structured populations differs of course from 
the classical typological species realism.525 It is not due to what Mayr calls a 
typological concept, a pre-existing form, which is given externally to the species 
itself,526 but it is based on a populational concept, a concept of a common gene pool 
of a species, a pool of information, a common fountain of youth, from which all orga-
nisms and sub-populations derive from and to which all reproducing organisms con-
                                                     
517 Th. Dobzhansky, Genetics and the Origin of Species (1951), p. 16. 
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Animal Species and Evolution (1963), pp. 13-14, 29. 
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tribute. According to the synthesis populations and species are real, but at the same 
time they are the only real taxa; all other higher taxa, like genera and so on, are in 
principle nothing but useful artificial conventions.  
This population realism is accompanied by gene realism and only partly by a nominalistic 
attitude towards organisms. Populations are understood as arrays of genes which mix 
freely. This assumption, emphasised in the first period of the evolutionary synthesis, 
has never been completely superseded. A panmictic population is a precondition for 
most of the statistical tools of population genetics and is linked to the notion of 
independent and not contextually defined genes. In the second phase of the 
evolutionary synthesis this concept has statistically been dismissed only in regard to 
the relation between different sub-populations, not – as far as I can judge – within sub-
populations. 
Despite this, it was an explicit conviction of the second phase of the evolutionary 
synthesis, especially during the years between 1950 and 1965, that there were gene 
interactions.527 In the wake of Dobzhansky, absolute fitness values of single genes 
were denied, and it was emphasised that fitness of genes depends strongly on the 
genetic and the environmental milieu.528 Mayr in particular advocated the importance 
of gene interactions and quite clearly arrived at a realist position concerning individual 
organisms, by simultaneously dismissing the focus on population genetics. Apart from 
him, the general trend of the statistical approach led, in the second phase of the 
synthesis as well, to what Mayr called “bean-bag genetics”529, at least 
within sub-populations.530  
The emphasis on a gene-pool, with the concomitant assumption of largely inde-
pendent genes, led – I presume – to the overwhelming disapproval of sexual selection by 
most proponents of the Evolutionary Synthesis. Any concept of sexual selection vio-
lates the assumption of panmixia. Correspondingly, many advocates of the synthesis, 
in particular Julian Huxley, campaigned against the concept of sexual selection.531 
But, as already has become apparent, the evolutionary synthesis was and is not a 
monolithic block. Although Mayr, for example, emphasises the whole individual 
organism as a real entity and as a unit on which selection apparently works, still to him 
the ‘unit of evolution’ is the population. Nonetheless, E. Mayr has acknowledged 
populations as possible units of selection.532 Other followers of the synthesis focus 
even more strongly on the population as the unit of selection.533 S. Wright, for 
                                                     
527 R. Lewontin, Theoretical Population Genetics in the Evolutionary Synthesis (1980). R. Lewontin, Gene, 
Organism, Environment (1983), p. 277. 
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example, states that there is also selection on the level of demes534. The importance 
and function of different levels of selection had already been a source of dispute to 
advocates of the Evolutionary Synthesis. However, it was generally agreed that events 
on the population level were somehow crucial to the formation of new species.535  
The sub-paradigm of gene-Darwinism later on started to argue against the importance of the 
population level in general and group selection in particular ( pp. 33, 123, 191). 
The focus on populations goes along with the concept that entities, mainly 
populations, could have properties which their components did not have. This 
emergentist belief is for example expressed by Dobzhansky: “The rules governing the 
genetic structure of a population are, nevertheless, distinct from those which govern 
the genetics of the individuals, just as rules from sociology are distinct from 
physiological ones, although the former are in the last analysis integrated systems of 
the latter.”536 This emergentist belief is advocated, although the Evolutionary 
Synthesis – as we have seen previously – is still largely Darwinian in regard to the 
processes employed and indeed emphasises chance production of variation and 
differential elimination.  
Still, the emergentist attitude and the changed general conceptualisation of 
evolution affected in which way this school applied their biological theory to culture. 
d) Disengagement from Ideological Programmes?  
In the literature on the attitude of the Evolutionary Synthesis towards culture one 
could find the position that it was accompanied by a disengagement from 
ideological programmes.537 
This is not the case in regard of the first phase of the Evolutionary Synthesis, 
which by many authors is designated as Fisherism. Fisher was in fact a particularly 
ardent supporter of positive eugenics, which he explicitly regarded as Nietzschean 
in character.538 
Only with the second phase of the synthesis, especially with the works of 
Dobzhansky, Mayr and Simpson, a relative ideological disengagement seems to have 
taken place.  
I think, this ideological disengagement in the second phase of the evolutionary 
synthesis is, despite important reservations, due to two aspects of the Evolutionary 
Synthesis: (1) The synthetic evolutionary theory in its second phase advocated some 
properties which make an application to man less harmful. (2) The evolutionary 
synthesis gave reason to be cautious in any direct application, and to acknowledge the 
entire dissimilarity of biological evolution and cultural development. 
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(1) The final Evolutionary Synthesis did not support a panselectionist view. New 
evolutionary factors, besides natural selection working on the level of the organism 
came into play. Factors working on the macro-level of populations, like the chance 
processes of genetic drift, and the founder effect, show that besides natural selection 
also chance plays a role in the moulding of organisms. This resulted in an abolishment 
of a radical adaptionism; not all aspects of an organism are naturally adaptive.  
Secondly, in its later phase, proponents of the evolutionary synthesis largely accep-
ted a certain degree of context relatedness with regard to a gene. A gene which might 
be maladaptive in one population could in a successive gene-pool with changed gene 
distributions or in a different environment suddenly turn out to be adaptive again.  
Thirdly, the recognition of the positive importance of variation in the evolutionary 
synthesis contributed something to the abolishment of a simplifying programme of 
eugenics. This was mainly due to Dobzhansky, who had imported this view from 
Chetverikov’s school of genetics, and who strongly believed in democratic plurality. 
The structuredness of a population supports variation, which on the long run is 
itself adaptive.  
Last but not least, the focus on the population level and the possibility of group 
selection might have weakened the ‘Malthusian’ character, social-Darwinism had 
hitherto had.539 The focus on species or on populations was also predominant in 
classical ethology and even today there are influential proponents of this school like 
I. Eibl-Eibesfeldt, who emphasises group selection at least as far as early humans are 
concerned – also giving a basis for truly altruistic behaviour.540 
The known primatologists Jane Goodall and Frans de Waal in my opinion also belong to 
this paradigm. They did not already theoretically assume unrestrained and ruthless 
competition in groups of animals and would not easily reduce primate behaviour to simple 
gene-egoism. Although their approach might be regarded as rather a descriptive one, their 
results seem to me to fit rather into the explanatory framework of the evolutionary synthesis 
than into the framework of gene-Darwinism.  
But there had been also ethologists concerning whom it would be wrong to generalise 
about the concept of ideological disengagement. In particular, the inglorious role of 
one of its founders should at least be mentioned. But the role of the Nobel laureate 
Konrad Lorenz in the time of Nazism in Germany can be opposed to the exemplary 
role of the co-founder of ethology Niko Tinbergen.  
There are many important questions, which could not be treated here at length: How did 
evolutionary theory, especially the evolutionary synthesis, influence Nazism, with its focus 
on racism? Which other aspects led to the blunt racist ideology of ‘blood and territory (Blut 
und Boden)’? What was the theoretical difference of most of the founding fathers of the today 
still actual second phase of the synthesis and the Nazi-biologist in Germany (and other parts 
of the world)? 
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Proponents of classical ethology, like K. Lorenz and N. Tinbergen, introduced the focus 
on populations of the Evolutionary Synthesis into the biological study of behaviour of 
animals and humans. By this they indeed made the study of instinctive behaviour in animals 
and man popular again. Lorenz was accused because of this focus on instincts and the 
‘natural’ aggression of humans.541 
Still Lorenz – based on the focus on the species – could also argue, that there is still 
something like ‘species-preserving purposefulness’ (arterhaltende Zweckmäßigkeit) of instinctive 
behaviour, like the killing inhibition of wolfs and dogs542. This at least in principle left some 
room for something like a basis for an altruistic behaviour, at least within a species. M. 
Midgley in the last decades has pointed out that this allows a much more positive approach 
to human biology than gene-Darwinism ( p. 46). Even Dawkins himself had called the 
ethology founded by Lorenz ‘old benevolent regime’. 
Despite this it has to be acknowledged that Lorenz, indeed had been involved in the 
racist research politics of the Nazis. It is a dispute, how far Lorenz’ involvement into ‘racial 
hygienics’ had gone, but some involvement took place. The Dutch zoologist Tinbergen, who 
had strongly opposed the Nazis, after the war helped to rehabilitate Lorenz. However, many 
biologists especially in Germany, but also in many other countries have had advocated 
racism and Social Darwinism. 
What role did biology have in this catastrophe? Neo-Darwinian explanations, according 
to Rensch, already prevailed in German biology textbooks between 1912 and 1945. 
Nevertheless, it was only slowly that accompanying sceptical remarks and defenders of 
different views were overcome.543 According to Mayr, selectionist thinking began to spread 
in Germany not so much in the 1920s but mostly in the 1930s.544 A proper treatment of 
biology in the time of Nazism would have to answer whether the involved biologists 
belonged to the first or to second step of the Evolutionary Synthesis, and in how far their 
views differed from both of these theories. 545 
Also the – in my view originally positive – force of German idealism and romanticism 
with its urge for unification of knowledge in a perverted way seems to have played a role, as 
it was combined with neo-Darwinism. If one wants to discuss this topic in depts, one needs 
to consider the position held by the British idealist Muirhead in regard of World War I, 
advocating that not Kant and Hegel, but the abandonment of these views were responsible 
for the highly aggressive attitude of the Germans at that time.546 One may argue that both 
materialism and Darwinism may have contributed to the moral decay, and may indirectly 
have their share in the rise of Nazism.547 But this topic is far too complicated and too 
important for any simplifying treatment: Not only vitalists like H. Driesch, but also 
Darwinians of a similar brand as Lorenz, like Tinbergen, opposed Nazism. 
Apart from these reservations, I think it overall still appears to be correct that the new 
aspects of the second phase of the evolutionary synthesis, at least in Britain and the 
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546  See: S. M. d. Otter, British Idealism and Social Explanation (1996), p. 32. 
547  R. Nachtwey, Der Irrweg des Darwinismus (1959), Chapters 1, 6, 7, see also Chapter 8.  
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United States, have to some degree mitigated the social implication of the revival of 
biological neo-Darwinism. 
 
(2) The other aspect of the ideological disengagement of the proponents of the 
evolutionary synthesis was a critique of directly drawing conclusions from the 
biological evolution to cultural development.  
For example, J. Huxley, although writing much not only about evolution but also 
about ethics, finally rejected any simple analogy from biological evolution: “The human 
situation is so different from the biological, that it may prove best to abandon the 
attempt to apply concepts like natural selection to modern human affairs.”548 Such a 
rejection of a biologisation of human affairs was uttered by different authors of the 
synthesis, but could have many different reasons: 
(a) It might be due to developments within sociology and psychology. In particular 
behaviourism, which in an increasingly moderate form dominated psychology till the 
1960s or 1970s, opposed any reduction of psychological phenomena to specific 
biological instincts or drives. 
Of course behaviourism at the same time reduced inner phenomena to external behaviour. 
Moreover, paradoxically the trial and error process which behaviourism employs resembles a 
Darwinian process ( pp. 221 f.). 
(b) For writings after the Second World War, the traumatic experiences of Holocaust, 
racism and millions and millions of war victims, has been a remaining memorial 
against all simplifying biologistic accounts. 
(c) The Evolutionary Synthesis itself provided already within biology examples of 
emergentism. The dynamics of the macro-evolution is explained by some emergent 
properties (e. g. genetic shift) on the population level.549 In spite of this, the 
proponents of the Evolutionary Synthesis have always emphasised that this is fully 
compatible with the micro-processes of evolution. More adequately, they tried to steer 
a middle course between reductionism and emergentism. For example, Mayr explicitly 
supported the notion of emergence, Simpson refered to it as compositional method 
and Lorenz (at least after the war) used the term ‘fulguration’ and refered to the 
ontological stratology of Nicolai Hartmann.550 Dobzhansky, according to Francisco J. 
Ayala beheld that in man biological evolution has transcended itself into the realm of 
self-awareness and culture. Accordingly, although he apparently rejected fundamental 
beliefs of traditional religion, he was a “religious man”.551 
Corresponding with the general Newtonian background of Darwinism, some 
proponents still regarded human evolution to be governed by the same eternal set of 
                                                     
548 J. Huxley, Introduction. In Evolution: A Modern Synthesis (1963, 2nd ), quoted in J. C. Greene, Science, 
Ideology and World View (1981), p. 165. 
549  footnote 536. 
550 E. Mayr, The Growth of Biological Thought (1982), pp. 63-64. K. Lorenz, Die Rückseite des Spiegels: 
Versuch einer Naturgeschichte menschlichen Erkennens (1973/1977), pp. 44-64. For my own treatment 
of emergentism  pp. 245 ff. 
551 F. J. Ayala, Theodosius Dobzhansky: The Man and the Scientist (1976).   
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laws as animal evolution.552 Accordingly their ideological disengagement has not been 
at all total. For example, Simpson applied the neo-Darwinian paradigm to man: “Man 
is the result of a purposeless and materialistic process that did not have him in mind. 
He was not planned.”553 Huxley, despite trying to extend the Darwinian concept of an 
apparently purposeless selection of random variations into a new general world-view, 
still saw a purpose in evolution.554 Even Simpson, although he explicitly fought 
against any vitalistic and teleological explanations in evolutionary theory, came to the 
conclusion that man today is guided by ‘interthinking’ rather than by interbreeding,555 
and that finally the concept of the human uniqueness seems to have gained the upper 
hand: “The best human ethical standard must be relative and particular to man and is 
to be sought rather in the new evolution, peculiar to man, than in the old, universal to 
all organisms. The old evolution was and is essentially amoral. The new evolution 
involves knowledge, including the knowledge of good and evil.”556 
Most proponents of the final synthesis on the one hand similarly seem to have 
abandoned any strict biologistic stance. They had not the intention of reviving the 
crude message of social Darwinism. On the other hand they still claimed the relevance 
of natural selection for the understanding of the homo sapiens. For example, Dobzhan-
sky argued against a biologistic stance proposed by Darlington, but at the same time 
also criticised the “staunchest nurture hypothesis” of the psychologist Watson and the 
radical culturalism of L. White.557 It is typical for Dobzhansky, steering a middle 
course, that he advocated that the main biological trait of humanity is its plasticity and 
educability, and – although he allows some variance – this generally holds “in all clas-
ses and races of people, in short, in the species Homo sapiens.”558 
More work to substantiate the outlined position would be needed. But for the time 
being it can be concluded that most proponents of the later phase of the synthesis 
were, ideologically rather disengaged, at least in comparison with most early 
proponants of Social Darwinism. 
4.4 ‘Sociobiology’ as Gene-Darwinism – A New Synthesis? 
‘Sociobiology’ as a special Darwinian sub-paradigm, not as a discipline, has already 
been characterised by a focus on selfish genes, and by a largely gene-deterministic ap-
proach towards culture and ethics ( pp. 1 ff.). Therefore here only a short comparative 
historical outline of its biological features will be given.  Moreover, we will not treat this 
paradigm mainly in its own terms as a phenomenon, but use a more abstract descrip-
                                                     
552 On the external history of Darwinism,  pp. 160 f. 
553 G. G. Simpson, The Meaning of Evolution (1949), pp. 343-344, quoted in C. G. Greene, Science, 
Ideology and World View (1981), p. 171. 
554  P. Bowler, Evolution (1987), pp. 309-310. 
555 C. G. Greene, Science, Ideology and World View (1981), p. 172. 
556 G. G. Simpson, The Meaning of Evolution (1949), p. 281, quoted in C. J. Greene, Science, Ideology and 
World View (1981), p. 173. 
557  Th. Dobzhansky, Man Evolving (1962), pp. 75, 97, 99, 252, 320. 
558  Ibid, pp. 8, 100, 252, 320.  
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tion in order to grasp its paradigmatic core.559 Only thereafter the more general, 
external historical background to this subparadigm will be analysed ( pp. 191 f.) and 
then the basic assumptions of this approach will be criticised ( pp. 243 f.).  
The discussed subparadigm in this work has been called gene-Darwinism to 
distinguish it from other approaches in sociobiology and evolutionary theory. In this 
section am going in detail to characterise and define this sub-paradigm biologically by 
what I will call ‘germ-line reductionism’, ‘gene-atomism’ and (with certain a certain 
reservation) ‘Darwinian process monism’. 
The discussed sub-paradigm is clearly a Darwinian paradigm according to our 
working definition, since it focuses on natural selection as the main or only 
evolutionary mechanism, and this holds even more clearly than for the mentioned 
earlier sub-paradigms. The ‘selfish gene’ account of evolution560 could be contrasted 
to the organism or genome centred theories of Darwin or Weismann as well as to the 
gene-pool or population centred conceptions of the evolutionary synthesis. But gene-
Darwinism does not break with Darwinism, but it radicalises the more moderate views 
of Darwin, Weismann or the Evolutionary Synthesis – as well with regard to the 
evolutionary entities as to the evolutionary processes. 
a) Germ-Line Reductionism 
Dawkins radicalises Darwinism with an extreme interpretation of Weismann’s concept 
of the continuity of the germ-plasm. This interpretation leads Dawkins to the 
conception of genes as immortal survivors in the battle of life and of phenotypes as 
largely epiphenomenal ‘vehicles of genes’ or ‘gene machines’.561 
Darwin, still partly a Lamarckian, favoured his theory of pangenesis, whereas later 
Weismann adopted a stricter neo-Darwinian approach. The Weismann barrier 
( pp. 118), of course, has also been central to the proponents of the evolutionary 
synthesis. Hence the evolutionary synthesis – like gene-Darwinism – was in this 
respect a neo-Darwinian or Weismannian theory. However, the evolutionary 
synthesis, which accepted macroevolutionary factors, interpreted the Weismannian 
barrier in a way which we could evaluate either as being less radical or less clear than 
the interpretation of gene-Darwinism. Dawkins’ interpretation of Weismann’s barrier 
leads him to take a harsh nominalistic attitude towards the phenotypic side of 
                                                     
559 R. Dawkins emphasised the first aspect mentioned in the first sentence of the paragraph, 
whereas E. O. Wilson has emphasised the second one. Any differences from both aspects is 
here understoodas a deviation from the pure paradigm. 
Proponents of sociobiology do not always regard themselves as proponents of this paradigm 
( pp. 31). Even Dawkins wavered as to whether he regarded his approach as a new paradigm 
or only as a new perspective which is equivalent to the old one (Extended Phenotype, 
(1982/1989)). But Dawkins finally made it clear that his approach is intended to break with the 
old benevolent regime of classical ethology and the evolutionary synthesis (e.g., preface to 1989 
edition of The Selfish Gene). Here the hypothesis is supported that there is indeed a new sub-
paradigm with a certain inner cohesion.  
560  E.g., R. Dawkins, The Extended Phenotype (1982/1989), p. 4 and  footnote 74. 
561 R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (1976/1989), pp. 11, 23 f., 254 f.; Replicator Selection and the Extended 
Phenotype (1978), p. 68; The Extended Phenotype (1982/1989), pp. 97 f. 
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evolution, whether organisms or groups are meant. Because Weismann’s barrier 
allows only a direct flux of information from the genotype to the phenotype – and not 
the other way round –, the phenotype in the view of gene-Darwinism has to be 
regarded as epiphenomenal.  
In contrast, the advocates of the second step of the evolutionary synthesis 
emphasised the functional reality of macroevolutionary phenotypic properties, like 
geographic isolation or founder effect. Correspondingly proponents of the synthesis 
generally came to accept the reality (evolutionary causal relevance) of phenotypic 
properties of groups and some, like Mayr, additionally emphasised the reality of the 
individual phenotypic organism. As far as I can judge, this acceptance of the 
phenotypic structure became dominant only in the second phase of the evolutionary 
synthesis. This emphasis may have needed further theoretical clarification to prevent 
succeeding generations from the scourge of a simplifying interpretation of 
Weismann’s barrier.  
Later this gene-Darwinian radicalization of the central dogma of microbiology, 
which I call ‘germ-line reductionism’ shall be discussed in detail ( pp. 311 f.).  
b) Gene-Atomism 
An aspect of gene-Darwinism which has to be disentangled from the discussed germ-
line reductionism is its atomistic attitude towards genes. If germ-line reductionism, the 
sole relevance of the genotype, is taken for granted, an atomistic attitude additionally 
means that within the genotypic side of evolution only single selfish genes and not 
genomes or gene pools as wholes are causally relevant.75 Genes are competing for 
survival and in principle they are in conflict even within a single body.562 In this 
respect gene-Darwinism puts itself in contrast firstly to Weismann’s generally holistic 
understanding of the organismic germ-plasm, and secondly to the evolutionary 
synthesis, whose early proponents focused on gene-pools and whose later proponents 
have focused on natural populations.  
Despite this, the single selfish-gene viewpoint owes much to earlier Darwinian 
paradigms. It generally shares a reductionistic spirit with Darwin and Weismann, 
although those authors did not extend reduction to a thorough 
sub-individual reductionism. 
But the atomism of Gene-Darwinism more directly finds its main source in the 
first step of the evolutionary synthesis. This synthesis of genetics with mathematical 
models of unstructured populations ( pp. 125 f.), partly developed by Fisher, 
incorporated the perspective of separate independent genes in a common 
unstructured gene pool.563 Based on this Fisherian phase or wing of the synthesis, 
Dawkins – abandoning the focus on the gene-pool – still favours the idea of the 
primordial independence of single egoistic genes.564 Because of this shared gene-
                                                     
562  R. Dawkins, Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype (1978), pp. 71-72. 
563  G. C. Williams, Adaptation and Natural Selection (1966), pp. 3-4. 
564 R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (1976/1989), p. ix. Dawkins according to the index of his first three 
books mentions Fisher on a total of 34 pages and Dobzhansky not at all. 
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atomism gene-Darwinism mirrors Fisherism in a nominalist understanding of 
genomes as wholes and individual organisms.  
This nominalism is linked to the concept of random mixing during genetic 
recombination and to the chance interpretation of the first variational step of natural 
selection. On an evolutionary time scale genomes or organisms are only evanescent 
confederations of approximately immortal genes, and because of this ephemeral 
character they are regarded as unreal. 
 According to Dawkins, neglecting the concept of a gene-pool still present in 
Fisherism, not populations but single genes are the units of selection.565 The paradigm 
shift becomes obvious, not only in regard of the different positions of the unit of 
selection debate, but already in what  different problems these approaches are 
interested in; whereas speciation was an important question of the second phase of 
the evolutionary synthesis, Dawkins never summoned up much enthusiasm for ‘the 
species problem’.566 Correspondingly the spotlight of gene-Darwinism is not on the 
Hardy-Weinberg equation, but on the formulas of Hamilton and Trivers.567 
As already mentioned, there are additional differences to the second step of the 
evolutionary synthesis, because Dobzhansky had emphasised the contextuality of 
genes and Mayr has focused on phenotypes as existing wholes.568 Nevertheless, even 
during the second phase of the synthesis, the Fisherian inclination towards ‘bean-bag 
genetics’ was not completely superseded. 
However, the emergentist attitude of the second step of the synthesis both in 
regard of new evolutionary entities and a limited pluralism of evolutionary factors, like 
drift or founder effect, also made the concept of group altruism possible. In contrast 
to this view and to classical ethology, group selection and group altruism are anathema 
to proponents of pure gene-Darwinism.569 The rise of new textbooks in the spirit of 
the new sociobiological paradigm corresponds to an increase of a “kind of 
unsentimental, dog eat dog, language”.570 All animal communication, even within 
species, is now interpreted “as manipulation of signal-receiver by signal-sender” and in 
terms of “arms races”.571 Now generally mistrust, manipulation and exploitation is the 
normal gene-Darwinian yardstick. Every explanation which seems to confirm group 
altruism is regarded as anomalous and that in turn automatically leads to its 
critical reassessment. 
                                                     
565 Ibid, p. 10. 
566  R. Dawkins, Universal Darwinism (1983), p. 404. 
567 In R. Dawkins’ The Selfish Gene (1976/1989) Hamilton and Trivers are universally quoted, 
whereas the Hardy-Weinberg principle is not mentioned at all. Nevertheless, Hamilton himself 
reconsidered his early view on this matter,  footnote 1035. 
568  footnote 528. 
569 It has already been shown in earlier sections that Dawkins denies the possibility of group 
selection. Cf. also G. C. Williams, Adaptation and Natural Selection (1966), pp. 4 f.; Ch. 5 to 8. 
570 R. Dawkins, The Extended Phenotype (1982/1989), p. 56. 
571  Ibid, pp. 57, 61. Also: R. Dawkins, J. R. Krebs, Animal Signals: Information or Manipulation? (1978).  
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What I have called ‘gene-atomistic reductionism’, or ‘gene atomism’ for short, that 
is, the concept that single genes are the exclusive causally relevant agents of biological 
evolution, will critically be discussed in detail in Part IV.572 
c) Darwinian Process Monism 
Finally, we will now analyse the differences of gene-Darwinism to other largely 
Darwinian sub-paradigms in regard of the evolutionary process itself. 
Gene-Darwinism is usually a paean, praising pan-adaptationism and pan-
selectionism and is built on the metaphysics of universal Darwinism573. In this regard 
gene-Darwinism appears to be even more Darwinian than Darwin’s own approach, 
because the major, if not exclusive, evolutionary force is natural selection. Darwin did 
still thought of use inheritance as a source for variation. Moreover, the later Darwin 
became unsure whether natural selection could universally provide optimal 
adaptation.574 Although the evolutionary synthesis, in continuation of Weismann’s 
neo-Darwinism, had dismissed the Lamarckian concept of use inheritance and also 
defined the variance producing step of evolution in a more strictly Darwinian way as a 
blind chance process, the synthesis in its second step still allowed a certain causal 
pluralism. To some extent it took non-adaptive evolutionary factors into account. 
Moreover, the synthesis introduced some macroevolutionary factors to explain the 
evolutionary process. For example genetic drift is based on chance fluctuations and an 
adaptive interpretation would need additional assumptions.575 It is indeed 
controversial how far this causal pluralism has distanced the synthesis from 
Darwinism in its most extreme conceivable sense,576 but in any case it is clear that 
gene-Darwinism again started to treat macroevolutionary factors as if they were 
reducible to the concept of natural selection. Williams emphasised that in his time 
many discussions in evolutionary biology seem “on the surface to conform to the 
modern Darwinian tradition”, but on careful analysis they were found to imply 
something rather different. His goal was to purge evolutionary biology from such 
unnecessary additions to the theory of natural selection.577 Dawkins is equally clear on 
that issue: “[A]ll my books have been devoted to expounding and exploring the 
almost limitless power of the Darwinian principle”578. 
                                                     
572   pp. 243 ff. (The argumentation of gene-atomism and germ-line reductionism may be not 
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conclusion that organisms and groups are ephemeral and epiphenomenal. 
573   pp. 207 f., 216 f., 339 f., 350 f. 
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Despite the general focus on natural selection, it should not be neglected that the 
rise of gene-Darwinism was accompanied by the introduction of the concept of kin 
selection and the reintroduction of the concept of sexual selection.  
But gene-Darwinism regards the sociobiological mechanism of kin selection as a 
mere logical consequence of gene selection. “If we accept neo-Darwinian gene-
selectionism, kin selection necessarily follows. There is, indeed no need for the term 
kin selection to exist, and I suggest that we stop using it.”579  
Since the 1960s, with the rise of sociobiology, also the concept of sexual selection 
as non-random mating became dominant again.580 Furthermore, the application of 
this explanation to higher human capacities, like the intellect, has become common.581 
The main proponents of the Evolutionary Synthesis, due to their central assumption 
of panmictic gene pools, had largely abandoned sexual selection. Although gene-
Darwinism has taken up their concept of ‘bean bag genetics’, it on the other hand 
deviates from another central conception of the early phase of the Synthesis. By 
accepting sexual selection indirectly the concept of complete random combination of 
genes is challenged. 582 This in my view corresponds to the fact, already mentioned, 
that in regard to central equations population-Darwinism (the ‘Evolutionary 
Synthesis) has been built around the Hardy-Weinberg equations, whereas gene-
Darwinism (the sociobiological paradigm) has taken the equations of Hamilton and 
Trivers as its theoretical centre (though Hamilton himself is in his later work not a 
strict gene-Darwinian 1035). 
Gene-Darwinism attributes a much more active role to the gene. Gene-
Darwinism, in many respects the pinnacle of Darwinism, appears in this regard 
paradoxically almost non-Darwinian. In my opinion this aspect of gene-‘Darwinism’ 
even has a tendency to undermine the Darwinian understanding of adaptation to an 
external environment and hence Darwinism itself. However, because gene-Darwinians 
usually do not put emphasis on this subversive aspect, I will not treat it any further in 
this historical part, but will examine it later in the systematic discussion. 
Practically, the acceptance of sexual selection has not helped to turn gene-
Darwinism into a moderate position. This might have been assumed, because Darwin 
in his later publications, more directly concerned with human evolution, tried to 
smooth his relatively harsh explanation of the evolutionary process by introducing the 
less cruel mechanism of sexual selection.583 But gene-Darwinians not only emphasise 
the competition of single genes, but seems to interpret sexual selection only as a con-
venient term, a mere flatus vocis, which – like kin selection99 – is in principle reducible 
to the generalised term of gene-selection, and is hence no substantial mechanism on 
its own.584 However, the resulting interpretation replaces sexual partnership by an 
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583   pp. 112 ff. 
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unchangeable ‘battle of the sexes’ and results in a harsher view of relationship than 
any Darwinian paradigm had ever before. Partnership is represented to be essentially 
and eternally “a relationship of mutual mistrust and mutual exploitation.”585 The 
evolutionary synthesis has seen sexual behaviour “as essentially a co-operative venture 
undertaken for mutual benefit, or even for the good of the species!”586 
As we have seen already in the first and preceding second part of this work the rise 
of sociobiology brought not only many interesting stimulations to other subject areas, 
but also ended the period of relative ideological disengagement of biology. In the 
following Chapter 5 we will come to the external historical reasons for the 
development of these paradigms.  
But as the influence of radical gene-Darwinism has increased, alternative 
approaches started to flourish also, which criticise especially gene-Darwinism and 
even Darwinism in general. 
4.5 Criticism – A Better Synthesis in Sight? 
Today, not long after the beginning to the 21st century and about 150 years after the 
publication of Darwin’s Origin of Species, the question arises once more whether 
Darwinism, at least in its purified gene-Darwinian form, conveys an inappropriate 
overall view of life. Since the evolutionary synthesis hardened in the 1970s, criticism 
became influential and many alternative concepts supplementing ‘natural selection’ 
have been proposed and vigorously discussed. Although Darwinism in its broad sense 
is no doubt the most vigourous and influential approach in biology, there has been an 
increasing plurality of views within Darwinism, some opposing only radical gene-
Darwinism. Others even came to oppose Darwinism in general.587 
The present crisis resembles the crisis of the radicalised neo-Darwinism between 
1890 and 1930. That crisis at the turn at the end of the 19th century had been triggered 
by the discontent with Weismann’s radicalised neo-Darwinism and its apparent incon-
sistency with new genetic findings and Mendelism. In the last decades, framing the 
turn of the 2nd millennium, the disputes are again triggered by a radicalisation. This 
time the Evolutionary Synthesis, especially in continuation of its Fisherian wing, has 
been radicalised by what has here been called ‘gene-Darwinism’. But this radicalization 
called forth the explication of alternative approaches not only in philosophy of biol-
ogy but in biology itself. Gene-Darwinism in an openly disdainful sense has been 
called ‘ultra-Darwinism’588 and leading advocates of the second phase of the 
evolutionary synthesis, like E. Mayr, have opposed a Selfish Gene’s point of view, and 
                                                     
585 R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (1976/1989), p. 140. 
586 Ibid, p. 140. 
587  For historiographic overviews on developments in evolutionary biology in the last decades see, 
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have explicated more clearly that they see whole populations or species as units of 
selection or macro-evolution.589 Refined models of group selection – which took the 
challenge of gene-Darwinism seriously - have been developed590 and recently even E. 
O. Wilson, doyen of sociobiology, reinterpreted the case of eu-social insects, taken as 
paradigmatic example for kin selection replacing group selection, as being coherent 
with group selection.591 Moreover, at the intersection of biology, economics, and hu-
man psychology several evolutionary mechanisms have recently been postulated that 
go beyond kin selection and direct reciprocial altruism, such as cooperator choice592, 
indirect reciprocity,593 strong reciprocity,594 and altruistic punishment595. Although it 
is an open debate whether these mechanisms can be understood along reductionist 
gene-Darwinian lines as epiphenomena, the approach advocated here suggests that 
these mechanisms may well be genuine evolutionary mechanisms – as actually explic-
itly postulated by some of the mentioned authors. However, I shall not discuss these 
novel approaches in detail here – most of them became popular after this book was 
edited the first time. Nonetheless, I think the general discussions of reductionism will 
shed light on these and other approaches as well.  
Additionally, the highly successful paradigm of gene-Darwinism and its far-
reaching application to culture came into conflict with traditional systems of morality 
(cf. Chapter 2). As in the first crisis of Darwinism, a flourishing theoretical pluralism 
within biology – now generally more moderate – challenged radicalised Darwinism. 
Apart from new models of altruism and group selection, biology faces pluralism in 
many areas reaching from genetics to ecology. New conceptions of selforganisation 
have emerged and old developmental conceptions have reappeared in the so-called 
evo-devo debate. Punctuated equilibrium, new genetic mechanisms, and dynamic 
systems theory challenge ultra-Darwinism and in part even Darwinism itself. If 
Darwinism had not to start to struggle for its life, it at least needs to struggle for its 
unity and its proper definition. 
The central tenets of gene-Darwinism – exclusive focus on selfish genes, 
gradualism, pan-selectionism and pan-adaptionism – have led to heated controversies 
in the public and in academia. Certain biologists and philosophers of biology attacked 
gene-Darwinism to vindicate both the ontological and epistemological existence of 
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higher genetic units, phenotypes and populations as causal relevant wholes and even 
an ontological reality of ecosystems. Darwinian gradualism has been challenged.  
Furthermore, it has been maintained that other forces than exclusively natural 
selection play irreducible roles in evolution, i. e. chance mechanisms (drift etc.), mo-
derate versions of Lamarckian mechanisms, Baldwinian mechanisms or developmental 
constraints. The connection of natural selection and adaptation has been dissociated 
by R. C. Lewontin, who has claimed that natural selection does not necessarily always 
lead to adaptation. (In economic terms we may say he broke with the belief in a 
biological invisible hand.) Hence, all main aspects of gene-Darwinism have been 
challenged. 
As in the time before the Evolutionary Synthesis, it is today not clear, how a new 
different synthesis may finally unite most of these proposals.596 Although there are 
signs of a convergence even on the side of gene-Darwinism, the influence of their 
austere research programme seems to be undiminished.597 One group advocates that 
the old evolutionary synthesis is generally open enough to provide a framework for 
most of these approaches.598 The opposed group advocates a more fundamental 
theoretical turn, but is far from being united. Some of them want to expand 
Darwinism into a multi-level Darwinism; others want to supplement or even replace 
natural selection either by less blind mechanisms or by mechanisms which are not 
adaptive, but based on chance or structural constraints. Furthermore, some rather 
favour a historisation of nature replacing scientific universal rules by narratives; others 
favour an even stronger reliance on mathematics and physics in the context of the 
complexity revolution599. 
a) New Views in Micro- and Macrobiology 
The present criticism of the gene-Darwinian subparadigm and also of Darwinism in 
general is motivated by new empirical results and new theoretical concepts. It is 
convenient to distinguish developments in microbiology and in macrobiology.  
 
                                                     
596  M. v. Sydow, Darwin's Heritage – Still Open to Debate (2004). 
597  But R. Dawkins in River out of Eden (1995) in regard to gene-atomism seemed more guarded than 
before. Dawkins’ central metaphor of this book, the branching digital river of genes, refers 
mainly to species, not to single genes. In this respect his position seems to resemble the one of the 
evolutionary synthesis, which he had always opposed (e.g., pp. 4-6, 20, 29, 35. f.). But even in 
this respect Dawkins finally seems to get back to his old conclusions (pp. 5, 28, 118, 121-122). 
Moreover – as far as I know – he has never explicitly renounced his original gene-atomism or 
germ-line reductionism central to his most influential book The Selfish Gene ( also footnote 62). 
In any case, gene-Darwinism is far from becoming extinct and its ordinary followers are inspired 
by the original paradigm.  
598 This is mainly advocated by moderate proponents of the second phase of the synthesis, like E. 
Mayr in One Long Argument (1991), esp. pp. 147, 149, 164, and finds its result in textbooks, like 
D. J. Futuyma, Evolutionsbiologie (1986/1990), who is incorporating the heterodox views into the 
framework of the evolutionary synthesis. 
599 E.g., D. J. Depew, B. Weber, Darwinism Evolving (1995), pp. 315-316, Chapter 15-16. 
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Microbiology had already been an obstacle to Darwinism at the time of the first 
bloom of Mendelian genetics (de Vries and Bateson). Afterwards Mendelian genetics 
had been absorbed into the evolutionary synthesis by combining it with statistical 
models of biological populations. Also the discovery of the actual structure of the 
germ plasm, the double helix of DNA, by James Watson and Francis Crick in 1953, 
and the discovery of the biological protein synthesis at that time gave support to the 
largely neo-Darwinian Evolutionary Synthesis. 
Starting in the 1960s, and particularly in recent decades, genetics has undergone 
fundamental developments at a breathtaking and even increasing path. At the turn of 
the 20th century, it again appears possible that genetics becomes an obstacle to 
Darwinism, especially for the concept of genetic atomism, but perhaps even for the 
evolutionary synthesis as well, and thus for Darwinism in general 
( also, for instance, pp. 377 f.)  
(1) The neutral theory of protein evolution, firstly stated by the Japanese population 
geneticist Motoo Kimura in 1968, is based on the information redundancy empirically 
found in the protein synthesis. In this process different triplets of nucleotides encode 
the same amino acid, and in many proteins different amino acids are equifunctional. 
Thus, mutations in the sequence of amino acids only seldom lead to phenotypic 
change and most mutations are not ‘visible’ to selection. Moreover large parts of the 
DNA are not read at all during the DNA-RNA-transcription. Kimura follows from 
these facts that the central genetic role of natural selection has to be reduced. 
Kimura’s neutralism alternatively rather focuses on the chance accumulation 
of mutations. 
Kimura’s theory has also been connected with the conception of a ‘molecular clock’, 
assuming that the changing rate of an allele has its own fixed tempo. 
(2) The operon model of the French geneticists Francois Jacob and Jacques Monod was 
stated in 1961. It was an important step to show an inner organisation of the genome. 
It was shown that the expression of structural genes is controlled by regulatory genes. 
If a regulatory gene mutates or structural genes come under the regime of a different 
regulatory gene this can result in sudden huge changes of the phenotype. Although 
Monod counts as a proponent of Darwinism, his approach enabled a new far more 
active and organised understanding of the genome and a new form of saltationism.  
(3) In the further development of genetics genes have increasingly been seen not 
as mere genetic atoms, but as being parts of a highly contextual and complex genetic 
system of functional ‘checks and balances’. For instance, the Oxford physiologist and 
systems biologist Denis Noble has compellingly argued for flexibility of the 
organisms’ regulation of gene expression and the idea that there is no privileged level 
of causality in biological systems.600 Joachim Bauer, in The Cooperative Gene, has pointed 
                                                     
600  D. Noble, The Music of Life: Biology Beyond Genes (2007). 
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out that genetic regulations may affect even the direction of mutations in a 
systematic way.601 
(4) Over the recent decades microbiologists have increasingly identified fine-tuned 
micro-‘machinery’ working in each of our cells and highly complex regulation systems 
controlling our metabolism.602 In my view this does not provide enough reason to 
doubt evolution as such, but it may indeed cast doubt on the wastful Darwinian trial 
and error explanation of evolution.  
(5) Microbiology also inspired attempts to revive a – comparatively moderate – 
version of Lamarck’s long-discredited mechanism of inheritance of acquired 
characteristics. This mechanism is seen as an addition rather than an alternative to a 
selection theory. 603  
Ted Steele in 1979 proposed that RNA can in fact influence the DNA of the germ 
cells, just as a retrovirus transmits information to its host’s DNA. Steel proposed a 
process of feedback between the immune system – in his view working on the basis of 
‘somatic selection’ – and the DNA. He influenced the neo-Lamarckian Arthur 
Koestler, who opposed the Darwinian passive understanding of organisms as mere 
genetic machines moulded externally by selection (here differential environmental 
elimination). But it was argued that Steele’s heretical empirical results could not be 
replicated.604 A similar dispute on the scientific respectability of empirical results took 
place in regard to the results of Cairns, Overbaugh, and Miller.605 Lateron Edward 
J. Steele, together with two co-authors, wrote the book Lamarck’s Signature, where 
Steele’s original theory has been defended, elaborated and popularised.606 
Already in the late 1950s H. Termin, who received the Nobel price in 1975, had 
discovered reverse transcription, which is central for the replication of retroviruses. 
Actual gene transposition had then been proven by Barbara McClintock (1902-1992), also 
a Nobel laureate. According to McClintock’s research, genes could be moved within a 
chromosome or even between different ones. These results in principle may violate 
the central dogma of molecular biology. If the transposition is catalysed by certain 
states in the cell, theoretically an external influence could also have an impact on the 
genome, and if this takes place in the germ cells it would have an impact on 
the germ line.  
                                                     
601  J. Bauer, Das kooperative Gen: Abschied vom Darwinismus (2008). Likewise, I have argued in favor of 
such mechanisms already in the earlier edition of this work: M. von Sydow, Sociobiology, 
Universal Darwinism and Their Transcendence (2001),  also p. 377 f.  
602 Cf. M. J. Behe, Darwin’s Black Box (1996/2006).  
603 E. J. Steele, R. A. Lindley, R. V. Blanden, Lamarck’s Signature (1998), pp. 1, 6, 11, 23, Chapter 5. 
A short survey of the precursors of this present Lamarckian attempt is given by e.g., 
P. J. Bowler, Evolution (1984), pp. 319-321. 
604 P. J. Bowler, Evolution (1984), pp. 320-321. 
605 J. Cairns, J. Overbaugh, St. Miller, The Origin of Mutants (1988). They were opposed by: L. 
Partridge, M. Morgan, Is bacterial Evolution Random or Selective? (1988). D. Charlesworth et al., 
Origin of the Mutants Disputed (1988). R. Lenski et al., Another Alternative to Directed Mutation (1989). 
Quoted in: E. Khalil, Neo-classical Economics and Neo-Darwinism (1992). 
606 E. J. Steele, R. A. Lindley, R. V. Blanden, Lamarck’s Signature (1998). 
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However, the work of McClintock and the general development of genetics, for 
example the largely adaptive way in which gene transpositions work, seem to suggest a 
much more self-organised view of the genome. This presumably will be difficult to 
harmonise with the perspective of a genome build up by ‘selfish’ independent genes. 
One can even say that a more selforganised understanding of genomes and organisms, 
even if strict Lamarckism will remain to be false, in some sense may rather mirror the 
active Lamarckian or orthogenetic understanding than the originally passive 
Darwinian one607. 
 
Macrobiology had resisted integration into the Evolutionary Synthesis more than other 
biological disciplines, especially in its ecological and palaeontological branches. Some 
concepts in these disciplines have continuously resembled tenets of romantic biology. 
In palaeontology – even after Darwinism seized power – the concept of saltationism 
was still discussed (e. g. Schindewolf, 1950 and even Simpson advocated ‘quantum 
evolution’). In ecology the view of romantic science comprehending ecosystems as 
‘superorganisms’ in their own right, had its peak in the time of the eclipse of 
Darwinism, but it continued as a undercurrent in biology afterwards. This view has 
also influenced the philosophy of deep ecology. Today at least some macrobiological 
ideas are again receiving some support. In the years since this book has first been pub-
lished many researchers came to oppose the genetic atomism and gradualism of gene-
Darwinism. I here only mention two approaches: both focusing on macrobiology, 
although they both try to be coherent with microbiological evidence as well. 
(1) The theory of punctuated equilibrium, first elaborated in 1972 by the 
palaeontologists Stephen Jay Gould and Niles Eldredge, repudiates the gene-
Darwinian paradigm in several respects. 608  
Richard C. Lewontin is another persuasive critic of gene-Darwinism. He has 
written influential articles together with Gould against ubiquitous adaptation,609 and 
could count as his ally. Although Lewontin definitely has an interesting own 
theoretical viewpoint and standing, and although he comes from the microscopical 
side of genetics, he will here simply be treated under the same headline. 
Although Gould, Eldredge and Lewontin in their earlier publications still followed 
in the wake authors like Mayr, Dobzhansky, and Wright, at the time as the synthesis 
hardened in particular, Gould and Lewontin became even critical of the synthesis. 
Here I will only briefly contrast the position of these three writers with gene-
Darwinism, which in this context has also been called ‘ultra-Darwinism’588. 
(a) Punctuated equilibrium turns against phyletic gradualism as traditionally 
postulated by Darwinism. According to punctuated equilibrium the normal status of 
evolution is one of stasis, of equilibrium and only minor change. Stasis is claimed to 
                                                     
607  For such claims the definition of Darwinism and Lamarckism is crucial  pp. 358. 
608  N. Eldredge, St. J. Gould, Punctuated Equilibria: An Alternative to Phyletic Gradualism (1972). 
St. J. Gould, N. Eldredge, Punctuated Equilibria: The Tempo and Mode of Evolution Reconsidered 
(1977). St. J. Gould, The Structure of Evolutionary Theory (2002). In 1971 Eldredge had already 
presented the basic idea of the theory (Gould, 2005, p. 775). 
609  S. J. Gould, R. C. Lewontin, The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm (1979). 
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be only rarely punctuated by phases of rapid change and speciation. The theory seems 
to be reminiscent of the saltationistic tradition of palaeontology.610 Saltationism could 
be traced back to Schindewolf and Goldschmidt, and could recently also be found in 
S. Løvtrup’s writings. Proponents of punctuated equilibrium have actually distanced 
themselves from the traditional type of saltationism, since the theory does not postulate 
macro-mutations or novel genetic processes.611 Advocates of punctuated equilibrium 
may even be taken as defenders of Darwinism, because they postulate that 
punctuation may arise from allopatric speciation only. Although in other writings they 
do not commit themselves to particular mechanisms causing the postulated pattern, at 
least this original version reinterpretes evidence that traditionally would have 
contradicted Darwinism in a way that is at least compatable with the partly Darwinian 
evolutionary synthesis.  
In any case, at least on the level of predictions this theory has clearly saltationist 
leanings, since it is advocated that stasis and punctuation, opposed to gene-Darwinian 
gradualism, is empirically supported by the fossil record. In contrast, Darwinian 
gradualists have tradictionally dismissed the fossil record as not being directly 
conclusive, because of its assumed incompleteness.  
Although gene-Darwinism is opposed to any deviation from gradualism, already 
the evolutionary synthesis had indeed acknowledged the phenomenon of sudden 
changes in evolution. Eldredge and Gould (1972) explicitly turned to Mayr’s writings 
on allopatric speciation, geographic isolation, and the founder effect as they 
formulated their theory.612 Even Simpson acknowledged periods of rapid change in 
evolution, which he called ‘quantum evolution’; Mayr worked on ‘adaptive 
radiation’613. In recent years it was nevertheless especially Gould and Eldredge who 
emphasised that punctuated stasis is central for evolution and who since the 1970s 
have defended this claim against the rising tide of gene-Darwinism.  
The biological controversy between gradualism and saltationism is not only much older but 
also more general. It could be found in the geological dispute between Hutton’s (and Lyell’s) 
uniformitarianism and Cuvier’s catastrophism; or in history of science, where Kuhn 
challenged the conception of a continuous scientific approximation of the truth and replaced 
it by discontinuous phases of normal and revolutionary science. Such parallels might indicate 
that actually deeper values and metaphysical commitments may be at stake. 
(b) Gould and Eldredge differ from the sociobiological paradigm in their claim of 
some autonomy of macroevolution from microevolution. This concept had also to 
some extent been present in the second phase of the Evolutionary Synthesis.614 
According to the theory of punctuated equilibrium speciation is the primary source of 
evolutionary change. 
                                                     
610 Cf. M. Wuketits, Evolutionstheorien (1995), p. 93. 
611  N. Eldredge, Reinventing Darwin (1995), pp. 27, 98, 100; St. J. Gould, The Structure of Evolutionary 
Theory (2002), pp. 781, 779. 
612  N. Eldredge, St. J. Gould, Punctuated Equilibria: An Alternative to Phyletic Gradualism (1972), cf. also 
St. J. Gould, The Structure of Evolutionary Theory (2005), p. 779. 
613 A term originally introduced by H. F. Osborn, a proponent of orthogenesis.  
614  footnote 514. 
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Especially if such an explanatory autonomy is given, palaeontology could be 
regarded as an important biological discipline, which has the fossil record at its 
disposal and hence almost exclusively has empirical access to the long term 
macrobiological evolutionary process. Gould has argued against the often assumed 
irrelevance and de facto submission of palaeontology.615 
(c) Gould, Lewontin and Eldredge, together with the followers of the 
Dobzhanskyian wing of the evolutionary synthesis, have opposed gene-Darwinism 
not only in regard of macroevolutionary mechanisms, but – closely linked to this – in 
regard of the existence of macroevolutionary entities. They, despite some ambivalence 
and restrictions,616 have generally vindicated the existence of organisms, populations 
and species.617 According to them, evolution and also natural selection work on higher 
levels of organisation than exclusively on the level of single genes.  
(d) They advocated the causal relevance of phenotypes and opposed the exclusive 
relevance of genotypes.618 In this regard they continued and radicalised the second 
phase of the Evolutionary Synthesis, in their recognition that the phenotypic 
population structure and – at least according to Mayr – the organismic phenotype are 
uneliminable factors of evolutionary theory. 
Besides theoretical reasons for adopting this view, a phenotypic approach is also 
more suitable for the classical methodology of palaeontologists, who only seldom had 
the opportunity to study palaeontological DNA. 
(e) Gould and Lewontin in particular attacked the simplifying ‘adaptationism’ of 
gene-Darwinism.619 Again, by doing this, they radicalised aspects of the second step of 
the evolutionary synthesis – here Wright’s concept of genetic drift – and argued that 
especially in speciation random fluctuations – as opposed to adaptations – are central 
for the evolutionary process.  
(f) Finally, proponents of punctuated equilibrium have incorporated tenets, which 
historically have to be regarded as being originally concepts of romantic biology. Inner 
constraints, Baupläne and an inner developmental necessity and direction of evolution 
here started to play a role again.620 This is the case although proponents of this 
approach still advocate natural selection as a very important factor of evolution. 
                                                     
615  St. J. Gould, Irrelevance, Submission, Partnership: The Changing Role of Palaeontology in Darwin’s Three 
Centennials and a Modest Proposal for Macroevolution (1983). N. Eldredge, Reinventing Darwin (1995), 
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618  R. C. Lewontin, Gene, Organism and Environment (1983). 
619  S. J. Gould, R. C. Lewontin, The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm (1979), 
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P. Bowler, Evolution (1984), 324-325. Despite the stress on inner direction, Gould – taking 
natural selection still as basic process – has argued against the notion of evolutionary progress, 
which was central to the Romantics and the pseudo-Darwinians. Ruse has pointed out that 
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(2) Systems theory of evolution stresses that entities have to be regarded as parts of 
larger systems.621 This viewpoint is the opposed (or may be the complementary) view 
to atomism, either of a genetic,622 an individualistic or a ‘speciestic’ kind. If such a 
more holistic approach is applied to ecosystems623, this can be seen as a demystified 
form (normally working in terms of causa efficiens) of the idea of ecosystems 
as superorganisms.  
Ludwig von Bertalanffy founded a general systems theory at the end of the eclipse 
of Darwinism.624 Of course this system theory in turn has older origins. Today 
systems theories have become influential again. I limit myself to distinguish three sub-
schools: (a) The Austrian biologist Rupert Riedl and the philosopher of biology Franz 
Wuketits revitalised the ‘systems theory of evolution’ rather as a modification of the 
synthetic theory than a different paradigm. Also, for example, the German biologist 
Bernhard Hassenstein (Freiburg) has reformulated processes of variation and natural 
selection in terms of feedback loops. (b) The Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana 
and Francisco Varela have put emphasis on the reintroduction of the ancient term 
autopoiesis and rather have favoured a radical constructivist paradigm shift than only a 
modification of the synthesis. (c) The British scientist James Lovelock has introduced 
and popularised the concept of selfregulation on the level of  the whole planet earth, 
his so-called ‘Gaia-hypothesis’ (the historian will be reminded of the Antique  
concept of anima mundi). 
As we will see in the next section, in recent years physics, chemistry and 
information science also contributed to extend and dynamise systems theory so that it 
has become an even more interesting source for our search for a new synthesis.  
b) A Multilevel Synthesis – Darwinism versus Developmentalism? 
A huge range of different micro- and macrobiological approaches are in contradiction 
to or at least different in emphasis from gene-Darwinism. Is there another synthesis in 
sight? Will this pluralism of alternative proposals be transcended? Where in the 
theoretical ‘space’, which is highly dimensional, non-Euclidean and itself changing, 
will this discourse settle and find again at least a local maximum of truth? 
In my view gene-Darwinism, which today plays an important role in sociobiology 
and in other subject areas, will indeed contribute to such a synthesis. But, although 
gene-Darwinism is a highly appealing theory in regard of its empirically bold 
predictions and its theoretically austere simplicity, it will not dominate future 
                                                                                                                                 
Gould’s understanding of complete random contingency is inconsistent with Christian religion. 
I would agree with Ruse, but I doubt that Dawkins’ unmodified concept of unrestrained 
struggle for life leads further? See: M. Ruse, Being Mean to Steve (2000), p. 4. 
621  Punctuated equilibrium may also owe something to systems theory, especially the notion of a 
dynamic equilibrium. Lewontin was likewise concerned to analyse different kinds of 
homeostasis. However, because of their actual influence and because of the palaeontological 
roots of punctuated equilibrium, punctuated equilibrium is here treated as an approach on its 
own.  
622  Cf. D. Noble, The Music of Life: Biology Beyond Genes (2007). 
623 E.g., W. Wieser, Energetische und soziale Aspekte der Evolution (1989), p. 101. 
624  L. v. Bertalanffy, Kritische Theorie der Formbildung (1928).  
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evolutionary theory. In my systematic fourth part of this work reasons for the 
inconsistency of gene-Darwinism will be given ( pp. 245 f.). The evolutionary 
synthesis would need to change some of its central basic assumptions to incorporate 
both gene-Darwinian tenets and its alternatives. 
 
If there will be a new unified theory (as an alternative to gene-Darwinism) two multi-
level approaches appear to propose themselves:  
(1) An approach which accepts many levels of evolution, but which, concerning 
the evolutionary mechanisms, will still remain predominantly Darwinian. This 
approach could be called ‘multi-level-Darwinism’. 
(2) An even fuller paradigm shift, which not only favours a multi-level approach in 
regard to evolutionary objects, but which also abandons an exclusive focus on natural 
selection and introduces different or additional evolutionary mechanisms. We may call 
this ‘multi-level-evolutionism’, or in the extreme specific case of a rather 
developmental or romantic approach ‘multi-level-developmentalism’. 
Both approaches would clearly be opposed to pure gene-atomism and favour a 
multi-level account of evolution. But concerning the evolutionary mechanisms, multi-
level-Darwinism and multi-level-Developmentalism would be the extremes of a 
continuum. Most present actual authors would have to be placed somewhere in the 
middle on this continuum: Proponents of the Evolutionary Synthesis, like proponents 
of Punctuated Equilibrium – and even Dawkins625 – all have in principle accepted that 
natural selection and chance and inner constraints do play a role in evolution. But 
because gene-Darwinism has vigorously attacked the compromise reached by the 
evolutionary synthesis, the opponents of this gene-Darwinism were forced to pin-
point their own alternative views more distinctly and explicitly. This may have ended 
the period in which thoughts from many different ideological and philosophical 
backgrounds had all been easily subsumed under the term Darwinism.626 (If nothing 
else of gene-Darwinism remained, this clarification would be an important lasting 
contribution of this paradigm.)  
I am going to outline these rather artificial extreme options, because they could 
help to understand the possibility space in which a new evolutionary synthesis may 
take place: 
(i) Multi-Level-Darwinism 
In biology and philosophy of biology, multi-level-Darwinism tries to overcome the 
substance reductionism of gene-Darwinism, but in regard of processes remains in 
radical sense Darwinian, basing its argumentation on a selectionist argument.  
Proponents of this approach argue that selection takes place on many levels and 
hence also these levels are real in evolutionary terms. In a frequently quoted paper 
from 1970, Lewontin introduced the term ‘unit of selection’, arguing in favour of group 
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626  Also  footnote 404. 
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selection.627 Proponents of a selectionist argument may, for example, maintain that 
the individual phenotypic organism rather than the selfish gene is an entity which is 
eventually ‘visible’ to selection, because selection (in the sense of differential 
environmental elimination and survival) acts on each actual organism. For the time 
being we will leave aside the discussion of possible objections.628 It is concluded that 
organisms hence have to be regarded to be real, because having an effect on entities 
seems to be a sufficient (if not necessary) condition for being real. There is an 
increasing number of biologists and philosophers who advocate a refined multi-level 
extension of individualist Darwinism or gene-Darwinism.629 Some authors extend a 
selectionist argumentation even to species or even ecosystems. That an ecosystem may 
be doomed to become extinct as a whole, may gain some plausibility as we understand 
that if man destroys other species, he may be next on the list. 
Such arguments appear to be valid, only if the whole would indeed have additional 
properties, which its parts did not already had on their own; in terms of the Gestalt-
psychology, if the whole is more than the sum of its parts; in terms of variance 
analysis, if there are not only main effects of the parts, but also interaction effects. But 
whether there are such effects is of course the very question of the unit of selection 
debate from the outset. We will currently not engage in this controversial and detailed 
debate, but will return to it later on ( pp. 245 f.). At present we may simply assume 
that there are ontologically properties on different hierarchical levels, which may play 
a role in the being or survival of entities. In this sense they would be real and not 
reducible to or collapsible into each other. Such a view would indeed be at odds with 
pure gene-Darwinism. 
But is this view still Darwinian enough to found a position which we would dub 
‘multi-level-Darwinism’ in its most radical sense? (Remember: we aimed at outlining 
the most radical positions at the end of a hypothetical continuum of multi-level-
theories.) Would the approach outlined before – which in my view would indeed be 
an improvement compared with gene-Darwinism – be as clearly an Darwinian 
position as possible? I think not. The outlined approach, although historically clearly 
inspired by Darwinism, would mean not much more than merely stating that there are 
higher properties of entity collectives. Such a claim is not an especially Darwinian one. 
The only additional epistemological aspect would be that the reality of properties 
would be linked to their role in survival, that is, to the probability of a thing to be or 
not to be. This argumentation answers the question ‘what entities do exist?’ with 
‘entities which change the probability to exist exist’. This answer may be meta-
physically interesting, may be true or false, or may be close to a tautology, but does 
definitely not encapsulate the complete essence of Darwinism.  
Natural selection indeed is usually regarded as the core of Darwinism. But the 
term ‘selection’ is normally – and in this work as well – used in a weak and in a strong 
sense: Selection in the weak sense only means the second step of a Darwinian process, 
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i. e., elimination or differential survival of entities. In this weak sense it has largely 
been used in the present section above. But this weak meaning does not necessarily 
involve notions like replicators, evolutionary lines etc.  
Alternatively, selection in its strong sense could mean the whole Darwinian 
process of blind variation of replicators and external selection. Multi-level-Darwinism 
as a pure paradigm should hence on many ontological levels refer to this natural 
selection in the strong sense, to a stratification of full Darwinian processes of blind 
variation and external elimination (For questions concerning the definition of 
Darwinism,  pp. 102, 358). Multi-level-Darwinism in either case carries on the 
process-monism of gene-Darwinism. Moreover multi-level-Darwinism in its strong 
sense puts comparatively more emphasis on the first step of or the replicator side of 
the Darwinian process and is hence less concentrating on the second step concerned 
with phenotypes: Dawkins, who has emphasised the importance of replicators, regards 
phenotypes only as their ‘vehicles’; correspondingly he argued that in this strong sense 
of selection there is only one exclusive unit of selection, i. e. that of selfish genes.630  
But in principle this replicator and vehicle argumentation may also be applied to 
gene-pools as wholes, for example. Gene-pools as wholes may also be regarded as 
replicators which as vehicles, phenotypic groups, become selected ( already p. 131). 
Lewontin, although he coined the term ‘unit of selection’, should not be classified as 
belonging to such a radically Darwinian multi-level-approach, because he does not 
exclusively focus on natural selection and is one of the main proponents who fought against 
pan-adaptationism.631 
The first replicational or variational step of evolution is bound to the notion of a 
‘replicator’; the second eliminational step of evolution is bound to the notion of 
phenotypes as mere ‘vehicles’ (Dawkins)632 or the notion of an ‘interactor’ 
(D. Hull)633. Here one may already detect an interesting unity of processes and 
objects. However, why use the two terms ‘interactor’ and ‘vehicle’? On the first view 
these notions seem to resemble each other, but the interactor-terminology Hull (who 
always has advocated the species-as-individual-view) seems to concede at least a 
somewhat more active role to the phenotype ( pp. 219 f.). If we are in search for the 
purest version of multi-level-Darwinism, the notion of a mere vehicle seems to me to 
be more clearly and purely Darwinian – in its present radically neo-Darwinian 
understanding – and finally more problematic. 
In the following chapters we will see that multi-level-Darwinism tends to be 
extended to an all-pervasive approach.  
In Chapter 5, on the external history of Darwinism, we will see how biological 
Darwinian theories developed in interaction with non-biological Darwinian 
                                                     
630  Selection here is obviously meant in its strong sense, because Dawkins bases his focus on the 
gene when interpreting a full Darwinian process.  
631   footnote 619, 627. Also the way how he has proposed the hierarchy of Darwinian processes 
has itself been contrasted to a replicator-vehicle approach. H. Plotkin, Darwin Machines and the 
Nature of Knowledge (1994/1995), pp. 82-101.  
632  R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (1976); cf. Replicators and vehicles (1982b). 
633  D. Hull, Units of Evolution: A Metaphysical Essay (1981). 
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approaches. Today these theories with which Darwinism interacted may provide the 
material for a universalised multi-level-Darwinism.  
Darwinian processes found in such different areas will be focused in Part III, with 
Chapter 6 and 7. The specific non-biological theories based on a Darwinian process 
will be described in detail in Chapter 7. In Chapter 6 we aim at unifying these 
accounts within a more general metaphysical approach, which I will call ‘Process-
Darwinism’ ( pp. 216 f. 221 f.). Process-Darwinism could be understood as a meta-
physics, because its ontological (and epistemological and ethical) demands are 
ubiquitous and exclusive. Moreover it is an almost archetypal metaphysical theory 
because in regard of its abstractness, its explanatory power, its simplicity and also its 
connection to actual sciences. It is a theory of which metaphysicians have long dreamt 
of. If the paradigm of pure gene-Darwinism declines, multi-level-Darwinism 
intuitively appears to be to be the next step, because it still shares the processes with 
gene-Darwinism, but incorporates much of the criticism against the gene-atomism of 
gene-Darwinism. I had to find out that the actual historical development had already 
drawn this inductive inference and already many contributions on (universal) process-
Darwinism have been made (e. g. Campbell, Dennett, Hull, Munz and Plotkin). Often 
these proposals still sustain pan-selectionist and pan-adaptationist beliefs.  
Although I think we have to work our way through all-pervasive process-
Darwinism, I think inconsistencies of this approach could also be shown ( Part IV, 
pp. 336 f., 339 f., 350 f.). Although process-Darwinism is in some respects indeed a 
wonderful approach from which much can be learned, and although process-
Darwinism in my opinion would definitely be an improvement compared with gene-
Darwinism, it is in my opinion still built in a too one-sided way on the Darwinian 
metaphor, focusing more on competition than on co-operation and more on the 
passive process of being selected than on the active process of selforganisation. This 
critique of process Darwinism will be substantiated in Chapter 9. 
(ii) Multi-Level-Evolutionism:  
Developmental Approaches and Selforganisational Approaches 
The other extreme approach of the assumed continuum of possible multi-level 
accounts, would be a far-reaching replacement of natural selection; we called it multi-
level-evolutionism (evolution here meant in remembrance of the original connotation 
of the term). Natural selection on different levels would not any more be regarded as 
necessarily the only essential mechanism of evolution, to which all other mechanisms 
are in principle reducible. 
Approaches which are critical towards Darwinism could generally proceed in two 
ways: They may firstly start from a given, even radically Darwinian starting point and 
only thereafter try to ‘reconstruct the ship on the open sea’, i. e. to supplement the 
ubiquitous Darwinian mechanism by additional processes, constraints etc. The other 
procedure would be to build independently an alternative conception of the unfolding 
of nature. In either cases, the focus could already be on the evolutionary beginnings or 
(possibly additionally) on the further evolutionary process, which, in its further course, 
is itself regarded to be a changeable object of evolution.  
Part II. Chapter 4: The Internal Logic of Theories – From Darwin to Dawkins 157 
My own approach in the present work starts from within radical Darwinism and then tries to 
show the need to extend or even in some respects to transcend this paradigm, already partly 
concerned with the beginnings, but even more pronounced when concerned with the 
further course of evolution. 
We have already outlined above some specific contributions in micro- or 
macrobiology which have appeared to be at odds with Darwinism. Presently, we want 
to outline a multi-level-approach which also breaks with the emphasis on Darwinian 
processes. In the following two general multi-level-approaches will be described, 
which – independent of questions of procedure – may in my view contribute to a 
radical extension or even replacement of Darwinism.  
 
(1) Multi-level-developmentalism, which in aspects was revitalised during the last decade, 
fully breaks with the predominant focus on Darwinian explanations. This approach 
with a focus on an inner structural or morphological logic is a reformed version of 
what we have called romantic biology,634 linked with terms like ‘Morphogenesis’, 
‘Rational Morphology’ or ‘Entwicklungsmechanik’. 
For reasons of simplicity we here also subsume other non-Darwinian evolutionary 
approaches which are not strictly romantic, but which also have opposed the sole 
dominance of causa materialis and causa efficiens, like e. g. the neo-Aristotelian or neo-
Thomist teleological approach of Spaemann and Löw.635 This is done, since different 
philosophical understandings of nature, which could not easily be harmonised with 
Darwinism, have moved closer together.636 
The romantic (or dynamic transcendental-idealist) tradition could be traced back to 
the pre-Darwinian biology of Oken, Geoffroy St. Hilaire, the late Owen or at least to 
the ‘romanticising materialist biology’ of Buffon and Lamarck, who advocated at least 
also an active understanding of the organism.634 The tradition of romantic biology was 
taken up in a modified way, mainly during the eclipse of Darwinism, by Conrad Hal 
Waddington, D’Arcy Thompson, Hans Driesch and later again, for example, 
by Jean Piaget. 
Today, the biologist Brian Goodwin637 and his school explore the possibilities for 
reviving a similar hierarchical theory of forms, which puts emphasis on the reality of 
organisms, and opposes a purely Darwinian approach to biology.638  
 
                                                     
634  For an introduction to pre-Darwinian biology  pp. 87 f.; for a treatment of what we called 
romantic biology  pp. 95 f. 
635  On R. Spaemann and R. Löw see: R. Isak, Evolution ohne Ziel? (1992), esp. p. 145. 
636  On a Thomistic-Whiteheadian metaphysics see e.g., J. S. Felt, Proposal for a Thomistic-Whiteheadian 
Metaphysics of Becoming (2000).  
637 Goodwin did his PhD studies at Edinburgh under Waddington. 
638 G. Webster, B. Goodwin, Form and Transformation: Generative and Relational Principles in Biology 
(1996). Although also the authors put themselves in the above tradition (e.g., pp. ix, 7), they also 
differ in some respects from the tradition they come from (e.g., pp. 10 f.). B. Goodwin, G. 
Webster, J. Wayne-Smith, The 'Evolutionary Paradigm' and Constructional Biology (1992).  
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(2) The second possibility for building a multi-level-theory without any or without a 
main focus on Darwinism appears to be linked to theories of selforganisation or dynamic 
systems theory. 
We have already mentioned contributions to systems theory in the last section, 
especially in their application to macrobiology ( pp. 152). 
But there are also scientific theories not yet mentioned, which are less closely 
linked to biology but coming out of physics, chemistry or information science still 
have a generalist aim. Most of them dynamise and extend systems theory. I am only 
going to list some of these approaches: the theory of dissipative structures 
(I. Prigogine), the theory of synergetics (H. Haken)639, the theory of co-evolution of 
macro- and microcosm (E. Jantsch)640, the theories of deterministic chaos 
(E. N. Lorenz & B. Mandelbrot), and the conception of an ‘elastic’ ecosystems 
(C. S. Holling). Other important names in these quite heterogeneous areas are: H. von 
Foester, W. Krohn and G. Küppers.641 It is still not clear how or even if these theories 
could be integrated into a larger well defined theory, but they might be integrated into 
a dynamised and enlarged systems theory, the theory of selforganisation. 
Selforganisational approaches often have developed in isolation or in opposition to 
Darwinian approaches; or sometimes are regarded rather as a completion than an 
alternative to Darwinism. In my opinion both views are true in a certain respect. 
Perhaps the future will show that Darwinism and theories of selforganisation are 
compatible complementary parts of a future synthesis. Still dynamic systems theory at 
present is best understood as an antithesis to entity and process atomism and the 
passive understanding of entities normally found in full-blown Darwinism.  
 
Could selforganisational approaches clearly be distinguished from the above romantic 
or developmental approaches? It seems that theories of selforganisation have their 
roots rather in physics, whereas multi-level-developmentalism is directly linked to 
philosophy and the romantic tradition of biology. Moreover, developmentalism more 
openly favours the importance of form or morphology, whereas theories of 
selforganisation seem to stand in a rather mechanistic tradition. In this sense multi-
level-developmentalism appears to be the more radical alternative to Darwinism.  
Actually a closer investigation may well show that both approaches have quite 
similar roots, which could both be contrasted to Darwinism. Moreover, both 
approaches focus on systemic organisation (whether it is called form or system) rather 
than on microscopic components.  
Depew and Weber, for example, have stressed that the developmentalist tradition 
is not at odds with, but has been revitalised by complex systems dynamics.642 Webster 
and Goodwin also tie their own originally more traditionally morphologically inspired 
                                                     
639  H. Haken, Synergetics: An Introduction: Nonequilibrium Phase Transitions and Self-Organization in Physics, 
Chemistry, and Biology (1977/1983). 
640  E. Jantsch, Die Selbstorganisation des Universums: Vom Urknall zum menschlichen Geist. (1982/1988). 
641 A bibliography on this topic: R. Paslack, P. Knost, Zur Geschichte der Selbstorganisationsforschung 
(1990). 
642  D. J. Depew, B. Weber, Darwinism Evolving (1995), pp. 395 f. 
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approach to new approaches concerned with dynamic complexity.643 Similarly, a 
German research group on ‘critical evolutionary theory’ at Frankfurt on the Main at 
the Senkenberg museum appears to combine aspects of a morphological organismic 
argumentation (based on hydraulic and energetic physical construction principles) 
with concepts drawn from theories of selforganisation.644  
A convergence of developmentalism and theories of selforganisation has not 
necessarily got to be a surprise: morphological and field-theoretical approaches often 
claim not only romantic legacies, but a further (dynamised) Aristotelian legacy. The 
notion of ‘selforganisation’ – as often ignored – in its literal translation also reminds 
us of the Aristotelian term autopoiesis. 
 
In this chapter we have worked out three different Darwinian paradigms and also 
outlined the present and mainly biological criticism of gene-Darwinism and 
Darwinism in general. By discussing the Darwinian sub-paradigms it becomes clear 
that Darwinism is itself not as united, not as easy to define and not as unchangeable as 
it is often supposed to be. In the following part we will work out the external influ-
ences, which moulded these paradigms, in order to reveal what additional non-bio-
logical theoretical background may also be at issue when we discuss these paradigms. 
 
                                                     
643  G. Webster, B. Goodwin, Form and Transformation: Generative and Relational Principles in Biology 
(1996), p. 130 and final Chapter. 
644  Members of the group have been W. F. Gutmann, M. Grasshoff, J. L. Franzen, D. S. Peters, 
M. Gutmann, M. Weingarten etc. See, e.g.: M. Weingarten, Organsimen – Objekte oder Subjekte der 
Evolution. Philosophische Studien zum Paradigmenwechsel in der Evolutionsbiologie (1993), pp. 2, 279 f.. 
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Chapter 5: 
The External History of Darwinism – 
From Whig Biology to Neo-Liberal Biology? 
In the present chapter a survey of the main cultural, intellectual and ideological 
influences on the formation and further development of Darwinism will be given. 
This external history complements the account on the internal history of different 
Darwinian subparadigms, given in Chapter 4. It will be shown that the development 
of Darwinism is not only due to an inner logic of biological conceptions and empirical 
findings, but also underpinned by philosophical and methodological assumptions, 
which partly came from outside biology.  
To describe this development of the different successive Darwinian paradigms 
exclusively by the sentence ‘from Whig Biology to Neoliberal Biology’ appears to me 
rather too radical and over-simplifyingly political, but I think it indeed contains a grain 
of truth; hence I have put this sentence into the headline, though only as a question. 
The evidence for an interaction of politics and economics with biology will be 
summarised. To accept such an interaction should not imply a mono-causal under-
standing of history, neglecting the role of inner-biological theoretical necessities and 
empirical evidence. 
A simple one-to-one relationship between scientific theories and external 
metaphysical commitments or values could normally not be given, because the 
definition of a scientific theory on the one side, the description of dominating values 
on the other side and finally the historical endeavour to establish a link between these 
sides are all three complex cultural processes.645 To acknowledge this complexity by 
no means implies that the external aspect of the history of science should be ignored; 
on the contrary there is a need to supplement the internalist approach, often 
competently treated by scientists themselves, by a profound externalist approach. 
Although the link between a certain scientific theory and certain metaphysical 
commitments (and vice versa) will normally not be deterministic, we may still search 
for probabilistic links between them. Although Darwinism in general, in my opinion, 
owes much to some general metaphysical commitments, this might be disguised by 
differences between its subparadigms. Hence to differentiate between different 
Darwinian subparadigms, each (again in a probabilistic way) with their specific 
metaphysical commitments may help to reveal and clarify the essence of Darwinism 
and of its metaphysical commitments. 
My external approach to Darwinism does not focus on the socio-economic 
background (without from the outset regarding this as irrelevant), but on intellectual 
ideas. Besides the possible influence of some political or socio-economic theories, I also 
want to give an outline of how other intellectual currents like Newtonianism, the 
                                                     
645  P. Bowler, The Non-Darwinian Evolution (1988), p. 171,  footnotes 404 and esp. 460. 
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probability revolution and modern reductionism might have influenced the different 
Darwinian sub-paradigms. 
Evolutionism of the early modernity, as we have seen in Chapter 3, already existed be-
fore the rise of Darwinism and had to some extent been rooted in Spinoza’s and his 
adherents’ approach to give a unified account of the World and of God. Since 
Descartes,  the picture of the World had been ripped into two pieces by a dualistic 
account, which mirrors the Christian distinction of Machina Mundi and Alter Deus.646 
Opposed to this, romanticism and romantic biology followed Spinoza’s approach, 
focusing on the active (ideal) unfolding of Nature or – in other words – on the self-
realisation or incarnation of God.647 It has been argued that Buffon, the founder of 
what I have called ‘romanticising materialist biology’, had been influenced by Spinoza 
and came to a more active understanding of matter and evolving entities 
than Darwin did.648 
Darwinism – as I am going to show – has interpreted the originally romantic idea of 
evolution along atomistic, mechanistic lines. By explaining evolution in terms of 
unchanging, eternal, mechanical laws of nature the concept of evolution was 
transformed and placed in the respected Newtonian research tradition predominant at 
Darwin’s time, especially in Britain. Newtonianism in turn could be regarded as a 
peculiar blend, on the one hand, out of the mechanicism based on the Christian 
notion of Machina Mundi, and, on the other hand, out of the atomistic, reductionistic 
and individualistic tenets, present in the increasingly nominalistic attitude at the end of 
the mediaeval period.649  
But Darwinism at the same time undermined Newtonianism, on which it relied: 
God’s eternal law is largely reduced to a process of blind chance. God became blind. 
This aspect of the Darwinian revolution of evolution had already been foreshadowed 
by the development of the philosophy of will, which had changed the romantic 
approach from a purposeful unfolding of nature or God, to a blind development of 
the universal will. To Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) in his work The World as Will 
and Representation (1818) the will is the general driving force of the development: 
everywhere: “the will [...] is obviously at work [...] but in blind activity.”650 This 
concept is radicalised by today’s gene-Darwinian paradigm, which in some respects 
could be regarded as pinnacle of pure and radicalised Darwinism. In this paradigm 
God is ‘a blind watchmaker’. Still, in my opinion, this biological world-view also bears 
the seeds to partially undermine itself, and even Darwinism in general.  
But first we start with Darwin, who brought the conception of a largely blind 
evolution into the realm of the respectable Newtonian research tradition. 
                                                     
646   pp. 73 f., pp. 79 f.  
647   Section ‘d) Idealism and Romanticism – The Dynamic Trial of a Unification‘, pp. 82 ff. 
648   pp. 9087 ff. 
649   pp. 75 ff. 
650 A. Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation (1818, transl. 1883), p. 118. 
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5.1 Darwin – A Malthusian Synthesis of Romantic and Newtonian Thought 
The biological precursors of Darwin, who had already formulated the building blocks 
of Darwin’s theory of descent, without creating a coherent whole, have already been 
mentioned in Chapter 4 on the internal history of Darwinism ( pp. 106 ff.). Here 
I shall try to give an account of the external, more general influences which moulded 
and constrained the composition of Darwin’s theory as a whole. 
It has been argued that in the times of Darwin there was a certain (scientific) 
Zeitgeist in Britain which made the development of Darwinism more probable there, 
than, for example, on the European continent.651 This is supported by the fact that 
Darwin and Wallace, who concurrently developed roughly the same theory of 
evolution by natural selection, were both British. 
Alternatively, one may argue, that the empirical evidence for the Darwinian theory 
was overwhelming and because of the expanding British empire, naturalists, who 
sailed the world, were often British. The conception of geological transformation at 
Darwin’s time had anyway become largely accepted in many countries, and the fossil 
findings provided striking empirical evidence for evolution.652 Darwin and Wallace 
had the extraordinary opportunity of getting insight from an enormous amount of 
empirical evidence. Darwin’s voyage on H. M. S. Beagle (1831-36) around the world 
and Wallace’s journey to the Amazon and Malay Peninsula gave them both the 
possibility to observe related species on different islands. 
Although empirical argumentation surely played a role, it also is plausible that this 
argumentation had to be complemented by a certain Zeitgeist in Britain. In France and 
Germany the concepts of romantic and Lamarckian biology with their claim of 
evolution and ideogenesis had been common much earlier than in Britain.653 In 
France and especially in Germany there was at this time a huge number of competent 
professional biologists.654 Additionally, it would be wrong to assume that these 
biologists were completely isolated from the new empirical findings from the new 
colonies. Since the founding of Linnaean school of taxonomy many biologically 
educated explorers from different countries had the same opportunities as Darwin 
and Wallace; in Germany Humboldt, Leichhardt and v. Müller, for example. But still 
the theory of evolution by natural selection was not developed in these countries. 
Additionally, the biographies of Darwin and Wallace show similar influences. For 
example, both were entrenched with a Newtonian ideal of science, both read Lyell 
during their travels, both were exposed to romantic or French materialist proposals of 
                                                     
651 J. C. Greene, The Kuhnian Paradigm and the Darwinian Revolution in Natural Selection (1971/1981), 
pp. 49, 54. S. S. Schweber, The Wider British Context in Darwin’s Theorizing (1995), pp. 36-38, also 
stressing the Scottish influences on Darwin.  
652 For example, Herschel, as Darwin met him already in 1936 in Cape Town, had already written a 
letter to Lyell, criticizing Lyell for not grasping the implication of his own theory of gradually 
evolving landscapes for the successive appearance of new species. Mentioned in: A. Desmond, 
J. Moore, Darwin (1991/1992), p. 185. 
653   pp. 90 ff. Also: E. Mayr, The Growth of Biological Thought (1982), pp. 388-391. 
654  E. Mayr, The Growth of Biological Thought (1982), pp. 389. 
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evolution and both read T. R. Malthus’ Essay on Population655. Thus, it seems to me to 
be a reasonable working hypothesis to accept that the intellectual milieu in Britain has 
played a role in the parallel development of the theories of Darwin and Wallace. 
In the next three sections I will give reason for the claim that for Darwin three 
external influences were of special importance: (1) Romantic and the ‘romanticising 
materialist’ concept of evolution; (2) Newtonian thought, which provided the general 
pattern of a mechanical, universal explanation, and (3) economic thought, especially of 
Malthus (but also of A. Smith), which gave to this synthesis the specific 
Darwinian spin. 
Of course, the influences on Darwin were much more complex and diverse. For 
example, Darwin, after reading Comte, noted that he generally agrees with Comte’s 
positivistic approach.656 But given that the manifold of influences on Darwin needs to 
be structured I think the three described schools could be regarded as corner stones 
of Darwin’s philosophy. 
Before we come to discuss these influences, I have to concede that the claim of any synthesis 
of Newtonism and Romanticism at first glance might appear absurd. As already outlined, 
Newtonian thought and romantic thought were traditionally two opposed currents. Moreover, 
Darwin got beyond both Newtonism and Romanticism: Darwin firstly abandoned the strictly 
nomothetic character of Newton’s laws, accepting a probabilistic law and by this turned 
against the Newtonian (in a sense still Platonic) world-view of an unchangeable eternal world. 
Darwin secondly rejected most of the metaphysical presumptions which had been at the 
very heart of romanticism. His theory is not based on ideogenesis, but is a mechanistic 
theory based exclusively on causa efficiens. It is only reasonable to speak of Darwin’s synthesis 
of Newtonian and Romantic thought if we see it – like most syntheses – as a partial 
synthesis which also changes the adopted aspects of the synthesised schools.  
a) Romanticism and Romanticising Materialism 
Only quite recently some historians of thought claimed that one “of the most 
significant and distinctive features of the positivist historiographic tradition has been 
its denial of the positive contribution of Romanticism to science.” 657 It has already 
been shown that romanticism generally had a larger impact on the development of 
modern science than had often been assumed.658 This also holds for Darwinism, 
although some of today’s neo-Darwinians sometimes tackle history with surprising 
ignorance.659 Historians increasingly see Darwinism not only as breaking with 
romantic biology and with what I have called ‘romanticising materialist biology’, but as 
continuing at least some aspects of these traditions.660 Darwin’s concept of evolution, 
                                                     
655 E.g., R. Willmann, Evolution im Duett (2008).  
656  Ch. Darwin, Notebook M (Ed. P. Barrett, 1987), orig. pp. 69-70. See also e.g., A. Desmond, J. 
Moore, Darwin (1991/1992), pp. 260-261. 
657 E. Richards, The Romantic Gestation of Nature (1990), p. 130. See also: P. Bowler, The 
Non-Darwinian Revolution (1988), pp. 5, 19, 29, 31, 48 f. 
658  Sections on Romantic Biology, pp. 82 f. and pp. 95 f. 
659  footnote 210.  
660 E. Richards, The Romantic Gestation of Nature (1990). See also: P. Bowler, Charles Darwin (1990), 
pp. 17-32. 
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despite using different explanatory mechanisms from his predecessors, was itself no 
creatio ex nihilo. 
Even in the time before romanticism, in the late enlightenment, the general idea of 
development or evolution gained more and more influence. For example, the pre-
critical Kant, independently followed by Laplace, proposed in 1755 a hypothesis on 
the dynamic formation of planets, the so called Kant-Laplace nebular hypothesis.661  
Nevertheless, since the ‘romanticising’ materialist and romantic idealist movement 
( pp. 82 f., 90 f., 95 f.), the concept of universal development became central to 
philosophy as well as to science. In particular, in biology a romanticising materialist 
biology and romantic idealist biology spread the idea of evolutionism. 
I treat the influences of these two different – partly opposed – schools of thought 
together, because both made Darwin at least prepared to finally outgrow his belief in 
the fixity of species and than motivated him to work out his – quite different –  
explanatory account of evolution. Moreover, both schools had been influenced by 
Spinoza. Correspondingly the (romanticising) materialist school advocated a more 
active notion of matter and had a firmer belief in progress than Darwin had. The 
idealist school had a belief in the necessary progressive unfolding of form. Moreover, 
despite the differences in their reception especially in England, both schools for 
example in the early evolutionary debate in France were allied in the persons of 
Lamarck and Geoffroy against Cuvier. Also after 1859 both schools became 
allies against Darwinism662. 
Although it is credible that Darwin indeed long believed in the fixity of species, the 
notion of evolution was at any rate ‘in the air’. The theories of Lamarck, Geoffroy and 
some German romantics were known – also in Britain. Grant, Knox, Green and later 
Chambers and even Owen were clearly in favour of these concepts, although Owen 
became cautious in publishing them. Although Darwin’s intellectual starting point 
indeed was indeed a Paleyan-Newtonian understanding of the world, it would be 
wrong to neglect the influence of the Pre-Darwinian evolutionary theories, both of 
romanticising materialist and romantic biology. 
Darwin, like most of his generation, read Romantic poetry. Darwin in his youth and 
also in the time he adopted his belief in evolution took much delight in reading poems 
of Byron, Scott, Coleridge, Shelley and Wordsworth.663 The romantic poets in a poetic 
way have expressed ideas also advocated by Romantic biology.664  
Charles of course knew of the evolutionary speculations of his famous grandfather 
Erasmus and read his medico-evolutionary book Zoonomia while studying medicine at 
Edinburgh (1825-27). Although Charles at that time presumably was not trans-
mutationalist he greatly admired Erasmus’ work and he even himself concedes in his 
autobiography that hearing early in life of such evolutionary views may probably have 
moulded his own – of course different – account.665 Being the grandson of the known 
                                                     
661 I. Kant, Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels (1755). 
662  P. Bowler, Darwin (1990), Chapter 9, esp. p. 167. 
663  Ch. Darwin, Autobiography (Ed. F. Darwin, 1887), pp. 33, 69, 100. 
664   footnote 260. 
665 Ch. Darwin, Autobiography (Ed. F. Darwin, 1887), p. 38. 
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early evolutionist and poet Erasmus Darwin surely played a role in putting the species 
question on Darwin’s agenda.  
Erasmus has to be classified as a romantic biologist or at least as a romanticising 
materialist biologist. Erasmus favoured the belief in the improvement of species by 
their “own inherent activity”666. D. King-Hele, who has edited Erasmus’ letters, 
writings and life, has even argued that Erasmus’ writings did not only resemble the 
writings of the romantic poets, but that he directly made his mark on Blake, 
Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley, Keats and also on Goethe.667 Coleridge for example, 
a good friend of the romantic biologist Green, thoroughly knew Erasmus’ works. 
And, Darwin although finally turning strongly against Erasmus’ approach665, kept his 
work in mind as he himself adopted a concept of evolution. After re-reading the 
Zoonomia, he even took this title as opening heading of his Notebook B, his first 
notebook mainly on species transmutation668. 
In his second year at Edinburgh, Darwin was under the tutelage of the 
transformist Grant. Grant was mainly influenced by a Lamarckian view of evolution; 
to a certain extent only he was also influenced by romantic biology (e. g. by Geoffroy) 
in adopting the theory of recapitulation.669 Grant advocated that species have certain 
life cycles. His transformist leanings were evident in his papers in Jameson’s Edinburgh 
Philosophical Journal.670 Grant and Charles Darwin – the grandson of Erasmus Darwin 
– became closely acquainted. Darwin also helped Grant with observations on the 
larvae of molluscs and sea-mats, which played part in Grant’s evolutionary attempt to 
show homologies from people to polyps, and Darwin even had to look something up 
in a publication of Lamarck for him.671 Once, as they were walking together, Grant 
“burst forth in high admiration of Lamarck and his views of evolution”.672 Although 
in his autobiography Darwin assumed that listening in silent astonishment to this 
position was “without any effect” on his mind,672 it certainly suggested this 
research topic to him.673 
Generally, most idealist or materialist evolutionists in Britain had a predominantly 
Scottish, mostly Edinburgh, training.674 Knox, gave lectures on Comparative Anatomy 
fully based on the principles of ‘Autenrieth, Goethe, and Geoffroy’ exactly in the 
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years, when Darwin was at Edinburgh.675 Darwin did not hear Knox’s extra-academic 
lectures himself, presumably mainly because he was disgusted by dissecting anyway.676 
But Knox’ lectures were the largest anatomical classes in Edinburgh, even in British 
history,677 and it seems improbable that Darwin, who took an active part in the 
naturalist societies, should never have heard about his ideas. Even the respected 
R. Jameson, curator of the University’s Natural Museum, to whose course Darwin 
went, had – anonymously – published a paper in praise of Lamarck’s mechanism of 
evolution.678 Darwin, who had almost stopped studying medicine, took part in two 
naturalistic societies, which were among the most probable places in Edinburgh to 
find students or lectures concerned with these topics. One was the Plinian student 
society, founded originally by Jameson, at that time penetrated by radical students. To 
the other, the Wernerian Natural History Society in Jameson’s room in the museum, 
Darwin was regularly brought by Grant as his guest. Knox had already become a 
member of this society in 1821.679 
At Cambridge, while studying theology Darwin mainly strengthened his 
Newtonian understanding of science ( pp. 168 f.). Still, Darwin also read A. v. 
Humboldt’s Personal Narrative with great interest and later on as he published his 
Journal of Research modelled on Humboldt he even sent him a copy. Humboldt 
delightedly answered his letter, mentioning that, for him, Erasmus Darwin had been a 
source of inspiration.680 
On the H. M. S. Beagle, Darwin had leisure to examine Lamarck’s Histoire naturelle 
des animaux sans vertèbres and he found in the second book of Lyell’s Principles of Geology 
a full presentation of Lamarck’s theory of evolution and also an outline of Serres’ and 
Tiedemann’s concept of recapitulation of the embryological development through 
stages of lower animals. Despite Lyell’s disapproval of these theories, he substituted 
nothing in their place681. 
Although Darwin – like Lyell – seems not to have become convinced by these 
evolutionary concepts of his time immediately, all these ideas probably played a role in 
preparing him for his later conversion to evolutionism. And indeed, at least in the 
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early part of the period between March 1837, when Darwin actually converted to the 
belief of transformism of species, and before September 1838, when he arrived at his 
theory of natural selection, passages in his notebooks indicate a understanding of 
evolution which could be attributed to some romantic brand of evolution. For 
example, Darwin directly after adopting his belief in evolution claims that evolution 
works ‘per saltum’.682 Moreover, in this period he also studied not only Cuvier, but 
also Geoffroy’s Principles de philosophie zoologique (published 1830).683 
The historian Richards has argued that Darwin’s very early reflections on 
transformation largely followed a romantic concept of embryological-zoological 
recapitulation. Thereby Charles Darwin followed in the footsteps of his grandfather 
Erasmus Darwin and found confirmation of his views in an article of Serres, a disciple 
of Geoffroy.684 Moreover, Martin Barry’s representation of von Baer’s treelike 
conception of the vertebrate and invertebrate archetypes and their development 
(1837) might have inspired Darwin’s conception of common descent.685 
The theory of common descent, to Darwin, as earlier presumably to Geoffroy, was so useful 
because it acknowledged the evidence of two opposed schools. It firstly acknowledges the 
unbridgeable difference of species, which had been advocated by essentialists, like Cuvier 
and, at that time, by Owen (with whom Darwin rubbed shoulders), at least in a ‘horizontal’ 
sense. It secondly acknowledges the concept of ‘vertical’ transmutation. 
Even later on, as Darwin in 1842 and 1844 prepared first systematic unpublished 
formulations of his theories, he, like some romantic and some former essentialist 
authors, formulated a theory of periodical change, as a “compromise between static 
creationism and a totally dynamic model of natural change”686. 
According to Desmond and Moore the discussion of revolution and of 
Lamarckian transmutation took already place on the streets, as by the mid-forties 
transmutation was moving “out of the shabby dissecting theatres, [...] into the 
drawing-rooms”687. This was partly due to Robert Chambers anonymously published 
and journalistically written book Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation, which made a 
romantic understanding of cosmic self-development and progression of nature 
accessible to a larger public.688 According to Chambers evolution could be seen as a 
continuous divine creation. 
Anyway, evolution was in the air, long before Darwin published his Origin. But to 
Darwin the materialist Lamarckian notion of evolution in the air smelled like the gun 
powder of the excesses of the French Revolution. Presumably mainly because of this, 
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Darwin – himself silently thinking about evolution – distances himself from Grant 
and even witnessed a conspiracy against his old teacher Grant, which was only the 
first attack in a larger war against him.689 This was the case, although Darwin, in 
respect of the source of variation, stayed a Lamarckian throughout his life.690 But also 
the other, the idealist romantic, notion of evolution seemed from Darwin’s 
Newtonian viewpoint too obscurantist to be scientifically respectable. 
 
The emphasis of history mainly on the break in the transition from romanticism to 
Darwinism, underestimates the continuity in the belief of evolution. This might partly be due 
to the overbearing importance Darwin awards to a causal, Newtonian explanation. 
Darwin indeed in many respects was opposed to some idealistic explanations. 
Moreover his theory of natural selection undermined romantic biology, which might 
have caused evolutionists like Knox and Owen to oppose this theory of evolution. 
The “unity of type”, a concept central not only to advocates of a fixity of species but 
also to dynamic romantic biology, “is” as Darwin pointed out in his Origin “explained 
by unity of descent”691. Also because the quickly abandoned static essentialist school 
of biology shared some notions with romantic biology, it might have been easier to 
underrate the impact of the second school. 
Although Darwin totally transformed the conceptions of romantic and 
romanticising materialist biology, he started not from blank paper, but was pre-pared 
and influenced also by the hotly discussed theories of evolution of his day.  
b) The Impact of Newtonism – Darwin’s Process-Monism 
Nearly 200 years after Newton’s Principia (1687) Darwin’s Origin (1859) extended 
Newtonism to biology. Darwin indeed became the ‘Newton of a blade of grass’ 
(Kant) and he at the same time also strongly modified, changed and perhaps even 
undermined the generalised Newtonian approach. 
Darwin – like Wallace – has developed his theory in an intellectual milieu with 
strong Newtonian underpinnings: 
William Paley’s (1743-1805) Natural Theology (1802), which Darwin enthusiastically 
read692 at Cambridge, where he studied to become a priest, was utterly Newtonian in 
its spirit. From our today’s viewpoint this might appear paradoxical, because to us 
science – and hence Newtonism – often is conceived being opposed to theology. But 
Paley indeed was a creationist in a quite Newtonian sense. To Paley, as for Newton – 
but not for the romantics – the universe ought to be seen as world machine. 
Accordingly, in the beginning of the Natural Theology, Paley describes the world with 
the metaphor of a clockwork. Putting himself in contrast to Kant, Paley, like 
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Descartes, advocated that even organisms are machines. But according to Paley 
organic machines are perfected to such a high degree, that we are forced to postulate 
the most skilful creator we can imagine, that is God.  
The original association between Newtonism and Natural Theology based on the 
Christian-Platonic notion of machina mundi had been pointed out already ( pp. 74 f.). 
The concept of machina mundi was increasingly changed from a Platonic to a 
mechanistic sense. But its original link to the design argument for the existence of 
God stayed a powerful driving force in the development of the increasingly 
mechanistic sciences ( pp. 76 f.). 
It has even been argued (in the tradition of Weber and Merton), that, perhaps due 
to Puritanism, the link of the new sciences and theology in natural theology had a 
particularly strong impact in Britain.693 However, it is undisputed – also perhaps due 
to the Cambridge Platonism694 – that both Newtonism and Natural Theology became 
very influential, especially in England. In Paley’s time, particularly at Cambridge, 
Newtonian science had become predominant.695 
In Darwin’s time Paley, although already dead, was still one of the most important 
natural theologians. In the late 1820s and early 1830s, despite a then growing fear of 
deism, England’s natural theology was still in bloom, in particular in the natural 
sciences community at Cambridge. And in this community the young Darwin, really 
studying ‘arts’ in order to become a priest, spent most of his time.696 Darwin, coming 
to Christ College, moved apparently into the same room where Paley had lived.697 
Darwin had to read other works of Paley for his exams, but although he was not a 
very ambitious student, he read Paley’s Natural Theology voluntarily and ‘with delight’ 
even after he finished his exams – and it was one of the few books he read at 
Cambridge which made a permanent impression on him.698 
Paley does not only leave to Darwin his Newtonian mechanical understanding of 
Nature, but, by this, the belief in an unchangeable law of God. “As it was in the 
beginning, it is now, and even shall be: world without end” (Gloria). In an irony of 
history this seems present in today’s claims of a universal Darwinian Metaphysics. 
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Moreover, Darwin, as personified secularisation, in the time of the Origin still preaches 
largely with unbroken zeal, not only pan-selectionism, but the metaphysical optimism 
of physicotheology: panadaptionism.699 Like in a worldly theodicy, Darwin in some 
writings appears to explain and to justify the necessity of natural suffering by the 
higher means of natural selection, the origin of life. Finally, Darwin’s way from natural 
theology to natural selection paradoxically led him to demolish the venerable edifice 
natural theology. After his own biological theory contributed much to make him an 
agnostic and to shatter his optimistic belief in progress, he again relaxed his 
adaptationist biological assumptions.700  
Another important implicit Newtonian influence on Darwin was Charles Lyell 
(1797-1875), who had carried on Hutton’s work to introduce Newton’s idea of 
gradual change (of e. g. the gradual change of the direction of the movements of the 
planets around the sun) to geology. In Lyell’s Principles of Geology (three volumes, 
1830-3, 1872 the 11th ed.) he expounds a theory of geological change not based on a 
sudden and violent, but on a gradual change. So he took position as a ‘uniformitarian’ 
geologist, opposing the ‘catastrophists’. Darwin had read the Principles on the Beagle 
and later Lyell became Darwin’s academic mentor701. 
French saltationism and catastrophism might have been associated with the excesses of the 
French revolution, although they have earlier been advocated by the rather conservative 
biologist Cuvier. It can not be assessed here, how far such sentiments played a role for 
dominance of (geological) gradualism in Britain. 
More explicitly Newtonian was the influence of the famed astronomer 
John F. W. Herschel (1792-1871), who was presumably England’s most important 
‘philosopher of science’ in the 1830’s. I think D. Hull has been right in claiming that 
the “Darwinian revolution was as much concerned with the promotion of a particular 
view of science as it was with the introduction of a theory on the trans-
mutation of species.”702  
In the English speaking world, Philosophy of Science had become a largely 
independent and self-conscious discipline not much earlier than in the time of 
Darwin. Hull has argued that there has been two camps: Darwin tried to continue in 
the vein of Herschel, Lyell and John Stuart Mill, whereas Owen, Forbes and Agassiz 
followed in the (modified) Kantian wake of William Whewell.703 In contrast to this 
view, Ruse has pointed out that, despite differences in the metaphysical aspects of 
science, Herschel and Whewell were not only close friends, but differed little with 
respect to ‘methodological’ questions. Not only Herschel, but Whewell as well paid a 
lot of respect to the Newtonian research program.704 However this may be, we will 
mainly focus on the less controversial views of Herschel here. 
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Herschel, in a Newtonian manner, demands that science should not only search 
for mere empirical correlations but to explain true causes (vera causae), in terms of 
cause and effect. Still, like Newton, he did not think that this might rule out God, 
indeed, rather the contrary. In his view to state that there is something not causally 
explainable, would mean that there is no God, because the Creator works through 
these ‘intermediate’ or ‘secondary’ causes. 
Darwin, as an undergraduate, had read Herschel’s Preliminary Discourse on the Study of 
Natural Philosophy (1830).  
Darwin, still at Cambridge also knew Whewell quite well and Whewell at the time Darwin 
returned from his travels seems to have supported Darwin’s scientific career. How far he 
represents a Newtonian or non-Newtonian influence on Darwin could not be assessed here. 
Since his travels Darwin also knew Herschel personally. Moreover both were active 
members of the London Geological Society. Darwin reread parts of the Preliminary 
Discourse in 1838, when he was going to build a theory based on the concept of natural 
selection. His theory of natural selection should fulfil the criteria set up by 
Herschel.705 Among many aspects, Darwin in his theory hoped to provide vera causa in 
the sense of Newtonian ‘secondary’ causes, of eternal mechanisms. Still, to Darwin’s 
disappointment finally not only Whewell, but also Herschel and Mill 
dismissed his theory.706  
In his Descent of Man Darwin generally mentions Newton explicitly as the individual 
who achieved highest status on the scale of the evolution of human mental capacities; 
and it is also not by chance that Darwin mentions the eternal law of gravity in the last 
sentence of the Origin.707 
Let us now have a general look in which respect Darwin took over Newtonian 
thought? What is Darwin’s Newtonism like? The main and most important feature is that 
Darwin stated one universal law which mechanistically governs the world of 
organisms, as the material world is governed by eternal Newtonian laws. As the effect 
of gravity on stars and on a falling apple could be explained by the same laws, all the 
special creations of animal species should in Darwin’s view be explained by one 
universal mechanism. Even before Darwin adopted his characteristic mechanism of 
evolution, he writes in his notebooks: “Astronomers might formerly have said that 
God ordered, each planet to move in its particular destiny. – In same manner God 
orders each animal created with certain form in certain country, but how much more 
simple, & sublime power let attraction act according to certain laws such are inevitable 
consequen let animal be created, then by the fixed laws of generation, such will be 
their successors. –”708 This mechanism later got its final shape by the influence of 
Malthusianism, but the main Newtonian ingredient is the early deep belief in a mono-
mechanistic eternal explanation. This explanation should have no historical or spatial 
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constraints. One mechanism or one set of laws should rule the whole of evolution and 
should rule in all regions of the earth and on all planets where there might be life 
(although, as far as I know, Darwin did not state this in regard of other planets, he 
certainly would do this today). Although Darwin had, as has been shown, stepped 
back in the Descent of Man from his radical adaptionism he still largely upheld his 
mono-mechanistic creed. Throughout time variation had been introduced “by the 
same general causes, and governed by the same general and complex laws as at 
present.”709 Giving a universal account of evolution is also Romantic, but to give a 
mechanistic law is obviously rather Newtonian. 
But Newton’s influence goes further: Newton favoured a passive understanding of 
matter.710 Matter, on which no force impinges, will only act according to its inertia. 
Hence, the natural movement is straight and not circular, like Aristotle had believed 
for celestial bodies. Apart from its inertia, the cause for its movement is externally 
given. To Darwin – if we focus on his theory of natural selection – organisms are not 
actively adapting but are adapted by the external force of natural selection. This opposed 
the Buffon/Lamarckian view of active matter and organisms ( pp. 90 f.).  
This parallel between Darwin’s theory of natural selection and Newton’s model of 
a law bound system of matter in motion has been more fully elaborated by Depew 
and Weber. According to them, species could be compared to objects, say planets 
moving around the sun, which have a certain inertial tendency, but at the very same 
instant they are pulled back by the external force of gravity. Organisms – without any 
force acting on them – would tend to reproduce similar organisms, but natural 
selection, like gravity, is acting upon them, causing them to go off this tangent, 
causing them to transform.711 Moreover, the “Newtonian construction of the action 
of the force as occurring incrementally in infinitesimally small steps is also present 
in Darwinism.”712 
Notwithstanding this parallel, it is still important to see that at the same time as 
Darwin found a universal law which might meet the Newtonian standards for 
theories, he also transcended the Newtonian framework. In following Herschel’s 
Newtonian idea of giving a universal causal explanation for the whole process of 
evolution, Darwin had to pay the price in accepting only a probabilistic law. 
(Cf. Maxwell on gases, also 1859). Involuntarily Darwin turned against Herschel’s idea 
of vera causae as necessary, nomothetic laws. To Darwin’s disappointment, Herschel 
did not approve his theory of natural selection, but as Darwin was told, con-
descendingly called Darwin’s mechanism of evolution ‘the law of higgledy-piggledy’. 
Darwin had dynamised the conception of nature by introducing on a second level 
a fixed, ahistorical, eternal mechanism in a Newtonian way. “God was, for Darwin 
then, still the traditional good and wise creator, but one never working in so many 
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separate acts of interference, always through the natural consequences of a few initial 
enactments of general laws: as with planetary orbits and the law of gravitation.”713 But 
differently from the Platonic conception the advocated unchanging background of the 
changing world, is not provided by a universe of eternal forms, but by one blind 
process of overproduction and elimination. Later, it will be shown that it is disputable, 
to accept a historisation of nature, but to oppose a historisation of its evolutionary 
laws ( pp. 363 ff., esp. 405 ff.). 
In conclusion, it appeared adequate to me to call Darwin the ‘Newton of a blade 
of Grass’714, a phrase Kant had introduced. Kant himself was convinced that there 
could in the strict sense never be such a Newton of a blade of Grass; there could 
never be an adequate explanation for organisms only using causal explanations.715. In 
this thesis it will be argued that there is still a need for an Einstein or a modernised 
Aristotle of a blade of Grass. 
c) Thomas Malthus, Adam Smith – The Influence of Economic Thought and Practice 
When discussing the external history of Darwinism an often-discussed characteristic 
of Darwin’s theory (and of the later following neo-Darwinian theory) should also be 
considered; it is its closeness to some central aspects of political economy and social 
practice of Whig individualism, competition and laissez-faire economy. This sort of 
economy was favoured by A. Smith, Malthus and Ricardo, the then influential British 
school of ‘political economy’, and since the middle 1830s these theories had partly 
become bitter social practice in Britain. The theory of natural selection, according to 
J. C. Greene, came “naturally to Englishmen” of that time, steeped in this tradition of 
‘political economy’, and correspondingly it “is no mere coincidence that all of the men 
who arrived at some idea of natural selection in the first half of the nineteenth century 
– one thinks of William Wells, Patrick Matthew, Charles Lyell, Edward Blyth, Charles 
Darwin, A. R. Wallace, and Herbert Spencer – were British.”716 A closer scrutiny 
shows that these formulations of ‘natural selection’ differ considerably in how far they 
focus on the struggle of individuals.717 But a certain resemblance appears to remain. 
However, I do not base my argument on these parallels. Instead I concentrate on 
Darwin’s theory of natural selection in particular. Though I shall, of course, not claim 
that Darwin’s theory is merely a projection of the concepts of laissez-faire capitalism 
onto nature, it will be shown that it is apparent that Darwin’s theory, in some respects, 
is similar to and was actually inspired by economic thought.  
 
There are two ways to discuss a resemblance of theories of quite different subject 
matter. Firstly one might work out that there is a structural similarity, an analogy. 
Secondly actual direct influences, a line of descent, a homology, may explain this 
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similarity. If no direct influence could be found, it is reasonable – as in the romantic 
search for convergent lines of evolution – to search for indirect influences, intellectual 
resonances, or otherwise for common influences from a third source, in short, reasons 
to claim that these homologies are due to something which was in the air, which was 
necessary at least at a certain stage of the Zeitgeist.718 I am firstly going to outline the 
general analogy of Darwin’s theory and some basic tenets of early ‘political’ 
economics, which still forms the basis of neo-classical economics. Then, in more 
detail, I discuss the analogy and actual influence of the theories firstly of Malthus and 
then of Smith. Finally, we come to discuss the impact of the actual contingent social 
situation of Darwin’s time. 
 
It has often been stated, and I think to a certain extent rightly, that there is a striking 
general analogy of theories of (Neo) classic economy and (Neo) Darwinian biology.719 The agents in 
the competition on the free market are, according to the main Smithian presumptions, 
rational individuals maximising their own benefit. Like them, organisms in Darwin’s 
Origin are necessarily egoistic individuals, which tend to maximise their own 
reproduction. In both cases resources are scarce. This implies economic competition 
on the free market – or struggle for existence between organisms. The competition is 
severest between individuals or firms offering similar products, or between most similar 
organisms. Both views focus on competition and both introduce, what I have called 
‘principle of egoism’, mainly on the level of the individual. 
Now I come to the discussion of the more specific theory of Malthus. The analogy 
between Malthus and Darwin, and the actual influence of Malthus on Darwin will be 
discussed. Darwin himself in the Origin described his theory of natural selection as 
“the doctrine of Malthus applied with manifold force to the whole animal 
and vegetable kingdoms”.720 
Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834), also a Cambridge educated Newtonian 
clergyman721, in his Essay on the Principle of Population, as It Affects the Future Improvement of 
Society (1798, 1803, ..., 6th ed.: 1826) stated as a law of nature that human population 
increases in a geometrical (exponential) progression, whereas the food production of 
the land can increases only in an arithmetical (linear) way.722 This, according to him, 
naturally results in a necessary scarcity of resources,723 in famine, misery, war and 
pestilence, which act as ‘positive checks’ of population growth. Correspondingly, 
Malthus thought that it was and would never be possible to build a society where all 
                                                     
718  This methodology is paralleled by my theory of exformation  pp. 316 f. 
719 This idea has largely been discussed. The idea newly has been elaborated by the economist 
E. L. Khalil, who criticises both paradigms in a similar way, Neo-classical Economics and Neo-
Darwinism: Clearing the Way for Historical Thinking (1993), pp. 22-72. 
720 Ch. Darwin, Origin of Species (1859), p. 117. 
721  To R. Malthus God is acting by eternal and general laws, Essay on the Principle of Population (1798), 
pp. 159, 353. 
722  R. Malthus, Essay on the Principle of Population (1798), pp. 14, 18 f., 21. 
723  Ibid, p. 291. 
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citizens “should live in ease, happiness, and comparative leisure”, an argument which 
is in his view “conclusive against the perfectibility of the mass of mankind”.724 
Before Malthus’ time, poor laws had been instituted in Britain to partially remedy 
the distress of the poor of each parish. Malthus wrote against these poor laws725: “The 
poor-laws of England tend to depress the general condition of the poor”, because of 
an increased price for food, a more than proportionate increase of population of the 
poor, and an increasing laziness of the fancied rich.726 Malthus even went further: “A 
man who is born into a world already possessed, if he cannot get subsistence from his 
parents on whom he has a just demand, and if the society does not want his labour, 
has no claim of right to the smallest portion of food, and, in fact, has no business to 
be where he is. At nature’s mighty feast there is no vacant cover for him.” Thus, 
instead of arguing that we should directly strive to prevent or alleviate misery, Malthus 
recommended a harshening of the conditions of life of the poor. “Dependent poverty 
ought to be held disgraceful”727. Although he tried in the more academic second 
edition of his Essay to soften some of the most remorseless conclusions of the first 
edition, he still held an extremely critical stance towards welfare. 
Because of such a position today one is inclined to call Malthus a pre-Darwinian 
social-Darwinist. Darwin was born only eleven years after the publication of the first 
edition of Malthus’ Essay. Accordingly, historians, like, for example, Robert M. Young, 
have emphasised that Darwin’s view of nature arose naturally out the social debates 
centred on Malthus’ works.728 Darwin, as we shall see later, read Malthus and he 
rubbed shoulders with important Malthusians. Here the structural resemblance is 
important. Darwin’s and Malthus’ works resemble each other in the concept of a 
necessity of overpopulation, which leads to a general scarcity of recourses and to a 
struggle for existence. Malthus also provided a mathematical formulation, suited to 
Darwin’s Newtonian understanding of science. Moreover, Darwin’s belief that indivi-
dual struggle for existence leads to progress seems to resemble at least Malthus’ 
general Whig belief that individual competition leads by an invisible hand to 
the common good.  
Internal historians ( pp. 102), like E. Mayr, have pointed out that Darwin’s the-
ory was at least not primarily a socio-economic theory, although also Mayr concedes 
that the reading of Malthus’ was of some importance for Darwin.729  
P. J. Bowler tried to steer a middle course, accepting that Malthus provided an im-
portant step to Darwin’s theory of natural selection, but arguing that Darwin’s and 
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725  Ibid, pp. 74-99, esp. 98. 
726  Ibid, pp. 76, 77, 78, 83 
727 Ibid, p. 85.  
728  See: P. J. Bowler, Malthus, Darwin and the Concept of Struggle (1976), p. 635. R. M., Young, Darwin’s 
Metaphor (1985). A. Desmond, J. Moore, Darwin (1991/1992), pp. 267 f., 413-414. 
729  E. Mayr, Darwin, Intellectual Revolutionary (1983), p. 33; One Long Argument (1991), pp. 69 f. 
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Malthus’ view still differed considerably.730 Malthus indeed impressed Darwin by his 
emphasis on an inevitable ‘struggle for existence’ in general and by the resulting con-
cept of scarcity of resources for the species as a whole. Both emphasise pressure of 
the environment on populations always tending to expand.731 But, in Bowler’s view, 
Malthus did not – like Darwin – advocate a struggle on the individual level as a basis 
for change or progress.732 The distress of the poor should be held disgraceful, not 
because poor persons with superior ability should win in the struggle for existence 
relative to others, but because the general situation should prevent further birth of 
children and should be a stimulus for the lazy. 733   
These differences between Darwin’s and Malthus’ position, seem in my opinion to 
be valid; though I would less stress their importance. Bowler is right, that differential 
survival is on the individual level clearly less central in Malthus’ Principle of Population 
than one would suspect if Malthus had taken a strict ‘socio-Darwinian’ position. Still, 
there are some passages, where Malthus in the context of the overpopulation problem 
and of the Poor Laws draws not only distinctions between few rich and the mass of 
the comparatively poor, but also within the rather poor. Malthus distinguishes firstly 
the unemployed very poor of the workhouses, who “cannot in general be considered 
as the most valuable part” and secondly the “more industrious, and more worthy 
members”, whose part is diminished by the former.734 Moreover, Bowler himself 
concedes that Malthus in later editions recognises at least some struggle for existence 
within species735 and generally there is also according to Bowler “no doubt that Mal-
thus assumed modern society operated on a basis of self-interest and competition.”736 
I think, Darwin, in some respects came to share with Malthus a political view critical 
towards any state intervention and welfare: 737 
“The advancement of welfare of mankind is a most intricate problem.” If man is “to ad-
vance still higher, it is to be feared that he must remain subject to a severe struggle. Other-
wise he would sink into indolence and the more gifted men would not be more successful in 
the battle of life than the less gifted. Hence our natural rate of increase though leading to 
many and obvious evils, must not be greatly diminished by any means. There should be 
open competition for all men” 738 
                                                     
730  P. J. Bowler, Malthus, Darwin and the Concept of Struggle (1976), pp. 631, 636, 637. 
Similar: P. J. Bowler, Evolution (1984), pp. 96-97, 162-164; The Non-Darwinian Revolution (1988), 
pp. 34 f.; Charles Darwin (1990), pp. 82-84. Also: M. J. S. Hodge, The Development of Darwin’s 
General Biological Theorizing (1983/1985), pp. 56 f. 
731  P. J. Bowler, Malthus, Darwin and the Concept of Struggle (1976), pp. 637, 647. 
732 Ibid, pp. 634, 636, 639. (Similarly: E. Mayr, One Long Argument (1991), pp. 80-82.)  
733  Ibid, pp. 636, 641, 642, the first reason is not mentioned by Bowler, but  footnote 728. 
734  R. Malthus, Essay on the Principle of Population (1798), p. 84. 
735 P. J. Bowler, Malthus, Darwin and the Concept of Struggle (1976), pp. 638, 647. 
736  Ibid, p. 639. See also: P. J. Bowler, Evolution (1984), p. 164. 
737 For a more detailed analysis of Darwin’s view  the section on the Descent of Man, pp. 112 f.  In 
the Descent of Man Darwin in fact is in some respects more guarded than in the Origin. This is in a 
way mirrored by the moderating attempts of Malthus’ 2nd edition of the Essay, where he puts at 
least some more emphasis on education and self-introduced restrictions, with the hoped result 
of postponing marriage and reproduction etc. 
738 Ch. Darwin, The Descent of Man (1874), Chapter XXI, p. 945. 
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Bowler worked out, that Malthus did not, at least not explicitly, favour the differential 
elimination of the unfit, i. e. of the poor, and that he may have hoped that their 
disgraceful situation would encourage ‘slothful mankind’ to work.739 Nevertheless 
Malthus accepted and demanded such a situation of the poor and accepted even their 
starvation – of course in the service of achieving a higher good740.  
Moreover, the other structural similarities of Malthus’ demographic and economic 
theory to Darwin’s theory make it clear that it was only a little step for Darwin to 
transform Malthus’ theory into his own – albeit different – theory of natural selection. 
The parallel concepts of natural population pressure, of scarcity of resources, of a 
general struggle for existence, and of the opposition against poor laws are striking. 
Already convinced of evolution anyway, prepared by empirical facts and by his 
population thinking derived from animal breeders, all these tenets – combined with a 
public conception of Malthus as a proponent of a politics of free labour market and 
individualistic laisse-faire – were missing links for Darwin’s formulation of his own 
specific theory of individual natural selection741. 
 
The above parallels are not only analogies but at least partly homologies: the concepts 
are not only similar, but in fact Malthus’ approach had been the most important 
external influence on Darwin’s theory of natural selection. 
Apart from Darwin’s statement in the Origin, Darwin also stated in his 
autobiography that he got the idea for his theory of natural selection on the 28th 
September 1838 while reading the sixth edition of Malthus’ Essay on Population742:  
“[...] fifteen months after I had begun my systematic enquiry, I happened to read for 
amusement Malthus on Population, and being well prepared to appreciate the struggle for 
existence which everywhere goes on, from long-continued observation of the habits of 
animals and plants, it at once struck me that under these circumstances favourable variations 
would tend to be preserved and unfavourable ones to be destroyed. The result of this would 
be the formation of new species. Here, then, I had got a theory by which to work”.743 
The reading of Malthus had no doubt shaped the similarities of Darwin’s and Malthus 
conceptual core. To acknowledge the importance of Malthus for Darwin’s theory of 
natural selection is in my view not in contradiction to Hodge’s or Bowler’s 
argumentation that the reading of Malthus provided only an important step to 
Darwin’s causal theory of evolution.744 
Apart from this, Malthus, famous for his strict opposition to the poor laws, ironically also 
influenced John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946), normally regarded as a moderate left wing econo-
                                                     
739  P. J. Bowler, The Non-Darwinian Revolution (1988), pp. 37-38. 
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See also: E. Mayr, Darwin, intellectual revolutionary (1983), p. 37. For Bowler’s argumentation 
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mist, who supported active intervention of the state in the case of an economic crisis. This 
influence is not based on Malthus’ theory of population, but on his view that cyclical crises 
in economy are caused by underconsumption.745 Malthus thought that, for example, the 
post-Napoleonic War distress was caused by a deficiency in effective demand. This brought 
him into conflict with his friend David Ricardo (1772-1823), who upheld the so-called Say’s 
Law, stating the impossibility of a general underconsumption and who for this different rea-
son followed Smith’s theory of governmental non-interference. However, we are here con-
cerned with Malthus’ writings on population, which effected a laissez-faire politics.746 
Darwin had personal ties to outstanding Malthusians of his day and anyway, Malthus’ 
“name was on everybody’s lips, as either Satan or Saviour.”747 Darwin, as Desmond 
and Moore have pointed out, was in contact with relatives and still living friends of 
Malthus’ circle. But more important was that Charles’ brother Erasmus seemed to be 
close to marrying Harriet Martineau, well known for her popularisation of the writings 
of Malthus.748 After he came back from his travels Darwin was delighted to join regu-
larly their dinner parties at Erasmus’ house, a hive of evolutionary and Malthusian 
ideas. Here Darwin was imbued with Malthusian ideals of overpopulation, competi-
tion and free trade.749 
 
Adam Smith (1723-90) could be considered as another economic influence on 
Darwin’s thought. With his main work, the Wealth of Nations (1776), the Scotsman and 
professor of Moral Philosophy is regarded as the reputable founding father of Whig 
economics, which before Darwin’s days had already extended the Newtonian 
paradigm to economics and combined it with radicalised enlightenment individualism. 
Smith favours capitalist self-interest, competition, and natural consumer preferences 
as mathematically describable forces leading to optimal prosperity and freedom. 
The foundation of laissez-faire economics coincides with the general founding of 
economics as an independent subject, because now philosophy and politics did not 
have to define the purposes of the economic development beforehand; instead 
economics was now regarded as a self-sustained machinery, which had to be examined 
as a separate science. Although the school of Smith and the early economists in his 
wake is usually called ‘political economy’, because till then economy was regarded as 
serving politics, it would be more appropriate if this school would rather be called the 
first ‘non-political’ economics.  
There are many structural parallels of Darwin’s and Smith’ approach: 
(1) Smith has to be regarded as one of the modern founders of what has here been 
called the ‘principle of entity egoism’ on the level of the individual. Economic agents, 
capitalists, descriptively do act – and in Smith view even should act – out of self-
interest. We have already shown that Darwin had also applied the principle of egoism 
on the level of the individual organism. 
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(2) Smith favoured capitalist free competition and the notion of unrestrained 
competition was central to Darwin as well. To Smith any intervention by government 
is almost certain to be injurious. Still, of course, the competing agents were, to Smith 
as to other early liberal thinkers, still bound to basic moral rules. 
(3) The concept of ‘division of labour’ was introduced by Smith into economics. 
Darwin applied this idea to biology, where it was one source for his idea of speciation 
with of common descent.  
(4) The confidence of Smith in the self-interest of egoistic individuals is also at 
least to some extent present in Darwin’s work. To Smith the sole maximisation of 
one’s own interests is not wicked, as Plato had thought, and will not lead to the 
collapse of society, but the other way round: it will achieve, as if effected by an 
‘invisible hand’, the wealth of all members of a nation. This is mirrored by Darwin’s 
belief, largely present in 1859, that most organismic properties are adapted, and that 
these adaptations, of species and ecosystems, could be full explained by the egoistic 
striving of single organisms for their own survival and reproduction. In a letter to Lyell, 
who was critical of Darwin’s non-progressive mechanism of evolution, Darwin still 
wrote: “If I have a second edition, I will reiterate ‘Natural Selection’, and, as a general 
consequence, Natural Improvement.”750 As he wrote the Descent of Man, this belief in 
only the level of the individual and in the process of natural selection as the sole 
evolutionary factor had partly crumbled: 
“[...] I was not however, able to annul the influence of my former belief, then almost univer-
sal, that each species had been purposely created; and this led to my tacit assumption that 
every detail of structure; excepting rudiments, was of some special, though unrecognised, 
service. Any one with this assumption in his mind would naturally extend too far the action 
of natural selection [...]”751 
Besides the structural similarities, the actual influences of Smith’ optimistic Whig indi-
vidualism on Darwin is less direct and striking than the influence of Malthus – still it is 
quite plausible. 
Desmond and Moore have argued that the general Darwin-Wedgwood family 
background was a ‘world of wealthy Whiggism’. Not only at liberal Edinburgh, but 
also later on – despite other influences – Darwin stayed imperturbably a Whig.752 
Cambridge was less a bulwark of ‘High Church Thoryism’ than Oxford was. Many of 
Darwin’s friends from the (new) scientific establishment, like Babbage, Henslow, 
Herschel, Lyell, Sedgwick and Whewell, were moderate Whigs. On the one hand, 
Darwin had argued with staunch Tories, like FitzRoy, on the other hand Darwin 
shared his “family’s abhorrence of the ‘fierce & licentious’ radicals”.753 
Nevertheless, many of Darwin’s moderate scientific Whig friends remained critical 
of his radicalised Malthusian solution of the species problem. They at least partly 
looked for a more lawful, inherently progressive and finally also more harmonious 
solution. Darwin’s theory pleased only some aspects of the shared Victorian, and 
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especially Whig, “cluster of respectable values: a gospel of work, a trust in self-help, a 
belief in thrift, and a sense of duty as the foundation of character.”754 Although indivi-
dual effort (opposed to biological determination), ‘moral reformation’ and the concept 
of a resulting harmony was to them inseparable from improvement, they indeed also 
shared a belief in liberalisation and individual competition. But like Smith many 
Victorian religious Whigs still optimistically believed in a final harmony of self-interest 
and common good. Bowler has speculated that Smith may have played a role to give 
Darwin’s theory the individual spin, which, as he has stressed, is not explicitly present 
in Malthus’ writings on population.755 Darwin in fact read some books of Smith. 
Furthermore, he stated that he acquired the concept of division of labour from Henri 
Milne-Edwards, who in turn acknowledged that he got this idea from Adam Smith.756 
In conclusion, it is plausible to assume that Darwin was also inspired by Smith’s 
hopeful belief, shared by many Whigs that individual self-interest finally also leads to 
the achievement of the common good. Despite this, Darwin not only took a strongly 
individual stance, but, based on it, also for a while retained a strong belief in the 
progress and adaptation of a species. Nonetheless, Darwin came to undermine this 
optimistic belief of the mid Victorian Whigs: competition for Darwin does not lead to 
the well-being of all members of a species, but only to the surviving ones.757 
Moreover Darwin played a role in undermining religion, on which much of the 
optimism of the Victorian ethos was based.  
 
Another often mentioned reason why Darwin was prepared for a mainly Malthusian 
solution of the species problem was the social situation in Britain.758  
When Darwin came back from his voyage on H. M. S. Beagle, while he still was 
wrestling to build a theoretical structure to bring order into the massive amount of 
data he had accumulated throughout his travels, Britain fell into a deep 
economic depression. 
Moreover, the rapid growth of population in early and middle Victorian period, 
the time when Darwin formed his theory and published the Origin, seemed to be 
consistent with the Malthusian population doctrine, although the abolishing of the 
Poor Laws seems not to have had much overall effect on the growth of population. 
Only in the late Victorian period there was talk not about overpopulation, but about 
underpopulation as well.759 
But also for another reason it could be said that Darwin was returning to a 
“Malthusian world – Malthus’s words had finally been acted on: the old outdoor 
charity had been scrapped, and the poor made to compete or face the workhouse.”760 
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Malthus had largely god-fathered the Poor Law Amendment Act in 1834, which had 
ended the relief for all but the most destitute.761 F. Engels wrote that the New Poor 
Law had been “constructed as far as possible in harmony with the doctrine of 
Malthus, which is yet more barbarous than that of laissez-faire, because it interferes 
actively in cases in which the latter is passive.”762 Between 1837 and 1842 this in 
combination with the additional crisis led to enormous misery; riots and starvation 
were common.763  
 
That this social situation prepared Darwin could partly be regarded as the ‘social 
resonance’ of Malthus’ theory: Malthus ideas on population had affected the 
Amendment of the Poor Laws, which in turn had the effect that the economic crisis 
resulted in extreme and widespread pauperism. In this unconstrained capitalism 
Darwin indeed could have seen Malthusian principles at work and was perhaps 
prepared by these circumstances to adopt the theory of natural selection from Malthus 
and even in principle to apply it also to human society. Thus society at the time of this 
economic crisis and pauperism seemed to confirm Malthus’ principles in regard of 
humans, although – ironically – one can see these principles at least partly as a cause 
of the misery and not only the explanation of them: 
Today’s demography takes a rather critical stance towards a pure Malthusian approach and is hence 
closer to the position of Malthus’ opponent Johann Peter Süssmilch (1707-1767): Contrary 
to the Malthusian principles there actually has been generally more additional production of 
food than average population growth – even in the case of most developing countries. 
Moreover, especially in many ‘developed’ countries with a welfare system, like for example, 
Germany after the Second World War, the poor were treated not treated in a disgraceful way 
as Malthus demanded; but the population growth has been comparatively small, in Germany 
for example even negative. Herwig Birg maintains a demographic theory of transformation 
according to which the birth and death rate changes corresponding to the social 
transformation of a society. 
The biologist and eminent writer Ernst Ulrich von Weizsäcker also emphasises the high 
correlation of poverty and the increase of population. According to him, this makes it 
evident that an increase in population is strongest where children are needed for individual 
survival, because there is no pension scheme. 
Thus the consequences of Malthusian theory, to make the human struggle for survival 
more severe, is diametrical from the consequences, which – I think – have to be drawn from 
these empirically supported concepts: welfare is not necessarily an obstacle to the reduction 
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of growth in populations, indeed it might even be one precondition among others allowing 
for the reduction of population growth.764 
Hence, it appears to be correct that Darwin is not only directly intellectually 
influenced by Malthus’ and Smith’s ideas, but also by the contingent state of the 
society in his time, which again had been influenced by economic theories. Although 
it is wrong to neglect the differences between socio-Darwinism and the originally 
more optimistic view of, for example, Adam Smith, one can see the point which Karl 
Marx made as early as 1862 in a letter which he wrote to Friedrich Engels: 
“It is remarkable how Darwin recognises among beasts and plants his English society, with 
its division of labour, competition, opening up of new markets, ‘inventions’, and the 
Malthusian struggle for existence. It is Hobbes’ bellum omnium contra omnes”765. 
It could be summarised that Malthus’ emphasis in his Principle of Population on 
overpopulation, scarcity of recourses and the general struggle for existence, and 
also the Smithian optimistic belief in the fruitfulness of individual competition, 
had in many ways influenced Darwin’s theory of natural selection. We have 
worked out the structural similarities between Malthus and Smith, on the one 
hand, and Darwin on the other. We also traced the ways in which these ‘political’ 
economists have actually directly influenced Darwin. Additionally it has been 
shown that they, especially Malthus, also influenced Darwin via ‘social resonance’: 
Malthus inspired the amendment of the old Poor Laws and this was at least one of 
the reasons for the deterioration of the situation of the poor in the 1830s, which in 
turn gave support for Darwin’s belief that the Malthusian principles were actually 
at work in society. 
Darwin transformed these – at least partly more optimistic – theories of the 
‘political’ economists into his own different theory of natural selection. This theory 
then was not only applied to biology, but exported back, via various forms of 
socio-Darwinism, to politics and economics. 
We will show that this ‘cross-fertilisation’ has also gone on in the further 
development of evolutionary theory. Interaction of theories from different 
subjects areas is, of course, in principle not negative. However, such an interaction 
reminds us, like other externalist explanations in history of science that some 
aspects of a scientific construction of the world may be also due to historically 
contingent factors. For example, the focus on individuals in Darwin’s Darwinism, 
has for various internal and external reasons been shifted in the evolutionary 
synthesis. Of course, what is seen as contingent is a function of our present 
systematic position. Moreover, there was an interaction of internal and external 
reasons for Darwin to adopt his theory. Still to find external reasons, which are 
contingent, might also inspire our systematic discussion. Also the method of ruling 
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out criticism of the basic presumptions in one of these fields by referring to the 
other field developed in interaction, becomes suspect. 
Writing on the external influences on Darwin’s theory, it seems correct to 
regard his theory not only as a synthesis of romantic and Newtonian ideas, but also 
one out of Malthusian and Smithian concepts. Besides the also valuable internalist 
argumentation, we – treating its external history – also have to keep in mind that 
Darwin in some respects undermined not only romanticism and Newtonism, but 
also the optimistic and harmonic aspects of Victorian Whiggism. Only in this 
limited sense, Darwin’s Darwinism could be regarded as a form of Whig biology. 
d) God – A Blind and Brute Creator? 
The atomistic Platonism of the Newtonian search for causal natural explanations and 
eternal divine laws, at least in its Darwinian synthesis, finally turned 
against Christianity. 
Darwin banned causa formalis and causa finalis from biology and explained the world 
in terms of causa materialis and causa efficiens. The Darwinian paradigm overcame the 
concept of Platonic, Aristotelian or Kantian forms or ideas. To Darwinians there are 
no necessary morphological types, no embranchements and no regulative idea of wholes 
which are both their own cause and effect. Darwinism, in a strict sense and not a 
Victorian misconception of it, also implies no necessary inner logic, no direction and 
no purpose of evolution – not even as a mere regulative idea. In the Newtonian 
system of matter in motion, there were only eternal ‘atoms’ and eternal laws pertaining 
their movement. But Newton could still think of God, not of an intervening God, but 
of a God, who governs by harmonious laws, which need neither revision nor super-
vision. As we have seen, Darwin had similarly adopted a rather deistic stance, before 
he adopted his theory of natural selection, assuming that God does not actively inter-
act with the world, but acts through secondary causes, Newtonian eternal and univer-
sal laws of nature. To assume that God is concerned with the “long succession of vile 
Molluscous animals”, Darwin thought anyway to be “beneath the dignity of him”766. 
Since Darwin combined the Newtonian concept of eternal laws and matter in 
motion, in a Malthusian way with the romantic idea of evolution, it inevitably resulted 
in a catastrophe for religious thought. One of the traditional proofs of God’s 
existence was the perfection of the world (the fourth proof of Thomas Aquinas’ 
Summa Theologiae, or Paley’s mechanist proof). – How could a merciful, good God use 
such a cruel, blind and wasteful mechanism to create the world? Paradoxically, Darwin 
in his search for certain, eternal and ubiquitous “laws of harmony”767 finally adopted 
the law of natural selection; and by adopting this mono-mechanistic account, harmony 
metaphysically became based on and explained by struggle. The hopeful Christian 
credo “As it was in the beginning, it is now, and even shall be: world without end” 
(Gloria) – if in this context applied to man as well – leads to its most cynical or 
unhappy conclusion: “To prevent the recurrence of misery, is, alas! Beyond the power 
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767  Ibid, orig. p. 36. 
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of man.”768 Wilberforce might indeed have grasped that this is at least an inclination 
inherent to Darwinism. Nietzsche, for example, whose philosophy is by some 
regarded as strongly influenced by Darwinism and at the same time a reaction against 
Darwinism, was forced to believe that “The total nature of the world, is [...] to all 
eternity chaos”.769 And it was Nietzsche, who at least as a diagnosis for his present age 
coined the phrase: “God is dead.”770 
Darwin himself still held a belief in a creator, and even some years after he 
adopted his theory of natural selection he still struggled with its implication; possibly 
for psychosomatic reasons he became ill and finally became an agnostic. In Darwin’s 
theory the Platonic element of Newtonian thought is reduced to only one universal 
and eternal mechanism; which is itself not harmonious, but wasteful and cruel. Hence 
it appears preferable to become an agnostic – to regard Darwin’s mechanism as a 
‘secondary cause’, put in place by God, as Asa Gray in fact still tried to believe, was 
finally doomed to failure.  
If God had created this mechanism, which leads to a purposeless, unchangeably 
cruel and wasteful development, lacking any direction, he would not be the benevo-
lent God of Christianity: in this framework God becomes a blind and brute demiurge. 
5.2 Evolutionary Synthesis – Thermodynamics and the Philosophical Zeitgeist 
The evolutionary synthesis, the second Darwinian sub-paradigm we have discussed here 
(for its internal history  p. 123), was externally influenced (a) in its first phase by 
models imported from the probability revolution, especially from thermodynamics, 
and (b) – more speculatively – by the change of the more general philosophical 
Zeitgeist, episteme, nous or logos in the second quarter of the 20th century, corresponding 
to the changing positivist attitude in philosophy.  
a) The Influence of Thermodynamics 
There is an impressive structural similarity between population genetics of the first 
phase of the evolutionary synthesis and thermodynamics.771  
To start with, both approaches explain macroscopic phenomena by the behaviour 
of large numbers of identical microscopic, unconnected components. Fisher, the arch-
proponent of ‘bean-bag genetics’ during the first phase of the evolutionary synthesis, 
                                                     
768  Th. R. Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population (1798), p. 98, also  footnote 724). 
769  F. Nietzsche, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (1882), p. 109.  R. J. Hollingdale, Nietzsche: The Man and His 
Philosophy (1965), pp. 88-90. Nietzsche also retained at least some belief in Lamarckism. Still, 
paradoxically, his critique of Darwin’s and Spencer’s theory (both more Lamarckian themselves, 
than almost any of today’s Darwinians) seems to emphasise that Darwin still finally vindicates 
the values of Victorian England. Spencer, still drawing ‘a line of hope’ of an eventual 
reconciliation of egoism and altruism, even more clearly was adopting the decadent ‘herd 
values’, which Nietzsche castigated. See also: L. Call, Anti-Darwin, Anti-Spencer: Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s Critique of Darwin and ‘Darwinism’ (1998).  
770  K. Jaspers, Nietzsche (1935/1950), p. 247. 
771 D. J. Depew, B. Weber, Darwinism Evolving (1995). See also E. A. Lloyd, The Structure and 
Confirmation of Evolutionary Theory (1993), p. 4. 
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focused on independent genes in an amorphous, ideal gene-pool, as if they were 
molecules moving independently in an ideal gas, modelled by thermodynamics. Both 
currents mainly draw from the theory of probability to explain macroscopic effects. In 
order to save some aspects of the originally deterministic Newtonian research 
programme the introduction of probability theory was necessary. This was necessary 
for pragmatic reasons to manage the complexity of phenomena which had to be 
explained, but perhaps also for deeper reasons – even today the three body problem 
has no classical solution. 
Thermodynamics describes the macroscopic phenomenon of temperature as the 
average kinetic energy of the molecules in a gas. Similar, evolutionary change is 
understood as the average change of gene frequencies. In thermodynamics, energy is 
transferred between molecules as a result of collisions. By assuming that all 
combinations of molecular motion are equally likely, it can be concluded that this 
transfer continues until a statistical uniformity or thermal equilibrium is achieved. This 
probabilistic tendency, called entropy, is stated in the second law of thermodynamics. 
Transferred into the language of Fisherian population genetics, equilibrium is the state 
of the best possible adaptation, where no selection pressure is left.772 
Fisher’s radical adaptionism was discarded in the second phase of the evolutionary 
synthesis, mainly by Wright, Dobzhansky and Mayr. They, as we have seen, rather 
focused on interaction effects of gene loci and the structure within populations, which 
are now regarded to be necessary for speciation and for providing the variance for 
evolution. Moreover, some macroscopic mechanisms had to be introduced into this 
framework. This second phase is generally regarded as the final realisation of the 
evolutionary synthesis and for a good while it gained almost unquestioned dominance 
in biology. Despite these changes many aspects of the statistical view of 
thermodynamics were taken on board.773 
Depew and Weber have shown that Fisher’s theory was not only structurally 
analogous to the probabilistic and atomistic spirit of thermodynamics, but that Fisher 
was actually influenced by the probabilistic revolution. Besides being impelled by the eu-
genics-driven biometrical research programme of Galton; Fisher – under the tutelage 
of the physicist James Jeans – was also directly imbued with the spirit of Maxwell and 
Boltzmann. In the 1860s and 1870s they had introduced the probability revolution in 
their formulation of statistical thermodynamics. It still needed almost a half century till 
the probability revolution in its mathematical formulation reached biology.  
Maxwell and Boltzmann thought that they would extend the Newtonian concept 
rather than replacing it. They related the phenomenological gas laws concerned with 
temperature, pressure and volume, to the microscopic probabilistic concept of 
collisions of molecules. But, by doing this, they also undermined the classical 
Newtonian deterministic framework and introduced a rather statistical view. By the 
time of Werner Heisenberg, and Niels Bohr, the interpretation of probability changed 
                                                     
772 This far going analogy is especially peculiar because entropy generally leads to a decline of order, 
whereas evolution in this sense leads to an increase of order. (On ‘bean-bag genetics’ 
 footnote 506). 
773 For the differences and similarities of the second phase of the synthesis  p. 127. 
Part II. Chapter 5: External History – From Whig Biology to Neoliberal Biology? 186 
from a mere epistemological one, to an ontological one. Although the models of 
Fisher resembled thermodynamics and not quantum mechanics, Fisher adopted those 
models with an objective interpretation of probabilities.774 
b) The Impact of the Philosophical Zeitgeist and the Development of Logical Positivism and 
Logical Atomism? 
The general Zeitgeist might also have had an impact on origin and establishment of the 
evolutionary synthesis. 
Such a broad hypothesis is of course highly problematic. The assumption that 
there was a general Zeitgeist tends to neglect the differences of various schools and 
countries at a certain time. Moreover, the notion of a general intellectual climate is too 
wide-ranging to be supported here. Any such approach is doomed to be relatively 
speculative. Still, in my view it would be worth neglecting the possibility of more 
general and indirect influences only for methodological reasons. 
Hence I want to steer a middle course; on the one hand I dare to embark into this 
speculative discussion, on the other I want to delimit its scope in several ways. In the 
first place the investigation is limited mainly to philosophy. Other interesting parallels, 
like that of the development of psychology, can only be mentioned775. Focusing on 
this ‘philosophy of biology’ I have had to leave aside whether in this period there had 
even been a ‘politics or economics of biology’: Has there been a direct political 
motivation for the way the evolutionary synthesis had been shaped? It would be 
interesting to examine the hypothesis that the proponents of the second step of the 
synthesis (stressing the relevance of groups) had been motivated by social 
commitments of whatever ilk. (Haldane, for instance, sometimes took a socialist 
perspective.) Moreover, I limit my investigation to only Britain and the US, because 
these countries seem to me to have been the main – although not the sole – birth 
countries of the evolutionary synthesis. Finally, I only point to what is, in my opinion, 
an intriguing parallel. I leave open how these sides are causally linked, whether this 
analogy is due to direct or indirect influences or whether this is due to inherent 
developments on both sides or to shifts in the external culture or whether they are 
mere chance coincidences. 
Firstly, we will return to the philosophical climate which was rather metaphysical 
when Darwinism was on its deathbed. Secondly, we are going to discuss the parallel of 
the atomistic positivism of the first step of the evolutionary synthesis, i. e. Fisherism, 
on the one hand, and the philosophy of logical atomism, on the other hand. Thirdly, 
we will outline the parallel development in the second step of the evolutionary 
synthesis and in analytic philosophy, both advocating a less atomistic and a more 
contextual approach. 
                                                     
774 Paragraph: D. J. Depew, B. Weber, Darwinism Evolving (1995), pp. 243-273. They are partly 
referring to M. J. S. Hodge, Biology and Philosophy (Including Ideology): A Study of Fisher and Wright 
(1992). 
775  See e.g., L. D. Smith, Behaviorism and Logical Positivism (1986). 
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(i.) Philosophy at the Time of the Eclipse of Darwinism 
We have already shown that Darwin himself had been influenced by Newtonism and 
positivism.776 He shared the positivists’ belief in the crucial explanatory role of 
science. Although Darwin came from a Christian background and was guarded (not 
wanting to be recognised as a radical), he de facto established a materialistic theory of 
evolution which undermined teleology and formal causation in biology. In the 1870s – 
the heyday of early Darwinism and pseudo-Darwinism – positivism, materialism and 
empiricism were not only biologically, but also philosophically most influential. When 
Darwinism was at the height of its powers, even psychology was directed by the 
promising prospects of a biological perspective, founded on the theory of 
evolution777. The decay of Christianity, the increasingly indifferent or critical attitude 
of science towards religion, and, even more pressing, the importance of eugenic ideas, 
and the prevalence of a general biologistic attitude, led to a sharp parallel reaction in 
philosophy, psychology and biology: Despite earlier influences of idealism in Britain 
( pp. 95 f.), objective or absolute idealism became pre-eminent in British philosophy 
by the mid-1880s, although some late Victorian theorists still continued in a 
Darwinian and Lamarckian vein to apply concepts of biological evolution (partly even 
in semi-idealistic way) to society and ethics.778 The main proponents of idealism in 
Britain were T. H. Green and F. H. Bradley at Oxford and J. Ellis McTaggart at 
Cambridge.779 British idealism was to some extent motivated by the search for a 
religion and an ethics, “which would be less vulnerable to [...] Darwin” and at the 
same time “nobler [...] than Benthamite utilitarianism”.780 Although earlier, in the days 
of an unchallenged high church, idealism was hailed as a danger for Christian faith, 
and indeed idealism and not utilitarianism finally broke down the authority of the 
clerical party even in Oxford, idealism was revitalised as the remaining promising 
saviour of the spiritual world against mere materialism. In social regards the idealists 
favoured a more harmonious community in the face of increasing fears about the 
fragility of the society.781  
Although philosophers in Germany had already partly abandoned this position, 
idealism gained influence almost all over the world as, for example, with the work of 
Josiah Royce in the United States. 
Likewise different non-Darwinian persuasions blossomed, such as Bergson’s conception of 
life and, later, Whitehead’s conception of processes and Husserl’s pure phenomenology. 
Despite the huge differences between these approaches many of these schools were 
opposed to reductionism, materialism and naive realism. Moreover, communism, 
philosophies of life and pragmatism gained influence in this time. The general philosophical 
situation is, of course, more complex and a differentiated assessment of these schools can 
not be provided here.  
                                                     
776   pp. 168 f. and footnote 655. 
777 L. S. Hearnshaw, A Short History of British Psychology 1840-1940 (1964), p. 120. 
778  S. M. Den Otter, British Idealism and Social Explanation (1996), pp. 1-2, 88-119 (Chapter 3). 
779  The cradle of British Idealism was primarily Oxford. See: Ibid, pp. 36-44. 
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Based on the general speculative and metaphysical attitude just mentioned, Bergson’s 
concept of Creative Evolution in particular appears not only to have played a pivotal role 
during the ‘eclipse of Darwinism’, but also in the re-establishment of Darwinism later on. 
Bergson always stressed the irreducability of the ‘elan vital’ and – although himself partly 
influenced by Darwinism – generally aimed at developing “a non-Darwinian evolutionism 
that made room for religion, albeit not for orthodox Christianity”782. Nevertheless the 
concept of indeterministic progress, creativity and the openness of evolution, favoured by 
this non-Darwinian philosopher, in turn also seems to have influenced some proponents of 
the largely Darwinian evolutionary synthesis783. 
In biology the pre-eminent anti-atomistic metaphysical tendency in philosophy is 
mirrored by the eclipse of Darwinism, which started about 1890 and by particular 
alternative theories such as morphological, orthogenetic and early saltationist 
approaches. Besides some inherent biological problems within Weismann’s neo-
Darwinian perspective, this metaphysical tendency presumably played a role in the 
moral reaction against this radicalised mono-mechanistic explanation of evolution 
( p. 121) and in the promotion of different evolutionary factors. 
During a similar period psychology too was divided into various groups with 
different philosophical and methodological commitments: there were Gestalt 
psychologists, structuralists, functionalists, early behaviourists and various brands of 
depth psychologists. This turmoil certainly had some bad consequences, but it served 
the aspiration of preventing the dominance of a simple psychological biologism.784  
In philosophy, biology and psychology, at least some of the schools were united in 
their opposition; still, all failed to construct a consistent, accepted and 
lasting synthesis.  
(ii) Parallels of Logical Atomism and Logical Positivism to Fisherism? 
In the 1920s, after the First World War, logical atomism and logical positivism gained 
influence. Logical atomism has been developed particularly by Bertrand Russell 
(1872-1970) and – the early – Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951). Logical positivism 
has been developed by Moritz Schlick (1882-1936), Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970), 
Otto Neurath (1882-1945), Carl Gustav Hempel (1905-97) and Alfred J. Ayer 
(1910-89). These two approaches differed in some respects but were united in their 
interest in mathematical or scientific explanations, and their common opposition to 
the endless controversies of traditional metaphysics.  
Although both these related groups of philosophers saw things differently, the rise 
of logical positivism and logical atomism in some aspects paralleled the rise of the 
evolutionary synthetic theory. These parallels are described best with the 
programmatic notions positivism and atomism: 
• Atomism: Although Fisher also worked with the notion of populations, Fisher’s 
‘bean-bag genetics’, as we have seen, is obviously a strongly atomistic theory 
( pp. 125, 184).  
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According to the logical atomism of Russell and the early Wittgenstein we describe 
the world in a language built of propositions. These propositions can be analysed 
into elementary independent atomic propositions, which are connected to 
compound complex propositions by logical operators. These atomic propositions 
are, according to logical atomism, the only real entities – besides logic – in the 
sense that they are, in the empiricist interpretation, the immediate connection to 
our sense experiences. In the atomistic vision of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus these facts 
can be combined, for example, in a disjunctive way, but this component is not real 
on its own, but reducible into its components. “Every statement about complexes 
can be resolved into a statement about their constituents and into the propositions 
that describe the complexes completely.”785  
Not all Logical Positivists or members of the Vienna Circle were atomists, on the 
contrary, they regarded atomism in the sense of a supposed structure of the world 
as a metaphysical view, hence a view they want to get rid of. Even in Logical 
Atomism, although claiming ontological relevance, logical atoms of course need 
not to be chemical atoms. Logical Positivism and Logical Atomism were not two 
totally separated movements. Wittgenstein although officially no member of the 
Vienna Circle, at least for a time, was closely associated with that group. Moreover 
later the Circle engaged in intensive discussions of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. 
Although, for example, Neurath challenged the assumption of Carnap and Schlick 
that basic propositions must express private experience, as being inconsistent with 
the required intersubjectivity of science, most Logical Positivists at least epistemo-
logically also wanted to reduce complex propositions to simple ones, to basic 
protocol sentences.786 
However, early evolutionary synthesis and at least logical atomism treat their 
different basic building blocks as context-independent elements, as atoms, and 
regard their combinations essentially as unreal. 
• Positivism: The synthetic theory of evolution is certainly a highly scientific empirical 
and mathematical theory. Especially in its first phase there was a strong emphasis 
on mathematical formulations of the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium. For both 
theories atoms are connected in a mathematical way, although the apparatus of 
course is different – in one case formal logic, in the other probability theory. 
Moreover, the modern synthesis resembled models of physics ( above). This cor-
responds to the tendency of the Vienna Circle and of Logical Positivists to regard 
physics as the paradigmatic science. The evolutionary synthesis has also distanced 
itself from the more metaphysically orientated biology of the period of the ‘eclipse’ 
of Darwinism. Similarly, the philosophy of logical positivism was a revolt against 
the general metaphysical turmoil and the still-influential idealism.787 If Fisher in his 
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main writing788 does nearly not quote any philosophers, not even the Logical 
Positivists, this, in my view, does not falsify his assumed positivist background. 
Logical Positivism, though also being concerned with questions of logical 
analyticity, to a large extent accepted and even favoured the autonomy of science. 
 
Additionally, biotic and scientific evolution were both understood as two-step 
processes; the production of new mutations or theories was regarded as if they “just 
come from the sky”, while the methods for testing them, the second step, was 
regarded to be “highly rigid and predetermined”.1181 
The outlined parallel, of course, has its limits. The biological and philosophical 
schools are in many respects utterly different, even opposed. Fisher’s topics were 
evolution and survival, Logical Atomism and Logical Positivism were concerned with 
epistemological problems and the ideal of truth. Additionally, Fisher – although 
distancing himself from philosophy – was central in founding an ideologically engaged 
biologistic research programme, whereas for instance Russell, like Moore, was a 
proponent of an ideological disengagement of philosophy, especially a disengagement 
from a biologistic research programme789.  
Despite such differences, both currents in different subject areas represent a 
positivistic and atomistic approach, and (only) in this respect it may not only be 
historical contingency that Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (the English translation in 1922) 
and Fisher’s On dominance ratios (1922) were both published at a similar time.  
Hence, it appears that the growth of Fisherism – despite all differences – was 
externally made possible not only by the existence of the new models imported from 
thermodynamics, but by the increasingly positivistic and atomistic conviction of the 
time, linked in philosophy to logical positivism and logical atomism. 
(iii) Contextual Turns in Philosophy and Biology 
After the Second World War analytical philosophy underwent a huge change, known 
as the linguistic turn, expressed in the works of Gilbert Ryle, John L. Austin, 
J. R. Searle and the later Wittgenstein. This tendency in analytic or now linguistic 
philosophy criticised the approach built on prepositional atomism and on formal 
logic. Still, its proponents mostly did not go the whole way back to adopting a 
traditional metaphysical system. The philosophy which was dominant in the English 
speaking world from about 1945 to 1960 dismissed its focus on the formal (logical) 
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language and only replaced it by a focus on the ordinary language, where propositions 
are regarded to be highly context dependent. 790 
These developments are mirrored by aspects of the second phase of the 
evolutionary synthesis. Despite also shifting the emphasis to more contextuality of 
genes,  the proponents of this phase or wing of the synthesis likewise did not return to 
an Aristotelian or an idealist philosophy and did not advocate notions like teleology or 
orthogenesis. Their approach has been closely linked with Darwinian-Mendelian 
population genetics. They only stressed the contextual dependence – here of genes – 
and, in this respect also resembling ordinary language philosophy, they put more 
emphasis on the ‘ordinary’ observations of naturalists and on the actual situation 
populations are found in. Although the early proponents of the second phase of the 
evolutionary synthesis had published their works in the late 1930s till the late 1940s, 
this way of thinking only gained acceptance, roughly speaking, at the end of the 
Second World War.791 
Apart from this possible influence of the changing philosophical climate in the English 
speaking world, obviously also many other external events may have had an impact on the 
second phase of the synthesis. The ideological disengagement, the acceptance of a moderate 
dualism and an accepted autonomy of culture presumably played a role in its own right. A 
fuller treatment would also need to take the developments of sociology, psychology and of 
society itself into account. 
On the whole, there seems to have been a striking parallel development in biology and 
philosophy even at the time of the evolutionary synthesis, although this theory 
claimed to be philosophically neutral. During the eclipse of Darwinism, and then 
during the first and second phase of the evolutionary synthesis there are parallels first 
to British Idealism, then to logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy. It 
seems probable that this parallel is not only a mere coincidence, but is presumably due 
either to similar challenges in the fields or even to a direct interaction of 
these approaches.  
5.3 Gene-Darwinism – Reductionism Generalised 
A radical “gene’s-eye view of Darwinism” became explicit – after the earlier partly 
similar Fisherism – in the 1960s792 and gained influence from the 70s till today.  
The main biological claims of sociobiology have already been worked out 
( pp. 1 ff.). In the chapter on the internal biological history we tried to gain a deeper 
understanding of what I called gene-Darwinism and which I regard to be at the very 
heart of many approaches in sociobiology. In that chapter we also compared gene-
Darwinism within biology to other Darwinian sub-paradigms ( pp. 138 ff.). Now 
the intellectual influences on gene-Darwinism external to biology will be discussed. 
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The creative, rebellious spirit of the 1960s and 70s made it generally possible to 
break with traditions. In these years one not only sought for new ways to live, but also 
for new ways in which to interpret life scientifically. E. O. Wilson’s war-cry to biolo-
gise culture, Dawkins’ radicalisation of the gene’s viewpoint of evolution, but also the 
somewhat antagonistic claims ( pp. 144 f.) of, for example, R. C. Lewontin would 
not have been possible in the conservative 1950s. Because of these extremely different 
tendencies, it is especially difficult to speak in this time of a predominant paradigm in 
the sense of a uniform Zeitgeist or an approach dominating biology as a whole.793 
Soon even some biologists levelled the charge against gene-Darwinism that it is 
not only warranted by inner-biological support, but that it is also based on external 
hidden ideological or metaphysical commitments. For example Lewontin and Levins, 
former colleagues of Wilson at the University of Chicago, – who are also themselves 
not free of commitments external to biology794 – loudly opposed gene-Darwinism and 
its application to man. Instead of a synthesis of sociobiology with sociology, they 
favoured the synthesis of population genetics with ecology. Against “the agitated 
background of the Vietnam War, in protest against which Lewontin resigned from the 
National Academy of Science, Levins and Lewontin formed the Science for the 
People, and later the Dialectics of Biology Group, to oppose genetic reductionism 
(= mechanism), atomism (= individualism), and determinism (= social and 
political passivity)”795. 
It is difficult to assess historically how far metaphysical or ideological reasons, 
external to biology, were actually central in formulating the gene-Darwinian sub-
paradigm in question, because this area of the history of science is still comparatively 
young. I agree with Ruse that it would be too easy to argue directly, that, for example, 
when the white southerner Wilson talks of ‘slave species’ of ants he is thereby 
showing solidarity with the antebellum South (cf. also Darwin’s Origin). Nevertheless – 
and this has also been conceded by Ruse – it has also some plausibility that despite a 
biological basis for such ways of speaking, describing ants as ‘invaders’ and 
‘colonisers’ with ‘caste systems’ seems to be not completely value free. Ruse in regard 
of Dawkins points out that a repugnance towards religion – in this respect Dawkins 
differs from Wilson – from the outset may have played a role in formulating his 
position.796 But even in this case it seems to me that a closer treatment would be 
needed to decide whether the detectable repugnance is a cause or a symptom of 
Dawkins’ gene-Darwinism.  
Still being in the wood, one cannot see it for the trees. Generally the 
historiography of gene-Darwinism is still too young and compared with Darwin’s 
                                                     
793  Hence I have to stress once more that I use the term sub-paradigm rather with the meaning of 
school and only want to emphasise its abstract character, its incommensurability and its inner 
coherence. 
794  I do not want to deny that the criticism of Darwinism and gene-Darwinism has inevitably some 
cultural or ideological aspects. See e.g., M. Ruse, Mystery of Mysteries (1999), pp. 162-167, 142-146. 
However, here I focus on the external history of gene-Darwinism. 
795 D. J. Depew, B. Weber, Darwinism Evolving (1995), p. 375. 
796 M. Ruse, Mystery of Mysteries (1999), pp. 131-134, 187-191, 239. 
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Darwinism there is not yet an as accepted canon of literature concerning its 
intellectual and social history. 
Despite such historiographic problems I will at least present some hypotheses of 
mine as to what the four main external theoretical influences on gene-Darwinism and 
its universal application within sociobiology may have been: firstly, – and completely 
uncontroversially – a direct legacy from Fisherism; secondly, a neo-romantic urge of 
the 1960s and 70s for interdisciplinarity; thirdly, a tide of reductionism and 
materialism in Anglo-American philosophy; and fourthly, further conceptual ‘imports’ 
from economics. 
a) The Different Biological Legacies of the Schools of Evolutionary Biology 
A continuation of existing traditions certainly played an important role for all of the 
currently opposed theories. Gene-Darwinism continues and radicalises Fisherism, 
which had been dismissed by the proponents of the second phase of the synthesis.  
Contrariwise especially Gould and Lewontin, are in some respects continuing and 
radicalising the approach of Dobzhansky, Mayr and Wright, in their emphasis on 
macroevolutionary autonomy (genetic drift, founder effect) variability and 
heterozygote superiority. They even partly advocate concepts, linked to the notion of 
structural constraints, which were central to romantic biology.  
Today’s situation is even more heterogeneous and the proponents, for example, of 
orthogenesis, systems theory or modified neo-Lamarckism again have their own 
precursors ( pp. 144 f.). 
Here the Fisherian tradition, from which gene-Darwinism draws, is at least mentioned, 
because it is external to gene-Darwinism; all the same it is internal in respect to the history 
of biology as a whole. Thus these influences are discussed more extensively in the chapter 
on internal history of biology ( pp. 138 f.). 
b) A Misled Neo-Romantic Aspiration for Unification and Interdisciplinarity 
A force which might have influenced sociobiology, gene-Darwinism and their wide 
application was a (possibly misled) let us say ‘romantic’ aspiration for unification and 
interdisciplinarity, present in the new Zeitgeist of the 1960s and 70s. 
There are of course many different ways as to how one may describe the spirit of 
the rebellious youth of 1960s and 70s. For example, one may argue that at this time a 
materialist revolt of the body and sexuality against culture took place; or, the other 
way round, that it was a revolt of an authentic spirituality against the materialism ‘after 
the gold rush’ of the 1950s. 
Even if we would assume that the student movement has been incarnated in the critical 
theory of H. Marcuse, M. Horkheimer and Th. Adorno – a blend out of Hegelian, Marxist 
and Freudian thoughts – things do not get much easier. 
This general ambivalence appears to be mirrored by the flourishing of a wide range of 
directions in biology. The easiest plausible way to link these two sides, would be 
simply to link on the one hand gene-Darwinism, as the reductionist core of present 
sociobiology, to the materialistic aspect; and on the other hand the new introduction 
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of some tenets of romantic biology to the generally rather non-materialistic aspects of 
that time. Such a description may be valid as a rule of thumb, but I think the mapping 
of these approaches could not be done as simply as this.  
Here we are concerned with the external background especially of 
gene-Darwinism. Gene-Darwinism as we have shown is clearly a quite reductionist 
and materialist position,797 but I am going to argue in the present section, that in 
certain ways it has also been influenced by what we may call the romantic aspects of 
the 1960s and 70s. 
The much more obvious thesis, that gene-Darwinism is linked to reductionism and 
materialism, is discussed in the next section. Actually we will not discuss this tendency 
as an aspect of the Zeitgeist, because it is easier to pinpoint a parallel to the 
development of the academic Anglo-American mainstream philosophy of that time 
( pp. 197). 
But before, my less intuitive hypothesis will be developed that the romantic 
aspects of the movement of the 1960s and 70s paradoxically influenced gene-
Darwinism and not only its quite diverse biological antitheses (from a strictly romantic 
morphological approach, to something like Lewontin’s materialist approach of 
dialectical biology). It will become clear that the current opposition of these two 
directions does not need to imply a complete historical isolation of each of them. If 
such a view on this matter would be supported by further evidence, this would parallel 
the recent acknowledgement that the non-romantic mechanistic account of Darwin 
owed something to romantic biology ( pp. 163).  
I will now outline how three attitudes of the movement of the 1960s and 70s 
resembled the metaphysical commitments we have found central for the original 
romantic science ( pp. 82 f.): i. e. an organic and not mechanistic approach, a 
dynamic rather than static approach to society and science, and – here of most 
importance – an aspiration of unification and interdisciplinarity. 
(1) The movement of the 1960s and 70s, like romanticism at the turn of the 19th 
century, could be regarded as a revolt of feeling and freedom against the sole 
predominance of a mechanistic rationality. This movement was at least ambivalent 
towards the enlightenment, which in its positivist disenchanted form, tends to 
undermine its own originally liberating aspects, neglecting ethical concerns and being 
dominated by a cold exploitive manipulative ‘instrumental rationality’ 
(Zweckrationalität), which rigidly serves only self-preservation as the remaining 
absolute overriding goal.798 
The 1960s and 70s aspired a more holistic or organic understanding of the world – 
often also inspired by East Asian religions, like Buddhism – and contrasted its own 
intellectual desires to the alienating, individualist and capitalist ‘Western rationality’.  
This aspect of the 1960s/70s rather seems to be at odds with gene-Darwinism, 
which even tries to treat moral behaviour in terms of mathematical formulas and 
                                                     
797   pp. 138 f., but see also pp. 255 f. 
798  M. Horkheimer, Th. W. Adorno, Dialektik der Aufklärung (1947/1988). This book is not a 
rejection of enlightenment, but it is argued that enlightenment needs to be protected and 
enlightened about its own inherent barbarian tendencies. 
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which compared to an economic school would resemble a totally unrestrained version 
of neo-classic economics799. As far as there was a holistic non-individualistic attitude 
in the 60s and 70s, this attitude will instead have inspired the flourishing of alternative 
biological movements, for example, as concerned with ecological questions 
( pp. 144 f.). 
Nevertheless, youthful opposition towards the technical sterility of the 1950s may 
have contributed to the setting of the sociobiological agenda. As subconscious mind 
or universal love were discussed in public, the darker and brighter sides of the human 
nature were also discussed under the new heading of ‘sociobiology’, which from its 
very start was concerned with questions of aggression, sexuality and morality. As we 
have seen before, neither sexual behaviour nor sexual selection was a main topic 
under the sober regime of the evolutionary synthesis.  
(2) The political and social movement and the student rebellion optimistically 
hoped that everything was changing, or was at least changeable. Processions of 
demonstrators hoped that the relations between the sexes, between nations and 
between economic agents could be newly invented. The 1970s – despite a critical 
attitude towards mere technical progress – shared with romanticism a belief in 
dynamics and in social progress.  
This belief was presumably one of the reasons why the biological evolutionary 
discourse (in all its different deviations from the orthodox), as the prototypic 
discourse of change, became publicly important and was extended to the social 
sphere. In this sense also the romantic aspirations may have set the agenda for 
sociobiology. Despite this, the way sociobiology and especially gene-Darwinism 
worked on the topics of this agenda were in contrast to the original aspirations. 
Sociobiology and gene-Darwinism had the very reactionary aspect of denying 
changeability and emphasising a given human nature. Moreover the evolutionary 
mechanism were still largely regarded as something external and eternally given. Gene-
Darwinism has continued not a romantic, but mainly a mechanistic approach, which, 
in a lingering echo of deism and a materialistically transformed Platonism, still bases 
its argumentation on almost eternal material and on an eternal and external – almost 
God-given – force, that is selection.800 
(3) Perhaps most crucially, the spirit of the 1960s and 70s was driven by a romantic 
urge to unify the separate. Generally old boundaries and borders, in politics, human 
relationships as well as in science, were criticised. The border of the private and the 
public sphere was threatened. (The private is political!) In some respects the spirit of 
unification went even further than during Romanticism, when it only had led to the 
unification of national states ( p. 85). The protest movement of the sixties and 
seventies was explicitly anti-nationalistic and was committed to the idea of 
international companionship and universal peace. Especially during the Vietnam War, 
it became a movement for universal peace against national imperialism and 
egoistic capitalism. 
                                                     
799   pp. 198, 236. 
800  As argued elsewhere in this work, gene-Darwinism also bears the seeds of transcending a purely 
externalist view of Darwinism. 
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Within science, this urge for unification, the aspiration to join the separate, had the 
consequence that more emphasis was put on interdisciplinarity. Correspondingly the 
strict border between cultural and natural sciences was challenged – and biology was 
close to this border. This border could be seen as a result of the Cartesian division of 
the world in res extensa and res cogitans ( pp. 79 f.), which then had been challenged by 
the romantics ( pp. 82 f., 95 f.). Of course also materialist and positivist approaches 
have, now in a clearly bottom up way, continued the programme of disciplinary 
unification,801 but this quite radical, finally physicalist, programme was often carried 
out in a simplified way (and left no room for values etc.). Hence it has either naturally 
provoked criticism or problematic historical consequences. 
After the Second World War a cultural compromise in the demarcation of these 
two realms again had become nearly universally accepted. Biology worked in a 
Darwinian framework, but was marked by a comparatively ideological disengagement 
in regard of cultural questions ( pp. 134 f.). Psychology and sociology regarded 
learning as a mechanism in its own right and human culture as a distinct strata. ‘Omnis 
cultura ex cultura’ – whether one was a follower of a mechanistic or a holistic approach, 
culture was again largely regarded as a thing sui generis.802 C. P. Snow (1959) referred to 
this – I think basically Cartesian – split of intellectual life into two polar groups, with 
literary intellectuals at one pole and scientists at the other as “the two cultures”, with 
biology now on the side of the sciences. This gap between the two cultures was 
increasingly felt to be a “gulf of mutual incomprehension” and a cause of 
mutual paralysis.803 
In the 1960s and 70s it once more became possible, probably also due to the 
generally romantic unifying aspirations of this time, to question this division. But in 
different intellectual milieus, this interdisciplinary approach led to different results. On 
the side of the arts the sciences have been made an object of the flourishing 
disciplines of cultural and intellectual history. On the side of biology interdisciplinarity 
led not only to a possible increase in the use of metaphors804, but to an 
universalisation of biological evolutionary accounts805 and hence – opposed to the 
approach of the arts – to a stronger acknowledgement of the biotic aspects of the 
human nature. Thus the romantic aspiration of the 1960s and 70s to join the separate 
                                                     
801  Hence scientific unification in this sense became a central objective of modern science.  In 
physics, for example, one aims at a so-called ‘general unified theory’ (GUT) or a ‘theory of 
everything’ (TOE).  
802 J. Tooby,  L. Cosmides, proponents of evolutionary psychology, describe this view as the 
‘Standard Social Science Model’, The Psychological Foundations of Culture (1992), pp. 24-49.   
803  C. P. Snow, The Two Cultures and A Second Look  (1959/1963), pp. 3, 4, 9, 50. 
804 Metaphorical language is normally regarded as a hallmark of romanticism. E. Richards, The 
Romantic Gestation of Nature (1990), p. 131. Although metaphors are actually generally used in 
science (‘spin’ or ‘flavour’ in physics or ‘natural selection’ in biology) for example Dawkins had 
the special will and gift to use metaphors (‘selfish gene’, ‘puppet’, ‘vehicles’, ‘blind watchmaker’ 
etc.).  
805 E.g, H. Krings, a German philosopher, mentioned the neo-Romantic character of a universal 
evolutionism which became increasingly influential during that time, Evolution und Freiheit (1984), 
p. 168.  
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may have also catalysed the new, finally non-romantic, rather mechanistic 
sociobiologist synthesis of the biotic and the cultural world. 
 
In conclusion, the agenda of sociobiology to give an evolutionary explanation to the 
social (especially sexual and moral) behaviour even of humans, has plausibly been 
influenced by the neo-romantic aspirations of the 1960s and 70s: firstly by an interest 
in shedding light on the darker and brighter aspects of human life, secondly, by the 
goal of giving an evolutionary account of these matters and thirdly, by the aspiration 
to give an interdisciplinary account.  
The transformation of Darwinism to gene-Darwinism, which in an atomistic way 
worked out (and altered) the neo-romantic agenda of a unified evolutionary 
explanation of the biotic and cultural world, could in my opinion only be understood, 
if we additionally take materialism and reductionism into account, partly present in the 
general spirit of the time and which clearly became dominant in philosophy. 
c) ‘Naturalistic Turn’ – Reductionism and Materialism in Philosophy 
In the 1960s and 70s analytical philosophy, especially influential in the English 
speaking world,806 turned away from the semantic approach mentioned before 
( pp. 186 f.).807 Instead a materialist, naturalist view started to hold centre-stage.808 
This development is especially striking for the philosophy of mind: Quine 
proposed a more naturalistic approach to epistemology.809 D. M. Armstrong’s 
A Materialist Theory of Mind (1968) or D. Davidson’s Mental events (1970) influentially 
developed a physicalist and reductionist perspective. One might say that the 
eliminative materialism of the Churchlands is a recent radicalisation of the materialist 
approaches of that time. However, such attitudes – perhaps not always voluntarily – 
paved the way for a far reaching denial of inherent properties and purposes of culture 
also influential in sociobiology. 
Within psychology as well the minimalist movement – despite a growth of 
alternative approaches – reached its peak in the years when gene-Darwinism started to 
come into full bloom. Complex intentional activities were analysed as chained 
sequences of atomic bits of behaviour.810 
Reductionism, especially in philosophy and philosophy of science, presumably will 
not only have paralleled the reductionism in gene-atomistic Darwinism, but also may 
have influenced it. Gene-atomism is – according to Mayr’s terminology811 – a 
‘proximate’ reductionism. Another even more important form of reductionism is an 
                                                     
806 In Germany, for example, analytical philosophy, although of increasing influence, was still far 
from being dominant even in the 1990s. This becomes clear in a guide which the author has co-
published with the contributions of 200 German philosophy professors: M. v. Sydow, 
St. Rabanus, P. Steinfeld, Studienführer Philosophie (1996). 
807 Also e.g., A. Quinton, Analytic Philosophy (1995), p. 30.   
808 D. Cooper, World Philosophies (1996), pp. 459 f. 
809  W. v. Quine, Epistemology Naturalised (1968/1969), esp. p. 90.  
810  R. J. Richards, Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior (1987), p. 539. 
811 E. Mayr uses the terms ‘proximate questions’, which asks for a physiological explanation of a 
trait, and ‘ultimate question’ which asks for an evolutionary explanation. 
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‘ultimate’, here functional one, claiming that there is only one relevant existing 
mechanism, i. e. selection. Some present philosophers like D. C. Dennett, himself 
coming from philosophy of mind, take the latter view.812  
As the reductionism of gene-Darwinism in its sociobiological application definitely 
had a repercussion on philosophy, sociology and ethics ( pp. 51 f., 207 f.), it also 
seems plausible that the reductionist attitude dominant in philosophy may likewise 
have influenced the reductionism of gene-Darwinism.  
d) ‘Import’ of Economical Concepts – Gene-Capitalism? 
Milton Friedman was awarded the Nobel price for economics in 1976, the same year 
Dawkins published his seminal book The Selfish Gene. 
It is doubtful that Friedman, as ardent supporter of pure capitalism, had been 
directly influenced by what we have called gene-Darwinism, i. e. a gene-atomistic and 
germ-line-reductionist Panglossism813; but it is striking that both of these approaches 
became popular at about the same time. Leaving aside the question whether Friedman 
was influenced by this school of Darwinism especially, he was unquestionably 
influenced by Darwinism in general.814 Moreover, this approach was equally combined 
with a very reductionist individualistic approach. 
This should not indicate that Friedman himself adopted a biologistic stance: His 
approach did not focus on the reduction of economy to neurology, but he adopted 
the Darwinian mechanism and applied it as the natural order of economy. In this sense 
he could be seen as what I am going to call a ‘process reductionist’, advocating 
‘process-Darwinism’, rather than as a ‘substance reductionist’ ( pp. 243 f.). 
Friedman indeed adopted the notions of natural selection, competition and 
survival of the fittest from evolutionary biology. He believed that increased 
competition automatically leads to adaptation. The general belief in an overall positive 
result of the individual’s pursuit of selfish interests, although purged of all religious 
and moral overtones, goes back to Adam Smith’s belief in the invisible hand and his 
optimistic foundation of laissez faire capitalism ( p. 178). Friedman defended the 
claim of rational maximisation of profit based on the concept of natural selection. But 
the Panglossian belief that natural selection and competition necessarily leads to 
                                                     
812 D. C. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995). But functionalist views, as in the case of 
H. Putnam, need not necessarily to result in materialism. For example, a mental state of pain can 
be realised on different physiological grounds. This seems to be valid even within the machine 
metaphor: Computer programs can (sometimes) run on different operating systems and 
different hardware. 
813 The notion Panglossism indicates a radical adaptionist view, either in a religious, teleological or 
secularised form, for example in Ch. Darwin’s Origin of Species (1859). In Voltaire’s Candide 
(1759), Dr. Pangloss states total adaptationism for teleological reasons,  footnote 818. 
814 G. M. Hodgson, Economics and Evolution (1993), pp. 199, 201, 208 (on Friedman and Darwinism). 
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adaptation – also held by Darwin in his middle period815 – has become criticised 
within both biology816 and economics817.818  
Like Malthus, who had strongly influenced the reduction of the Poor Laws 
( p. 180), Friedman had a strong impact on politics. As the leading protagonist of 
the politics of a highly competitive unrestrained market economy and the abolition of 
almost all government intervention, he became the counter-player to Keynesianism.  
In the 1980s Friedman god-fathered the economic politics of R. Reagan in the United 
States, M. Thatcher in Britain and A. Pinochet in Chile. 
This Friedmanian politics led in these countries to a decrease of the inflation rate, but also to 
an extraordinary rise in the unemployment rate and to a decline in production.819 
Similar to Friedman’s demand to abolish most state interventions, gene-Darwinians 
theoretically abandoned (or at least neglected) all macroevolutionary mechanisms, 
which had before been emphasised by the largely Darwinian evolutionary synthesis. 
M. Ridley, a writer in the field of sociobiology, shows how interwoven biological and 
economical thoughts are: “Society is composed of competing individuals as surely as 
markets are composed of competing merchants; the focus of economies and social 
theory is, and must be, the individual. Just as genes are the only things that replicate, 
so individuals, not societies, are the vehicles for genes.”820 If we also allow ourselves 
such simplifying associations between approaches in biology and economics, the 
evolutionary synthesis appears to be linked with a social market economy, whereas 
gene-Darwinism would be associated with unrestrained neo-liberal economics. 
Herewith I do not want to deny inner-biological necessities, but I agree with Midgley, 
that gene-Darwinism as an economic metaphor is “biological Thatcherism [...] 
celebrating evolution as a ceaseless crescendo of competition between essentially 
‘selfish’ individual organisms”821. 
It has to be conceded that Dawkins’ gene-Darwinism, unlike Darwin’s individual 
Darwinism, argues even sub-individually. In this regard it is even more reductionistic 
than Darwin’s Darwinism, but – although likewise arguing against any true within-
group-altruism – gene-Darwinism at least in a limited phenotypic sense allows in prin-
ciple the existence of unselfish behaviour. Still, its seems to me, that gene-Darwinism 
could metaphorically be linked to the Chicago School of Economics, because the 
proponents of explicit or implicit gene-Darwinism have always emphasised the 
                                                     
815 Darwin had left this tenet behind by the time he published the Descent of Man (1874), 
 footnote 751.    
816 A canonical paper on this topic is: S. J. Gould, R. C. Lewontin, The Spandrels of San Marco and the 
Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme (1979).  
817 See e.g., G. M. Hodgson, Economics and Evolution (1993). 
818  For the differences of this biological and the original economical approaches  pp. 174 f.. For a 
general overview of different critiques of Panglossism  pp. 339 and footnote 816. 
819 P.-H. Koesters, Ökonomen verändern die Welt. Wirtschaftstheorien die unser Leben bestimmen (1982), pp. 
283-300. 
820 M. Ridley, The Red Queen (1993/1995), p. 11. 
821 M. Midgley, Beast and Man (1978/1995), p. xvi. 
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contrast to the ‘benevolent’ synthesis and they regarded the assumption of an 
unrestrained selfishness of organisms as a good approximation to the truth.822 
It appears to me that gene-Darwinism in the early 1990s gained even more 
influence (despite the discussed parallel growth of subversive approaches), as after the 
end of the Cold War also the temper of the age in the West and East for a while 
became emphatically individualistic, egoistic and competitive.  
In conclusion, Darwinism in general has not only influenced Friedman, but 
combined with Friedman’s especially reductionist anti-interventionist approach, it 
indeed resembles the denial of group altruism also present in gene-Darwinism. 
 
Besides the general parallel of Friedmanian economics and gene-Darwinism, an actual 
‘import’ of economic language or models into biology took place.  
The language of sociobiology is interspersed with economical analogies. The 
originally economic concept of the division of labour has already long been imported 
from biology and has continuously been used in the whole tradition reaching from 
Darwin to also Wilson and Dawkins.823 
Sociobiology adopts the metaphors around the notion of ‘investment’, which is 
generally used in its explanations of apparent ‘altruism’, i. e. kin selection and 
reciprocal altruism. Here the language of costs and returns is prevailing. Any parental 
behaviour is now called investment “which increases the probability the offspring’s 
chance of surviving [...] at the cost of the parent’s ability to invest in 
other offspring”.824  
Even more arresting is Dawkins’ way of speaking, for example, of the ‘casino’ or 
‘stock market’ of evolution.825 Dawkins in The Selfish Gene takes an outspoken view of 
unrestrained gene capitalism in which the atomistic, egoistic genes are the only agents.  
However, in later publications, Dawkins also speaks of maximising DNA as the 
true Darwinian “utility function”, which lends itself to an economic treatment and in 
its result is very different from “maximizing the economic welfare of the species or 
population”.826 But “God’s Utility function, as derived from a contemplation of the 
nuts and bolds of natural selection, turns out to be sadly at odds with such utopian 
visions” and is necessarily based on an “uncoordinated scramble for selfish gains”.827 
 
Moreover, specific economical theories were imported into biology. J. Maynard Smith 
embraced the mathematics of the Theory of Games.828 This theory had been developed 
by J. v. Neumann and O. Morgenstern (1944) and as a mere mathematical theory it 
neutral towards different values or even political positions. Nevertheless, its 
                                                     
822  R. Dawkins,  footnote 79; G. C. Williams,  footnote 70.  
823  M. Ruse, The Mysteries of Mysteries (1999), pp. 180, 241-245. 
824 This has been the case at least since R. Trivers article Parental investment and sexual selection (1972), 
where he generalised the notion of investment as it has been used before. See e.g., K. Grammer, 
Signale der Liebe (1995/1998), pp. 45 f. 
825 R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (1976/1989). pp. 55-56. 
826  Idem, River out of Eden (1995), pp. 106-107, 118. 
827  Ibid, pp. 121-122. 
828  See especially: J. Maynard Smith, Evolution and the Theory of Games (1982). 
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application normally presupposes certain metaphysical commitments: especially the 
validity of the axiom of entity egoism has to be assumed on a certain basic level of 
explanation.829 
Maynard Smith himself has cautiously speculated about connections between his 
increasingly reductionist theoretical approach and his political increasingly critical attitude 
towards Marxism.830  
Generally game theory is at least in its simple applications concerned with basically 
competitive ‘games’, or more generally, with conflicts.831 A mathematical theory only 
can be applied if its axioms are applicable. The axiom of entity egoism, here the 
egoistic goal to win a game, is no doubt usually valid in cases like roulette or checkers 
(where the rules of the game normally make players fulfil these axioms). For gene-
Darwinism, where the principle of entity egoism is assumed to work on the level of 
single genes, it of course appears consistent to introduce this principle on the gene-
level. But this is not self evident and needs a theoretical and empirical discussion. A 
cautious application of game theory may indeed shed light even on the evolution of 
morals,832 but it should be realised that supporters of the evolutionary synthesis, like 
E. Mayr, would, for example, not have taken the axiom of gene egoism as a default 
explanation. In their view the burden of proof in the unit of selection debate would 
rest rather on the selfish gene approach than on the population approach 
( pp. 127 f.). 
Although the incorporation of economical models has no doubt enhanced the 
complexity of sociobiology, still the basic question which the philosopher in particular 
has to pose, is whether the principles on which this edifice is build are always 
applicable – this means whether they are true, useful and ethical ( pp. 243 f.). 
Sociobiology, in its radical version, claims that models of game theory can also 
explain human moral behaviour. But it is highly problematic, whether the axiom of total 
entity egoism – either on the level of the gene or on the level of the individual – is in 
particular always applicable to human moral behaviour. It totally neglects the fact that 
humans appear to be able to act morally, not only because it is from time to time also 
profitable, but because it is good. Game theorists may translate this into their 
language. ‘Entity egoism’ does not always have to be a valid axiom. The pay-off for 
humans can sometimes lie not in the maximisation of their own profit, but in being 
intrinsically moral, that is in following an external end in itself. Expressed in different 
words closer to traditional philosophy we may say, that the essence of being human – 
                                                     
829  However, without having worked on Maynard Smith’s account in detail, I think that his concept 
of evolutionarily stable strategies may well be interpreted to transcend gene-atomism in its most 
austere sense;  pp. 39 f.  
830 J. Maynard Smith, Shaping Life (1998), p. 43, 45. 
831 A. J. Jones, Game Theory: Mathematical Modes of Conflict (1980). (Actually Neumann and 
Morgenstern also treated co-operative games, but they are more complicated and are less often 
found in the evolutionary literature.) 
832  E.g., M. Schefczyk, Die Evolution der Kooperation: Perspektiven und Grenzen spieltheoretischer Modelle 
(1996). 
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which is indeed not always realised – is to live not only to survive, but to live to be 
good ( pp. 418 f.). 
Whether such a critique is theoretically possible will be discussed at length in the 
last Part IV.  
5.4 Summary: Biology as ‘Geisteswissenschaft’? 
In the current Chapter 5 of Part II on the external history of Darwinism, it became 
clear that all Darwinian sub-paradigms, we had distinguished in biological respects in 
Chapter 4, have also been externally influenced by the intellectual developments of 
their time. These influences reach from the application of theoretical tools of other 
disciplines, over a striking parallel to the mainstream development in philosophy, to 
an interaction for example with economic theories and commitments.  
First, theoretical or mathematical tools had been adopted from other disciplines. 
For example, concepts of the ‘probability revolution’, partly developed in 
thermodynamics, with some relay had been applied to what I have called the first step 
and also the second step of the evolutionary synthesis. Another example would be the 
mathematical theory of games applied in present sociobiology. 
Secondly, we have worked out that the rise and fall of the discussed Darwinian 
sub-paradigms has in some central respects been paralleled by the development 
mainstream philosophy at least in the English speaking world: Darwin’s Darwinism – 
compared with earlier romantic or essentialist biologist – already mirrors the 
increasingly secularised theism of universal laws of nature dominating his time more 
and more and the rise of positivism, materialism and mechanicism. Moreover, his 
individualism could also be found in utilitarian approaches at about that time. 
Correspondingly the decline of Darwinism at the turn of the century is paralleled by a 
bloom of idealist philosophy. Another tide of a much more technical Darwinism 
corresponds also another tide of positivism in philosophy, now logical positivism. But 
above these bold parallels in the climate of philosophy and biology there are also 
further more detailed parallels. We have worked out that strict logical atomism in 
philosophy has been paralleled by Fisherism in biology. Fisherism, the first step of the 
evolutionary synthesis, also treated genes in a gene-pool in a very atomistic way. 
Because of this Mayr dubbed this school ‘bean bag genetics’. As the second, final 
phase of the evolutionary synthesis differs from the first one mainly in its 
acknowledgement of genetic context and of the evolutionary importance of naturally 
observable groups, we analogously find the ‘linguistic turn’ away from propositional 
atomism towards ordinary contextual language in the mainstream of analytical 
philosophy. Gene-Darwinism in its radicalised revival of Fisherian genetic atomism is 
then paralleled by the increasing influence of materialism and reductionism in the 
philosophy of that time. Matters are not quite as simple as described here – for 
example, it might paradoxically be the rather romantic aspect of the 1960s and 70s 
which was interested in interdisciplinarity and which finally has contributed to the 
generalisation of the atomistic approach of Gene-Darwinism. Moreover, I only have 
shown general parallels of the biological or philosophical climate, without elaborating 
how these parallel developments actually have influenced each other.  
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Thirdly, we have found interactions of biological thought, in particular with 
economics. Darwin was influenced by Malthus and in turn has influenced economical 
thought. Further I think we have shown that gene-Darwinism, not only imports 
economic ideas and often uses economic language, but, at least as a metaphor, depicts 
the world in Friedmanian terms of unrestrained neo-‘liberalism’. 
It is difficult for a historian of science – and especially if he originally is a 
philosopher – to simplify these much more complex interactions in an adequate way. 
Although this is not the only concern of this work, I hope to have taken enough care 
in this chapter to substantiate the claim that in any discussion of the biological 
paradigms, more may be a topic of discussion than isolated biological questions.  
I am the last one who would want to deny that there are inner-biological 
necessities and inner-biological evidence. Moreover I am fully in awe of and respect of 
the scientific enterprise of creating objective and culturally neutral knowledge!  
But in fundamental disputes of biology and other sciences, it is not only ethical 
implications which have to be considered. Even in regard of the very premises of the 
theory in question, much more may be at stake than mere inner-biological or inner-
scientific assumptions. I think we should not simply claim that all science is ideology – 
in its worst or best sense. In some aspects it is ideology, in others it is not. But anyone 
who wants to claim that a specific theory is to a certain extent based on ideological 
commitments firstly has to take on the painstaking work of disentangling its internal 
and external history, secondly has to show alternative theoretical options and thirdly 
has to argue why these scientific theories and their corresponding background 
ideologies have to be preferred. 
Nevertheless, particularly in basic controversies or in phases of a scientific revolu-
tion, even science is and has to be also partly a Geisteswissenschaft, a cultural science, an 
art. With such an intention the label ‘sociobiology’ would indeed get a new meaning. 
Based on the shown interactions with other subject areas it became apparent, that non-
biological disciplines also employ Darwinian processes as theoretical core. We will in the 
following part embark into the search for a metaphysics of process-Darwinism build out of 
theories found in different subject areas.  
 
Part III: Universal Darwinism 
“Some indeed attribute our Heaven and all the worlds to chance happenings,  





In this part the philosophical position of Universal Darwinism will be developed. 
I will provide evidence for the claim that Darwinism, as special kind of Evolutionism, 
has already conquered many areas of the academic and popular world-view. I will 
explain some of the (often implicit) philosophical arguments which seem to support 
this approach. 
In Chapter 6 I am going to outline the metaphysics, the basic conceptual structure, 
of Universal Darwinism. I shall distinguish two types of Universal Darwinism, 
Biologistic Darwinism with the prototypic example of gene-Darwinism, and Process-
Darwinism, which is not biologistic but still only based on Darwinian processes. 
In Chapter 7 an outline of the ‘phenomenology’ of universal Darwinism will be 
given. Actual theories from different subject areas will be described, which make an 
exclusive use of Darwinian Processes and which thus could be regarded as building 
blocks of process-Darwinism. Our historical treatment of the interrelations of 
Darwinism with other academic disciplines builds the basis of this systematic 
treatment of theories with a process-Darwinian core. 
For example trial-and-error-psychology – albeit build as a protective dike against Darwinian 
biologism – could be regarded as an approach built around a Darwinian process. Moreover 
falsificationism, a predominant theory of scientific justification, or aspects of neoliberal 
economic theory share structural similarities with Darwinism. The concepts of trial and 
error, conjecture and refutation, mutation and selection may serve as a possible basis for an 
ideology of universal Process Darwinism. 
Since gene-Darwinism has been treated earlier as a phenomenon and as abstract 
theory, both chapters of this part will mainly focus on the development of process-
Darwinism. 
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At the beginning of the third millennium after Christ the theory of the concept of 
the survival of the fittest, whether one follows gene-Darwinism or process-
Darwinism, is almost as ubiquitous as the concept of ‘God’ was 1000 years ago. 
The development of universal Darwinism will be a prerequisite for its partial 
criticism in Part IV of this work. 
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Chapter 6: 
Darwinian Metaphysics –   
Biologistic and Process-Darwinism 
In this chapter we are concerned with Darwinism as metaphysics, because, firstly, the 
theories in question claim relevance for many (if not all) subject areas and secondly 
because they are abstract and not directly affected by experience or empirical tests. 
They will shape the implicit premises of empirical hypotheses, but as part of a 
complex theoretical system they will neither be directly verified nor falsified. 
Nevertheless these concepts could be made the object of a rational discussion both 
within special sciences and within philosophy in general. 
There are two types of ‘Universal Darwinism’.833 I am going to call them ‘Biologistic 
Darwinism’ and (Universal) ‘Process-Darwinism’.834  
To define these terms it is necessary to distinguish between substances and processes. 
This distinction mirrors not only the subject-predicate or noun-verb distinction of 
most languages, but is an almost ubiquitous aspect of (Western) common-sense 
ontology. The substance-process distinction is historically based on the traditional 
conceptual antagonism betweem being – defined as an antithesis of becoming 
(Parmenides) – and becoming – defined as an antithesis of being (Heraclitus).835 
Today this distinction is, par example, inherent in evolutionary biology on the one 
hand in the words ‘genes’ and ‘species’ and on the other hand in the words ‘natural 
selection’ and ‘genetic drift’. 
Instead of ‘becoming’ I am using the specific term process which normally refers to 
ordered forms of becoming, because here we are interested in explanations; and 
explanations by definition are always concerned with some form of order. 
I am using the specific term substance as an antonym of ‘becomings’, because the 
possible alternative general notions ‘being’ or ‘entity’ (ens) are in their broad sense also 
used to include becomings.  
Nevertheless the term substance carries two problems with it. Firstly substance is often 
understood in the sense of essence, which is not necessarily opposed to process but rather to 
accidentia. Indeed we may think of an essential process. The essential process of Darwinism, for 
                                                     
833 The term ‘Universal Darwinism’ is used by R. Dawkins, Universal Darwinism (1983) and e.g., by 
H. Plotkin, Darwin Machines and the Nature of Knowledge (1994/1995), pp. 59 ff. 
834 Within the specific area of evolutionary epistemology M. Bradie in Asserting Evolutionary Epistemology 
(1986) proposed a different distinction. He proposed the two classes of ‘Evolutionary 
Epistemology of Mechanisms’ and of ‘Evolutionary Epistemology of Theories’. Roughly 
speaking the former term corresponds to Biologistic Darwinism and the latter to Process 
Darwinism. This distinction has been adopted e.g., by W. Bechtel, Towards Making Evolutionary 
Epistemology into a Truly Naturalised Epistemology (1990). I do introduce a different terminology, 
firstly, to denote specifically Darwinian approaches, secondly, not to be limited to epistemology 
and thirdly, because the term ‘mechanism’ in the present context would misleadingly refer to an 
approach based on processes instead to a biologistic approach.. 
835  See: J. Mittelstrass, Werden (1996), p. 659. ( pp. 70 f.). 
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example, is natural selection. Similarly, essence traditionally implies lastingness. But 
processes may be lasting as well, following e. g. Newtonian physics both substances and 
processes are regarded to be eternal. Hence substance understood as essence is not always 
opposed to the notion of a process. 
Secondly, substance in its modern meaning has a connotation associated with a 
materialist atomistic ontology. In this sense the substance of a table is not its ‘tableness’, but 
exclusively its causa materialis, its constituting matter, i. e. wood, a mixture of water and 
certain carbohydrates – finally its constituting elementary particles.  
Here the term ‘substance’ should only be understood as antonym of process and 
therefore should imply neither an essentialist nor a materialist metaphysics. Substance 
should, for example, denote atoms, chairs, duck-rabbits, minds or theories, whereas 
gravity, natural selection or the event of running can be considered as processes or 
forces causing processes. 
Employing the existing antagonism between being and becoming for descriptive 
reasons should not imply that I advocate its metaphysical truth. On the contrary, I 
rather sympathise with the position of process philosophy that ‘an actual entity is a 
process’. It might turn out that the being of ‘things’ is identical with the being of 
processes and vice versa that the being of processes is identical with the being of 
things.836 But based on the substance-process distinction we could subsequently 
understand biologistic Darwinism and process Darwinism more explicitly as specific 
Darwinian cases of two more general types of Reductionism. 
Subsequently I will not distinguish between reductionism and ‘eliminativism’. For simplicity 
reasons I shall also not always distinguish between reduction of theories and reduction of 
entities. Reduction in the present work is normally used in the sense of what I shall call 
‘downward reduction’, corresponding to the intentions of the physicalist research programme 
( pp. 245 f.). 
Biologistic Darwinism is a Darwinian form of Biologism. Note the difference between 
Biologistic Darwinism and biological Darwinism, which does not need to deny the 
existence of higher ontological strata. Biologistic Darwinism is universalised biological 
Darwinism. The ‘ism’ in biologism implies its universalisation or the reduction of all 
higher ontological layers.  
Hence biologism, like physicalism, advocates a certain form of ‘substance 
reductionism’: Higher ontological levels, psychological, social and cultural entities should 
(proximately or ultimately837) be reduced to biological entities. Mental and social 
substances should be reduced to biotic substances. In this view our cognitive 
‘apparatus’ is finally nothing but a physiological entity, which must have evolved solely 
according to the laws of biology (and physics). 
Biologism is not necessarily Darwinian. We can also conceive a Lamarckian 
biologism, although Lamarckism more than Darwinism may tend to accept the 
                                                     
836  e.g., pp. 333, 363, 405. 
837  footnote 811. 
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autonomy of culture.838 Hence Darwinian biologism does not only employ substance 
reductionism but also an inner-biological Darwinian process reductionism.  
Process-Darwinism should only be defined by an exclusive use of Darwinian 
processes. Darwinian processes the other way round should not imply process-
Darwinism as long as also other processes build an essential part of the ontological 
inventory in question. Process-Darwinism in regard of substances may employ 
substances on levels above biology, but each process finally has to be reducible to the 
Darwinian process of natural selection ( p. 102). 
Process-Darwinism can either be used in the sense of Universal Process Darwinism 
(UPD), which denotes Process-Darwinism as world-view, or in the sense of a 
Particular Process Darwinism (PPD), which denotes Process-Darwinism – the 
exclusive application of Darwinian processes – in a certain subject area. 
Process Darwinism is a special Darwinian case of what we may call ‘Processism’ or 
(universal or particular) process reductionism. To introduce the clumsy term ‘Processism’ 
appears pardonable to me because of the analogy to the different types of substance 
reductionism (physicalism etc.). Processism is not concerned with the reduction of 
‘things’ to lower ontological substances, but with the explaining of all processes by 
one process or one class of processes. 
Besides UPD there are also other approaches which have favoured a universal 
process reductionism. For example dialectical approaches to philosophy either in its 
idealist (Hegel) or materialist (Marx) version universalise the one process of thesis, 
antithesis and synthesis. 
 
Biological Darwinism – like any Darwinism – in its strict understanding always implies 
process-Darwinism (but not vice versa). This is the case because the essence of 
Darwinism itself is the exclusive usage of the process of natural selection.  
Before discussing biologistic Darwinism and process Darwinism in detail, I shall 
discuss the epistemological problem of induction at the logical centre of Darwinism in 
general and hence of both outlined types of a Darwinian metaphysics. 
6.1 The Problem of Induction – 
The Necessity of Blind Variation and External Elimination? 
a) Darwinism Seen as Universal Principle 
In a Darwinian Metaphysics – either gene-Darwinian or process-Darwinian – natural 
selection is often understood to be more than a quasi-physical force, it amounts to an 
all-powerful principle.  
Such a claim can either rest on an “extrapolation” of an empirically found 
hierarchy of selection processes “to all knowledge processes”839 or on logical or 
                                                     
838 The prevailing biologism of the 1920s was actually not a purely Darwinian one, but partly mixed 
with Lamarckian ideas. If a more romantic and Lamarckian biology would replace or modify 
pure Darwinism, this does not necessarily result in an abolition of biologistic attitudes towards 
culture. 
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metaphysical considerations. Examples of the empirical basis will be outlined only in 
the following chapter, whereas the logical argumentation linked to the problem of 
induction will be outlined in the next section of the present chapter. In the present 
section some striking examples of a universalisation of Darwinism will be 
documented, without treating their justification in detail. 
Dawkins has claimed that Darwinism is not only empirically but theoretically 
“probably the only theory that can adequately account for phenomena that we 
associate with life.” Other explanations are “in principle incapable of [...] explaining 
the evolution of organized, adaptive complexity.”840 For example Lamarckian 
“aquired characters are not always improvements. There is no reason why they should 
be, and indeed the vast majority of them are injuries.” Dawkins argues in principle 
against instructivism and in favour of selectionism: “Even if acquired characters are 
inherited on some planet, evolution there will still rely on a Darwinian guide for its 
adaptive direction”.841 
Campbell generally argued that a Darwinian process, “a blind-variation-and-
selective retention process”, “is fundamental to all inductive achievements, to all 
genuine increases in knowledge, to all increases in fit of system to environment.”842 
“Considered as improvements or solutions, none of these variations has any a priori 
validity.” According to him “at no stage has there been any transfusion of knowledge 
from the outside, nor of mechanisms of knowing, nor of fundamental certainties.”843 
Campbell concedes that there could be shortcuts of these processes. But these shortcuts are 
completely achieved “originally by blind variation and selective retention, and contain their 
own blind variation and selective retention concept on some level.”844 
These two formulations of universal Darwinism might be regarded as a cynical 
interpretation of the biblical text: “What has been is what will be, and [in regard of 
processes] there is nothing new under the sun” (Ecclesiastes, 1:9). 
b) The Problem of Induction (Hume and Popper) 
Although not every advocate of the outlined generalised Darwinian approach will be 
aware of it, these claims have a deeper and older philosophical grounding, which has 
to be taken seriously. Besides important empirical questions, the logical core of 
universal Darwinism is the proposed purely negative ‘solution’ to the problem of 
                                                                                                                                 
839 E.g., D. T. Campbell, Evolutionary Epistemology (1974), p. 421. D. T. Campbell, Blind Variation and 
Selective Retention in Creative Thought as in Other Knowledge Processes, 1987 (1960), p. 111. (From the 
viewpoint of Universal Darwinism the term ‘extrapolation’ in my opinion would not be an 
appropriate term.  pp. 209). 
840 R. Dawkins, Universal Darwinism (1983), pp. 403, 404. 
841  Ibid, p. 409, also p. 408. 
842 D. T. Campbell, Blind Variation and Selective Retention in Creative Thought as in Other Knowledge 
Processes (1960/1987), p. 91. Identical: D. T. Campbell, Evolutionary Epistemology (1974), p. 421. 
843  D. T. Campbell, Evolutionary Epistemology (1974), pp. 415, 411. 
844  Idem, Evolutionary Epistemology (1974), p. 421; Blind Variation and Selective Retention in Creative 
Thought as in Other Knowledge Processes (1960/1987), p. 91. 
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induction.845 If any possibility of ‘sight’ is theoretically deemed to be impossible, if any 
possibility of induction in its broadest sense is denied, it will be shown that only blind 
Darwinian mechanisms remain to explore the unknown. 
The problem of induction goes at least back to Hume ( p. 79), who realised the 
logical problem to warrant causal laws like any claims about unobserved instances, 
based on an actually finite number of observed instances. According to Hume “there 
can be no demonstrative arguments to prove that those instances, of which we have 
had no experience, resemble those, of which we have had experience.”846  
If we would adopt an extreme Humean position and we would self-referentially apply this 
view to this claim itself, this claim might be also regarded as an unwarranted inductive 
generalisation of empirical knowledge. 
Although Hume did not solve the problem of induction, generalisation or 
extrapolation on logical grounds, he stayed convinced that human thought and science 
strongly relies on induction and that we actually do and have to regard some general 
theories as more valid than others. This tension between missing logical justification 
and heuristic mental necessity of a theory of induction could be called Hume’s general 
problem of induction.847 
Popper restated Hume’s problem of induction along the lines of simple modern 
formal logic. Universal (lawlike) empirical claims of knowledge, like ‘all strawberries 
are edible’, can never be completely verified on the basis of evidence, as long as not all 
instances, all strawberries, have been tested. There is – as almost everyone will agree – 
no necessity, why we should not suddenly come across a counterexample of a 
poisonous strawberry. But Popper goes further than this: Since induction could never 
have the security of deductive logic, every inductive methodology is strictly speaking 
not logical and hence not valid at all. Hence Popper radicalised Hume in arguing that 
there is no general problem of induction, because there is no induction at all. 
Moreover, Popper has stressed that a single counter-evidence, a poisonous strawberry, 
is – logically – conclusive to refute or falsify the proposition in question. Hence 
Popper – also inspired by biological Darwinism – concludes that scientists in a 
process of conjecture and refutation can and do only try to falsify laws and never try 
to verify them. This ‘logic of discovery’, which as we will see resembles a Darwinian 
process, was mainly worked out in the field of theory of science, but it was intended 
as a universal logical principle.848 
Quine called this approach ‘negative doctrine of evidence’. Evidence does not 
serve to support a hypothesis, but only to refute it.849 (In our more general context we 
may think not only of theoretical intellectual hypotheses but also of ‘biotic 
hypotheses’, i. e. varieties of organisms.) 
                                                     
845 For other central theoretical aspects  pp. 333f. 
846 D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739/1740; 1888; 1978), Book I, Part III, sec. VI, p. 89. 
847 K. R. Popper distingushes Hume’s logical and empirical problem of induction, Objective Knowledge 
(1972/1979), esp. 1.2, 2.26-2.29.  
848 K. R. Popper, My Solution of Hume’s Problem of Induction (1974); Objective Knowledge (1972/1979), 1, 
2; Logik der Forschung (1934/1966). ( pp. 232 f.). 
849  W. v. O. Quine, On Popper’s Negative Methodology (1974), p. 218. 
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In my opinion the basic assumptions of thorough (universal) Darwinism can be 
and have to be qualified to a further extent. Following a truly negative doctrine of 
evidence, one would not only deny any flux of information from the external to the 
internal, but one would additionally deny any internal reasoning or improvement of 
information or, to speak in a Kantian way, any synthetic truth a priori. This additional 
precondition naturally corresponds to the actual historical opposition of this school to 
the Kantian concept of synthetic truth a priory. It implies two additional more radical 
core assumptions of (Universal) Darwinism ( also pp. 358 f.). A denial of any 
induction and internal improvement, a learning process indeed has to be a Darwinian 
process, which in its first variational step is blind and in its second eliminational step is 
caused externally. Only with this additional second justification – as far as I know, 
normally not formulated explicitly – radical Darwinism seems to become justified. If 
we face the totally new and we have to step into the dark and our guesses are 
necessarily blind, the corrections of our guesses will be necessarily external 
( next section).  
c) Toward a Critique of a Falsificationist Necessity of Universal Darwinism 
In the current section I am not yet concerned with a full criticism of the outlined 
metaphysical foundation of Universal Darwinism ( Part IV), but I want to point out 
that this view has not remained unchallenged. 
Kant did not only follow Hume in attacking dogmatism, but also opposed Hume’s 
sceptical despair concerning the logical justification of causal laws. Kant favoured the 
rational a priori existence of a principle of causality. Moreover – in contrast to the above 
Darwinian metaphysics – he advocated the possibility of a (critically limited) synthetic 
reasonable extension of the a priori (or empirically) given.850 
Within a more pronounced empiricist approach, Mill developed the inductivist 
Method of Agreement and Difference which had been developed earlier by Scotus, 
Ockham, Grosseteste and even Aristotle. But also later, within the Vienna Circle – 
already versed in modern formal logic –, Popper’s falsificationism was challenged and 
stood in antithetical opposition to the influential inductivist approaches. Carnap and 
Reichenbach in particular advocated that hypotheses have truth probabilities, 
according to their positive degree of confirmation. 
It is neither possible to elaborate nor to access these alternative approaches here. 
Instead, I want to mention some objections which have been made directly in reaction 
to Popper’s ‘negative doctrine of evidence’, which in the extended outlined version 
could be regarded as a possible basis of a Darwinian metaphysics. 
Quine, who partly shows sympathy for Popper’s way of arguing, also pointed to a 
flaw if Popper’s logical argumentation is taken as basis for a general negative doctrine 
of evidence. Quine firstly pointed out that on the grounds of deductive logic a 
negative doctrine of evidence is not reasonable for existential statements like ‘some 
strawberries are edible’. On the contrary, for existential statements supportive 
evidence is decisive and negative evidence does contribute as little as positive evidence 
                                                     
850  I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft. (1781/1787), B, pp. 19 f., 127-128, 232 f, 786-797. 
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does in the case of universal statements. But because science is normally concerned 
with universal laws, he concedes that this argument might not be a refutation of a 
predominantly negative methodology. Secondly, Quine argued that complex 
propositions with multiple quantification are logically not directly falsifiable. Hence to 
Quine a general negative doctrine of evidence also becomes questionable.851 
Putnam criticised that if there “were no suggestion at all that a law which has 
withstood severe tests is likely to withstand further tests”, no theory would be more 
verified than another one, and “science would be a wholly unimportant activity”. 
Science actually seeks for predictive power. According to Putnam, Popper could only 
argue the way he does, because – against Popper’s own views – Popper’s theory of 
corroboration is a theory of induction.852 Similarly Lakatos argued that, understood 
properly, Popper’s approach – albeit conjectural – implies a ‘thin’ metaphysical 
principle of induction.853  
Secondly Putnam, in its results similar to Quine’s logical second argument, urged 
that theories in fact are not directly falsifiable; instead of their central claims often 
only less central ‘auxiliary sentences’ become rejected.854 Lakatos’ treatment of theory 
development stresses that the core of a theory is protected by a belt of auxiliary 
sentences and hence could not directly be falsified by contradictory observations. 
It is an essential feature of the argumentation of Quine, Putnam and Lakatos that 
in a complex situation – not limited to simple protocol sentences – a falsificationist 
approach is neither descriptively nor normatively the philosopher’s stone. 
 
My own criticism of universal Darwinism in the subsequent Part IV shall build on this 
way of arguing. Nevertheless, I want to point out here that the Darwinian critique of 
induction does indeed make a valid point – although may be a tautological and trivial 
one, which in my view is finally not at odds with inductive methodology. If newness is 
strictly defined as the totally unknown we will by definition not know anything at all 
about it. (This differs, for example, from the situation in which we are entering a dark 
room, where we would still at least know something about gravity and we would have 
the rough idea that a room has a limited seize etc.). Provided that we could think of 
the totally unknown – it almost seems to be a non-thought855 – any strategy to explore 
it would a priori have the same value (this is a precondition for our understanding of 
the term ‘unknown’), and in this sense any strategy could indeed by definition be 
interpreted as a process of blind variation and external elimination. That the totally 
unknown by definition could not be known in advance is true, tautological and trivial. 
Although this true – if tautological – claim has too seldom been acknowledged, it 
is worse that this claim even is more seldom separated from a claim which, in my 
                                                     
851  W. v. O. Quine, On Popper’s Negative Methodology (1974), pp. 218-220. 
852  H. Putnam, The ‘Corroboration’ of Theories (1974), esp. pp. 222-223.   
853  I. Lakatos, Popper on Demarkation and Induction (1974), pp. 256, 261. 
854  H. Putnam, The ‘Corroboration’ of Theories (1974), esp. pp. 226-237, but also see: K. R. Popper, 
Putnam on ‘Auxiliary Sentences’, Called by Me ‘Initial Conditions’ (1974). 
855  It could be argued that the totally new or unknown could in principle not be a matter of 
explanations, otherwise it would not be totally new or unknown. See similar: R. Spaemann, 
R. Isak, Evolution ohne Ziel? (1992), p. 154. 
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opinion, is indeed controversial. Although the unknown is of course by definition 
always unknown, the only reasonable problem of induction is whether the new, the 
yet unobserved, is always completely unknown and whether the apparently new always 
needs to be explored by the same simple blind mechanism. Is it legitimate to assume 
that the sun will rise tomorrow? Such questions opened the dispute on induction and 
inductivists only have hoped that there is a solution to such a problem. Could we 
legitimately claim to know something about what had not been directly observed 
before, could we infer from observed to unobserved instances, is it justified to 
generalise, to extrapolate, to synthesis or – to put it boldly – to reason in a bottom up 
way?If induction supports that the sun will rise tomorrow, it will – of course – never 
have the same degree of security as strict, deductive reasoning.856 Although I welcome 
the fallibilist claim that our (scientific) knowledge always remains vulnerable, this in 
my opinion does not require a research programme of strict blindness and 
falsificationism.857 I am going to argue that knowledge (intellectual or biological 
knowledge) in facing the new is neither necessarily blind nor omniscient; instead there 
are different degrees of sight ( particularly pp. 371 f.). 
Following Quine’s, Putnam’s and Lakatos’ arguments, complex systems of 
(biological or intellectual) knowledge do not logically need to function according to a 
falsificationist methodology of discovery. In the fourth part of this work I shall argue 
that not everything new to a theory (or to an organism) is necessarily totally unknown, 
in the sense that only blind trial and external elimination is the only possible 
mechanism to explore it. I am arguing against the view that the world on the relevant 
levels of explanation is a priori limited to the one and only search algorithm of a strictly 
Darwinian process. I am going to argue that guesses logically, and empirically already 
in the biological layer, neither need to be blind nor to be externally selected. If an 
organism, for example, literally has the capacity of sight, it can see new paths even if 
these paths have never existed before. Of course, this capacity might have evolved 
based on the existence of other paths in the phylogenetic history of that organism. 
Nevertheless it seems that generalisations (inductions) may play a crucial role even in 
biological evolution. The organism may also perceive streets and cars which did 
definitely not exist in the evolutionary history. An ‘epistem-ontology’ which only 
reduces this to old patterns (despite the importance of such an explanation) and limits 
itself to an inevitable blind trial-and-error process, would I think neglect this essential 
tendency for openness to new possibilities.  
Although I conceded the above developed (tautological) principle of blindness, I 
think our metaphysics should stress something else: I will argue that the biological and 
cultural evolutionary process should rather be understood as an evolving process 
itself, whose rules are changing and which may partly even be changeable for us. On 
the relevant explanatory level there is no principle of conservation of blindness and 
wastefulness, but the possibility of progression towards sight. Newly evolved forces 
                                                     
856  I think it was Strawson, who argued that inductive inference is inductively valid just as deductive 
inference is deductively valid. 
857  It appears possible to me that both seemingly apposed positions partly may only use a different 
terminology and may somehow be reconcilable. 
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may gain some autonomy and direct evolution in a different direction. For example 
moral beliefs may direct human, cultural (and even biological) development into a 
direction which is not always opportunistically adaptive, but in accordance with 
religious or philosophical principles. 
After developing the metaphysical background to Universal Darwinism and a 
sketch of my critique of this approach, we now come back to the two types of 
universal Darwinism, biologistic Darwinism and process-Darwinism. 
6.2 Biologistic Darwinism – Gene-Darwinism as Prototype 
The Darwinian paradigm of gene-Darwinism could be seen as today’s most influential 
representative of a theory of Darwinian Biologism.858 
Generally many of its proponents claim that psychology and social sciences should 
become biologised ( pp. 35 f.). Although this Darwinian paradigm could not yet be 
counted as accepted basis for all social science, it can already be detected as an 
assumption in a wide range of subject areas.  
Gene-Darwinism is a prototypic reductionist theory, because, even compared with 
other largely Darwinian paradigms, it continues the reductionist programme in regard 
of substances and processes most radically. 
In regard of substance reductionism gene-Darwinism within biology vigorously 
advocates the reduction of all other explanatory levels like organisms, groups, gene-
pools and ecosystems to only one unit of selection. The ultimate Reality is built by 
single egoistic genes only. Earlier we distinguished the germ-line-reductionism and the 
gene-atomism inherent in such a claim ( pp. 139 f.).  
In regard of process reductionism gene-Darwinism is presumably the most radical 
example of pure Darwinism. In contrast to Darwin’s Darwinism and even to the 
synthetic theory, gene-Darwinism is purged from all remaining non-Darwinian aspects 
and advocates a minimalist Darwinian process monism ( pp. 142 f.). It is only 
natural selection, which ‘drives’ evolution:  
First, processes especially on the level of populations, like genetic drift or founder 
effect, which have been emphasised by proponents of the second step of the 
evolutionary synthesis, are not clearly strictly Darwinian as a process of atomistic trial-
and-error. These processes are clearly less emphasised by gene-Darwinism – like the 
level of population is in general. If these processes are not explicitly rejected, they are 
regarded either to be comparatively irrelevant or reducible to natural selection. 
Secondly, the new processes which paradoxically have been newly advocated in the 
gene-Darwinian parent discipline of sociobiology, are, according to gene-Darwinism, 
finally reducible to natural selection. Sociobiology has distinguished new types of 
selection, especially kin selection and selection of reciprocal altruism ( pp. 36 f.). 
Although – as mentioned in the referred section – it might be possible to argue that 
these mechanisms gain some autonomy, I think that gene-Darwinism regards them as 
mere applications of one fundamental selection principle. Dawkins pronounces that 
we should move “towards giving up the term ‘kin selection’ as well as group selection 
                                                     
858  On gene-Darwinism and sociobiology  pp.  29 f., 138 f., 191 f., 207 f. 
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and individual selection. Instead of all these we should substitute the single term 
‘replicator selection’. Evolutionary models, whether they call themselves group-
selectionist or individual-selectionist, are fundamentally gene-selectionist.”859 
Thirdly, sexual selection as alternative process to natural selection has been 
revitalised by gene-Darwinism and sociobiology. The evolutionary synthesis, for 
reasons mentioned earlier, has neglected or denied its existence. I very much 
appreciate this revitalisation, but I think that gene-Darwinism still does not regard 
sexual selection as a proper noumenon. (a) Sexual selection is normally not understood 
as a new emergent process with some autonomy, but at most as a short-cut version of 
natural selection. (b) Sexual selection is not (yet) integrated into a general theory of 
process emergentism.  
Although I indeed think that the more active understanding of the genes and even 
the proposed or revitalised mechanisms also bears germs for the transcendence of 
pure Darwinism ( pp. 143, 358 f.), I think gene-Darwinism both in regard of 
substance reductionism and in regard of process reductionism, could, at least in its own 
understanding, serve as a prototypic example of Darwinism. 
6.3 Universal Process-Darwinism – A New Alkahest 
Today, the general idea of a universal – not necessarily Darwinian – evolution is 
widely accepted. Nature and culture is described in an increasingly evolutionary and 
dynamic way.860 Today’s physics teaches us that even the structure of atoms, stars and 
the basic physical forces are not static, but changing, unfolding or emerging in time. 
Palaeontology provides us with an account of the changes of the biotic world. History 
tells us about the development of culture and politics. History of philosophy and 
history of science is concerned with the development of techniques, theories and 
disciplines, telling us something about the change of nous. Despite this unanimous 
appeal to evolution, different schools and disciplines strongly differ on how to 
interpret this process of evolution. 861 
Universal Process Darwinism (UPD,   pp. 153 f., 207 f.) is a world-view that 
Darwinian Processes could provide an adequate exhaustive explanation not only for 
biology, but for any subject areas, where evolution occurs. This approach results in a 
‘nested hierarchy’862 of Darwinian Processes.  
                                                     
859  R. Dawkins, Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype (1978), p. 62, also  footnotes 99, 579. 
860 E.g., I. Prigogine, From Being to Becoming: Time and Complexity in Physical Science (1979). K. Gloy, 
Das Verständnis der Natur (1995), pp. 224-225. J. Götschl, Zur philosophischen Bedeutung des 
Paradigmas der Selbstorganisation (1993), pp. 66-73. G. Vollmer, Evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie 
(1975/1990), Chapter C ‘Universelle Evolution’. 
861 Like Darwinism, different philosophical, developmental or selforganisational theories likewise 
claim to have a quite universal scope  e.g., pp. 152 f. 
862  D. T. Campbell, Evolutionary Epistemology (1974), pp. 419 f.; Blind Variation and Selective Retention in 
Creative Thought as in Other Knowledge Processes (1960/1987). 
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I define a Darwinian Process as the process of natural selection in the broad sense, 
which we have already identified as the conceptual core of today’s Darwinism.863 
Natural selection in the broad sense is a two step process371  of blind production of 
entities and their environmental elimination. This algorithm372 has adequately been 
described by D. Campbell as a process of “blind-variation-and-selective-retention”.864  
This definition of a Darwinian process may need further clarification. What does ‘blindness’ 
and ‘selective retention’ mean? To build up a position worth attacking, we will once more 
examine and clarify this definition ( p. 333).  
Particular theories of Process Darwinism have actually not only been proposed for 
biological evolution but also, for example, for the immune system, for operant 
conditioning, for the selection of theories and even in economics ( pp. 221 f.). Here 
Darwinian Processes are dominating particular subject areas.  
Both as a collection of theories and as a general approach, process Darwinism has 
gained influence. Important steps towards UPD have been made by Campbell, Hull, 
Dennett and, in a way also, by Dawkins, who radicalised the biological discussion as 
well as contributing to a two level process Darwinism of atomistic genes and 
memes.865 Lewontin’s notion of the unit of selection, though himself rather critical of 
an exclusively Darwinian metaphysics, has also contributed to the flourishing of this 
school.866 Other proponents of UPD are, for example, H. Plotkin867 and, in some 
respects, P. Munz.868 
 
As already mentioned UPD is defined by its Darwinian process reductionism. The 
concept of Darwinian Processes is regarded to be the ‘alkahest’ – the alchemists’ 
universal solvent. ‘Dennett’s dangerous idea’ appears to be a prototype of an abundant 
application of Darwinian Processes as well as of the reduction of all processes to 
Darwinian ones. Though Dennett told me in a personal discussion that he would not 
interpret his position as radical process reductionism, I would still hold that his book 
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea has to be seen as a prototypic example for process 
reductionism (in type, not in token).869 According to Dennett the Darwinian 
                                                     
863 For our working definition of Darwinism  p. 102, esp. footnote 370. Correspondingly Darwin 
himself was not a strict ‘Darwinian’,  pp. 106 ff.   
864 D. T. Campbell, Epistemological Roles for Selection Theory (1990), p. 7.  
865   pp. 57 f. 
866   pp. 153 f..  
867  H. Plotkin, Darwin Machines and the Nature of Knowledge (1994/1995). 
868  P. Munz, Philosophical Darwinism: On the Origin of Knowledge by Means of Natural Selection (1993), 
pp. 144, 153, but pp. 167, 169. 
869 Dennett and I had a longer discussion in a train to London, after he had given a talk at the 
conference of the Royal Institute of Philosophy at Reading in 1996. Drawing the parallel 
between processes and objects I argued in favour of something like process emergentism 
( pp. 333 f.). Although he denied thorough process reductionism, he was also critical of 
process emergentism. I would interpret in hindsight that he – maybe surprisingly – was not 
convinced of thorough substance reductionism and advocated that Darwinian processes – 
despite being critical of group selection – indeed took place on different levels. Nevertheless, he 
did argue in favour of what I call process reductionism, i. e. the reduction to one type of process. 
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algorithm could be seen as universal acid which eats through all traditional concepts, 
including religion.870 The algorithm could be applied to everything; “all exist as fruits 
of a single tree, the Tree of Life, and the processes that have produced each and every 
one of them are, at bottom, the same.” Dennett concludes, on the last page of 
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, that there “is no denying, at this point, that Darwin’s idea is a 
universal solvent, capable of cutting right to the heart of everything in sight.”871 
As physicalism claims that all entities (substances in contrast to processes) could 
finally be completely reduced to elementary particles, or as gene-Darwinism claims 
that all biological or even cultural ‘substances’ could be reduced to the action of 
selfish genes, process-Darwinism claims that all evolutionary processes – biological and 
cultural – could be reduced to the ultimate processual unit of natural selection. The 
Creator had been as lazy as could be imagined. According to the metaphysics of 
Process Darwinism natural selection is the unchangeable processual atom of 
evolution, and all other evolutionary processes in essence are nothing but these 
processual atoms ( pp. 209 f.). 
 
Dawkins has contributed the general notion of a replicator to this approach, which he 
claims to be central to any process of natural selection. Dawkins has abstracted the 
logical essence of ‘genes’ and generalised it (although Dawkins within biology 
remained a gene-Darwinian). Replicators are “any entity in the universe which 
interacts [...] in such a way that copies of itself are made”872. 
I also think, perhaps even more strongly than Dawkins, that the notion of a 
replicator could be regarded to be a unifying central notion of Darwinism. (Although 
I differ from Dawkins in thinking that this notion also points beyond Darwinism. 
For details  also pp. 257 f.) 
(1) The concept replicator somehow leads to the concept of a evolutionary line of 
replicating entities and slightly changed entities. The notion of an evolutionary line is 
not new and other proponents of UPD have claimed that this is a necessary 
component of a Darwinian process (besides blind variation and ‘natural’ 
elimination).873 But from this it can be concluded that drops of water and planets are 
excluded from being objects of Darwinian processes, because it would be difficult to 
define what an evolutionary line based on replication should be. This is the case 
although drops of water and planets may vary and be selected and even evolve 
according to some law of nature.  
Drops of water and planets may even lawfully increase or decrease in number. Still it is 
difficult to think of them being copied. I will agree that copying is an important emerging 
property. However, a certain kind of evolution seems to be excluded by this definition, 
which on ‘higher’ evolutionary levels may also wrongly be ignored.  
                                                     
870 D. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995), pp. 61 ff.; Es geht auch ohne Gott und Geist: Darwins 
ätzende Idee zerfrißt die letzten Mythen (1996). Cf. D. Dennett, Breaking the Spell (2006). 
871 D. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995), pp. 63 f., 511, 521. 
872  R. Dawkins, Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype (1978), p. 67. 
873  E.g., D. H. Campbell, Evolutionary Epistemology (1974), p. 421; Blind Variation and Selective Retention 
in Creative Thought as in Other Knowledge Processes (1960/1987), p. 92. 
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(2) The notion replicator (almost) entails the two other normally acknowledged 
features of a Darwinian processes, blind variation and natural elimination 
( pp. 257 f.). “In practice no replication process is infallible, and defects in a 
replicator will tend to be passed on to descendants.”874 Differential elimination of 
these varying entities even under simplest circumstances seems to follow.   
I think that the notion of a replicator indeed could serve to conceptually unify all three 
components of a Darwinian Process. Simple replicators may imply natural selection. Natural 
selection may even imply replicators. But I am going to argue that there is the possibility that 
new more complex replicators have come into being which are linked to less wasteful 
mechanisms, which for reasons of clarity should not be called Darwinian Processes.  
(3) The concept of a replicator, at least in Dawkins’ works, is closely connected with 
an assumed ontological primacy of replicators. In the biological context this is 
expressed in his germ-line reductionism, the claim that selfish genes (in his view the 
sole replicators) have exclusive evolutionary reality whereas phenotypes, like 
organisms or groups, are only their ephemeral and epiphenomenal vehicles875.  
 
David Hull in his early writings took a rather ‘organicist’ or ‘holist’ stance and opposed 
the radical substance reductionism of gene-Darwinism. Together with Michael Ghiselin he 
has even vindicated the existence of species as individual wholes or – for short – as 
‘individuals’.876 They proposed that species are no mere (subjective) categories with 
members, but rather individuals with parts. 
Nevertheless, in an irony of history, Hull seems to have become an ardent 
supporter of Darwinian process reductionism. Extending the unit of selection argument to 
other entities than atomistic genes, it paradoxically was he, who gave respectability for 
a larger audience to the claim that all evolutionary processes are Darwinian processes. 
Hull distinguished two classes of evolutionary entities, replicators and interactors. 
Thereby he adopted the notion of a replicator and also the genotype-phenotype 
distinction from Dawkins’ replicator-vehicle distinction (which in turn could be 
regarded as a materialist reformulation of the Platonic distinction of mundus intelligibilis 
and its expression in the recognisable mundus sensibilis). Hull, replacing the term 
‘vehicle’ by the term ‘interactor’, still appears to struggle against an epiphenomenal 
understanding of what Dawkins called vehicles. According to Hull there are two units 
of evolution, one unit of replication and one unit of interaction. Whereas the replicators, 
are the exclusively information carrying entities which form lineages, the interactors 
are units which are interacting and which are selected by the external environment. 877  
                                                     
874  R. Dawkins, Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype (1978), p. 67. 
875 R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (1976/1989), pp. 15-20, also e.g.,  footnote 977. Dawkins later 
extended his concept of a vehicle, The Extended Phenotype (1982/1989). 
876 M. Ruse, David Hull through Two Decades (1989), pp. 3-4, 8, 12. M. T. Ghiselin, A Radical Solution 
to the Species Problem (1974). D. Hull, Individuality and Selection (1980). 
877 D. Hull, Individuality and Selection (1980); Units of Evolution: A Metaphysical Essay (1981). (Hull still 
often uses ‘units of selection’ for ‘units of evolution’. This might be due to the different narrow 
and broad meanings of ‘selection’  pp. 102 f.) 
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New questions arise: How far is an interactor truly differing from a vehicle? Do we 
have to opt either for vehicles or interactors in general, or is this a domain-specific 
question? Although Hull’s position appears very Darwinian in style, it is questionable 
whether his replicator-interactor position should be regarded to be as neo-Darwinian 
as Dawkins’ replicator-vehicle position is. 
In the following chapter we will discuss particular theories of Process Darwinism 
especially in the fields of psychology and theory of science, which might be 
incorporated into larger Darwinian phalanx.  
UPD results in a world-view, where genes, organisms, humans, ideas and companies are all 
at war and fighting for survival. It is a radicalisation of Hobbes’ homo hominem lupus est. In the 
fourth part of this work, it will be worked out, why such a view, despite its simplistic appeal 
– at least as an exclusive and complete world-view – becomes self-contradictory.  
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Chapter 7: 
Process-Darwinism in Particular Subject Areas 
7.1 Darwinian Epistemologies and Darwinian Philosophies of Science 
a) Darwinian Biological Epistemology and Darwinian Process Epistemology 
The two general types of Universal Darwinism, (Universal) Biologistic Darwinism and 
Universal Process Darwinism, could presumably best be exemplified in the areas of 
epistemology or psychology, where both analogous classes of a Darwinian Biological 
Epistemology and a Darwinian Process Epistemology are especially apparent.878  
Epistemology, as opposed to ontology starts its investigation not directly with the question 
‘what is the case’ but indirectly with the question ‘what can we know’. Nevertheless, 
epistemology has always more or less directly interacted with ontology.  
A Darwinian Epistemology can either be grounded on the conception that our percipient 
and mental capacities are massively moulded by Darwinian biological evolution, or 
could be based on the application of Darwinian process not only within biology but 
also in regard of trials, thoughts and theories. 
‘Darwinian Epistemology’ should not be conflated with ‘Evolutionary Epistemology’. 
Although the term Evolutionary Epistemology – with its pleasing alliteration – has 
been made popular predominantly by Darwinian thinkers,879 it would be inadequate to 
equate Evolutionary Epistemology exclusively with Darwinian Epistemology: 
Evolutionary Epistemology firstly could be understood as an epistemology which puts 
emphasis on how the biological or historical situation came into being. Being is understood 
based on its becoming; diachronic understanding sheds light on synchronic understanding. 
In this sense the antonym of evolutionary epistemology would be systematic epistemology. 
In this interpretation Evolutionary Epistemologies need not to be Darwinian but could also 
be Lamarckian, Hegelian etc.  
Secondly, the term ‘evolution’ especially in a philosophical work could be understood in 
its traditional sense, meaning the unfolding of a preformed potential structure, interpreting 
the whole nature by the metaphor of embryological development. In this sense evolutionary 
epistemology would almost be an antithesis of Darwinian Epistemology ( pp. 82)! 
Thirdly, Evolutionary Epistemology could simply refer to the ‘fact’ of biological 
evolution. As long as there is dispute about the mechanisms and interpretation of biological 
evolution this understanding need not to be synonymous with Darwinian biological 
epistemology. The premiss of biological pan-Darwinism is neither an obvious logical 
necessity nor favoured in this work. 
A generally biologically inspired approach to epistemology is not new (whether 
directly biological or only adopting biological processes). Particularly since Darwin a 
number of important thinkers, like Baldwin, Bergson, T. H. Huxley, James, Mach, 
Peirce, Poincaré, Simmel, Spencer and von Uexküll have contributed to such an 
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epistemology; but according to Campbell most of these approaches kept a critical 
distance from a purely Darwinian epistemology.880 Under closer scrutiny I think it 
may even turn out that some of the apparent advocates of a Darwinian Epistemology 
are also not appropriately labelled as pure Darwinians.  
We are now going to outline the classes of Darwinian Biological Epistemology and 
Darwinian Process Epistemology. 
 
Darwinian Biological Epistemology is a discipline or an approach which explains questions 
concerning epistemology by referring to the biotic stratum which is in turn 
understood in a Darwinian way. For the moment we leave the Darwinian aspect of 
such an epistemology aside. The term ‘biological’ in Biological Epistemology can be 
understood in a twofold way, either it could specify the part of epistemology which is 
meant (thereby accepting other aspects or approaches), or it could be an exclusive 
characterisation of epistemology (thereby excluding, for example, transcendental or 
sociological epistemology). 
Biological epistemology, understood as a part of epistemology, appears to me to 
be the legitimate discipline. One may object that it is generally a more valuable task to 
seek other explanations, for instance, to unveil a securer aprioric foundation of 
knowledge, to take subjective phenomena as true starting points, or to investigate the 
social construction of knowledge. I think, as long as (prima facie) such epistemologies 
are also accepted and as long as we also keep a critical distance from biological ‘facts’, 
an acknowledgement of our biological nature is an essential part of epistemology – 
even if it turned out that this human nature is a tabula rasa. 
Biological epistemology, understood as biological characterisation of epistemology, 
is a sort of biologism, which, of course, is disputable. If biologistic epistemology is 
also Darwinian this results in a full sub-theory of the already discussed Biologistic 
Darwinism. Since some sociobiologists have claimed that ethics should become 
biologised, the biologization of epistemology is advocated. In its purely Darwinian 
version this would imply that all our mental and epistemic capacities (like our visual 
cortex etc.) are explainable by their evolution by natural selection. In such a view even 
“language is no different from other complex abilities such as echolocation and 
stereopsis” and “the only way to explain the origin of such abilities is through the 
theory of natural selection.” 881  
 
Like evolutionary theory in general, Darwinian biological epistemology has often 
wrongly been conceived as being monolithic. But authors actually vary considerably in 
their evolutionary assumptions and how far their position could be called biologistic 
and Darwinian. Although most authors of a biological epistemology definitely 
advocate at least a partly Darwinian position, even most founders of the discipline 
have not been as purely Darwinian as today’s gene-Darwinians are ( pp. 142). 
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Instead of developing their epistemological position I will mention their position in 
regard of evolutionary theory. 
Biological epistemology has a long history, at least reaching back to the pre-
Darwinian schools of evolutionism. Darwin – no pure Darwinian in its today’s 
definition – also contributed to this field. Important steps to an at least partly 
Darwinian Biological Epistemology have been made by K. Lorenz. He even 
contributed to a generalisation of selection theory.882 However, it should be noted 
that Lorenz in many respects also took an opposed position to today’s radical gene-
Darwinian view ( pp. 134 f., 152 f.).  
Biological epistemology, then, has been elaborated especially by the philosopher 
and physicist G. Vollmer in Evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie (1976) and in Was können wir 
wissen? (1988). Vollmer favoured hypothetical realism. In regard of the employed 
evolutionary theory Vollmer was sympathetic towards the ‘valid’, and actually 
moderate, Darwinism of the evolutionary synthesis.883 However, it seems to me that 
Vollmer in this early writings was not so much concerned with the differences 
between more or less Darwinian paradigms, but more generally tried to argue and 
exemplify that our epistemological capacities have evolved and hence should be made 
object of an evolutionary (biological) epistemology. Although Vollmer adopted the 
‘valid’ evolutionary theory, he conceded its incompleteness.884 
Another now classical book on biological epistemology is R. Riedl’s Biologie der 
Erkenntnis (1979). Riedl was also orientated towards the synthetic theory, which he 
regards as ‘no doubt completely valid’ but still also incomplete.885 Riedl, like, for 
example, Wuketits, advocates a moderate systems theoretical extension of the 
synthetic theory ( pp. 152). 
Maturana and Varela have also on system theoretical grounds in El árbor del 
concocimiento (1984) rather stressed their opposition to the Darwinian assumption of an 
externally given environment to which organisms are adapting. Their epistemology 
instead proposes a radical constructivism of organism and environment. 
J. Barkow’s, L. Cosmides’ and J. Tooby’s anthology The Adapted Mind (1992) is a 
landmark for the reintroduction of biological evolution to psychology and for 
providing empirical evidence for this approach. Tooby and Cosmides argued that 
explanations of biological evolution had been ignored because of the exclusive 
dominance of cultural explanations in a ‘Standard Social Science Model’.886 The 
anthology mainly adopt Darwinian explanations at the gene level. This is also the case 
                                                     
882 K. Lorenz, Die Rückseite des Spiegels: Versuch einer Naturgeschichte menschlichen Erkennens (1973), 
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for Cosmides’ and Tooby’s own theory of human rationality887, which was 
subsequently radicalised by Gigerenzer.888 They provided experimental evidence that 
participants were not able to test hypothesis in a logical way. Instead they interpreted 
their evidence that participants were only adapted to check for cheaters of reciprocial 
social contracts, as long as participants fears a potential personal disadvantage for 
themselves. This elicited a debate and other authors have argued that the rationality of 
humans in the testing of rules may indeed go beyond propositional logic, but that the 
testing of social rules is nonetheless highly systematic and not necessarily only at the 
service of personal interests, involving processes of cheater and co-operator detection 
as well as the use of a deontic logic.889  
In any case, there is no monolithic phalanx of evolutionary psychologists, but a 
developing field which is rapidly changing. It should be noted that even Cosmides and 
Tooby, in some writings actually opposed the strict reductionism of gene-
Darwinism.890 More recently, Gigerenzer, who continues to advocate an evolutionary 
based ecological notion of rationality, seem to have turned against a pan-adaptationist 
view of evolution, which may indeed be difficult to bring in line with his theory of a 
cognitive toolbox of simple heuristics.891  
The linguist N. Chomsky is also often wrongly conceived to be an advocate of a 
radically Darwinian biologistic epistemology because he has proposed that the ability 
to develop a universal generative grammar is due to an innate disposition. It should be 
noted that Chomsky himself maintains critical distance from the 
ultra-Darwinian camp.892 
In my opinion an acknowledgement of a biological basis of our nature and our 
embodied knowledge is definitely a merit. But evolutionary approaches are by far not 
as unified as they are often supposed to be. Moreover, to replace the ‘Standard Social 
Science Model’, ignoring biology, with a ‘Standard Biologistic Science Model’, ignoring 
culture, would be no proper alternative. Hence, nothing less is at stake than human 
nature and the role of its second nature, culture.  
Some cases of a biological epistemology seem uncontroversial. For example the 
range of electromagnetic waves which our eye could recognise, roughly corresponds 
to the range of light rays passing through the atmosphere.893 Nevertheless, please note 
that even the interpretation of a prototypical and simple example, like this one, is far 
from trivial: 
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How People Cope with Uncertainty (2008). 
889  M. v. Sydow, Towards a Flexible Bayesian and Deontic Logic of Testing Descriptive and Prescriptive Rules 
(2006). M. v. Sydow, Y. Hagmayer, Deontic Logic and Deontic Goals in the Wason Selection Task 
(2006).  
890 J. Horgan, Die neuen Sozialdarwinisten (1985), pp. 82, 86.  
891  G. Gigerenzer, Rationality for Mortals: How People Cope with Uncertainty (2008). 
892 D. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995), Chapter ‘Chomsky contra Darwin’. 
893  G. Vollmer, Evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie (1976), pp. 45-49, 97-100. H. v. Ditfurth, Im Anfang war 
der Wasserstoff (1972/1981), pp. 97-101, Figure 7. 
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The correspondence of visual receptivity and atmospheric window seems to be most easily 
explainable by an adaptationist epistemology and in turn seems to support a Darwinian view. 
Such a result would not contradict my position developed later, because I will not turn 
against any Darwinian explanation, but against pan-Darwinism.  
Firstly, although adaptation to an external environment is necessary defining 
characteristic of Darwinism, it is not a sufficient one. Adaptation was also advocated by 
utterly different authors, like Paley and Lamarck. Even if we accept that their approaches are 
no more viable today, does this imply that Darwinism remains as only option? If our 
evolutionary theory advocated a less blind evolution – and in at least in this respect rather 
resembled Lamarckism, without adopting the Lamarkian mechanism – then, I think, it 
would be inappropriate to call this a Darwinian theory ( pp. 358 f.). 
Secondly, even for example given, it could be questioned whether the environment is 
externally given, a second defining characteristic of Darwinian adaptation. For example bees 
are receptive to a range of higher frequent electromagnetic waves, seeing no ‘red’ but 
additionally ‘ultraviolet’ light.  
Thirdly, biology may develop an improved definition of Darwinism to distinguish 
between more or less Darwinian sub-paradigms ( pp. 358 f.). The fitting between 
atmospheric window and the receptivity of most animals, does not directly decide whether 
we should advocate group or gene selection, saltational (punctuated) or gradual evolution. If 
these theories are not all equally Darwinian, then the given example does not imply a purely 
Darwinian paradigm.  
For the philosophical debate it seems relevant if one may equate ideas a priori, 
advocated from Plato to Kant, simply with innate ideas. If this would be the case, 
Darwin would rehabilitate Plato, while he would degrade Locke. By advocating this 
interpretation, Darwinian and other schools of biological epistemology take aspects of 
transcendental and sociological epistemology by storm. Haeckel explicitly interpreted 
the a priori of Kant in the sense of innateness, Lorenz later made this claim famous 
and many authors have followed in their footsteps.894 Whoever is right, it should be 
clear that such an interpretation is not in accordance with the intentions of Kant 
himself. Kant in the Critique of pure Reason explicitly argued that concepts a priori are 
not simply innate concepts, but – independent of whether they are inherited or 
learned – they are logically necessary preconditions for understanding.895 
 
Darwinian Process Epistemology is the other sub-class of Darwinian Epistemology. Based 
on process Darwinism the ontological inventory of this sub-class is not limited to 
biological entities (substances). Instead this approach applies Darwinian processes to 
objects of higher ontological strata. Nonetheless, in regard of processes this 
epistemology remains confined to Darwinian processes. 
Despite differences in emphasis as to what entities should actually be regarded as 
being real, there is a consensus among this approach that there are roughly at least 
three ontological strata where Darwinian processes do work.896  
                                                     
894 K. Lorenz, Kants Lehre vom Apriorischen im Lichte gegenwärtiger Biologie (1941), p. 99. G. Vollmer, 
Evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie (1975), pp. 91, 126-31. P. Munz, Philosophical Darwinism (1993), 
pp. 151-153. 
895 I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781/1787), B, pp. 167-168. 
896  Similar: H. Plotkin, Darwin Machines and the Nature of Knowledge (1994). 
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First, Darwinian processes are working within the biotic layer. From an orthodox 
viewpoint Darwinian processes are the only evolutionary mechanisms in this layer. In 
this respect, Darwinian Process Epistemology is identical with Darwinian Biological 
Epistemology. Inner-biological multi-level-Darwinism ( pp. 153 f.) seems also in 
line with Process Darwinism, and – although it is at odds with pure gene-Darwinism – 
it can occur as a case of biological Darwinism.  
Secondly, it has been argued that Darwinian processes were working within the 
individual psychological stratum and could even provide an exclusive explanation for 
the heterogeneous mental and behavioural phenomena. Donald T. Campbell, based 
on the older theory of operant conditioning, elaborated that, for example, creativity, 
pattern recognition and visual perception could all be understood solely on the basis 
of Darwinian processes. Later on he also integrated these approaches with a 
Darwinian approach of theory development into a generalised selection theory.897  
Thirdly, it has been claimed that Darwinian processes also were working in the 
cultural stratum, based on to the evolution of logoi or memes, like words or poems, 
thoughts and theories ( pp. 57 f.). Dawkins has proposed memes as general 
atomistic units of the Darwinian evolution in the cultural sphere. In the field of theory 
development other earlier and more elaborated proposals have been made. Already 
T. H. Huxley’s and E. Mach’s views on theory development were affected by 
Darwinism. More recently it was especially Popper and, to some extent, S. Toulmin  
who have elaborated a Darwinian theory of theory development.898 
Kuhn is also sometimes discussed in an evolutionary context and he seems to share with 
Darwinism that there could be no absolute progress, since he regards different paradigms to 
be incommensurable. Nevertheless Kuhn should not be regarded to be a Darwinian, since 
his view of theory development is essentially not gradualist but salutatorian. 
These approaches, as seen already, became more and more integrated into a general 
theory of process-selection. As epistemology it has been stressed that all these 
processes are processes of knowledge acquisition. Often neglected, even the economic 
concept of competition – sometimes interpreted as resembling a Darwinian process – 
has been understood as a discovery procedure.899 All biological, psychological and 
cultural evolutionary phenomena should be explainable as a learning process of blind-
variation-and-selective-retention. As evolution is regarded as a process of exploring 
possibilities, as a process of learning, first in the biotic, then in the mental and the 
cultural sphere, Darwinian Process Epistemology more than other epistemologies is 
conflated with ontology. Ontogeny in its broadest sense is knowledge acquisition. 
Ontology is Epistemology and vice versa.  
                                                     
897 D. T. Campbell, Adaptive Behaviour from Random Response (1956); Evolutionary Epistemology (1974); 
Blind Variation and Selective Retention in Creative Thought as in Other Knowledge Processes (1960/1987); 
Epistemological Roles for Selection Theory (1990). 
898 St. Toulmin, Human Understanding (1974), pp. 394-406. ( pp. 232, especially on Popper). 
899  F. A. Hayek, Competition as a Discovery Procedure (1968/1978). Hayek even mentions ‘a trial and 
error’ process of ‘cultural selection’, The Atavism of Social Justice (1976/1978), p. 67. In general 
 pp. 236 f.  
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In my opinion such an argumentation could be taken as an example for a tendency 
of Darwinism to undermine and transcend its own materialistic roots. Here process 
Darwinism suddenly looses it affinity to traditional mechanistic materialism and rather 
resembles a neo-Platonic, a Christian or a Schellingian idealism, where nature is 
understood as a process of ‘intellectual’ unfolding. As will afterwards appear, I share a 
view of evolution as intellectual process. Correspondingly, how the epistemological 
problem of induction may bear on ontological questions is discussed. Nevertheless, I 
will also stresses the differences of ontological strata and an unfolding of the process 
of unfolding itself. Darwinian processes, although important concepts, in my 
approach are not understood as the final solution to our theory of knowledge.  
Nevertheless an equation of ontology and epistemology raises fundamental problems. This 
is especially the case in a Darwinian framework, where biological, psychological or cultural 
knowledge is a Darwinian adaptation and blind adaptation to an external environment is 
knowledge. Such an approach would tend to dismiss anything which does not aim at short-
term survival, but at sustainable survival because short-sightedness is a defining aspect of 
Darwinism. Moreover, if survival is made the only yardstick moral and aesthetic reasons 
would not be appreciated as autonomous as they should be. A position with such 
inclinations is I think neither true nor – to formulate it in a self-refuting way – adaptive. 
Finally, we should not forget the disastrous example of the Nazis, who claimed that every-
thing is true which is adaptive for the race, justifying an anti-intellectual and anti-religious 
attitude and a racist selection programme. Hence, I think that if epistemology and ontology 
are equated, the further characterisation of such an ‘epistemontology’ would be vital. 
In the following sub-sections two prototypic examples of Darwinian Process 
Epistemology will be elaborated. One is in the psychological and one in the cultural 
area that is operant conditioning and Popper’s falsificationism. As we have seen 
already and as we will see in the next section there are also other ways how Darwinism 
has been applied in different subject areas.900 There is not only a complex unit of 
selection debate in biology, but also one in process-Darwinian branches of psychology 
and of cultural science.  
However, the chosen examples were influential and have preceded the general 
formulation of Process Darwinism by Campbell, Dawkins, Hull and Dennett. Both 
treatments show a different irony of history: Behaviourism, though built as a bulwark 
against biologism, paradoxically adopted Darwinian processes as central mechanisms. 
Popper advocated an actually Darwinian theory of falsification and was led by this 
very theory to attack Darwinism. 
b) Operant Conditioning – Learning as Darwinian Process? 
The conception of trial-and-error learning was introduced into psychology by Edward 
Lee Thorndike (1874-1949) and was later continued under the label of operant (or 
instrumental) conditioning, which was particularly promoted by the American 
psychologist Burrhus Frederic Skinner (1904-90). Operant conditioning, together with 
classical conditioning, formed the theoretical core of psychology and behaviour 
                                                     
900  For different psychological applications of Darwinian processes see: D. T. Campbell, 
Evolutionary Epistemology, (1974). 
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therapy during the second wave of psychological behaviourism from after World War 
II to the early 1970s. To achieve a further theoretical unification it was even 
considered whether classical conditioning, as second pillar of the behaviourist theory 
of learning, could at least partly be understood as being reducible to operant 
conditioning.901 Provided that there are no additional ‘higher’ processes of learning, 
such a reduction would imply that trial-and-error psychology would not only be one 
of many legitimate psychological theories, but only the very core of the psychology of 
learning and hence of psychology as whole. 
In the present section I want to point out three parallels between trial-and-error-
psychology and Darwinism. Firstly, the mechanisms proposed are strikingly similar. 
Secondly, both schools are in a similar respect tautological. Finally, I should suggest 
and subsequently develop, that biology in its future course might – despite all 
differences – take a historical turn as psychology has, replacing a mere trial-and-error 
theory by more complex mechanisms of learning. 
 
(1) Behaviourism not only rejected the flourishing biologistic instinct theories but 
paradoxically also established a theory which in regard of processes could justly be 
called a ‘Darwinian’ theory.902  
The metaphysical or methodological confinement to behaviour forbade the 
flourishing speculations of philosophical schools and psychoanalyses as of 
physiological and instinct theories,903 around the turn of the century. A rigorous or 
even rigid scientific standard was established which made it possible to show that 
based on trial-and-error learning even animals like dogs, pigeons and rats were not 
completely driven by instincts, but could to a large extent modify their behaviour due 
to a given environment. But as behaviourism restricted itself only to the external, i. e. 
directly observable behaviour in a given situation, the internal became neglected. In 
principle any first person account was excluded. Moreover, although operant 
conditioning complemented classical ‘respondent’ conditioning and hence seemingly 
was concerned with a more active aspect of behaviour, this theory was still placed 
within the behaviourist framework of the ‘empty organism’ and was actually limited to 
simple, rather passive processes.904 Despite advanced experimental designs the 
construction of more complex inner mechanisms, whether inherited or learned, 
actually became neglected. The only learning process that remained after the dust of 
the earlier theoretical turmoil had settled was trial-and-error learning. 
Trial-and-error learning resembles the Darwinian two step process of blind-
variation-and-selective-retention. In trial-and-error learning the trials, like mutations, 
                                                     
901 See e.g., J. Bredenkamp, W. Wippich, Lern- und Gedächtnispsychologie (1977), pp. 55-60 
902  This has also been stressed by the recent tide of process-Darwinism: H. Plotkin, Darwin Machines 
and the Nature of Knowledge (1994/1995), pp. 73 f. D. Campbell, Epistemological Roles for Selection 
Theory (1990). 
903  E.g., B. F. Skinner, The Behavior of Organisms (1938), pp. 4, 44; Contingencies of Reinforcement (1969), 
pp. 75-78. 
904  “I do not mean that there are no originating forces in spontaneous behavior but simply that 
they are not located in the environment. We are not in a position to see them, and we have no 
need to.” B. F. Skinner, The Behavior of Organisms (1938), p. 20. 
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could be broken down into small units, which retain their identity.905 A pigeon in a 
‘Skinner box’ which needs to push a button to get food shows a variety of different 
trials in a random way. This corresponds to the first step of the Darwinian process, 
the process of blind-variation. 
It is assumed that any behaviour (here the pushing of a button) correlated e. g. 
with food will be reinforced – only, of course, if the pigeon is hungry or, empirically 
speaking, if it had been deprived of food. Generally it is argued that behaviour which 
has an approximately simultaneous positive outcome is reinforced, i. e. it becomes 
more probable to occur again. The trials which failed to have such effects tended to 
become extinct, like less favoured genes or species. This aspect of trial-and-error 
learning corresponds to the selective-retention step of natural selection where 
different trials are selected according to their adaptation to a given environment. The 
theory of operant conditioning – like Darwinism – stringently advocates that the 
‘evolution of individual behaviour’ takes place in a gradual way and in this respect 
differs, for example, from Gestalt-psychology.  
In the same way that biological Darwinism has emphasised that the Procrustean 
law of natural selection is in a Newtonian way universal and immutable throughout 
nature, proponents of psychology based on operant conditioning – with only little 
reservation906 – have also tended to advocate an exhaustive applicability of trial-and-
error-learning equally for flatworms, rats and humans.  
Thorndike’s approach finally fundamentally resembles Darwin’s treatment of 
phylogenetic purpose, moving the explanation of an adaptation from the future to the 
past and abandoning the original meaning of concepts “like purpose, intention, 
expectancy, or utility”907. 
Nevertheless it may of course be objected that the outlined analogy is not valid in every 
respect. For example the ‘extinction’ of a behaviour is not as irreversible as the final 
extinction of a species.  
(2) Both psychological trial-and-error learning and biological natural selection have 
been criticised for being tautological in a similar respect. 
One of the main claims of the Darwinian research tradition is that natural selection 
leads to ‘the survival of the fittest’. It has often been pointed out that this claim (not 
natural selection as a whole) has regularly been understood in a tautological way, 
because fitness is naturally defined by survival: The ultimate test for the fitness of an 
entity (gene or organisms etc.) is whether it survives. But such a definition leads to the 
proposition that the survivor will survive, an indeed undeniably true but empty tautology.  
To avoid this problem alternative definitions of fitness have also been proposed. 
Fitness for example could be defined by the probability of long term survival. In this 
case the claim ‘survival of the fittest’ will no longer be tautological – but also no 
longer always true. Short term adaptations do not imply long term adaptations. The 
                                                     
905  B. F. Skinner, The Behavior of Organisms (1938), p. 33; Contingencies of Reinforcement (1969), p. 106. 
906  B. F. Skinner, The Behavior of Organisms (1938), p. 442. 
907  Idem, Contingencies of Reinforcement (1969), p. 106. 
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dinosaurs became extinct, and humans try to achieve the same result today. The 
charge of tautology needs to be taken seriously. 
This does not imply that the claim that a Darwinian two step algorithm leads to evolutionary 
change is tautological. Nevertheless, I think that strict (but non-tautological) pan-
adaptionism – despite claims of many Darwinians – could not be warranted. (On the 
tautological aspects of Darwinism,  pp. 339 f.) 
In operant conditioning an analogy to the tautology of ‘survival of the fittest’ could be 
found in Thorndike’s law of effect or Skinner’s principle of reinforcement: “If the 
occurrence of an operant its followed by presentation of a reinforcing stimulus, the 
strength is increased.”908 The likelihood or strength of a behaviour is increased if it 
becomes reinforced. But the explanans is in turn defined by the explanandum. 
Reinforcement is normally defined by an increased likelihood or strength of a shown 
behaviour. The resulting proposition ‘the likelihood of a behaviour is increased, if the 
likelihood of a behaviour is increased’ is once more logically true, but not helpful. If 
the likelihood to be (here of a behaviour) is equated with survival than this claim 
becomes structurally similar to the above claim of ‘the survival of the survivor’.  
Nevertheless, besides their mere different level of application, other differences between 
both claims remain. The proposition ‘the likelihood of a behaviour is increased, if the 
likelihood of a behaviour is increased’ is not the direct but rather the dynamic and 
probabilistic equivalent of ‘the survival of the survivor’. But to use the terms ‘increase’ and 
‘likelihood’ may not make an essential difference and also ‘survival of the fittest’ might be 
understood in a dynamic and probabilistic way.  
It appears to be more relevant that fittest seems to refer to the past, present or future, 
whereas reinforcement seems to refer the past and present only.  Furthermore the 
superlative ‘fittest’ has an emphatic connotation of the very best, which is less so in the case 
of the law of effect. Finally, the law of effect often treats the probability of one behaviour, 
whereas ‘survival of the fittest’ treats the differential survival of different entities.  
If the mentioned differences turned out to be essential, then the discussed propositions 
could not both completely be tautological. Despite this problem, I hope to have shown that 
both claims have, at least partly, to be interpreted as a tautology of the ‘survival of the 
survivor’. Further comparative investigations are needed. 
In the field of operant conditioning attempts have also been made to avoid the charge 
of tautology and to re-define reinforcement.909 I am not going to discuss these 
alternative definitions, but I would tend to suggest that some of them may mirror the 
chances and problems of the refined definitions introduced to avoid the mentioned 
biological tautology. 
 
(3) I finally want to suggest that Darwinism may follow the fate of trial-and-error 
theory to be complemented or replaced by a different paradigm which allows also less 
blind and more complex forms of learning or evolving. 
We have seen that the theory of operant conditioning while denying biologism 
paradoxically introduced the blind and gradual Darwinian mechanism into psychology. 
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The theory of operant conditioning stayed dominant in psychology till the early 1970s 
and often was advocated as a universal (ubiquitous and unchanging) explanation of 
learning. Also in this respect it resembled the orthodox Darwinian claims to provide a 
universal explanation of biological ‘learning’. 
But already while still being orthodox the theory of conditioning – like Darwinism 
– kept being challenged by remaining heterodox schools, like, for example, Piaget’s 
stucturalist developmental psychology.910 Also, for example, remaining Gestalt-
psychologists favoured a sudden process of understanding, an Aha-Erlebnis, and hence 
advocated what we may call a saltational theory of learning. 
Likewise in the history of science there are continuous disputes how far discoveries are 
gradual and saltational. What happened as the famous anecdotal apple fell on Newton’s head 
or as Darwin read Malthus?911 
In psychology much of the external criticism was first advocated in a less radical form 
from within a transformed version of the original orthodoxy. Nevertheless (and 
despite the radicalisation of the orthodoxy by Campbell) as mainstream the paradigm 
of behaviourism and trial-and-error learning finally became replaced by the paradigm 
of cognitive psychology. 
Already Bandura, still rooted in behaviourism, criticised the sole behavioural 
‘adaptation’ to an external environment and stressed a ‘reciprocal determinism’ of 
environment, person and behaviour.912 Moreover one increasingly acknowledged 
further complex psychological entities and processes, like cognitive maps, the 
information content of situations, concept learning, metacognitions and the (rather 
teleological) concept of expectations. These concepts partly complemented, partly 
contradicted the strict assumptions of trial-and-error psychology. Important early 
contributions to an initiation of a psychological paradigm shift have e. g. been made 
by R. Rescorla and E. Tolman. 
In a similar way as after many years of dominance orthodox trail-and-error-
psychology became questioned and replaced by an approach which also took ‘higher’ 
mechanisms into account, I think the biological trial-and-error theory of Darwinism 
might also be urged to drop its universalism and acknowledge a certain evolution of 
evolutionary mechanisms.  
In psychology there is also of course still good evidence of the simple learning 
processes of trial-and-error learning, from flatworms to humans. Nevertheless, simple 
                                                     
910  E.g., J. Piaget, The Construction of Reality in the Child (1953). 
911 Darwin himself wrote of a sudden insight while reading Malthus on the 28th September 1838. 
Correspondingly it was often advocated that Darwin was an intellectual revolutionary. E.g., 
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912 A. Bandura, The Self System in Reciprocial Determination (1978), quoted in H. M. Trautner, Lehrbuch 
der Entwicklungspsychologie (1991), pp. 140-145. 
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trial-and-error processes do not seem to suffice for an exhaustive explanation of all 
learning processes. Learning does not proceed unchanged from flatworms to humans.  
Instead of emphasising a mere paradigm shift from behaviourism to cognitive 
psychology, it would be preferable to stress that the current paradigm partly encloses 
older approaches and advocates the unfolding of mechanisms which indeed finally 
necessitate an almost opposed approach to learning.  
In 1949 Harlow already had shown that rhesus monkeys could ‘learn the learning’ 
and acquire new learning mechanisms transferable to other situations. The learning of 
a discrimination task at first proceeded gradually, but the monkeys in later 
experimental series showed that they had aquired the ability to solve a problem 
suddenly ‘by insight’. Stressing insightful behaviour – now clearly interpreted as 
learned – has to be interpreted as rehabilitation of the Gestalt-psychologist Köhler.913 
However, here the apparent change of the learning process itself is remarkable.  
Kendler and Kendler have subsequently shown that young children more easily 
learn to identify a second concept if only a few properties of that concept are changed 
and not a full reversal shift of all properties is required; the converse is true for older 
children.914 Whereas the learning of younger children appears to be consistent with 
ordinary conditioning theory, the learning of older children appears to require an 
additional theory of mediation, which is maybe based on, but is not, I think, reducible 
to this original theory. It has also been shown that not all animals that could be 
conditioned are capable of such reversal learning; for example M. E. Bittermann has 
shown recently that some species of fish are not capable of reversal learning. 
If such a perspective of an unfolding manifold of learning mechanisms were 
extended to all acknowledged mechanisms of cognitive psychology (in a way in part 
opposed to the original behaviourist concepts), the theory of universal trial-and-error 
learning would not be replaced but transcended by a theory of the learning of 
learning. Trial-and-error-mechanisms may be existing simple learning mechanisms, 
but this would not be the end, but the beginning of a theory of learning. In the further 
course of this work I am going to argue that biological Darwinism might be similarly 
transcended by a more truly evolutionary metaphor of the evolution of evolutionary 
mechanisms ( pp. 363 f.). 
c) Popper’s Falsificationism – Science as Darwinian Process? 
Sir Karl Raimund Popper’s (1902-1994) falsification theory of knowledge in some 
respects resembles a Darwinian process. The process of conjecture and refutation 
turns out to be a process of blind-variation-and-selective-retention. 
Apart from Popper’s approach other recent metascientific works are also based on a metaphor of 
biological evolution. According to Toulmin scientific disciplines evolve like biological 
species. But I think closer scrutiny shows that the biological analogy to Toulmin’s approach 
would rather be Lamarckism than Darwinism. Richards who, in the wake of Campbell, 
proposes a selectionist view for the historiography of science, only uses Darwinism as a 
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loose analogy. In my understanding his metaphor would have to be located somewhere 
between what I call Lamarckism and Darwinism.915 
Basing his position on the Humean problem of induction, Popper in Logik der 
Forschung (1934) criticised the prevailing view that science is fundamentally 
inductive.916 Alternatively he advocated his theory of falsification, based on the logical 
argument that strictly one contradiction could prove a theory to be wrong, whereas no 
theory could ever be totally verified and not even verified at all. According to Popper 
in principle there is neither a guaranty nor even a higher probability that new 
phenomena will support old generalisations. 
Popper nevertheless offered a theory of corroboration. This theory has been interpreted as 
re-introducing a crypto-theory of induction through the back door.917 
At the latest in Objective Knowledge (1972) I think Popper also admitted that the strict 
argument derived from formal logic is not applicable; otherwise practically no theories 
which could be regarded as acceptable would be left at all. Even in the case of the 
prototype of a mature science, physics, its central theory of relativity or of quantum 
physics both show some anomalies.918 But Popper is not only inspired by this logical 
argument; he is also directly influenced by Darwin, whose books he had read before 
he started to write philosophical texts.919 Popper himself advocated that the 
development of knowledge ‘from the amoeba to Einstein’ could largely be seen as a 
Darwinian process. 
The “growth of our knowledge is the result of a process closely resembling what Darwin 
called ‘natural selection’; that is, the natural selection of hypotheses: our knowledge consists, 
at every moment, of those surviving so far in their struggle for existence; a competitive 
struggle which eliminates those hypotheses which are unfit. [...] The theory of knowledge 
which I wish to propose is a largely Darwinian theory of the growth of knowledge. From the 
amoeba to Einstein, the growth of knowledge is always the same: we try to solve our 
problems, and to obtain, by a process of elimination, something approaching adequacy in 
our tentative solutions.” 920 
“In order to make the method of selection by elimination work, and to ensure that only the 
fittest theories survive, their struggle for life must be made severe for them.”921 
Popper’s concept of conjecture and refutation is a Darwinian two step process of 
blind-variation-and-external-elimination ( pp. 358 f.). In regard of the first step, it 
has often been advocated that Popper interprets “scientific discovery as fundamentally 
an accidental occurrence, a chance mutation of ideas”922. Those aspects which do not 
                                                     
915  R. J. Richards, Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior (1987), pp. 578, 
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916  K. R. Popper, My Solution of Hume’s Problem of Induction (1974). (also  pp. 210 f.). 
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920 Ibid, p. 261. 
921 K. R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (1957), p. 134. 
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appear to be chance trials are due to a (blind) re-application of older knowledge.923 In 
regard of the second step these blind trials are tested against nature or the real external 
world. 
Although these parallels are far reaching, I also want to mention that Popper partly 
stepped back: a) The tree of biological evolution branches more and more, growing up 
from one common stem, whereas the tree of human knowledge springs from countless 
roots, which tend to unite into one common stem. b) Human knowledge is regulated by 
the idea of truth rather than by the idea of helping us to survive.924 c) In the second 
step of the Darwinian process, the agent who eliminates is not nature, but the scientist 
or the scientific community. It is questionable whether one should equate the 
scientific community with ‘(natural) selection’, because one may argue that than any 
cause for the selection of an entity, i. e. for its being or not being, could 
inappropriately be called ‘natural selection’ ( pp. 358 f., 394 f.). 
Hence Popper seems to be more cautious than some modern Darwinian episte-
mologists, nevertheless it is not disputable that the concept of a process of conjecture 
and refutation has mainly been inspired by the concept of a Darwinian process. 
 
It is paradoxical that Popper, in particular, imported a concept of a Darwinian process 
into the theory of science: By deriving the pivotal criterion of falsifiability in its refined 
form not from logic but from Darwinism, he cannot help applying this criterion to 
Darwinism itself. But the Darwinian concept of ‘survival of the fittest’ often 
understood as ‘the survival of the survivor’ is at least partly tautological ( pp. 229, 
339 f., 350 f.) and thus Darwinism did not fulfil his (Darwinian) criterion of 
falsifiability. It was indeed Popper who pointed out that a “considerable part of 
Darwinism is not of the nature of an empirical theory, but is a logical truism.”925 But as 
Popper wanted to build up a normative metascientific approach – to him theories ought 
to be constructed in a falsifiable way. Popperians need to criticise unfalsifiable aspects 
of Darwinism. Nevertheless I think that Popper himself based the normative aspect of 
his methodology on exactly the tautological belief that a ‘Darwinian process’ leads to 
the ‘survival of the fittest’. Only on this basis could he assume that the Darwinian 
process of conjecture and refutation ultimately leads to the growth of knowledge and 
an approximation to the truth. If alternatively fitness is not defined tautologically in 
terms of momentary survival, it is not guaranteed that natural selection implies 
survival of the fittest. If Popper had applied this insight not only to Darwinism but to 
his own theory of theory development, the assumed best approximation of the truth 
by a Darwinian process would, I think, have become doubtful. Thereby the 
descriptive basis for Popper’s normative claim would largely have been lost.  
                                                     
923  K. R. Popper, Campbell on the Evolutionary Theory of Knowledge (1974). 
924 Idem, Objective Knowledge:  An Evolutionary Approach (1972), pp. 262-4. 
925 Ibid, p. 69. 
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Lakatos may also have pointed to a similar problem when he moaned that Popper never 
answered the question “Under what conditions would you give up your demarcation 
criterion?”926 
Popper not only charged Darwinism with being partly tautological, but he also tried to 
reform it along the lines of the Baldwin effect. The alterations in the executive organs 
must follow alterations in central organs. In a way he reintroduces a moderate form of 
orthogenesis and Lamarckism within a largely Darwinian framework.927 But if this 
insight were transferred back to his process-Darwinian theory of science, an 
unmodified falsificationist theory would be incomplete. 
In summary, I think that the Darwinian core of Popper’s own theory becomes 
inconsistent if his theory becomes applied to itself. 
7.2 Other Components of Process-Darwinism 
The Darwinian processual monism was not only transferred to the fields of 
psychological learning and the theory of science, but was also applied in different ways 
within biology and also in other fields such as, for example, economics. 
a) Antibodies and Neurones 
The prototypic inner-biological field of applying a Darwinian process is evolutionary 
biology. The Darwinian process has often been applied only on one level. For 
example, gene-Darwinians claim that the gene is ultimately the only level of selection. 
But we have already outlined the more moderate multi-level-approach, applying 
Darwinian processes on many levels, for example, on the level of groups. Whereas 
processes of Darwinian theories of evolution are normally concerned with the germ-
line, in biology Darwinian processes of somatic selection have also been proposed, e. g. 
for the neural development and the immune system. 
From the viewpoint of universal Process Darwinism these processes will be 
regarded as the same algorithm or heuristic as Darwinian evolution itself, nested upon 
the primary Darwinian process. Such nested algorithms evolved by chance and simply 
have never been eliminated. 
But actually somatic theories of selection have often been opposed to pure theories of germ-
line selection.928 Somatic theories at least ontogentically are concerned with aquired 
characters.929 Theories of somatic selection are Darwinian on a certain level, but might have 
quite non-Darwinian results on another. I will not discuss here whether these theories 
should hence indeed be regarded to be Darwinian. Only later I will generally discuss 
inconsistencies of an approach of nested Darwinian processes ( pp. 336 f.). 
In addition to his theory of selection of individual organisms Weismann after 1895 
postulated a theory of somatic selection of cells, tissues and organs, as postulated 
                                                     
926  I. Lakatos, Popper on Demarkation and Induction (1974), pp. 245-246.  
927 K. R. Popper, Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach (1972), p. 278. 
928  E. J. Steele, R. A. Lindley, R. V. Blanden, Lamarck’s Signature (1998), p. 101. 
929  Sir P. B. Medawar and Sir F. M. Burnet were awarded the Nobel price in 1960 for the discovery 
of ‘aquired immunological tolerance’.  
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already by Roux, and proposed a theory of ‘Germinalselektion’, claiming a struggle 
among ‘determinants’ for nutrition available within the germ plasm.930  
Here I can only briefly touch upon a Darwinian approach to the functioning of the 
immune system. The immune system for a long time was thought to work according 
to purely Lamarckian instructional mechanisms. It was thought that the immune 
response of the antibodies is not very wasteful but a flexible variable reaction 
informed by antigens. In contrast, the presently widely held theory of ‘clonal selection’ 
is normally understood along Darwinian lines. The theory was proposed by 
N. K. Jerne and elaborated by F. M. Burnet, who coined the term ‘clonal selection’931. 
According to this theory the immune system in a first step blindly produces a vast 
abundance of cells which produce specific antibodies (immunoglobulins). These cells 
preexist before their first antigenic encounter. If an antibody is ‘selected’ by an 
antigen, its mother cell becomes multiplied in a process of cloning.932 Even T. Steel, a 
present proponent of scientific neo-Lamarckism – on the level of the organism –, 
actually advocates a somatic selection theory on the level of the antibodies.933 
However, following process-Darwinism this secondary algorithm of an immune 
‘reaction’ is identical with and iterating the primary algorithm of evolution, i. e. 
natural selection. 
b) Darwinian Economics? 
The structural similarity of some aspects of neo-classical economics and neo-
Darwinian biology has in recent decades been newly acknowledged.934 
I have outlined some historical similarities of (neo-)classical economics and 
(neo-)Darwinian biology before. Such resemblances appeared to be due partly to a 
direct historical interaction of Darwinian biology with Smithian, Malthusian and 
Friedmanian economics, and partly to an independent yet similar development of both 
subjects, growing in a similar intellectual environment on the same fertile Newtonian 
soil. Here I shall give only a simplified, idealised account of these comparisons 
( pp. 173 ff., 198 f.).  
Economists following in Smith’s wake of classical economics till today mostly 
applied what I called the ‘principle of egoism’ on the level of individuals and favoured 
unrestrained competition. Individuals strive and even ought to strive only to maximise 
their own benefit. Darwin adopted the principle of egoism in his middle period and 
likewise applied it on the level of single organisms.  
                                                     
930  E. Mayr, Weismann and Evolution (1985), p. 321. 
931 See: F. M. Burnet, The Clonal Selection Theory of Acquired Immunity (1959). E. J. Steele, R. A. Lindley 
and R. V. Blanden give a historical sketch in Lamarck’s Signature (1998), pp. 95-102, esp. p. 95. 
932  It might be questioned whether this ‘selection’ should properly be called ‘natural’ or external, 
because the organism itself actively contributes much more than in normal natural selection to 
create this process ( pp. 394 f.). 
933   p. 148. 
934 See some critical comparisons, e.g., of E. L. Khalil, Neo-Classical Economics and Neo-Darwinism 
(1992). G. M. Hodgson, Economics and Evolution (1993). 
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Darwin first conceived his concept of natural selection as he read Malthus’ Essay 
on the Principle of Population. Malthus’ influence on Darwin has been much discussed. 
The Darwinian concepts of unconstrained growth of population, of scarcity of 
recourses, and of struggle for life definitely owed much to Malthus, who also counts 
as one of the founders of neo-classical economics. Although Malthus also firmly 
advocated that dependent “poverty ought to be held disgraceful”935, he like Smith still 
optimistically held that egoism, competition and struggle would finally lead to the 
good of all and not only to the survival of the fittest.936 Notwithstanding such 
differences, I have shown earlier that some parallels of classical economics with 
Darwinian economics remain to be striking.  
With few exceptions the application of the principle of egoism on the level of the individual 
(or of the household) dominated mainstream economics since Smith. This was consolidated 
by the rise of neo-classical economics after 1870. But other explanatory levels had also been 
proposed. In economics there is an old ‘unit of explanation’ or even ‘unit of selection’ 
debate. Even a substantial autonomy of macroeconomics has been proposed, e. g. by 
Keynes. Additionally a macroeconomic approach resulted naturally from new methods like 
national income accounting.937 
In the 1970s the microfoundationalist approach was advocated with new vigour and 
for a while forced back the concept of a certain autonomy of macroeconomy. 
Friedman, without taking a biologistic stance, has explicitly adopted the central 
concepts of natural selection, competition and survival of the fittest from Darwinian 
biology as building blocks of his microfoundationalist approach. Specifically he shared 
with gene-Darwinians a Panglossian brimming with natural selection, which led him 
to his normative demand of severe competition ( p. 198). Similarly von Hayek – 
though not strictly a neo-classical economist – strongly emphasised the universal 
necessity of competition and likewise emphasises a trial-and-error process of cultural 
selection. Moreover he demanded the abandoning of the ‘atavistic concept’ of social 
justice.899 Becker and Hirshleifer – inspired by gene-Darwinism – have advocated an 
account of the biological evolution of the ‘rational economic man’, providing the 
bridgehead for the ‘principle of egoism’ and the goal of maximisation of profit, as is 
predicted by neo-classical economics.938   
But let us step back for a moment. Not every ‘evolutionary economics’ is 
necessarily Darwinian, since they for instance advance group selectionism or a richer 
ontological process inventory, going beyond blind-trials-and-external-selection.939 If 
                                                     
935 R. Malthus, Essay on the Principle of Population (1798), p. 85. ( pp. 174 f.). 
936  P. J. Bowler, Malthus, Darwin and the Concept of Struggle (1976). For more  footnote 730, 732. 
937  G. M. Hodgson, Economics and Evolution (1993), pp. 236 f, 259 f. 
938 G. S. Becker, Altruism, Egoism, and Genetic Fitness: Economics and Sociobiology (1976). J. Hirshleifer, 
Economics from a Biological Viewpoint (1977); Natural Economy versus Political Economy (1978); 
Evolutionary Models in Economics and Law: Cooperation and Conflict Strategies (1982). 
See: G. M. Hodgson, Economics and Evolution (1993), pp. 28-31. 
939 G. M. Hodgson provides a classification of a variety of different approaches to evolutionary 
economics in Economics and Evolution (1993), pp. 39 ff. Cf. the antology G. M. Hodgson (Ed.), 
Darwinism and Economics (2009). 
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these theories are only broadly generally inspired by evolutionary theory they should 
better be called ‘evolutionary economics’. 
There are two Darwinian approaches to economics. Biologistic Darwinian 
Economics advocates the importance of the biological nature of human beings and 
understands this nature in a Darwinian way.  This approach is an expression of 
universal biological Darwinism in the field of economics. In difference, Darwinian 
Process Economics focuses on Darwinian processes of natural selection potentially 
not only on the level of genes but at the level of particular economical entities – 
without advocating group selectionism. Hence this approach is linked to Process 
Darwinism. The predictions of these two types of Darwinian economics may often be 
mutually exclusive. Some proponents of Biologistic Darwinian Economics have 
advocated a psychology according to which rationality is understood as being adapted 
to the conditions of the Pleistocene or even of the Stone ages, whereas a Process 
Darwinian Economics tends to assume that the economic sphere is moulded by blind 
economic trials and errors ( pp. 336 f.). Global rationality – or adaptation – is here 
assumed to arise from mere trial and error processes. This assertion is, of course, by 
no mean unproblematic.940 
If theories of economic Darwinism are scrutinised many interesting problems 
arise. Are we indeed concerned with an irrational trial-and-error-mechanism? Is there 
an equivalent to blind overproduction of economic products, agents and firms? What 
entity has to be regarded as selector? Is the selector ‘natural’? Should we call selection 
by humans exogenous, like Darwinism claims that natural selection is exogenous? 
Which entities are the units of economic evolution, genes, individuals, social groups, 
companies, regions, countries, multi-national giants, or trade blocs? Is economy in 
some regards autonomous from the biotic world? 
It is even questionable whether ‘real existing capitalism’ could be interpreted in a Darwinian 
way. E. g. the tendency to build global companies may contrarily be interpreted as a 
tendency to build large co-operative and planned entities. 
It is not within the scope of this work to discuss these problems of Darwinian 
economics separately, but in Part IV a general discussion of universal Darwinism will 
be given.941 
Darwinism – in a historical variety of meanings – combined with several different ideologies 
has actually influenced economics and politics in many more ways than could have been 
mentioned here.942 In the present section we were only concerned with the interaction of 
Darwinism with neo-classical economics.  
In this context it also should be mentioned that in politics Thatcherism and 
Reaganomics was inspired by Friedman, who explicitly had imported some central concepts 
from Darwinism ( pp. 198 f., also pp. 180 f.).  
                                                     
940  B. Sloth, H. J. Whitta-Jacobsen, Economic Darwinism (2006).  
941 For a biologically informed critique of economic Darwinism: G. M. Hodgson, Economics and 
Evolution (1993), pp. 234-250. E. L. Khalil, Neo-Classical Economics and Neo-Darwinism (1993), 
pp. 36-57. 
942  P. J. Bowler (1984/1988), J. C. Greene (1977/1981), M. Hawkins (1997), R. Hofstadter (1955); 
 footnotes 458-461. 
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Also later after the collapse of the ‘real existing socialism’ in Eastern Europe the only 
remaining utopia seemed to have been the harshening of the economic struggle for existence 
on all levels. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
countries, primarily in the Third World and East Europe, during the early 1990s ‘liberalised’ 
some hundred economic laws. I do not intend here to argue that this was plainly wrong. But 
since then even known advocates of a market economy have pointed out that this predomi-
nant tendency may go to far and that a totally unconstrained capitalism and a resulting pau-
perisation of large parts of the society may become the true enemies of an ‘open society’943. 
 
                                                     
943 G. Soros, a Hungarian multi-millionaire, formerly influenced by Popper, now criticises 
boundless capitalism, The New Paradigm for Financial Markets: The Credit Crisis of 2008 and What It 
Means (2008). See also: The Group of Lisbon, The Limits of Competition (1995).  
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Conclusion – The Universal War of Entities 
This wonderfully simple metaphysics of Universal Darwinism advocates an ontology 
of total war. Hobbes’ state of nature is radicalized and is turned into a highly general 
and apparently logic-based metaphysics. Entities are by definition egoistic and strive 
to outstrive each other. Panglossism is explained by Panbellicism. The reason for any 
apparent harmony is an eternal and omnipresent struggle, a truly bellum omnium 
contra omnes.  
Two types of Universal Darwinism have been proposed: Universal biological 
Darwinism (biologistic Darwinism) reduces all entities and processes of culture to 
Darwinian biology. In its gene-Darwinian version even within biology only genes 
exist. Genes have replaced God as the puppeteer, pulling the strings from within 
our bodies. 
Universal Process Darwinism – on which we have focused in the present part – 
has a slightly richer ontological inventory. There are not only genes, but possibly also 
genomes, gene-pools, organisms, groups and species; and even cultures, theories and 
economic firms may be accepted as causal agents. Nevertheless there is only one 
mechanism: blind-variation-and-external-retention ( p. 359). The relentless struggle 
continues on all existing levels. The existence of entities even appears to be defined by 
their egoistic struggle for life. Other entities are mere means and sometimes not 
regarded to be essentially real. Antibodies, organisms, the economic man, but also 
friends, ideas and theories are all fighting only for their own survival. 
Whether biologistic or process Darwinism, it seems that Darwinism has replaced 
theism as a universal explanation: everything exists not because of God’s creation, but 
because of the eternal unchangeable mechanism of natural selection. 
It seems hopeless to try to transcend the state of nature culturally, because either 
culture essentially does not exist, or culture is condemned to work according to the 
same brute and blind mechanism. Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, dressed in a more 
respectable Newtonian mantle, seem to celebrate their ultimate victory. Will and life 
are blind and the world is necessarily and exhaustively bad (or ‘value-free’). From a 
more traditional viewpoint it appears that existence is indeed a mistake and we are 
living not in the best, but in the worst of all possible worlds.  
The blind and irrational aspect of life are now declared to be universal; neither in 
nature nor in culture a preordained, rationally and ethically ordered logos remains. The 
romantic urge for unification ( p. 193) which challenged Descartes’ dualism is now 
not formulated in the way of traditional idealism or traditional life philosophy, but in a 
materialistic, mechanistic and largely atomistic way. The long-accepted Cartesian 
cultural compromise had been based on the contrast of machina mundi and alter deus: of 
an atomistic and causal world of physics and biology, and a teleological world of 
culture, ethics and purpose. As historically sketched the modern alter deus, the free 
human subject, finally has become incorporated into the mechanistic vision of machina 
mundi. The enormous project of the Christian disenchantment of Nature ( p. 73) has 
not only achieved the eradication of polytheism, but finally turned against Christianity 
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itself and even against the remaining secularised humanism. Gene-Darwinism and 
even process-Darwinism may be seen as the final nails in the coffin of the free alter 
deus. According to modern gene-Darwinism, humans are nothing but gene-machines. 
Even according to the already much more moderate process-Darwinism nature and 
culture are blind by definition. 
Even today Universal Darwinism is, in my opinion, paradoxically sustained by the 
theistic concept of universal laws, eternal ideas of God. Whereas the Darwinian blind 
understanding of evolution undermined any essence and purpose, gene-Darwinism 
and process-Darwinism are surprisingly themselves based on the almost last remaining 
island of Platonic statics, on a probabilistic but itself eternally unchangeable 
mechanism, natural selection. As it was in the beginning, it is now, and ever shall be: a 
world of unrestrained and ruthless competition. 
 
In this part we were concerned to develop versions of Universal Darwinism, not at 
least to make it accessible, disputable and worth attacking. A mere stigmatisation of 
these approaches would ignore their positive aspects, which may even partly serve as 
seeds to transcend this paradigm itself. It would indeed be a tribal conception of 
science to think simply of two opposed theoretical camps fighting against each other. 
There is a dynamics of theories, where we indeed have to decide what theory we 
prefer, but thesis and antithesis are not only opposed, but often mutually dependent. 
Moreover the intentions of developing a theory may sometimes differ from its final 
implications. 
Paradoxically, even gene-Darwinism, the most purified form of Darwinian materialism, 
mechanicism and reductionism, could, in my view, be seen as a turning point towards a 
metaphysic based rather on information than on matter. The information of genes, not their 
incorporation by particular molecules is crucial to gene-Darwinism ( pp 255 f.). 
Although in this part we aimed at developing Darwinian metaphysics we have already 
found some cracks within this position; but these inconsistencies are more 
systematically treated in Part IV. As the different approaches inspired by Darwinism 
have fortified each other, we will see that the criticisms uttered in different subject 
areas may support each other as well.  
 
Part IV: Transcendence of  Gene-Darwinism 
and Universal Process-Darwinism 
“A civilisation which cannot burst through its current abstractions is doomed to sterility after a very 
limited period of time.” 
 
Alfred North Whitehead, 1925. 
 
 
A Critique of Universal Darwinism, covering particularly gene-Darwinism but also 
process-Darwinism,944 needs to be written. This became clear as much from the 
unbearable ethical tendencies, which these world-views appear to have, as from their 
inconsistencies,945 such will be addressed systematically in the course of this fourth 
part. A first account will be given of how these metaphysical frameworks should be 
transcended. It appears to me that the current scientific and philosophical discourse 
concerning Universal Darwinism, though in some respects quickly progressing, in 
others is trapped by a set of mutually supporting assumptions, which need to be 
challenged in parallel, if a preferable theoretical position should be reached. I use the 
term ‘transcend’ (from Latin transcendere, to go beyond) to indicate that my criticism 
methodically does not start the discussion from an alternative viewpoint, but from 
within the metaphysics of Universal Darwinism. By criticising these dangerous, but also 
unifying and innovating ideas from within, we still try to go beyond this position. 
I am also using the old-fashioned word ‘transcend’ to indicate the belief that by 
attacking the metaphysical system of Universal Darwinism we may also learn 
something from traditional metaphysical systems. I am advocating this without 
approving a generally backward-looking approach. New problems often do need to be 
solved in new ways, but after much of the metaphysical lumber had been cleared out 
by analytical philosophy (at least in the English-speaking world), two points, I think, 
should be realised. Firstly, the remaining scientific world-view – as it also becomes 
                                                     
944 These terms have been introduced earlier,  pp. 205 f.  
945  esp. pp. 41 f., 221 f. 
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clear in this work – itself is based on some highly general, empirically not directly 
testable, and in this sense metaphysical assumptions ( e.g. pp. 4 f.). Secondly, also 
concepts have been abandoned, which are required to resist Universal Darwinism. 
While we should try to retain the achieved clarity of analytical philosophy, I think, we 
should come back to realise that we are only ‘dwarves on the shoulders of giants’. 
However, I concede that these dwarves – we – now have to try to see further than the 
giants have ever seen before. 
This present criticism of mine will focus on two main classes of reductionism, which 
have been shown to be at the very heart of the two strands of Universal Darwinism 
( pp. 205 f.), specific types of substance reductionism and process reductionism. 
Gene-Darwinism, today’s most radical form of Universal Biologistic Darwinism, 
has been characterised by an extreme biological substance reductionism, advocating what I 
have called ‘gene-atomism’ and ‘germ-line reductionism’. The selfish gene view of 
evolution is also tied to the principle of entity (gene) egoism. Moreover, also gene-
Darwinism is characterised by a radical form of process reductionism, i. e. Darwinian 
process-monism, according to which the process of mutation and elimination is the 
only real evolutionary mechanism. Modern nominalism indeed has reached another 
heyday ( pp. 138 f., 191 f., 215 f.). 
The other class of theories which could be subsumed under Universal Darwinism 
is Universal Process Darwinism. Universal Process Darwinism, contrary to Universal 
Biologistic Darwinism, allows the emergence of new entities like biological species, 
theories or economic companies, but still denies the emergence of new evolutionary 
processes. Universal Process Darwinism is hence characterised only by process 
reductionism, advocating that there is only one essential process in both biotic and 
cultural evolution, the Darwinian process of natural selection ( pp. 216 f.). 
In the following discussion substance reductionism and process reductionism will 
be criticised in two separate sections. Alternative accounts, which only can be 
outlined, are presented where they would replace the related types of reductionism. 
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Chapter 8:  
Transcendence of Substance-Reductionism 
In this chapter, I argue that the substance reductionism, which is employed in gene-
Darwinism, leads to fundamental theoretical problems. 
Generally speaking, the discussion of reductionism, particularly of substance 
reductionism, seems to be a modernised version of the mediaeval Dispute about 
Universalia. Do general entities or terms (universals like ‘species’, ‘genera’ etc.) exist 
before and out of particular things (ante rem), do they exist inseparably within 
particulars (in re), or are they mere convenient abstractions (in intellectu / post rem)?946 
In today’s philosophy of biology this dispute is concerned with the question of the 
unit of selection, or more generally the unit of explanation. Different largely 
Darwinian subparadigms, as we have seen, employed quite different types of 
substance reductionism ( pp. 102 f.). Darwin himself during his middle period, at 
the time when he wrote the Origin, believed only in the existence of single organisms; 
only later did he put a little more emphasis on groups and even returned to a 
typological definition of species. In Fisherism, the first step towards the evolutionary 
synthesis, the evolutionary relevance of single genes and whole gene pools was 
advocated. Proponents of the second step of the synthesis added the essential 
importance of the phenotypic population structure. Gene-atomism and germ-line 
reductionism of gene-Darwinism, often found in sociobiology, supposes that single 
selfish genes are the sole agents of evolution, the rest are gene machines, vehicles, or 
mere means to the genes’ end. The impressively meagre gene-Darwinian ontology, 
with which we are concerned here, claims to cover all apparently existing things, 
including complex forests outside of us, up to the moral beliefs inside us. 
To approach the critique of substance reductionism of this genetic kind, we must 
first discuss problems of (entity) reductionism in general and then get closer to the 
specific problems of genetic substance reductionism. 
8.1 Problems of Physicalism and Reductionism in General 
a) The Difference between Explanation and (Downward) Reduction 
If ‘reduction’ is defined in a very general way, some sort of reductionism seems to be 
unavoidable. The core of the notion of reduction (Lat.: reducere) is to trace something 
back to something different. This seems to be linked to the indispensable notion of 
‘explanation’. An explanation has something to do with restating a phenomenon in 
different words, which are themselves understood better. 
But the term ‘reduction’ in philosophy of science today is normally not used so 
generally. In the wake of logical positivism primarily downward, rather than upward or 
horizontal, reduction is implied. With this geometric metaphor I presuppose a 
                                                     
946 A broad collection of classical and modern texts concerning the dispute about universals is: 
H.-U. Wöhler, Texte zum Universalienstreit (1994), Volume 2. 
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hierarchy of complexity: from particle physics, atomic physics, chemistry, biology up 
to sociology. Within the vertical dimension it is not normally upward reduction but 
downward reduction that is desired, resulting in a physicalist ontology. Downward 
reductionism, here often for short ‘reductionism’, is the epistemological process of 
explaining wholes by their parts. I use the epistemological notion of ‘downward 
reductionism’, roughly associated to the ontological notions of ‘atomism’, ‘materialism’ 
and ‘physicalism’. 
Although the generally reductionist research programme has brought a gain in 
downward consistency947, three sorts of problems have to be faced and will be 
discussed subsequently. Firstly, the resulting physicalism provides us with an ontology 
which itself casts doubt on the materialistic assumptions on which it is built. Secondly, 
its premiss that wholes are nothing but their elements will be called into question. 
Thirdly, genetic reductionism, although originating from the same current of thought, 
comes in contradiction to strict downward reduction, and demands a different 
frame of thought. 
b) Problems of Modern Physicalism with Traditional Materialism 
If downward reduction (especially in its eliminative form) is strictly applied, we end up 
in an ‘atomistic’ physicalism. If a whole is nothing but its parts, an ecosystem is 
nothing but its organisms, a society nothing but its individual members, thoughts are 
nothing but neuronal activity patterns, a person is nothing but organs, these organs 
ultimately are molecules, molecules are atoms, atoms are hadrons, and hadrons 
nothing but elementary particles, then we indeed would have to concede, that there is 
nothing but elementary particles. 
Such an understanding of part-whole relations seems to be the core of materialism, 
and particularly physicalism, which advocates that only microscopic physical entities 
(and some eternal laws of nature) are real. According to this view the whole is not 
only constituted by its parts, but it actually is its parts and nothing but its parts. This 
view has been linked to a ‘billiard ball-concept’ of matter, figuring matter as solid and 
independent bits. Although this concept was strongly inspired by physics, the 
confirmed concepts of modern physics (relativity and quantum physics) paradoxically 
have broken with this ‘billiard ball picture’.  
(1) The ‘particles’ of physics are not particles in the classical sense, opposed to 
fields of forces, but are themselves entities which have properties of both particles and 
waves. After the problem has arisen that light, traditionally a wave, also had properties 
of a particle (Einstein), it soon became apparent vice versa that matter could be 
described by wave equations (L. V. de Broglie, E. Schrödinger). Also experimentally 
this counter-intuitive wave-particle dualism can easily be made apparent. For example 
in two-slit experiments single electrons which have passed through slits could be 
detected individually at the end of their route (as particle), but it could also be shown 
                                                     
947  Mostly high level terms have been made consistent with low level terms. Though this is of 
course positive, it becomes, I think, one-sided if this is done at the expense of upward 
consistency, for example denying – without much resistance – the existence of whole strata, like 
the cognitive world (e. g. qualia).  
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that ‘particles’ each behave differently depending on whether one or two slits are 
open, as if each would have passed several slits (like a wave actually does). According to 
the so-called Copenhagen Interpretation (N. Bohr, W. Heisenberg), the orthodox 
view today, reality can be ascribed only to a measurement and the wave-particle 
dualism does not reflect an inadequacy in present scientific knowledge, but is in this 
sense fundamental reality. Hence, elementary ‘particles’ are ontologically no longer 
only understood as ‘billiard balls’, but also as waves and distributions of probability.948 
(2) The Uncertainty Principle (Heisenberg) states that it is impossible to precisely 
specify certain quantities simultaneously, like the position and the momentum of a 
particle. In contrast to classical physics an electron can no longer be said to be at any 
precise point at any given time. The Copenhagen Interpretation understood this 
indeterminacy ontologically. Despite a strong opposition to this interpretation 
(A. Einstein, M. Planck) this opinion is nowadays still favoured by most physicists.948 
(3) The Uncertainty Principle likewise shows (and measures) the dependence of 
physical facts upon observation. 
(4) The finding of new elementary ‘particles’ is an ongoing process. In the 
eliminative-materialistic sense it is not clear (and even improbable) whether today's 
elementary particles, and hence the basis of our ontology, does strictly speaking ‘exist’. 
Moreover, in principle it is not clear whether there is an explanatory bottom, a level of 
basic elements, which could ever be reached. 
(5) E = mc2 expresses the equivalence and, in principle, even the convertibility of 
energy and matter.949 
(6) According to the theory of relativity the distinction of particles and space could 
not be sustained. Particles influence the space in which they move. 
 
If we accept the truth of modern physics and dismiss the ‘billiard-ball’ model of 
matter, it may still not be logically necessary to abandon materialism and (eliminative) 
downward reductionism as well. But, I think, in several respects they lose most of 
their intuitive appeal: 
(1) The concept of fields is not materialistic. It is doubtful if a resulting ontology 
where ‘matter’ and energy are convertible and where ‘matter’ is not only described by 
particles but by waves, probability distributions or fields, should still be called a 
materialistic position. Although it is of course possible to stipulate the definition of 
matter in a new way, I think this is not reasonable from the vantage point of the 
history of thought. The concept of fields is in my understanding rather reminiscent of 
Antique hylemorphism, of the Aristotelian kind, than of pure materialism.  
(2) The concept of higher strata would not be materialistic. Proponents of the 
‘billiard ball concept of matter’ will be inclined to believe that the whole is nothing but 
its parts. Who alternatively thinks in terms of fields, forms or ‘Gestalten’ will 
presumably be rather inclined to think of wholes as something more or something 
                                                     
948 See e.g., C. F. v. Weizsäcker, Aufbau der Physik (1985), pp. 490 f., 526 f.  
949 Also the less intuitive aspect of this Einsteinian prediction recently has been confirmed. In a 
Stanford particle accelerator a huge amount of energy was used to create matter (less than one 
atom). U. Schnabel, Warum ist etwas? (1997).  
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different from their parts. In this view it appears more appropriate to understand 
properties not only as being determined by the parts, but by their structure. Bohr, for 
example, in regard to two-slit experiments has always stressed the particle-wave 
individuality, which could not be decomposed into parts. This still may not be 
conclusive for an ontology of strata above particle physics. Additionally, the 
particularly modern physical theory of synergetics has favoured properties on the level 
of whole systems (H. Haken). It is doubtful whether a position which allows such 
higher partly autonomous explanatory levels, can still be called ‘materialistic’. 
(3) Scepticism concerning the ‘thing in itself’ is rather associated with theories 
opposed to materialism. In regard to epistemological questions materialism is at least 
historically correlated with realism. But modern physics rather appears to oppose any 
strong version of realism. If we accepted the physicalistic belief that physics is cardinal 
also for epistemology, then the uncertainty principle as well as doubts about the indi-
visibility  of ‘elementary particles’ (and thus about their reality) would, I think, support 
at least a limited scepticism concerning the ‘thing in itself’ (‘Ding an sich’). But a sceptic 
attitude towards our empirical knowledge has particularly been a hallmark of idealism. 
(4) Matter is in an epistemological sense not simple. Materialism historically tried 
to base our philosophy on obvious experiences of the physical world. Modern physics 
at a first glance is a paradigm case for the success of a research programme of 
exhaustive downward reduction of complexes into simples. But the conception of a 
simple idea and of a simple ontological entity has become dissociated. The search for 
ontological simple indivisible entities actually resulted in concepts of entities which are 
epistemologically not simple, but complex in the sense of being non intuitive. In this 
sense materialism has lost the advantage of epistemological simplicity. 
(5) The actual complexity of the world casts at least a pragmatic doubt on the full 
feasibility of the materialistic research programme. Even if it would in principle be 
possible to explain every whole completely in terms of its parts, this programme of 
reduction might get into difficulties. Not even the three body problem is exactly 
solvable (not even in the relatively simple mathematics of classical dynamics) and only 
a single drop of water contains more than a million million billion atoms.  
c) Logical Problems of the Modern Understanding of Substance – 
Is a Tree a Million Matches? 
The scientific question of reductionism in the 21st century is bound up with very old 
philosophical difficulties, concerning the concepts of substance and accident. The 
concept of substance had already been central in Antique and scholastic philosophy. In 
its Cartesian twist it became crucial to the modern era. Today the concept is still with 
us, for example, in the search for elementary particles or single ‘egoistic’ genes. 
Substance traditionally has been regarded as (the concept of) a being which does not 
need another (concept of a) being for its own existence. A substance is unchangeable, 
indivisible and independent. It is what is constant and what continuously underlies the 
changing flux of phenomena. This is the core of the notion throughout two and a half 
millennia. (In a way this is the unchanging substance of the notion substance.) This is 
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already found in Plato’s concept of underlying eternal forms or ‘ideas’. Equally 
Aristotle regards substances mainly as the underlying form (eidos) of actual beings.950  
Also Descartes’ notion of substance retained these meanings, but was not understood in 
the sense of causa formalis, but more and more in the sense of causa materialis. I will call 
this understanding of substance the ‘modern understanding’, because its predominance 
starts at the beginning of modern philosophy with the Cartesian notion of res extensa 
(although substance was still sometimes understood differently). The concept of res 
extensa led to the ‘billiard ball’ model of simple bits of matter and to downward 
reductionism. Now the concept of substance denotes unchangeable elements 
constituting a whole, strictly speaking, only the smallest eternal bits of matter. This 
modern understanding of substances can be spelled out as the complete immanence 
of properties of the whole within its single material parts. Elements are defined not 
only historically, but also logically prior to the whole, and they are assumed 
independent and not defined by the relation in which they are involved. In such a 
world there are, in principle, no new wholes, since there are no wholes. There are only 
new configurations.951 But configurations do not have any causal impact themselves. 
Eliminative Downward Reductionism transposes this ontological idea to 
epistemology. The whole has no own (relational) properties, which could not be 
explained by properties of the single elements. 
This modern understanding of substance could be regarded as the fundament of 
ontological or methodological individualism and atomism, present in many areas of 
physics, psychology and economy etc. Without getting involved in this topic in detail, 
this philosophy seems to me to be even embedded in some seemingly neutral 
instruments, for example classical test theory which presupposes the independence of 
all test items. In our context this modern understanding of substance has a pivotal 
role for the gene-Darwinian focus on single genes ( pp. 138). 
In this context, the current debate, concerning the question of eliminative materialism 
and reductionism versus emergentism, fulgurationism550 and supervenience952 is of interest, but a 
full treatment of this lively dispute, mainly concerned with the mind-body problem, 
would have extended the scope of this work. Moreover, it appears to me that most 
disputants unanimously start from a modern understanding of substance (as causa 
materialis) and only discuss whether systemic properties are acceptable on this basis. 
Often the presupposition that there are constituting elements is not questioned. 
Instead it is only considered whether there are emergent properties, what character 
                                                     
950  Aristotle, Metaphysics, 7th book. (Whether this eidos is something individual or general remains an 
open question.) 
951 L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921/1922), 2.027,  footnote 785. 
952 See, for example: E. J. Lowe, Causal Closure Principles and Emergentism (2000). J. Kim, Mind in a 
Physical World (1998). A. Beckermann, Supervenience, Emergence, and Reduction (1992). J. Kim, 
‘Downward Causation’ in Emergentism and Nonreductive Physicalism (1992). R. v. Gulick, Nonreductive 
Materialism and the Nature of Intertheoretical Constraint (1992). W. Krohn, G. Küppers (Ed.), 
Emergenz: Die Entstehung von Ordnung, Organisation und Bedeutung (1992). J. Kim, The Myth of 
Nonreductive Materialism (1989). P. Bieri (Ed.), Analytische Philosophie des Geistes (1981). J. A. Fodor, 
Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis) (1974). 
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such properties might have and whether they could have causal relevance 
(downward causation).953 
My discussion of this problem starts from the opposite direction. It is not the 
possibility of the existence of emergent properties, but the possibility of the exclusive 
existence of basic elements (substances in the modern sense) that is questioned. But, 
first I have to make clear why there is a problem at all because the intuitive concept of 
emergent properties appears questionable, of one starts with the modern 
understanding of substance. 
 
Emergent properties prima facie appear to be unproblematic. If elements are combined, 
they might form new relations and we might experience a new phenomenon. This 
holds for all sorts of subject areas. For example, if two people meet, they have the 
possibility of chatting; but – unsurprisingly – neither of them could (if they are sane) 
chat on their own.  
This has also been stressed by synergetics, a new school or discipline of physics, 
which in my opinion implicitly modifies the modern understanding of substance.954 
We take one class of the ontologically simplest bits of matter as an example. Three 
quarks (or antiquarks) could form a hadron (or antihadron), the smallest compound 
bits of matter. An example of a hadron is a proton or a neutron. The system of a 
hadron has the property to be in different energetic states, although the single 
elementary particles do not have this property.955 On the next level of complexity, an 
atom, built by up to 350 constituting parts (protons, neutrons, electrons), has again 
many new properties. New properties may not only emerge by adding new elements 
to the system, but also if a mere relational change of an identical set of elements 
occurs.956 This becomes apparent e. g. in the different properties of physical isomers 
(nuclei, which are identical in regard of their number of protons and neutrons, but have 
a different radioactive decay) or in chemical isomers (molecules, which consist of the 
same chemical elements, but whose atoms are arranged differently). But the 
phenomenon of structural properties seems to be even more general. I think, one 
might also conceive phase transitions in this way, e. g. the transition of H2O from ice 
to water to gas, or in principle also any chemical reactions. In all cases the elements 
                                                     
953 But, for example,  footnote 1069. 
954  H. Haken is the nestor of synergetics. See his Synergetics, Nonequilibrium Phase Transitions and Self-
Organisation in Physics, Chemistry and Biology (1983). There is also a Springer series on synergetics 
published by him. K. Stierstadt, Physik der Materie (1989), is an excellent textbook on physics in 
general, written from the viewpoint of synergetics.  
955 Epistemologically hadrons are even prior to quarks, not that they have been known earlier, but 
in the sense that Quarks could never be observed themselves. We only observe that hadrons get 
into different energetic states and infer the existence of quarks, because we have to assume an 
internal structure of these hadrons. 
956 Moreover, one could distinguish two types of properties of a system: ‘collective’ properties, 
which build an average of the properties of the parts (e. g. compressibility of an ideal gas), and 
‘co-operative’ properties, which are mainly determined by a certain interaction of the parts (e.g., 
polarizability).  
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remain (broadly) the same, only energy changes. Elements primarily change partners 
or change their structural position, but this results in completely different properties. 
The appearance of new phenomena seems to be too obvious to be disputed, but 
the crucial question is how to explain the nature of these phenomena. 
Eliminative materialism or downward reductionism can be seen as ontological or 
epistemological expressions of a position, both of which advocate (1.) that in principle 
there is nothing new957 and (2.) that apparently ‘new’ phenomena should be 
theoretically completely explainable by their old elements. According to this 
conception society is nothing but its individual members and humans are finally 
nothing but basic material elements.  
Dawkins, distinguished radicaliser, populariser and philosopher of a gene-Darwinian 
biology, but not particularly well versed in philosophy itself, apparently regards downward 
reductionism as the only possible form of explanation.958  
(1) The first of the above assumptions about the impossibility of newness could be 
stated in different words. The actual and changing world is not the real World based 
on eternal substances. This still mirrors the Platonic concept of eternal ideas (ειδος) 
and the scholastic distinction of a changing world (mundus sensibilis) and a real eternal 
world (mundus intelligibilis) ( p. 76). 
Although an assertion of an impossibility of newness seems quite daring – 
especially after we have shown above the intuitiveness of emergent phenomena – I 
think there is logically, or at least heuristically, an argument in favour of this view. If 
we equate ‘new’ with ‘unknown’, and ‘old’ with ‘known’, then it should become 
obvious, that we always have to understand the unknown by the known, hence the new 
by the old. Any phenomenon which would be radically ‘new’, would not be 
understandable. Thus, the assumption that the new is in fact old (if we do not want to 
call it a miracle or actually give up trying to explain it) seems strangely to be a 
necessary precondition of any understanding (in a way, a truth a priori)959. Here I do 
not discuss this argument any further, which unites the traditional and modern 
conception of substance, but concentrate on the second position, which is specific to 
the modern conception of substance. 
(2) The second assumption at first glance only restates aspects of the first. There is 
nothing new, the new is the old and the new has to be explained by the old elements.  
But the second assumption almost silently introduces another aspect, which I shall 
oppose. Now, the new should not only be explained generally by the old or the 
known, but by old or known elements. We again face the modern understanding of 
substance. Substance is seen as composing bits of matter. Causa materialis has 
supplanted causa formalis – or, I think, one might also say causa relationalis. According to 
this modern understanding of substances there is eternal matter, but no eternal form 
or relation; a whole has no explanans apart from its elements. The form, the structure 
or the relations of the compounds are understood as being epiphenomena and 
                                                     
957 Cf.: R. Löw, Die Entstehung des Neuen in der Natur (1984), p. 58. 
958  R. Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker (1986/1991), pp. 11-15. 
959 Cf.: I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781/1787) ‘Grundsatz der Beharrlichkeit der Substanz’ and A 
206/B 251.  
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conceptually have to be woven separately into each element composing that 
compound. Positively this makes causes locatable. But is a conception, according to 
which all phenomenal properties are reduced to separate basic elements, viable? 
 
With this question we come back to the task (instead of arguing positively in favour of 
higher-level explanations) of challenging the assumption that reality is in principle 
understandable in terms of basic elements. 
In the following argument I aim to show that such a conception is not free from 
fundamental difficulties. I shall argue that it is impossible to explain an apparent 
property, apparently given on the level of a system, only by referring to its constituent 
elements (substances in the modern sense), without making use of notions like form, 
relation or higher-level explanations. 
If we were to collect all compounding atoms of a human, we would of course not 
yet have created a human. A supporter of causa formalis may interpret this simple fact 
as support for the conception that not only matter but also form is a necessary causal 
factor. A supporter of an approach exclusively based on causa materialis would of 
course not directly surrender. Whereas the former would argue that the form or, here 
understood synonymously, the specific relations between the elements have an inde-
pendent role in explanation, the latter would have to build the confining conditions 
under which a ‘higher’ property appears into the concepts of each basic component.  
But if one tries to do this, an aporia of reductionism becomes apparent. The 
confining conditions for an element to produce a certain property are necessarily 
related to other entities, to the constellation of the relevant system. The properties of 
water become apparent only if oxygen (under certain conditions) builds a compound 
with hydrogen atoms. The relation can not be eliminated.  
A relation R is a two place predicate which has to connect at least two entities, 
a and b (or the concept of these entities). The reductionist might argue that it is 
possible to restate the property P of the relation Rab, on the side of entity a with a 
proposition, like ‘the entity a, if in a certain relation R to b, has a certain property P’, 
and on the side of entity b with the proposition ‘the entity a, if in a certain relation R 
to b, has a certain property P’. 
I argue that according to such a redefinition, both entities, a and b, would, against 
our intention, not be defined as substances in the strict sense any more.  
(1) As we have seen, it is a crucial aspect of the notion of a substance that it is 
‘(a concept of) a being which does not need another (concept of) being for its own 
existence’. 
But the redefinition of the entities a and b does not eliminate the relation. The 
relation is still mentioned in the definition of the entities as a constraining condition 
for showing certain properties. Moreover, now a would even need to incorporate b 
within its own definition! Oxygen, for example, would be defined as an entity which, 
if in a certain relation to two hydrogen atoms, shows the properties of water. Thereby, 
the entity a is not at all defined independently, but it is by definition related to the other 
entity b. Furthermore the entity b is in turn also related to a, and this proceeds ad 
infinitum. This implies that each definition would become self-referential, since the 
entity which is used in the redefinition (a part of the definiens) is in turn related to the 
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entity which is to be defined (the definiendum). Self-reference is in my view an 
interesting property, but it is definitely an unintended one from the viewpoint of a 
reductionist. However, the idea of the independence of the substance is not fulfilled. 
Hence, an understanding of substances as independent basic elements appears to me 
generally to be self-refuting and inconsistent. 
(2) A second aspect of a substance is usually that it is simple. The simplicity of 
unrelatedness has been discussed above. Reductionists with only a weaker concept of 
substance (perhaps claiming that alternative concepts also end up in aporia) may still 
refer to a prima facie appeal to simplicity. It appears at least epistemologically simple, if 
all properties are located in final elements. Although we of course daily make use of 
the concept of components (just as we make use of wholes), I want to show that a 
radical application of this idea is not reasonable. Taking up the line of argument from 
the last paragraph, a thorough reductionist redefinition of entities, would paradoxically 
finally force us to incorporate the whole world into the definition of each entity. 
Oxygen builds compounds not only with hydrogen but with many other elements, 
which would have to be incorporated into our definition. Not enough, these 
compounds would have to be extended to large systems to integrate, for example, 
properties of humans, like walking or thinking, in which water definitely somehow 
plays a role. One would have to consider all such higher-level properties. Even the 
sober biologist Mayr mentioned that a through reductionist account – instead of 
accepting emerging entities – would, strictly understood, force its advocates to adopt 
pan-psychic or hylozoic theories of matter (if they do not simply deny phenomena like 
thought).960 It would also follow, that all elements and constraining relational 
conditions which are involved in producing such properties or processes would have 
to be incorporated into the definition of oxygen as well. In a general downward 
reductionist epistemology all other elements would also have to be defined likewise. 
Hence, if a particular element was not yet directly part of this definition of oxygen, it 
would definitely in a secondary, tertiary etc. way (via the definition of hydrogen etc.) 
be integrated. Hence, it follows from taking reductionism to its true conclusions that 
the whole world – with all its elements and its higher properties – would finally have 
to be incorporated into the definition of each single element! 
Such a result would be totally opposed to the original idea sought after by the 
independent definition of basic elements. Concerned with the aspect of simplicity, we 
see how the apparently beautiful simple concept of (downward) reductionism, 
explaining all phenomenal properties of ‘higher’ systems in terms of ‘lower’ systems, 
quickly degenerates into a highly complicated and inconvenient philosophy. Even if it 
were in principle possible to transfer all properties of the known compound entities 
into the concept of elementary particles (which is of course actually not done), then 
these concepts would become loaded with an infinite bulk of conditions under which 
potential properties are shown. 
(3) Finally, it follows that the concept of the unchangeability of substances can not 
be sustained. I am not concerned with our factual knowledge that hydrogen itself only 
becomes stable in a certain stage of the evolution of the universe (one may circumvent 
                                                     
960  E. Mayr, The Growth of Biological Thought (1982), p. 64. 
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this problem by referring to currently basic elements). I am concerned with the rather 
logical problem that the relationships, which are part of our definition change in time, 
as nature, history and also our knowledge of these processes develops. For example, 
the definition of the basic components of genes, the nucleotide bases adenine, 
guanine, cytosine, and thymine, would not only have to integrate the possibility of 
replication, but also sexual reproduction (of which it builds the basis) as well as this 
present thought of mine. 
 
In conclusion, an ontology built exclusively out of single substances – in the sense of 
causa materialis – bears huge difficulties. Three defining criteria of elementary 
‘substances’ could not be sustained. Above all (a), a material substance seems not to 
be definable without relation to other entities, it could thus not said to be independent 
from other entities. Secondly (b), the resulting view seems far from being 
epistemologically simple, and thirdly (c), the definition of a substance changes 
throughout time. 
 
It is not within the scope of this work to elaborate a positive alternative account on 
this general level. Here it should be enough to have pointed out that metaphysical 
problems weight heavily upon the seemingly simple modern notion of substance and 
its epistemological counterpart of downward reductionism. To assume from the 
outset that the whole is nothing but its parts, is at least no less problematic than 
assuming properties on the level of a system. Although not trying to elaborate an 
alternative on such a general level, in specific areas I still shall contribute in the further 
course of this work to the rehabilitation of a modified Aristotelian aetiology, by 
introducing some ideas which may help to render causa formalis more acceptable. 
Nevertheless, I want already here, without making use of explicitly Aristotelian 
concepts show how the concept of downward reductionism as the only possible form 
of explanation might be transcended. 
I conceded that one may need to explain the new by the old, the unknown by the known. 
But given this premiss, how can one conceive an explanation which is not completely 
downward reductionist. Although (downward) reductionism is an important way of 
explaining the new by the old, there are, I think, other forms of explanation as well.  
I want to distinguish at least four types of explaining the new by the old. The first two 
types could be called ‘analyses’ since they are concerned with a closer scrutiny of the details 
of the entity in questions. Besides an (a) analysis of elements (downward reductionism), 
there is, I think, also an irreducible (b) analysis of the relations of these elements. The other 
two types of explanation may be called synthesis, since they explain by taking the larger 
context into account. There is (c) a synthesis with analogous (external) cases and 
(d) a synthesis with external conditions or causes. I do not discuss whether these 
explanations are types or aspects, or whether in an analyses synthesis always plays a part and 
vice versa, etc. I only want to give an impression that there are aspects of an explanation 
going beyond downward reductionism. 
Additionally I give examples for each of the two latter points, which may appear more 
opaque: (c) Chemistry, a field which has often served to provide examples for downward 
reductionism, could also illustrate the concept of a ‘synthesis with analogous cases’. 
Chemistry has not only derived its knowledge of the elements by an analysis of its 
components, but also by analogies with other elements, which had become systematised in 
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the periodic table (1869/1870 by Mendeleyev and Meyer). Only from such analogies could 
‘new’ elements and their properties be predicted. (d) An example for a ‘synthesis with 
external conditions’ could be the ‘Coriolis force’. If we must explain the direction of a whirl 
in a wash-basin we could only reach a sufficient understanding, if we actually take the 
rotation of the whole earth into account. 
The consequences and problems of such an alternative account could not be accessed 
here. I only proposed this classification to show that there are types or aspects of 
explanation which are often ignored by staunch reductionists.958  
d) The Inconsistency between Biologism and Physicalism –   
Genes or Information versus Quarks? 
This section firstly sets out to show that a gene-ontological approach, despite being 
biologically downward reductive, is itself in contradiction with strict downward 
reductionism, i. e. physicalism. Secondly, the notion of a replicator is introduced as the 
specifically gene-Darwinian justification for stopping reduction at the explanatory 
level of selfish genes. Thirdly, closer scrutiny of the notion of a replicator reveals that 
the very notion of a replicator – against the intention of the gene-Darwinians – 
undermines a materialistic account, and proposes an ontology which is built on form 
and information as opposed to matter. 961 I shall argue that the resulting informational 
or semiotic ontology paradoxically undermines the inner-biological reductionism of 
gene-Darwinism from which this view derived.  
 
(1) Biologism on the one hand is inspired by general downward reductionism, defining 
cultural phenomena in terms of biological phenomena. On the other hand biologism 
comes into contradiction with thorough downward reductionism, which would finally 
result in physicalism. In principle, downward reduction should not stop until it has 
reached the lowest possible level of explanation ( pp. 248 f.). Leaving my earlier 
general objections aside, taken as a general philosophy, any wholes would have to be 
determined in terms of their parts, till we reach the final a-toms, the smallest non 
divisible entity, or, still more modern, the elementary particles of physics.  
The ambivalent relation of biologism to downward reductionism also holds for 
gene-Darwinism as a prototypic biologistic approach ( pp. 138 f., 191 f., 245 f.). 
Advocates of a gene ontology on the one hand are notoriously enthusiastic about 
substance reductionism: ecosystems, societies, gene-pools, organisms and genomes are 
regarded as mere epiphenomena, and single genes are regarded to be essentially the 
only real biological (and sociological) entities ( pp. 35 f.; 264 f.). On the other hand 
this downward reductionist account suddenly stops at the ‘bottom’ of the biological 
sphere, at the explanatory level of single selfish genes. Despite a particularly strong 
inner-biological reductionism, this approach is still inconsistent with thorough 
reductionism. Later on, the assumption of genes as the only unit of explanation, 
denying all larger units, will be challenged ( pp. 264 f.). Presently, we have to grapple 
                                                     
961  This section was first presented as a talk at the post-graduate philosophy seminar (eidos) at the 
University of Durham under the title: Gene-Darwinism, Form and Information (22nd Sep. 1999). 
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with the problem of why genes themselves are not too large as units of explanation, 
provided that one favours a downward reductionist account.  
An advocate of gene-Darwinism might object to this reproach for being 
inconsistent with thorough downward reductionism that he or she still subscribes to 
downward reductionism, but that any reduction has to be done in pragmatic and 
viable steps. In the long run, the gene will also be reduced to biochemistry, etc.  
I would oppose such an interpretation of their enterprise, since it is apparently 
inconsistent with the claims and scientific practice of this school. I think, gene-
Darwinians truly believe in the existence of genes. Normally promoters of this 
approach, as we saw, contrast the reality of genes with the epiphenominality of 
genomes, groups and ecosystems. This contrast would not be reasonable if genes were 
ultimately supposed to be as unreal as groups are believed to be. The entire debate 
concerned with the unit of selection would be misconceived, if in principle all levels 
were not real anyway, i. e. there would finally be no entity which is replicating or 
which is being selected, but only chemical reactions. 
Additionally, assuming that there were no theoretical framework in biology, it 
would not be obvious why so much attention should be given to genes, any DNA 
molecules. Plain downward reductionism should proceed continually. If one only 
wanted to proceed in the reductionist quest pragmatically step after step, one would 
also from time to time use levels above or below the level of single genes. 
Explanatory levels above the level of the gene (e. g. individual animals, genomes etc.) are 
indeed sometimes employed, but these explanations are consistently used as provisory or 
short-cut explanations only. I see also no general tendency that in this paradigm explanations 
are increasingly given on a sub-genetic level. Gene-Darwinians (though seldom geneticists) 
do not, of course, deny the existence of bio-chemical or subatomic reactions, but they do 
not focus on them. They might use a ‘deeper’ explanatory level to explain aspects of the 
gene-level above (for example to show how X-rays could cause random genetic mutations), 
but they will always be interested, not in the chemical reaction itself, but in the higher 
explanatory level of the survival of genes. 
If advocates of gene-Darwinism only claimed that larger units have to be explained by 
smaller ones, resulting in physicalism, and there had been a book called ‘The Selfish 
Gene Pool’, ‘The Selfish Genome’ or ‘The Selfish Quark’, this would presumably not 
have triggered the same paradigm and the same dispute.  
I conclude that advocates of gene-Darwinism do attribute to genes a stronger 
degree of reality than would be justifiable on the ground of plain 
downward reductionism. 
 
(2) Now it is important to show that supporters of a gene-ontology might, even within 
their generally reductive framework, have reason to stop reduction at the level of what 
is called replicators. 
Whatever such an explanation might look like, I think, one cannot deny that any 
such explanation is by definition in contradiction with an exclusively downward 
reductionist approach. This exception may undermine the downward reductionist 
approach and it would become more plausible that explanatory levels above selfish 
genes became accepted. Still it would also be possible – albeit implausible – to accept 
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only one new entity or process which could not be reduced to physics. We have to 
look for an explanation which might justify the special treatment of ‘selfish genes’ 
without already at first glance, being incoherent with the remaining reductionist 
attitude of the gene-Darwinian paradigm. 
Many gene-atomists in fact do not ponder questions of this rather metaphysical 
kind: why reduction should stop at this explanatory level, or why it is at least 
pragmatically convenient to stop at this level. They – as we have seen – usually simply 
proceed in this way. 
In my opinion, the extraordinary centrality and the irreducibility of the gene in 
gene-Darwinism is linked to certain aspects of the notion of a replicator. “What is 
important about the gene is just that it has a certain combination of logical features. It 
is a replicator”.962 Dawkins in particular has made the importance of this notion 
explicit. I agree with Hull, that Dawkins has in this regard committed an act of 
metaphysics.963 Dawkins defines a replicator as “any entity in the universe which 
interacts [...] in such a way that copies are made”.964 The notion of a replicator is, I 
think, indeed general enough (like Aristotle’s notion of anima), to also serve as a 
criterion to divide the inanimate world of physics and chemistry, from the animate 
world of biology and sociology. 
It may be odd to assume that Dawkins, a renown ardent downward reductionist, should be 
regarded as a defender of the autonomy of biology. I do not know, whether he ever 
explicitly argued in this way, but his writings, in my opinion, suggest that he would have to 
support such a view, especially his emphasis on and his definition of the notion replicator, 
but also his neglect of physical and chemical evolution. 
Anyway, given that gene-Darwinism has to justify an explanatory level of genes above 
physics, I think, no other argument is provided by this paradigm. Hence, in my view 
advocates of a gene-ontology – if they were more concerned with these philosophical topics 
– would have to argue this way. 
Before we come to justify why a replicator could count as unit of explanation, not 
reducible to chemistry or physics, we should pause and consider whether the notion 
of a replicator might be a one-sided starting point of an inquiry. Although the main 
part of this work is dedicated to criticising gene-atomism and germ-line reductionism, 
I generally agree that the metaphysical (abstract and general) notion of a replicator is 
helpful for establishing the autonomy of the life sciences. Nevertheless, I concede that 
the notion of a replicator has a downward reductive leaning. 
Even if we were to adopt my later informational interpretation of a replicator as the basis for 
reconstructing the autonomy of the life sciences, we should be aware that this starting point 
still may have a reductionist leaning. A replicator – and hence of the origin of life – is normally 
imagined merely as being a molecule, presumably RNA or DNA. The concept of a 
replicator is normally a single entity and not a system or a part of a larger whole, say a cell. 965 
A definition of life based on replicators not only excludes stars and volcanoes from the 
                                                     
962  J. L. Mackie, The Law of the Jungle (1978), p. 459. 
963  D. Hull, Units of Evolution: A Metaphysical Essay (1981), pp. 30. 
964  R. Dawkins, Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype (1978), p. 67. See: R. Dawkins, The Selfish 
Gene (1976/1989), p. 15. 
965 Cf. e.g., Ch. v. Guttenberg, Biologie als Weltanschauung (1967), pp. 63-64.  
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animate world (a consequence we may welcome), it may also have a general tendency to 
neglect larger systems like ecosystems etc.  
I think it would make a difference to take the notion of a metabolism as starting point 
for the life sciences. The Nobel laureate M. Eigen has proposed the concept of a hypercycle 
with a stronger focus on systems, on the structure of the phenotype and maybe even on 
change without proliferation. I do not want to exclude the possibility, that the two concepts 
may be made coherent.966 Since I am trying to transcend gene-Darwinism from within, I 
only mention this slightly different starting point, without elaborating upon it. 
Also in regard to processes, the notion of a replicator is in my view linked with a 
position, which takes Darwinian processes at least as starting point ( the following 
argument b) and hence might exclude a strong understanding of developmentalism. 
   
For the time being we may ignore this possible one-sidedness. Why should a 
replicator count as a unit of explanation, not being reducible to chemistry or physics? 
In my view there are two reasons. The first reason (a) would relate to properties of 
wholes, and states a position quite obviously opposed to downward reductionism. The 
second reason (b) may closer resemple the actual reasons why gene-Darwinians hold 
this position. However, it replaces the problem rather than solving it. Linked to this, it 
will also be shown why the notion of a replicator undermines a strict 
materialist account. 
 
(a) A replicator, in my view, is a system of chemical components, and relations between 
them, with a certain relation to its surrounding. Only the whole system with its 
relations has the property of copying itself. Simpler entities, even, for example, 
‘organic’ molecules do not have this property of copying themselves. My general 
critical account of radical downward reductionism has already been given, and does 
not need to be repeated here 
 
(b) A replicator, in the view of gene-Darwinism, may have acquired its special status, 
because of its link with Darwinian processes ( pp. 218 f.).967 Despite my critical stance 
towards any exclusive Darwinian metaphysic, I have to draw attention to the fact, that 
the simplest notion of a replicator is, I think, indeed linked with the simplest notion of 
evolution, i. e. Darwinian evolution. Imagine the simplest thinkable atomistic 
replicator in the primeval soup. This replicator, like every replicator, is defined by the 
process of copying. But this first replicator will copy either quickly or slowly, 
accurately or inaccurately, with huge or little variance, and hence this process of 
proliferation is, I concede, as blind as possible (on blindness  pp. 368 f.). The 
proliferated replicators lack (nearly) any structure of their own and are not part of a 
larger whole and could, as far as it is possible, be regarded as being externally selected. 
This simple notion of a replicator leads within the limits of even our strict definition, 
to what we have called a Darwinian process ( pp. 358 f.).  
Following this line of argument, regarding the existence of a replicator as the 
dividing line between biology and chemistry appears obvious. Gene-Darwinism, 
                                                     
966  Cf.: R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (1976/1989), footnote on p. 269 relating to p. 14.   
967  Also R. Dawkins points out (without elaborating it) that the notion of a replicator implies the 
notion of natural selection, River Out of Eden (1995), pp. xi-xii. 
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implicitly following this argument, accordingly regards the resulting property of 
evolving replicators and the corresponding process of natural selection as irreducible 
topics of biology.  
 
Although I also want to draw this conclusion, I think that this quite Darwinian 
argument, defending the reality of replicators, leads it on further, and finally 
undermines its own roots. The argument hinges on assumptions, which, if spelled out 
in detail, undermine the materialistic legacy of this approach. 
Firstly, even if we accepted the presupposed evidence of the existence of Darwinian 
processes (as I actually do) the above argument has only replaced the problem rather than 
solving it. In a regress a gene-Darwinist replaces the problem of the irreducibility of a 
replicator to mere matter in motion by the problem of the irreducibility of natural selection 
to mere matter in motion. 
Secondly, given that the notion of a simple replicator implies a Darwinian process, it 
does not follow that the other way round the existence of Darwinian Processes also implies 
the existence of simple replicators. This depends on how both notions are defined. It might 
indeed be reasonable to define these notions in a way that they imply each other. A 
disadvantage of a resulting strict definition of Darwinian processes might be that drops of 
water and planets – also somehow ‘evolving’ – would be excluded from the scope of a 
Darwinian metaphysics. However, such a definition, in my opinion, would, surprisingly, tend 
to undermine Darwinian process-monism. Each new ‘higher’ biological object, accepted in 
our ontological inventory, while refuting pure gene-atomism, would be a candidate to 
undermine Darwinian process-monism as well. 
Thirdly, if we had accepted the equivalence of a simple replicator and a gene-Darwinian 
process, the notion of a Darwinian Process emphasises – besides blind variation – a second 
step of external selection. This reference to the external world (though a relationship in a 
quite limited sense) may be crucial to why this process could not be reduced to its internal 
parts. In my proposed classification of explanations this would be a ‘synthesis with external 
causes’ (type 4). But if this is the hidden reason to resist downward reduction in this specific 
case, this reference to external causes may also be necessary for many other explanations, 
undermining downward reductionism generally. 
Fourthly, this kind of external relationship appears not to suffice, neither to sustain the 
irreducibility of a replicator nor to characterise a replicator. External selection alone, in the 
mere sense of surviving or not surviving, being or not being (depending on the external 
circumstances), could also be applied (in an almost tautological way) to drops of water and 
planets. Hence, this either undermines the discussed account, or we need an additional 
characterisation to differentiate between drops of water and replicators.  
Following this line of argument, the notion of a replicator, although itself intimately 
linked to gene-Darwinism, either directly undermines gene-Darwinism or requires that 
we find another aspect of the notion of a replicator, which renders genes irreducible, 
but does not transcend gene-Darwinism. In the following subsection I show that the 
other aspect of the notion of a replicator, the reference to the sameness of the copy, 
generally tends to undermine a materialistic approach. 
 
(3) In the following section it is shown that the concept of a replicator, which was 
needed to justify stopping the eliminative quest at the level of the gene, involves 
(a) the concept of a catalyst, i. e. a concept of an entity which changes the probabilities 
that a certain entity emerges and involves (b) the concept that the copied entity could 
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not only be described in material terms, but that the identity of the replicator and the 
replica could only suitably be described in terms of form (eidos in a very simple rather 
Aristotelian than Platonic sense) or information.  
We take Dawkins’ definition that a replicator is “any entity in the universe which 
interacts [...] in such a way that copies are made”964 as a starting point. But our task is 
not finished by giving this definition; in my opinion the essential metaphysical quest 
only starts at this point! What property of a replicator makes it such a special entity 
that we are entitled to take it methodologically, or even ontologically, as a reason for 
an autonomy of the life sciences? We will (a) discuss what it means to ‘interact’ and (b) 
what it means to ‘be a copy’.  
 
(a) What do we mean in our definition of a replicator, when we are concerned with its 
first defining aspect, that of interaction?  
The first explication of this term would be that by interaction we mean some 
causal interrelation of two objects. (Here I will not dwell on the Humean problem 
of causality.)  
But, by interaction, we, of course, do not mean the mere existence of a certain 
entity at the same time its copy emerges. This is not as trivial as it seems, because we 
know since Newton that the gravity of any body interacts in principle with every other 
body. Gravity as a special form of interaction diminishes over distance, but is in 
principle not limited by distance. But if we accepted gravity as an interaction in our 
sense, any structural identical entity (as far as it has mass) would count as a replicator, 
when a new structural identical entity emerged (existing already before, within the 
distance of the speed of light). Obviously, such a proposal would be absurd. But why? 
Presumably, because an interaction is not enough to count as interaction proper. An 
extremely weak long distant influence within other, almost infinite, stronger influences 
is not enough. 
Moreover, we would neither accept all and every case of chemical interaction, 
taking place as close distance electromagnetic interaction. As a thought experiment we 
can look at a real experiment. Since the work of F. Wöhler (we also may think of 
Stanley Miller), we know that ‘organic’ molecules like urea can be produced in normal 
chemical reactions. Urea, chemically speaking CO(NH2)2, consists out of the 
‘inorganic’ components, two times N, five times H, one C and one O. We assume that 
in Wöhler’s test tube another molecule of CO(NH2)2 ‘by chance’ was around already 
when the new molecules of CO(NH2)2 emerged. We assume that this first molecule of 
urea even chemically interacted with one of the inorganic components, say with the 
hydrogen, shortly before a new molecule of urea was composed. Would we then be 
entitled to call the first molecule a replicator? Would we be entitled to deny that 
Wöhler has himself produced ‘organic’ molecules out of inorganic ones and to claim 
that it was the ‘replicating’ organic molecule which has been in the test tube before? 
No, I think not! If the interaction was not ‘essential’ for the emergence of the new 
molecule of urea, and (expressed the other way round) if the emergence of this 
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molecule had taken place ‘independently’ of this old molecule of urea anyway968, the 
interaction of these two molecules, would not qualify the first molecule as a replicator 
(and hence F. Wöhler’s honour remains undiminished). 
Hence, the actual presence of a causal interrelation is only a necessary, but not a 
sufficient condition for qualifying as an interaction proper. The sufficient condition is 
that a replicator by its presence has (to a relevant extent) to enhance the probability of the 
emergence of the identical entity (the replica). The notion of a replicator demands that this 
entity is ‘actively’ contributing something to this emerging new whole. Without the 
existence of a replicator, the probability that single elements become compounded 
into the entity in question, simply by hitting on one another (or what one may call 
chance), would be lower. In short, a replicator is an entity which has the property that 
its existence enhances (perhaps without changing itself) the probability of the 
emergence of the (structurally) same entity.  
Although the aspect of ‘enhancing the probability of an entity to come into 
existence’ appears to me to be philosophically particularly interesting, this is obviously 
not an exclusive property of replicators. In chemistry any catalyst also has the 
property of altering the probability, the rate or the velocity of a reaction (without itself 
undergoing any essential chemical change).  
In this philosophical work, I am not interested in chemical catalysts for their own 
sake, but rather in a generalised notion of a catalyst, i. e. any entity which changes the 
probability of the creation of other entities, without being altered itself. By introducing 
such a notion we, no doubt, enter upon interesting but difficult ground. Besides the 
chemist’s endeavour to look for the reactional mechanisms of catalysis, a metaphysics 
of catalysis appears to be needed. 
Which entities could count as catalysts in the generalised sense? What does it mean to 
change the probability of the elements to build a component? How could this notion of a 
catalyst be made coherent with the deterministic understanding of causality of (classical) 
physics? Are we entitled to use in our definition of a catalyst the complex notions of 
probability and counterfactuals? 
Back to our main line of argument. We have found that the notion of a replicator 
involves catalytic properties, to enhance the probability of the emergence of the 
identical entity. This appears to me to be in contrast to a simple notion of matter in 
motion. This also plays a role in the next section, where we focus on an additional 
property of replicators: unlike mere catalysts, such as enzymes, they are self-referential.  
 
(b) The second notion which plays an important role in our definition of a 
replicator is the notion of a ‘copy’. Besides interaction, this involves a notion of 
sameness. 
Replicators are enhancing the probability that a copy is made of the same entity, 
which enhances the probability that a copy is made of the same entity, which 
enhances the probability that a copy is made of the same entity. Subject and object 
of this process of copying are in some respects identical. A notion of identity is 
                                                     
968  Whether we are entitled to argue in terms of counterfactuals or not is not my topic here. Our 
actual usage of the notion of a replicator entails such a complex concept. 
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needed, which links the subject and the object of the catalytic process. I am going to 
argue that even a notion of informational identity is needed, which would change the 
focus from matter to structure or form (Greek: eidos) and which, historically, has 
been almost the antithesis of matter ( pp. 69 f.).969 
The concept information should here be understood in a common sense way, and not be in-
terpreted in the specified and specialised way of Shannon’s information theory or of semiot-
ics. Later on, I shall introduce the term ‘formation’ which is less burdened with given 
meanings ( pp. 316 f.). 
But what do I mean by informational identity. For my purposes I want to distin-
guish two dimensions of identity: a) Selfsameness and sameness970; b) material and 
formal identity. The notions are made clear in the further course of the argument. 
Obviously the notion of a replicator essentially involves something different 
from selfsameness. Herewith we mean that the replica is spatially distinguished 
from the replicator. The notion of selfsameness (material or formal) is already a 
precondition of any concept of an entity existing at different points of time! Hence, 
in regard to the first mentioned dimension the differentia specifica of a replicator is the 
catalysis not of the selfsame but of the same entity. 
Does this already imply informational identity? Not necessarily. If we think of a 
replicator for example as merely a fragment of DNA, the sameness of form, 
structure or (in)formation – at this point used equivocally – seems to be inextricably 
linked with material sameness. The compounding elements, the nucleic acids, are 
the same in the replicator and the replica. Hence one might argue that the formal 
sameness is only due to the material sameness, or, put differently, that formal same-
ness is reducible to material sameness. Ockham’s razor (i. e. theoretical parsimony) 
would demand us to abandon the additional notion of (in)formational sameness. 
This objection would be invalidated if are able to give an example, where formal 
(informational) sameness is not entangled with material sameness, and hence could 
not be generally reduced to material sameness. Keeping up to Dawkins’ generalised 
definition that a replicator is ‘any entity in the universe which interacts [...] in such a 
way that copies are made’, it is in fact easy to find such an example. In our Lebenswelt 
we are today provided today with a subject area which has become almost proto-
typic for the notion of information itself, i. e. the notion of software. A computer 
virus, a bit of software, obviously fulfils this general criterion for being a replicator.  
Our definition of a replicator implies that computer viruses are also alive, although of course 
not in a greater sense than a biological virus is.  
A computer virus produces copies of itself in a computer network. Such copies could 
also be made to a compatible, but different, computer system, with a different 
operating system, different underlying semiconductors, and different material basis 
(like silicon, gallium arsenide, or optical circuits). 
                                                     
969  For a similar antagonist understanding of matter and information, see e.g., G. Webster, B. 
Goodwin, Form and Transformation (1996), p. 4. But cf. also G. C. Williams, Natural Selection 
(1992), pp. 10 f. 
970  In German there are the terms ‘das Selbe’ and ‘das Gleiche’ to express this distinction. 
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Based on this example, it should become clear that the essence of the property of 
copying is (or at least could be) the copying of the form, the structure or information, 
not that of its material elements. The notion of a replicator, does in principle not 
require the sameness of the underlying material elements! Hence, formal or 
informational sameness, opposed to the material one, does play an indispensable role 
in defining the notion of a replicator.  
In conclusion, a replicator can be regarded as an entity which catalyses the building 
of an entity (i. e. it enhances the probability that such an entity is built) which is in-
formationally, not necessarily materially the same as the replicator. Thereby we have in 
my view already left or transcended a strict materialistic ontology. In the dispute about 
universalia the nominalists have claimed that universals (“the sort of thing which can 
be wholly present in distinct individuals at the same time”971) are mere abstractions, 
which allow us to order intellectually the changing flux of experience. Formal same-
ness would normally be interpreted by a materialist as a mere nominalist abstraction 
(universalia in intellectu), whereas material sameness would be regarded as real. Opposed 
to this it has been shown that the property of form is required. Although I would 
concede that ontological and epistemological issues can never be completely 
disentangled (“Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are 
blind.”972), the need to introduce formal sameness appears to be rather ontological. 
In any case it appears plausible that, if we should adopt an informational or 
semiotic metaphysic, it would undermine the reductionism of gene-Darwinism within 
biology and sociology. The notions of form and information may in this case also 
justify other levels of being. But although this becomes more plausible, it is not 
necessarily conclusive. At least in principle materialistic downward reductionism might 
be replaced by a similar ‘informational downward reductionism’. Thus, in addition to 
our general criticism of reductionism, the following sections on gene-atomism 
( pp. 264 f.), on germ-line-reductionism ( pp. 311) and on process reductionism 
( pp. 333) will challenge more specific aspects of gene-Darwinism. 
 
In conclusion, if gene-Darwinism tries to justify the actual stopping of its reductive 
quest at the level of single genes, it has to introduce the notion of a replicator. But this 
notion of a replicator, closely linked with gene-Darwinism, has been demonstrated not 
to be based on the notion of matter, but on notions of form or information. If this 
holds true, then an at least partly informational or semiotic metaphysic needs to be 
elaborated. On such grounds it might be easier to vindicate the existence of higher 
ontological levels, like organisms or groups, or even psychological states or culture. 
                                                     
971 J. Bigelow, Universals (1998), p. 543. According to Bigelow universals do not have to be 
‘universally’ present in all entities, but they are “characteristically the sort of thing which some 
individuals may have in common, and others may lack.” 
972 I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781/1787), p. A 51/B 75. ( also p. 67). 
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8.2 Genetic Reductionism I:  
Gene-Atomistic Reductionism and Its Transcendence 
Leaving the general problems of substance reductionism behind me, I will now discuss 
the specific problems of genetic reductionism, as advocated by today’s gene-Darwinism 
( pp. 138 f., 191 f.).973 Genetic reductionism could be regarded as being composed 
out of two different reductionistic tenets: firstly, the reductionism of gene-atomism, the 
veneration of the single, independent, selfish gene; and, secondly, germ-line reductionism, 
an extreme interpretation of the Weismannian ‘central dogma of molecular biology’, 
an interpretation venerating the genotype and dismissing the phenotype as a 
mere vehicle. 
If one follows a replicator-vehicle distinction974, gene-atomism is a position that 
exclusively states that single genes are the replicating entities, and germ-line reductionism is 
the position that organisms, groups, species and ecosystems are mere vehicles of the true 
agents of evolution, the genetic replicators.975 
a) Gene-Atomism – Empty or Wrong Claim? 
Gene atomism claiming that there are no other ontological and epistemological levels 
despite the level of single selfish genes ( pp. 140 f.). 
From a historic perspective this view could be contrasted against essentialistic 
( pp. 71, 92 f.), romantic ( pp. 82, 95 f.) and even Kantian biology ( pp. 80, 92, f.), 
which all emphasised that wholes are highly relevant for the existence or interpretation of 
parts. Additionally, gene-atomism also turns against other mechanistic accounts of 
evolution, like the evolutionary synthesis, which has largely focused on properties of 
populations ( pp. 127 f.). Today, gene atomism is a prominent view, but it is increasingly 
challenged by approaches which advocate many levels of evolutionarily relevant entities 
( pp. 152 f.).  
Gene atomism advocates that single genes, small genetic fragments, are the only real 
units of (biological) evolution. Different levels of replicators are discarded. According 
                                                     
973 This needs to be done cautiously, since some critics – though correctly recognising reductionism 
as a general hallmark of this paradigm – have sometimes slightly misinterpreted its specific type 
of reductionism. For example, L. Frith in Sociobiology, Ethics and Human Nature (1992), I think 
correctly, criticised the biologistic reductionism of sociobiology. But, firstly, she, in my view 
wrongly, attributes an individualist view to this paradigm (p. 150). The paradigm is indeed 
opposed to the existence of groups, but treats individualism only as an approximation of the 
truth; correctly the hard-core principle of gene-Darwinism, predominant in today’s sociobiology, 
is the sub-individual selfish genes’ viewpoint. Secondly, she states that sociobiologists treat family 
units in the same way as society and environments (p. 151). This also gives a too simplified 
impression. Although it is true that families like single organisms are seen in a nominalistic, 
reductionistic way, they are based on their relatedness, according to the theory of kin selection 
and understood to be much more real than other groups or ecosystems.  
974 For Hull’s modifications and Dawkins’ later extension of his own primordial terminology 
 p. 219. The distinction itself will be discussed in the section on germ-line reductionism 
( pp. 311 f.). 
975 R. Dawkins draws this distinction in a similar, but different, way, The Extended Phenotype 
(1982/1989), p. 82, sometimes a link of these two arguments becomes apparent, p. 95. 
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to gene-Darwinism it is essential that a unit of evolution or selection is a replicator 
(this guarantees its stability).976 For the time being, we are not concerned with the 
replicator-vehicle distinction or the phenotypic versus genotypic debate, i. e. with the 
phene-versus-gene, individual-versus-genome, group-versus-gene-pool debate. 
Instead, we engage in the gene-versus-genome-versus-gene-pool debate, which is only 
concerned with the genotypic side.977 
Are single selfish genes essentially the sole (biological) replicators? Or is it in 
principle possible to regard larger genetic units as replicators as well, like compounds 
of genes, whole genomes or gene pools of organisms, groups, species or ecosystems? 
In traditional terms this could be reformulated as the question of what is the 
genetic ‘substance’ and ‘accident’ of evolutionary change. Gene-atomism, linked to the 
modern understanding of substance, seeks this substance of evolution exclusively 
within smallest genetic bits ( pp. 248 f.). 
The claim of the selfishness of small genetic fragments results from two assumptions. Firstly, 
according to what I have called the ‘principle of egoism’ ( e. g. p. 110), every substance (at 
least, if it has active powers) ‘cares’ only for itself. Based on this principle, one may 
generalise the term ‘selfish gene’ to any – active – substance and call them more generally 
‘selfish entities’. The second assumption of gene-atomism is that the only genetic substances 
are single genes. At this point we are only concerned with the latter assumption.978 
I regard the gene-atomistic claim as either (1) empty or (2) wrong:  
(1) The notion gene is microbiologically closely linked to the discovery of 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). In that context a gene is conceptualised as a strand of 
DNA, a short pattern of information, coded in the simple alphabet of the nucleotide 
bases, adenine, guanine, cytosine, and thymine. According to this understanding a 
gene is frequently equated with a piece of three nucleotide bases (a triplet), which 
often codes an amino acid, those components from which proteins are build. It is also 
often restricted to those triplets, which actually code amino acids (codons). Sometimes 
a ‘gene’ also refers to a DNA-sequence which is the basis for an RNA-transcription or 
a polypeptide. 
However, Dawkins and other protagonists of the gene-Darwinian paradigm, as we 
have seen, have favoured exclusively single ‘atomic’ genes as replicators.979 Although 
this at first glance seems to be a radical claim – any larger genetic units, genotypes and 
gene-pools become excluded – it may well turn out to be an almost empty statement if 
the adopted definitions of a gene are taken into consideration.  
                                                     
976  E.g., R. Dawkins, Replicator Selection (1978), p. 69. 
977 According to R. Dawkins, one of the most passionate supporters of gene atomism, there may be 
a hierarchy of vehicles, not of replicators. He even claimed that the individual-versus-group 
debate is only concerned with vehicles and assumes that his gene-atomism – what replicators are 
concerned – is not questioned. Cf.: The Selfish Gene (1976/1989), p. 254; The Extended Phenotype 
(1982/1989), p. 82. Nevertheless, Dawkins, at least half-heartedly, discusses the question of 
gene-pool-selection in The Extended Phenotype (1982/1989), p. 114. 
978 Although the principle of egoism bears some truth, I do not regard it as being generally true 
( pp. 418f.).  
979 But  also p. 31. 
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In contrast to the microbiological understanding, a gene here is usually defined in 
evolutionary rather than primarily chemical terms. Williams defines a gene as “any 
hereditary information for which there is a favourable or unfavourable selection bias 
equal to several or many times its rate of endogenous change”980. Dawkins (referring 
to Williams) defines a gene as “any portion of chromosomal material which potentially 
lasts for enough generations to serve as a unit of natural selection”.981 A gene is 
defined by its immortality or lastingness, and not by its physical properties 
(cf.  p. 255 f.). But given such a general notion of a gene, it then means almost 
nothing to claim that the gene is the sole unit of (replicator) selection. The question 
‘what is the entity which lasts through generations and could count as replicator?’, is 
answered with ‘the entity (defined as ‘gene’) which lasts through generations and could 
count as replicator’. This is evidently true – but only because the answer tautologically 
repeats the question. The formulation only tacitly introduces a second criterion for 
being a unit of selection. Besides being a replicator now also longevity is required, 
which refers back to the concept of substance. However, we currently simply accept 
this criterion as adequate as well. In regard of a tautological formulation of gene-
atomism, an early critic of the selfish-gene view of evolution pointed out that this is 
like “someone analysing language, who insists that we must find its fundamental 
elements, but talks as if it did not matter whether we take those elements to be letters, 
words or sentences.”982 And indeed sometimes it appears as if Dawkins himself 
intended to define genes completely tautologically, allowing much larger units than 
single genes.983 “What I have now done is to define the gene in such a way that I 
cannot help being right!”984 
But there are several reasons which speak against the view that Dawkins and other 
gene-Darwinians use the term ‘gene’ merely to speak about any replicator, however 
complex. Firstly, gene-atomism would have stated nothing new, apart from that there 
are units of selection. It would still not be clear, if a small bit of DNA, a genotype, a 
whole gene pool, or a whole hierarchy of levels should be regarded as replicator. In 
spite of obvious tautological aspects of the above definition, Dawkins and other 
proponents of gene-atomism, of course, have not chosen the word ‘gene’ by chance 
and could scarcely have used ‘system of genes’, ‘genome’ or ‘gene-pool’ instead. As 
indicated earlier, a title like ‘The Selfish Genome’ or ‘The Selfish Gene-Pool’ would 
have implied a totally different research programme.985 Additionally in some 
definitions of genes smallness is mentioned: a gene is “a genetic unit that is small 
enough to last for a large number of generations and to be distributed around in the 
form of many copies”986. Although still advocating a fading-out definition of genes, 
Dawkins, in regard to sexually reproducing organisms (like humans), has always 
                                                     
980 G. C. Williams, Adaptation and Natural Selection (1966), p. 25. 
981  R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (1976/1989), p. 28. 
982  M. Midgley, Gene-Juggling (1979), pp. 450-451. 
983 R. Dawkins, Replicator Selection (1978), pp. 68-69; In Defence of Selfish Genes (1981), pp. 568-570; 
The Extended Phenotype (1982/1989), pp. 85-87, 89.  
984  Idem, The Selfish Gene (1976/1989), p. 33. 
985  Cf. e.g., R. Dawkins, In Defence of Selfish Genes (1981), p. 559; The Selfish Gene (1976/1989), p. 33. 
986 Idem, The Selfish Gene (1976/1989), p. 32. 
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argued that because of the meiotic shuffle, “small fragments of genome” are the only 
biological candidates for a replicator.987 “The shorter the genetic unit is, the longer – 
in generations – it is likely to live” and to count as a replicator. He has also called his 
view ‘atomistic’.988 Moreover, Dawkins himself regards ‘higher’ forms of selection and 
the concept of a hierarchy of replicators as utterly wrong989.  
Hence, I think we are entitled, to conclude that gene-Darwinism, as advocated by 
Dawkins, despite tautological aspects in the definition of genes, has actually favoured 
a concept of selection exclusively on the level of small genetic fragments. Apart from 
exceptions like non-sexually reproducing plants, the term ‘gene’ according to this 
paradigm exclusively refers to small piece of DNA. 
 
(2) But, if according to this strict gene-atomism small piece of DNA are the only units 
of (replicator) selection, I think this paradigm has to be rejected. Reasons for a 
rejection of this approach are worked out in the next three sections. 
This should, of course, not imply that I want to damn single genes in general as one level of 
explanation. I do appreciate that sociobiology has introduced this level.990 Still, I shall argue 
that gene-atomists have gone much to far in claiming that single genes are the only units of 
evolution and to understand them as being totally independent and radically selfish. In 
contrast to gene-atomism I shall advocate a multi-level approach in which single genes also 
have their place, and in which the acceptance of higher levels reduces, though not 
necessarily completely eliminates, the selfishness on the level of genes.  
b) Higher Genetic Units – Despite the Meiotic Shuffle 
(i) The General Possibility of Emergent Higher Genic Units 
The denial of larger units of present gene-Darwinism refers back to Fisher, often 
quoted by Dawkins.564 Alternatively, authors of the second step of the evolutionary 
synthesis have tried to reduce the atomism of ‘bean-bag genetics’ (Mayr) in their work, 
and stressed the contextuality and interaction of genes ( pp. 127 f.). Some of these 
authors even explicitly advocated a general position stressing emergent properties on 
the level of systems.991 
Although gene-Darwinism brought back gene-atomism, there are also theoretical 
germs within this paradigm itself, which, I think, point beyond atomism. I have 
worked out that the central concept of a replicator refers to information rather than to 
matter ( pp. 255 f.). In my opinion it is a general tendency in sociobiology to 
emphasise the information-transferring property of genes, which not only make 
copies of themselves, but support copies of themselves in other organisms. This also 
becomes apparent in the (helpful) metaphors of DNA as ‘a text’, the four amino acids 
                                                     
987 Ibid, pp. 29 f., even his, in this regard, more guarded R. Dawkins, Replicator Selection and the 
Extended Phenotype (1978), p. 62, even p. 68.  
988  Idem, The Selfish Gene (1976/1989), p. 29; The Extended Phenotype (1982/1989), p. 113. 
989 E.g., R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (1976/1989), pp. 2, 39; Replicator Selection and the Extended 
Phenotype (1978), p. 62. 
990  E.g., R. Dawkins, Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype (1978), p. 66. 
991  E. Mayr, The Growth of Biological Thought (1982), pp. 63 f. ( pp. 130, 134).  
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as ‘the alphabet’992, or the ‘river of DNA’ as a “river of information, not a river of 
bones and tissues”993. Taken to its own logical conclusion, it would become clear that 
genes understood as information could not be interpreted without their context. 
Philosophers might be reminded of the debate about basic sense data, where philosophers 
from different schools of thought like Gadamer, Quine and Rorty criticised the concept of 
elementary units of interpretation. 
Likewise genetics, as it appears to me, increasingly understands the genome not by the 
analogy of atoms or beans, but rather by the analogy of a computer program. The 
genome becomes characterised by contextuality and structuredness. This becomes 
apparent if one considers concepts like codogenes, exons, introns, regulatory genes, 
reparation mechanisms, mobile genetic elements etc.  
 
Even without explicitly referring to information it becomes apparent that genes could 
not be understood without considering their phenotypic effects and its genotypic 
context. If one thinks, for example, of a ‘monogenic’ inheritance for blue eyes. Even 
in this very simple case, where only one homozygous allele is said to have a 
phenotypic effect, selection of that single allele can only take place in a certain genic 
context. In the case of albinism a missing enzyme (tyrosinase) and the resulting lack of 
the pigment melanin leads to colourless eyes, which appear pink because the blood 
vessels of the retina are visible. This may be the case although alleles ‘for blue eyes’ are 
still at its locus, but because of the missing enzyme they are actually not ‘expressed’.994 
In this sense there is even in the case of monogenic inheritance no real independence 
of genes, there is, strictly speaking, no ‘monogenic’ inheritance. In order to provide 
the colour of something, that something has to be in place. The gene ‘blue (eyes)’ can 
only develop and survive together with the totality of genes required ‘for the character 
of eyes’. Hence, could we to a certain extent regard this unit as a higher-level gene and 
itself as a unit of selection? 
Particularly, within a Darwinian paradigm, it appears possible to say that where the 
new unit has a different inclusive fitness from its separate parts, the unit, will – by 
definition – have an effect on the selection process. Hence this higher-level gene 
fulfils the criteria of being a unit of selection.995 It is a chunk of DNA, which carries 
genetic information, which is longer than a single gene (in Dawkins sense); it replicates 
and has an evolutionary impact. 
In the case of asexual organisms, where no crossing-over takes place, any higher-
level gene, which improves the inclusive fitness of the organism as a whole, directly 
fulfils the criteria, of potentially being immortal or at least long-lived (which we 
                                                     
992 E.g., R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (1976/1989), p. 23; The River out of Eden (1995), pp. 11 f, 41, 43. 
993  Idem, The River out of Eden (1995), p. 4, also p. 19.  
994  R. Dawkins seems to accept such facts, but presumably due to his germline-reductionism and to 
his argument concerning the meiotic shuffle he draws opposed conclusions, In Defence of Selfish 
Genes (1981), pp. 565-568. 
995 For quite small units this is accepted also by R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (1976/1989), p. 32, 
also  footnote 983, 985, 986. 
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currently simply accept). In case of sexual organisms, we additionally have to face the 
problem of the meiotic shuffle. 
(ii) Higher Genic Units Despite the Meiotic Shuffle 
Sexually reproducing organisms have always been of foremost interest, since we 
ourselves belong to this group. The evolutionary synthesis particularly focused on 
them, because its theoretical core of population genetics is concerned with sexually 
reproducing interbreeding organisms. Gene-Darwinism, although in many respect at 
odds with the synthesis, also focuses on this class, since only there this “central 
argument”996 of meiotic shuffle supporting gene atomism comes into play. In the 
genetic shuffling during meiosis (the special kind of cell division to produce sex cells), 
the “genome is shredded to smithereens” and gene-Darwinians, like Dawkins, 
conclude from this fact that only short bits of DNA can be regarded as continuous 
units of selection.997 As outlined earlier, gene-Darwinians thus argue that the “shorter 
a genetic unit is, the longer – in generations – it is likely to live”998. Even if a gene-
atomist would concede that a gene can not be interpreted without its context, he or 
she, based on the fact of meiotic recombination, would still conclude that it is not this 
context which is preserved, and hence there are no higher-level replicators.999  
There are two possibilities for challenging this view. Either replicators have not to 
be lasting to qualify as units of evolution or larger units are actually in some sense 
lasting as well. I focus on the latter aspect and advocate that larger units in a 
probabilistic sense are actually lasting, but thereby I also challenge the assumption that 
units need to be lasting in the (materialistic) sense of permanent presence in each 
concerned instance.Gene-atomists argue that as a gene travels from genome to 
genome through the generations, the genic context changes completely. This, in my 
opinion, is wrong. Gene-atomists, although in other respects having started to 
understand genes as information, here in a somewhat old-fashioned way remain 
materialistic. This is linked to the – already old – ‘modern’ materialist understanding 
of substance. According to gene-atomists, permanence is only given if a nexus of 
100%, in the sense of a material continuous unity of one body, is given (which 
excludes systematic synergetic properties). 
But despite the meiotic shuffle, obviously some contextual continuities do still 
exist. The Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium, which is concerned with alleles, is based on 
this fact. In regard of different loci, the very notion of a locus already assumes a 
certain structure and a given context. A chunk of DNA ‘determining the eye colour of 
humans’ on its own, put into a test-tube with nutrients, will, of course, never develop 
the blueness without an eye, or an eye without a body. Also in regard of loci 
                                                     
996  Idem, The Selfish Gene (1976/1989), p. 29.  
997 Ibid, pp. 25 f.; Idem, Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype (1978), p. 68 (quote).  
As mentioned earlier, Dawkins in the latter publication is in this respect much more guarded, 
than in his Selfish Gene.  
998 Idem, The Selfish Gene (1976/1989), pp. 25, 29. 
999  R. Dawkins, for example, replies to E. Mayr’s stress on the context of a gene in this way, 
Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype (1978), p. 69. 
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continuities result from frequency distributions of gene-pools, and not only from the 
direct descent of organisms1000. Not only in asexual organisms but in sexually 
reproducing organisms too, the gene for eyes being blue will of course usually find 
itself united with genes for the general existence of the eye. Standard contexts could 
even be regarded to be a precondition for speaking of certain genes at all.1001 If this is 
provided, I see no reason to deny in principle the possibility of higher-level genes in 
gene pools, only because they do not assemble in each and every generation. 
An entity based on probability distributions does not need to appear remarkable, 
the more so, if we think of modern physics. Playing a causal role and being potentially 
long-lived, it should in principle (despite further qualifications) be possible for such 
higher units to count as a unit of evolution. 
One is even inclined to argue that the longer the genetic unit is, the more it is on 
average interpretable in terms of phenotypes and the larger is its evolutionary role. 
The wholes only exist in a probabilistic sense of context, where the whole does not 
only determine the parts, but the parts in their particular combination and inner 
dynamics also determine the whole. Hence, the envisioned non-reductive holism, 
which does not deny the relevance of parts and which is based on a probabilistic or 
field understanding of wholes, need not be linked to that sort of Platonic (opposed to 
an Aristotelian) essentialism, which neglects varieties and which has been criticised by 
Popper, Hull and Mayr.1002 
It lies outside the scope of this work to clarify the relation of this field interpretation to my 
field theory of exformation ( pp. 324 f.). 
To sum up, if there is a sufficiently high probability of coming together and 
togetherness causing a property which causes an increase in the fitness of this system 
compared with each of its parts, then – leaving all other things equal – the union will 
itself have the tendency to survive. Despite the meiotic shuffle higher-level genes can 
probabilistically have an evolutionary relevance. 
Matters, as we will see, are more complicated, since the tendencies of the parts have also to 
be considered. Only under certain causal conditions the effects of a whole lead to stabilise 
the system. 
                                                     
1000 The term ‘gene pool’ still has the misleading connotation of being totally structureless, which is 
usually not the case.  
1001  K. Sterelny, P. Kitcher, The Return of the Gene (1988/1998), p. 163. In that paper it is argued that 
the stability of the context is given, in order to defend the gene-Darwinian tenet that single 
genes do exist. The authors objected to St. J. Gould’s argumentation in Caring Groups and Selfish 
Genes (in The Panda’s Thumb, 1980, p. 77). Although in my view Gould was right in stressing the 
context dependence of genes, I agree that the not direct visibility of genes, does not entail that 
they do not exist. I do not deny the existence of single genes, but I criticise the claim of their 
exclusive existence. An acceptance of a stable context, using Sterelny’s and Kitcher’s argument 
with a different intention, also allows for higher-level units and thereby undermines gene-
Darwinian atomism. 
1002  Cf. also: M. Ruse, David Hull Trough Two Decades (1989). G. Webster, B. C. Goodwin, Form and 
Transformation (1996), pp. 9, 17 f., 99-100. (On the Plato’s and Aristotle’s understanding of 
forms,  also pp. 71 f.). 
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Synergetic or systemic properties, which I have tried to justify probabilistically, are 
often discussed under the keyword of the additivity criterion. 
The additivity criterion of a unit of selection was first in detail made explicit by 
W. Wimsatt and then, in a different way, was elaborated by E. Lloyd.1003  I abstract 
from their views and state a – I think – similar formulation in my own words. Perhaps 
this definition rather mirrors Wimsatt’s position: A unit of selection is any heritable 
entity or type of entity, which has an additional fitness (and in this regard varies to 
entities which have not this property), which does not appear at any lower 
level of organisation.  
This is not much more than the general old idea that ‘the whole is more than the sum of its 
parts’, applied in a Darwinian context. This simplified – and thereby maybe trivial – idea is 
implicitly present in many earlier evolutionary texts, for example in those of Gould and 
Lewontin. Also my argument above of the possibility of synergetic higher genic units in 
principle repeats these ideas, although applied on the side of the replicator, and not on the 
side of interactors.  
The actual definitions of Wimsatt and Lloyd are actually more refined, one focusing on 
context independence, the other on strict additivity. But for my purposes the further details 
appear not to be relevant. My proposed definition is perhaps even in contradiction with 
some aspects of Lloyd’s definition1004.  
Given a Darwinian framework, additivity or synergetic properties with a fitness 
effectseem to me to be necessary conditions for the evolutionary existence of wholes 
and thus for the transcendence of gene-atomism.1005  
Elliot Sober and David Sloan Wilson opposed the additivity criterion, although 
they criticised the philosophy of egoistic genes in a different way.1006 I do not discuss 
whether Sober and Wilson are right in respect of any specific formulation of the 
additivity criterion.1007 I think that they did not turn against the above more moderate 
exposure of synergetic properties (or if they did, they were wrong in doing so):  
Sober and Wilson in regard of a specific formulation of the additivity criterion argued, that 
groups which properties which are in a linear way dependent on the proportion of altruist 
members would by this definition be excluded from counting as wholes. But this 
assumption is central for their group selectionist models, and I agree that it would be absurd 
to exclude such groups from being a counterexample to gene-Darwinism. But, I think, a well 
understood concept of synergetic properties does not exclude these wholes. Such a linear 
relationship does not entail that the resulting entity is merely the sum of its parts. Instead the 
wholes or groups in Sober’s and Wilson’s examples show supersummative properties, which 
depend in their amount on the proportion of certain members. Hence, in my understanding, 
this could be counted as an example of a synergetic property. Thus, I tend to follow Lloyd, 
                                                     
1003  E. Lloyd, The Structure and Confirmation of Evolutionary Theory (1988/1994), pp. 69 f. W. Wimsatt, 
Reductionistic Research Strategies and their Basis in the Units of Selection Controversy (1980), p. 236. 
1004  E. Lloyd, The Structure and Confirmation of Evolutionary Theory (1988/1994), p. 102. 
1005  In a not purly Darwinian framework, it may be questioned, whether evolutionary morphological 
constrains, which also may have an impact on the direction of evolution, are adequately treated 
in terms of fitness. 
1006  E. Sober, D. S. Wilson, Philosophical Work on the Unit of Selection Problem (1994/1998), pp. 203 f. 
1007  E.g., E. Lloyd opposed this view, The Structure and Confirmation of Evolutionary Theory (1988/1994), 
pp. 72 f. 
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who had pointed out that Sober implicitly employs the additivity criterion.1008 At least 
provided a general understanding of synergetic properties this appears to be valid. Otherwise 
Sober and Wilson would not have been able to propose group selectionist models, based on 
the additional fitness of the whole group, differing from the fitness of its elements. 
In any case, I think that Sober and Wilson were right in having pointed out that a 
causal approach is also needed,1009 to show why a structural property of the super-
summative whole (for example due to the altruism of its members) is not overrun by 
selfish members.1010  
 
Therefore further scrutiny of this topic is needed. The next sections will be concerned 
with several questions regarding how far wholes can have a causal impact on their 
parts and in how far wholes are not undermined by selfish tendencies of their parts. 
Additionally, the question is considered once more whether it would be more 
appropriate to convert the parlance of higher-level units into single gene-parlance. 
Finally, we will be concerned with the question in how far the results for loci in one 
individual are valid for alleles in different organisms as well. 
c) Top-Down Causation and Higher-Level Genes at Different Loci 
In this section we will firstly be concerned with the general relationship of higher-level 
properties to downward causation. Secondly, the question is treated, whether higher-
level genes (a system of genes, which only together have synergetic properties for the 
good of the system), are probabilistically stable enough not to be overrun on a lower 
level by alleles which do not have this property.  
(i) The Relationship of Higher-Level Genes and Downward Causation  
Above I have advocated the probabilistic existence of synergetic properties of alleles 
at different loci, despite the meiotic shuffle. Now we additionally assume the stability 
of these probabilistic high-level genes, in the sense of not being undermined by selfish 
components (this will be discussed below). We discuss whether high-level genes under 
these conditions imply what has been called ‘downward causation’1011.  
Properties of systems of genes in a way have to be causally relevant, otherwise we 
would not perceive them and would not speak of a property being there at all. But 
here we are not interested in some causal relevance, but specifically in an evolutionary 
relevance. In a selectionist model, from which we started our discussion, all properties 
which bear on the fitness are by definition (in average) evolutionarily relevant and, 
hence, synergetic properties which have such an effect (higher-level genes) are also 
evolutionarily relevant (we may think of the example of eyes as wholes). 
Does this entail downward-causation, a top-down causation, which I use in the 
sense that wholes may be causally relevant for their parts? 
                                                     
1008  Cf.: Ibid, pp. 82, 85.   
1009 Cf.: Ibid, pp. 82 f. 
1010  E.g., E. Sober, What is Evolutionary Altruism? (1988/1998), p. 462. 
1011  A term, I think, first proposed by D. T. Campbell. 
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In principle it is not obvious that wholes could have an impact on parts. According to a 
generally downward reductive, materialistic ontology, which advocates a modern 
understanding of substances, wholes do not exist at all or are at best regarded to be 
epiphenomena. Wholes in this view are merely effects of the composing parts. It is, of 
course, true that a whole can by definition not exist without its parts (at least not in an actual 
sense), but this does not imply that the whole is nothing but its parts. A whole is not 
something alien to its parts, but it is its parts and specific relations between them. Based on 
my earlier critique of the modern downward reductive understanding of substances in 
general, I treat properties of systems, as long as they are not shown by their parts on their 
own (or at least in most other combinations) as properties of these systems, of larger 
wholes. I do not deny the existence of atoms, but I regard molecules with their specific 
relationships of parts to be real as well, having specific new properties which their elements 
do not have on their own ( p. 245). 
In a selectionist context, properties of a system, which change the fitness of that 
system, by definition not only influence the survival of the system, but thereby also 
influence its parts. Hence, parts may become selected, because of the properties of 
higher genic wholes (properties of systems of genes). Depending on the importance of 
such higher-level properties, alternative compounding alleles may perish, although, 
taken separately, they might have a higher fitness. Hence, higher-level genes can in 
principle have an evolutionary effect on the composing genes. Any such top-down 
effect, if actually found, is in contradiction to the spirit of the arguments and polemics 
of gene-Darwinians that single genes are maximally egoistic and can never serve any 
higher wholes. 
It is scarcely conceivable that properties of a high-level gene (here at several loci) 
have no effect on the composing alleles. The only case in which this may be 
conceivable is that of a restructuring of the genome without changing which genes are 
necessary. If different high level genes are based on the same underlying alleles, a 
more advantageous system may become established, without affecting which alleles 
build these systems. Here an evolutionary pathway may be taken which is best for the 
larger unit, with no effect for its elements. For example, if the genome of an organism 
by a specific type of mutation like an inversion or a translocation became restructured 
and this organism founded an isolated new population (founder effect), an improved 
high level-gene may evolve by changing the relations of the loci, without changing 
what composing alleles are advantageous. It might, for instance, be advantageous if 
the loci of a high-level gene are on one chromosome.  
Actually the species drosophila melanogaster, d. subobscura, d. pseudoobscura and d. willistoni differ 
mainly in their chromosomal structure. 
If this population and the other population remained functionally isolated, the new 
founded population only differing in respect of its advantageous high-level gene – and 
not in respect of its genetic components – would probably outbreed the other. In this 
sense, here no direct top-down effect is given. Nevertheless the increased fitness of 
the whole may indirectly still change the fitness of its parts.  
In conclusion, the existence of fitness changing properties of a system of genes 
(higher-level genes) are not only a necessary but a sufficient condition for top-down 
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causation, at least as long as we are not only concerned with a restructuring of the 
genome.  
(ii) The Stability of Higher-Level Genes on Different Loci 
Probabilistic higher-level genes, can be stable in the sense of not being overrun by 
alternative ‘egoistic’ genes on the lower level. 
In the present section we will be concerned with genes at different loci and we 
only later turn to the more difficult problem of alleles in different organisms (although 
this will play a role here as well). The question of higher-level genes at different loci 
has long been ignored, since the evolutionary syntheses was concerned with allelic 
competition and, at least in its early phase, which Mayr called ‘bean bag genetics’, the 
assumption of the independence of genes has often been taken for granted. Although 
the synthesis later increasingly acknowledged the dependence of different loci and 
alleles, the synthesis remained to be based on models of population genetics, where 
loci have been treated as somehow given, whereas the alleles were seen to be objects 
of competition and evolution. Proponents of the second phase of the synthesis, like 
Mayr, were also not required to defend higher-level genes, because they claimed that 
the individual phenotype, not the gene, is the unit of selection, and the species, not 
the gene, is the unit of evolution. 
A defence of higher-level genes only becomes necessary against the background of 
the gene-Darwinian claim that any selection is ultimately gene-selection and that all 
evolutionary entities are reducible to single genes ( pp. 140 f.). In principle the unity 
of the organism remains mysterious to gene-Darwinians.1012 “Fundamentally, all that 
we have a right to expect from our theory is a battleground of replicators, jostling, 
jockeying, fighting for a future in the genetic hereafter.”1013 Hence it was only 
consistent that gene-Darwinians have broken the dike between genes at different loci 
and genes on the same locus (alleles), though, of course, not denying their differences. 
Gene-Darwinians have shown that genes on different loci in one genome are 
competing.1014 Moreover, it became obvious in section a, that gene-Darwinians have 
argued that in respect of sexual organisms only short strands of DNA could count as 
evolutionary units. 
It should now be shown that higher-level genes at different loci, whose existence I 
advocated earlier, can under certain conditions be evolutionarily stable and are not 
undermined by single alleles which do not show the synergetic properties of the 
system.  
 
In order to show this, we take a closer look at the concept of a genetic system of 
genes A, B at two loci, the simplest possible genic system. For our purposes their 
distance on the chromosome or whether they are located on different chromosomes 
should not be taken into account. Although this distance is one factor determining the 
probability of the genes appearing together in directly successive generations. Here we 
                                                     
1012  Cf. e.g., R. Dawkins, The Extended Phenotype (1982/1989), p. 5. 
1013 R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (1989), p. 256. 
1014 Idem, The Extended Phenotype (1982/1989), pp. 156 ff.  
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are concerned with higher-level genes, whose probability of being united in the same 
genome, despite the meiotic shuffle, is a probability function of the frequency of both 
genes in the population. We assume that only in union do these two genes have a 
certain synergetic property improving the fitness of the two locus system:  
 
F(A, B) > F(A, bj),   F(A, B) > F(ai, B),   F(A, B) > F(ai, bj) 
 
Here ai and bj are the classes of alternative alleles corresponding to A and B (for our 
present example it does not matter how many alternative alleles there are). Focusing 
on this one higher-level effect, we stipulate for reasons of simplicity, that there are no 
such synergetic effects in the case of other combinations of alleles and that all these 
other combinations have the same, lower, fitness value:  
 




 F           F 
  
 
   
AB            AB 
   
          w                  0c                  w 
       
   
          0c, Ac, Bc                   Ac, Bc   
          
          0             p(A), p(B)              1                               0             p(A), p(B)              1 
Figure 3 and 4: The high-level gene AB could be fitter (F) than their components A and B. The 
right figure shows that even if their components are less fit outside of this system compared with 
each of their alternative alleles, the systemic advantage may still make them evolutionarily stable, if 
these genes are probable (p(A), p(B)) enough so that the synergetic effect counterbalances this 
undermining effect. In this case, the resulting fitness average fittness of the allele A (or B), indicated 
by w, has two optima, resulting in two evolutionary stable frequency distributions (indicated 
by the arrows).  
 
 
In Figure 3 the fitness values of these gene combinations are depicted as being 
dependent on the frequency of A and B relative to their alternative alleles in a given 
population. In order to present such a two locus model in one graph, which is 
normally used for presenting the relative frequency of two alternative alleles at only 
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one locus1015, we have to make some simplifying assumptions. We stipulate, only for 
reasons of representation, that the probabilities p of A and B, and of their alternative 
alleles should be coupled: p(A) = p(B); p(¬A) = p(¬B). This is irrelevant for my 
argument, but makes it possible to depict the relative frequencies of alleles of both 
loci on one axis.  
We also assume that synergetic effects have an absolute, not a relative, advantage in the 
population. Therefore all fitness values for certain combinations of genes are parallel to the 
abcissa.1016  
Furthermore we, of course, employ the usual assumption of population genetics that the 
gene pool is unstructured and that all genes mix randomly. These assumptions will be 
criticised later, but for the time being they are helpful. 
In the chart the gene-combinations of A with B is called briefly ‘AB’. The other 
combinations, of A with some bj, of B with some ai, and of some ai with some bj, are 
called ‘Ac,’, ‘Bc’ and ‘0c’.  
Let us first look at Figure 3 (left figure). If the probabilities of A and B are low, 
there will only seldom be an AB combination and its synergetic advantage will almost 
never come into play. Hence also the average fitness of A (or B) in this population (w) 
stays almost as low as if the synergetic property did not exist at all. In this first model 
A and B on their own (combined with some different alleles on the other locus) are 
neutral, if compared to their alternative alleles. Hence, if A or B evolved by mutation 
they will not directly be counter-selected. Instead one day the combination of As and 
Bs will come together to form a high level gene and then have a higher probability to 
multiply. The more As and Bs are present in the gene pool the more often the AB-
system will have an advantage, until finally all ai and bj alleles become extinct. 
Although the fitness of A and B gave each of them, on their own, no advantage, their 
systemic two locus interaction leads them to gain dominance in the population. 
Already in this case, I think, it would be inappropriate to reinterpret this in terms of 
gene-atomism or gene-egoism ( below and section e and f). 
 
In Figure 4 my point becomes easily apparent. I am only changing one assumption. 
Now we stipulate that the As and Bs, as long as they are not building their system, are 
less fit than their alternative alleles ai and bj. 
 
F (A, B) > F (ai, bj) > F (A, bj) = F (ai, B) 
 
A single A or B mutant will now be counter-selected and will soon die out. Here the 
genes which together (systemically) are advantageous for the larger system, will not 
survive. Only if A and B (as by a founder effect) both have a high enough relative fre-
quency that the advantages of the AB-system often enough came into play and could 
counterbalance the other effects, would the AB-system soon come to dominate the 
population. With other words, the AB-system, under these conditions, is an 
                                                     
1015  Cf.: E. Sober, What is Evolutionary Altruism? (1988/1998), p. 463. E. Sober, D. S. Wilson, 
Philosophical Work on the Unit of Selection Problem (1994/1998), p. 207. 
1016  In a different context: E. Sober, What is Evolutionary Altruism? (1988/1998), p. 463. 
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evolutionarily stable strategy. A mutant ai, or bj gene, which under different conditions 
would have had a higher fitness than A and B on their own, would now have a 
lower fitness value.  
One should note, that besides the synergetic property of A and B, we are here also 
concerned with the phenomenon of the changing of fitness values dependent on the 
frequency of composing genes in the population. In my view, this, based on the 
existence of higher-level genes, is another synergetic property of the relative frequency 
of genes in a given population. 
Back to our starting question, higher-level genes which have a positive effect on a 
system at large, could under certain conditions be evolutionarily stable, even if each of 
their composing genes, taken on its own, is less fit than their alternative alleles. This 
corresponds to the intuition that without higher-level genes, which are based on 
elementary genes and are good for a larger whole, despite being less fit outside this 
specific allelic context, the actual quite harmonious whole of the individual genome 
would be inconceivable. 
I have to concede that up until this point we have not much concerned ourselves 
with the question of the possibility of altruism between organisms, since we have treated 
higher-level genes at two loci of one genome (although also the synergetic property of 
a population became apparent). Later, we will discuss to which extend these 
arguments can be generalised. In any case this argument, possibly trivial from the 
viewpoint of other Darwinian paradigms, clearly undermines the gene-Darwinian 
philosophy that (in sexual organisms) only single genes are the units of selection and 
all higher levels are epiphenomenal. 
 
But we have not yet reached secure ground, because gene-Darwinians may still object 
that the above phenomenon could be better expressed in gene-Darwinian terms. I 
shall argue that such a claim is at odds with our common understanding of a system. 
If based on systemic properties, those genes become selected which establish the 
system and, although they are disadvantageous on their own, it would be absurd to 
claim that the system does not exist, but rather only single selfish genes. But this 
needs to be scrutinised more closely. In the next section I argue that strict gene-
atomism has to be either refuted or one has to define the gene as a unit of selection 
tautologically.  
d) The Fallacy of Claiming Gene-Atomism Tautologically 
Dawkins in the Extended Phenotype proposed that different evolutionary perspectives 
may be like two different views of a Necker Cube, a visual illusion, where a two 
dimensional representation of a cube could be interpreted in two completely different 
ways as a three-dimensional cube.1017 Dawkins, with his own gift of creating 
illuminating metaphors, captures an experience of the flipping over of evolutionary 
perspectives apparent to anyone, who has seriously pondered these matters. Dawkins 
                                                     
1017  R. Dawkins, The Extended Phenotype (1982/1989), pp. 1 f. Cf. the preface of the second edition of 
R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (1989), p. iix. 
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compared the gene-perspective with that of a whole individual, but I think one can do 
this equally well when one compares the single gene perspective with the group 
perspective or that of higher-level genes, as done in the last section. 
Should we hence simply draw the pluralistic conclusion that all these perspectives 
are true? This appears absurd, because these perspectives appear at least partly to be 
inconsistent, particularly in their philosophical message. Gene-Darwinism, but equally 
my opposed position above, would become a priori irrefutable.  
Of course, gene-Darwinians do not actually advocate such a pluralism, but, as I 
have shown earlier, they do strictly take sides. They finally advocate an exclusively 
gene-atomistic perspective. Dawkins even in the Extended Phenotype, albeit more 
guarded on this matter than in the Selfish Gene, clearly takes the view of gene-atomism 
( pp. 140 f., 264 f.). 
Above I have opposed the idea of an undecided pluralism on this matter as well. I 
oppose strict gene-atomism, although I think that even gene-atomism has a true core. 
Unlike some authors who have denied them, I accept that single genes could have 
evolutionary effects. Nevertheless I object to gene-atomistic denial of all larger 
wholes. In terms of the atom metaphor, I try not to discard genetic ‘atoms’ (although 
they are even more context-dependent than atoms proper are), but argue in favour of 
the existence of genetic ‘molecules’, of high level genes, in their own right. I do this 
particularly in a selectionist context (but I also literary have argued for the existence of 
molecules in their own right,  pp. 248 f.).1018 To argue that parts and wholes could 
play an evolutionary role and that the task is to determine in each case how far wholes 
are important, differs not only from the view that parts are exclusively the units of 
evolution, but also from a pluralism, which regards this to be a mere question 
of perspective. 
 
Now the question needs to be settled whether it is always possible to convert higher-
level explanations, as for example mine above, into a gene-atomistic language and, if 
this is the case, whether this is an appropriate and preferable representation of given 
facts. 
It is obvious that in a certain sense one can transform the proposed concept of 
higher-level genes (as, I shall argue, of all other higher wholes) into the language of 
single separate genes, since biological replicators, whether whole gene-pools or 
genomes in some way consist of single genes. A whole always consists of its parts. 
Hence, one may always somehow distribute the effect of the whole to its parts, and 
thereby make the whole disappear. Even if the whole is more than the sum of its 
parts, one can still proceed in a similar way. In this case it is not possible to directly 
distribute the effects to its parts, because the parts lose these properties if they are not 
part of the system. But indirectly it is still possible to distribute these properties, if one 
introduces the additional condition that this ‘distribution’ is valid for each of the 
involved elements only if they are together and standing in a certain relation with 
these other elements which before were said to form a system. Besides, the sense of 
                                                     
1018  I am aware that even molecules are, of course, a poor analogy for systems of genes. 
Cf.: St. J. Gould, Caring Groups and Selfish Genes (in The Panda Thumb, 1980), p. 78. 
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distributing the effects has changed. In my example of high-level genes the process of 
distributing could, of course, not mean dividing the fitness by two and adding these 
halves to A’s and B’s fitness. Instead, the synergetic fitness of the system AB would be 
‘distributed’ in a way that A, under the condition of the presence of B, would have a 
completely changed fitness value; and, vice versa, B as well. Hence, with these two 
additional modifications, we can always rephrase the phenomenon of higher-level 
genes in terms of single genes. The question is whether this is reasonable and if this 
implies that single selfish genes could justly be called the only units of selection. 
In my opinion a redefinition for which the mentioned additional assumptions have 
to be made does harm to what we usually call a system. These assumptions of our 
definition only conceal any system, which by any reasonable definition would be said 
to exist. With that definition one would also be able to redefine the result of the most 
radical group selectionist approach, against which gene-Darwinians always have 
turned, in terms of single genes only. It shall be made apparent in the course of this 
section that this is not an aspect of the gene-Darwinian claim which is scientifically 
respectable, but a vacuous argument; however organised a system may be, it can only 
be described in terms of its composing parts. This does not contribute anything to the 
discussion concerned. To clarify this matter we must once more take a look at gene-
atomism. 
 
In my view two different gene-atomistic claims, which are often found in gene-
Darwinism, need to be distinguished. The first claim is at least somehow empirically 
based and indirectly testable, the second claim, however, is, as I shall show, 
tautological. Rather like Sober and Wilson, I think that officially gene-Darwinians 
normally only made the testable claim, but that in the argumentative twilight of many 
discussions the tautological idea has contributed much to the appeal of this 
paradigm.1019 If one wants to oppose gene-atomism one needs to disentangle the 
testable and the tautological arguments which somehow support this paradigm. 
(i) The Testable Claim of Gene-Atomism 
During recent decades, many concepts and many phenomena have necessitated the 
use of an explanatory level of single egoistic genes. I think this has become sufficiently 
apparent in the several treatments of gene-Darwinism represented in this present 
work. Although I do not agree that all concepts and phenomena employed by 
apparent gene-Darwinians are purely gene-Darwinian, I, in any case, basically agree, 
for example, with Sterelny and Kitcher as far as they argue, that it was indeed 
reasonable, empirically justified, and likewise a fruitful research programme, that lies 
behind gene-Darwinians stress on the existence of single genes, below the level of the 
whole genome and below whole gene pools.1020 This, in my opinion does not, of 
course, entail that there are no higher levels of explanation existent as well. 
Gene-Darwinians, as we have seen earlier, do make a stronger claim. To them, 
selfish genes are the exclusive units of selection, excluding all higher levels.  
                                                     
1019  E. Sober, D. S. Wilson, Onto Others (1998), pp. 33-34. 
1020 K. Sterelny, P. Kitcher, The Return of the Gene (1988/1998), pp. 161 f., 167 f. 
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This idea has been supported by the success of explaining some important cases of 
traditional group selection by the new concepts of kin selection and reciprocal 
altruism ( p. 36). Gene-Darwinians have interpreted these theories as supporting 
their exclusive gene-atomism. Although it appears correct to me that single genes do 
play a role in these explanations, they, even in these examples, do not play an 
exclusive role. I have called into question whether reciprocal altruism is exclusively a 
single gene phenomenon, since the condition under which this evolutionary 
mechanism itself becomes an evolutionarily stable strategy, and is not undermined by 
cheaters, is also dependent on gene frequencies of populations, which are properties 
of the population and not of single genes. More strikingly, group phenomena of the 
hymenoptera – traditional examples of group selection – have been reinterpreted. 
Genetic relationship and not group selection, appears to be pivotal. Nevertheless the 
entomologist and co-founder of sociobiology E. O. Wilson himself still seems to have 
interpreted these explanations in a less radical gene-atomistic way than, for example, 
Dawkins. 58 We see that even these matters are entangled with interpretation. The 
involved theoretical changes were, it seems, in any case no mere redefinition of terms. 
Since its interpretation is problematic, however, we turn to a less ambiguous example. 
It was most crucial for the radical formulation of radical gene-atomism, that 
theoretical considerations and supporting empirical evidence, had, seemingly, shown 
that the remaining pure group selectionist models were flawed. Although theory here 
almost also seems more important than the facts (as I think it should be), these group 
selectionist models were not challenged by a mere redefinition of terms. Instead it was 
argued that groups were true altruism of genes and individuals is possible because 
group selection, could easily be undermined by selfish genes. In this argument the 
group advantage is not simply defined away and distributed among the individual 
members, but a causal problem is stated, relevant also for those who hold the 
opposed view. We are hence concerned with a testable or changeable claim.  
Later I shall actually discuss whether this problem, which some naive group selectionist 
models contain, can be surmounted,  p. 284. 
In my view, gene-Darwinism, also correctly point out that there is inner organismic 
genetic competition. Phenomena like meiotic drive could be interpreted in this way. I 
think, it was a false simplifying assumption that alleles at one locus as well as at 
different loci necessarily evolved, which are advantageous for the individual. As we 
have seen above, it may well be that a combination of favourable genes will not 
become fixed in a population, although this would be the most advantageous solution 
on a higher level of genomic organisation of an individual (Figure 4).  
Since we are concerned with a challengeable claim, it was possible to challenge it above, at 
least in its exaggerated version not only claiming the existence of single genes, but 
completely denying the existence of all higher units of replicator selection. 
(ii) The Tautological Claim of Gene-Atomism 
Firstly, the gene-atomistic tautology eliminates wholes from our semantic framework 
by defining wholes as being merely elements, and then makes the claim, by only 
restating this assumption, that it has been found that wholes do not exist. Secondly, 
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linked to this first aspect, gene-atomists have reasoned tautologically that irrespective 
of the system of which a gene is part of the fittest genes always survives, only restating 
that fitness is defined by survival. In either case this results in an unjustified claim that 
genes, only because of matters of definition, are the only possible units of evolution. 
These gene-atomistic tautologies are slightly different to the found straight definition of the 
gene as a unit of evolution and the tautological claim that the unit of evolution hence is the 
gene ( section a). 
(1) I have outlined that one can always simply redefine a whole in terms of its parts, 
even if the whole is more than the sum of its parts ( p. 278). One only has to extend 
the definition of each part by introducing the conditionals that the former systemic 
property has only been shown, if the other components of the ‘system’ are present as 
well. Even though the property can not be distributed directly to its parts, the whole 
property (in my example of a genetic higher-level unit) would appear under the given 
conditions. 
If any whole, by force, is redefined to be only its elements, the non-existence of 
wholes is discursively a priori given. It is then of course true by definition that wholes 
can not be units of evolution. But, is it reasonable and relevant to the questions we are 
concerned with to proceed in this way? 
I argued earlier, that the general philosophy of downward reductionism and 
eliminative materialism, if applied thoroughly, leads to fundamental problems and 
does not achieve its aims of an independent definition of explanatory elements, of 
explanatory parsimony, and of an explanatory basis independent of historical change 
( p. 248). Also in the present more specific context it becomes apparent that by a 
redefinition of a genetic whole, the other genetic elements would need to be 
introduced in the definition of each single gene and that the result in this regard would 
not fulfil the criterion of theoretical parsimony. 
More important for our present concerns is that such a redefinition would conceal 
the difference between a whole, or a system, and a mere aggregation. Certainly, by 
such a redefinition the synergetic properties would not be lost, but would only be 
hidden in each of the composing parts. Nevertheless, the philosophical message dif-
fers considerably if any wholes, however well integrated, are said to be only their parts. 
This undoubtedly would have the inclination to neglect synergetic properties. But an 
aggregation like sand is obviously something completely different from a system, 
where the sum is more than its parts. Any definition which conceals this difference is 
wrong in the sense of neglecting to focus on aspects which are essential to our dis-
cussion. It makes a huge difference to argue that wholes can not be evolutionarily 
stable because they are undermined by selfish genes, or to argue that wholes are any-
way to be defined in terms of single selfish genes. Particularly in a selectionist context 
we want to know whether traits which are good for the whole exist and are stable.  
Through my example of higher-level genes, it has been shown that combinations 
of genes with an advantageous systemic property and a certain frequency in the 
population will survive, although taken in isolation, alternative alleles are 
advantageous. I think it would miss the point, if one argued that in this case no 
systemic aspect existed. Of course, in that example, the composing genes of a whole 
Part IV. Chapter 8: Transcendence of Substance Reductionism 282 
survive too and even need to survive if that whole should be evolutionarily stable. But 
this does not mean that the whole is merely its parts. I do not think that it has to be a 
precondition of being a system, that members sacrifice themselves for it. Instead I 
think it is enough if genes create systemic properties (properties which the parts 
separately did not have), which have an evolutionary impact and which are 
evolutionarily stable. Also in this case genes in a way are less selfish than one may 
conceive, since they build up a system. In this example they do indeed profit from the 
system. I do think, however that it makes a difference to the case in which even such 
systems are undermined by genes which do not have this systemic advantageous 
tendency and which are more advantageous on their own.  
I concede that this is not the most radically thinkable case of sacrificing genic altruism 
( pp. 284 f.), but nevertheless, I think, we want to make the difference between systemic 
genes and those which are fitter outside of a system. I will argue in the next section that 
ruthless genetic egoism on the one hand and radical forms of group selectionist altruism on 
the other hand are extreme forms of a continuum. In the above example genes, albeit not 
self-sacrificing, become advantageous in a certain system, although they are relatively 
disadvantageous on their own. Such genes differ considerably from genes, which do not 
build such a system. Based on systemic changes the adaptive landscape for the single genes 
has changed considerably. It would be unintelligible to redefine this in terms which 
neglected these important changes. 
But even if one assumed that an altruist group evolved by group selection, which for 
some reason has not been undermined by selfish genes, such groups could also be 
redefined as outlined, since their replicators are of course somehow composed out of 
single genes too. This, of course, would obviously miss the issue of the unit of 
evolution debate. 
The case of a mere restructuring of the genome, where the composing genes stay 
the same likewise renders the outlined redefinition absurd. If chromosomal 
restructuring, for example, plays a role in formation of new species, the changed 
species are not only reproductively isolated, but also change some of their phenotypic 
properties. One would normally attribute the phenotypic changes not to the single 
genes, since they remain identical, but to the structure of the whole. Yet one may still 
proceed with a redefinition, simply by including different structural relationships into 
the definition of each gene. Although this is formally possible, I think it is apparent 
that this only conceals, what we normally mean when saying that the phenotypic 
change is due to the structure of the whole and not to its parts.  
Finally the idea of a redefinition would be inconsistent with the concession made 
by most gene-Darwinians, at least by actually discussing only cases of sexual 
organisms, that in the unimportant case of asexual organisms genomes are the units of 
replicator selection. In the case of a redefinition, one would absurdly have to state that 
here too only single selfish genes were the appropriate level of explanation. 
In conclusion a mere redefinition of wholes as simply the sum of their elements is 
logically possible, but misses the central point of how far wholes are evolutionarily 
relevant and stable. 
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(2) A tautological formulation, which is in my opinion linked with the first one, is 
hidden in the argument that (in a certain sense) always the fittest single genes survive, 
and that it is thus appropriate to only call them units of selection.  
This has similarly been elaborated earlier by Sober and D. S. Wilson, who I generally follow 
here. I only differ in stressing the importance of synergetic properties, which they in my 
view also implicitly assume when discussing group selection instead of synergetic gene pools 
with fitness effects ( p. 271).1021 (Additionally Sober and Wilson are only concerned with 
the difference of group selection and individual selection.) 
If one integrates in the above ways all synergetic properties of wholes into the notion 
of single genes, it is of course true that the fittest genes always survive, because all 
systemic properties and top down effects then count in favour of single genes. This is 
because all assumed higher levels involved are somehow based on the genes 
composing them. Whatever survives, whether a certain gene-pool by group selection, 
a high-level gene (although its components were less fit on their own), or a truly 
selfish gene which does not contribute to any larger system, one may state that 
without any difference the fittest genes have always survived.  
In particular E. Sober and D. S. Wilson have shown that, if one argues this way, 
even a model, where altruistic groups evolve because as a whole they are more fit than 
non-altruistic groups, would paradoxically still be taken as evidence for the gene-
atomistic and gene-egoistic viewpoint.1022 The group, which was fitter as a whole, is 
somehow composed out of individuals or single genes. Hence one may argue that it 
was the individuals or single genes of that group which were fitter, since they are the 
survivors. No matter how synergetic the genes of a group are, we can decompose 
them into single genes. No matter how altruistic they are redefined to be the most 
egoistic genes since they survived. Not taking into account whether their fitness is 
created by the group or the single gene, whether it is object of genic, individual or 
group selection etc., it is of course by definition true that those genes which survive 
are always the fittest genes, because fitness is ultimately defined by survive. Although 
true, this is, of course, completely uninformative. One would not distinguish between 
cases of ruthlessly selfish genes which are bad for the whole, and cases where the 
wholes determine what is good for the genes. 
If one really were to favour such a redefinition, the more substantive gene-
Darwinian argument that adaptive wholes may be subverted from within by single 
selfish genes, would not be necessary and meaningless, since one could in any case 
redefine the systemic advantage in terms of selfish genes. 
In principle a similarly absurd tautological argument in favour of levels of selection could 
easily be proposed. If we define a group as flexible as we defined a gene, of course the fittest 
group always survives. We would simply still call it a group independent of whether even its 
synergetic properties are subverted by selfish genes or not. 
It is a tautological truth that only those genes survive which survive. If we claim that 
all genes are egoistic and atomistic only because they survive, however altruistic and 
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1022  Ibid, p. 42. 
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systemic they may be, then by definition and not as an empirical result, all genes must 
be atomistic and selfish. It is, of course, inappropriate to simply excludes wholes from 
the semantic framework, since this does not solve but only conceals the crucial issues 
of the unit of selection or unit of evolution debate. 
e) Higher-Level Properties of Different Organisms – Four Possibilities for Achieving the Good 
of the Group 
In the last section higher-level genes (at different loci of one organism) have been 
shown to be possible. They can exist despite the meiotic shuffle and they are also 
stable if their components are less fit on their own. Hence it appears plausible that this 
also somehow holds for alleles in different organisms. In principle interaction effects 
of alleles in different organisms may exist in the different cases of alleles at the same 
locus, higher-level alleles and cross-loci interactions of alleles. Why should there be no 
evolutionarily stable synergetic wholes with a fitness effect in different organisms too? 
Firstly, I shall discuss how far these two different types of wholes differ, in order 
to learn what conditions have to be met to transfer our successful result to this type as 
well. Secondly, I will give a survey of four different ways in which properties which 
are good for the group may evolve. The first discussion may be skipped, but it may 
help to clarify the functional difference of these two types of higher-level properties 
and also gives an, I think, interesting example of a selection above individual selection. 
(i) Wholes in the Individual and the Many – Loci and Alleles 
Despite the tautological undertones in gene-atomism, as outlined before, one should 
not forget the lessons which indeed had to be learned from the reasonable aspects of 
gene-atomism. Groups of members which altruistically support the group may be ad-
vantageous for that group, but, as has been pointed out by Dawkins and Williams in 
particular, these groups may be subverted from within by ruthless selfish genes or 
individuals. Gene-atomists came to conclude that no higher level of organisation and 
no true altruism can evolve since genes always only ‘aim’ at reproducing themselves. 
Anyone who wants to object to the gene-Darwinian view of life needs to show that 
not only systemic properties exist on a supra-gene level, but that these properties are 
also evolutionarily stable. This has been shown above for higher-level genes, now it 
needs to be shown for groups as well. 
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In order to do this, it appears helpful 
to work out the differences of higher-
level properties of alleles at different 
loci in single organisms, L11L12 and of 
genes at the same locus or the same loci 
in different organisms, L11L21, 
L11L22, (L11L12)(L21L22). 
Confer Figure 5. Since we are concerned 
with sexual organisms it is a 
simplification not to mention their 
populational background and that each 
organism has two alleles at each locus. 
However, this is enough to clarify the 
main differences: 
(1) The components of a higher-
level allele at different loci in one 
organism (L11L12) are coupled, 
whereas alleles being in different 
organisms are not. In sexual organisms 
they are, of course, mixed with each and 
every generation, but nevertheless they 
are coupled in the sense of having a common fate and are tied to the other alleles on 
the other loci at least as long as they ‘inhabit’ that particular individual, thus until that 
individual dies or reproduces. 
This does not entail, as is often simply assumed, that only those genes survive, which are 
most advantageous for individuals. We have seen that genes which are good on a higher 
level of individual integration will not always be evolutionarily stable.  
(2) The distinction of genes at different loci versus genes at the same locus is usually 
conflated with the above distinction whether genes and their interaction are in one 
organism or different ones. In a single organism we are usually concerned with 
systemic effects of different loci, L11L12, whereas in different organisms we are 
concerned normally with the same locus in different organisms, L11L21. Although 
this is an important case, this conflation is obviously a simplification, since in sexual 
organisms there are firstly two alleles of the same locus, from the father’s and the 
mother’s side, and secondly we can also think of interaction effects of genes in 
different organisms at different loci, L11L22, (these interaction effects play an 
essential role in some of my following proposals).  
If the genes of the same loci are alleles, they are competitors in the sense that one 
may replace the other at that locus. Genes at two different loci (L11L12, but also 
L11L22) may together become predominant in a given population. Besides additional 
preconditions for not being subverted in principle a common universal victory is 
possible for these genes. This is not possible for two alleles on the same locus in 
different organisms (L11L21, but alleles at the same locus in one organism).  
Figure 5: A simplified visualisation of different 
loci in the same and in different organisms, in 
order to clarify my terminology. The first index 
stands for the organism, the second for the 
locus. (For simplicity reasons the two different 
alleles of each locus within diploid organisms are 
not shown.) 
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To define an allele as being “synonymous with rival”1023, nevertheless overstates 
the case, because in principle alleles may also cooperate with other alleles at the same 
locus (absolutely or relatively).  This could be exemplified by heterozygote superiority 
(e. g. in the case of sickle-cell anaemia), where there is a negative interaction effect 
between two identical alleles in one organism. Although here the interaction takes 
place within an organism, this also leads to the advantages of a certain amount of 
allelic pluralism in a population.  
Higher-level properties of genes at one locus of different organisms in any case 
have not to be limited to different alleles at the concerned locus. Traditional group 
selection has advocated a synergetic property of the same alleles at the same locus in 
different organisms. One normally concerned with altruistic alleles, which enhance the 
group fitness so much that their individual disadvantage becomes balanced by the 
advantage to the whole. Although in these group selectionist models the altruists are 
blindly altruistic to non-altruists as well (the alternative allele), the stability of this 
effect would be a synergetic property of the interaction of several altruist alleles in 
different organisms.  
Nevertheless, there is still a difference between different loci in single organisms 
and one locus in different organisms even if in the latter case there are the same alleles 
at the loci of the different organism. This is because of the background of the 
populations which are basic to these processes. In this case subversion from within is 
still a much graver problem. In principle both wholes may become subverted. In the 
case of the same altruistic alleles at the same locus in different organisms, however, 
the very property which is advantageous for the whole, if supporting the other group 
members, in particular also supports the competitors of the genes with that altruistic 
property. In higher-level genes of one organism this could not happen since (mainly) 
different loci are concerned.  
After this analysis we will better understand what preconditions facilitate the 
stability of higher-level genes. Likewise in this case stability is not trivial, since we have 
seen that certain populational preconditions need to be met if such a whole is not 
become subverted. In which way does the fact that we were concerned with alleles at 
different loci of one individual facilitate the possibility of genetic higher-level units? 
Based on the outlined coupledness of genes, providing that is they inhabit the same 
organism and on the fact that the whole that they build does not particularly support 
their rival alleles (we here neglect that diploid phenotypes have on each locus two 
alleles) we could distil two transferable facilitating preconditions for the stability of a 
whole. Firstly, the fitness effect is only shown when these genes together ‘inhabit’ an 
organism. Secondly, their synergetic co-operative effect also gives a fitness advantage 
for its composing genes and not for its competing alleles (neglecting the allelic loci 
within the organism). I have argued earlier that it would be wrong to deny the 
existence of a whole which is different from the sum of its parts, only because its 
composing parts profit from its existence.  
                                                     
1023  R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (1989), p. 26. 
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These facilitating preconditions for building a stable synergetic system which serve the 
common good are, as we will see later, not necessary. The stronger claim of sacrificing group 
selection will be discussed below. 
I shall now consider whether the conditions which facilitate the stability of larger 
wholes in regard to inner-organismic higher-level genes of different loci can also be 
applied generally in the inter-organismic case. In regard to groups this would mean 
that synergetic properties have only to be shown if all (or many) members of a group 
have the underlying gene, and that the fitness effect, if it is shown, is profitable to 
those members which have this property in particular. It is difficult to think of a strict 
coupledness as in the case of inner-organismic higher-level genes. Still one is able to 
think of similar cases.  
 
We may for example think of a pack of wolves hunting together and sharing their 
prey. This is group behaviour where something is achieved which one individual could 
not achieve on its own. If the food is shared between those who have hunted, it is 
those members in particular who are profiting from this synergetic property, who 
have created it.  
The non-zero sum advantage of hunting together, clearly a group phenomenon, is 
linked here to the support of those genes which create this holistic effect. It seems 
that the only problem is that a gene frequency needs to become established so that the 
holistic effect comes into play frequently enough to lead to the predominance of the 
underlying gene in the population. A gene for hunting together only has its synergetic 
effect if others want to hunt together as well. Like in the above case of higher-level 
genes, L11L12, the establishment of an enhanced frequency can be achieved in the 
first place, for example, by a founder effect – a new population with a strong 
proportion of mutants. 
But true gene-atomists would object that there may be a selfish mutant which is 
too lazy to hunt, but still tries to get the same share of the prey which had been 
caught. Equally all such group cooperations are in principle a riddle to gene-
Darwinians. But let us assume that the pack would after a while somehow exclude this 
selfish mutant from eating, from reproduction or from the group generally. Then 
hunting together and its profit are again coupled. 
It is indeed obvious that the selfish mutant who is too lazy to hunt, but still tries to 
eat equally from the prey of the pack, would under the above conditions become 
extinct. (For the time being we are not concerned with the possibility of an 
evolutionarily stable sacrificing altruism.) But despite our massively simplified 
assumptions this argument does not yet secure the stability of the synergistic system 
which serves the good of those who establish it. Additionally the stability of the 
genetic basis for exclusion of the selfish organism has to be considered as well.  
One simple solution of this problem would be to add the precondition that both properties, 
hunting and excluding the non-hunters from the profit, have to be based simply on one 
gene, in the gene-Darwinian sense a relatively short strand of DNA. Since genes mostly have 
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many effects – they are polyphenic (pleiotropic) – this is not as implausible as it may 
appear.1024 
Another relatively simple solution would be that we were concerned with two genes, but 
they are again for some different polyphenic effect morphologically or functionally linked. 
But since I want to make my argument as general as possible, I do not want to rest my 
position on this assumption.  
We assume that the two properties are based on genes at two different loci, which are 
not necessarily directly linked in any way. We are not merely concerned with another 
example of higher-level genes in the L11L12 sense, since the advantage is a group 
advantage, communal hunting and sharing could only be done in a group. Whether in 
a larger group the hunting gene H and the excluding gene E are present in one 
individual at L11L12 instead of in two different ones at L11L22 is here only 
secondary.  
We have assumed that in our population of wolves H and E are already 
predominant and is for example based on a founder effect. As mentioned above, it is 
obvious that an egoistic non-hunting mutant allele h will die out, because the E genes 
will exclude the lazy selfish individuals from the advantage created by the non lazy 
group. A more interesting question is whether the excluding gene E could not be 
subverted by a mutant gene e without this property. Indeed e-alleles might enter the 
population without being directly counter-selected, although in the long run they may 
cause a subversion of the systemic advantage of the group. But only as long as no h 
mutants are around, the e-allele is evolutionarily neutral. As long as this is the case the 
e-alleles will normally remain in the population without coming to predominate it. But 
if a h mutant appears, things change. The lazy non-hunter h may now be lucky in the 
rare case of him meeting two e-mutants with their prey (without any other E-wolf 
there trying to exclude him). In this case organisms with the h-allele will be lucky, but 
equally the e-allele organisms will be unlucky because they themselves become less of 
the food they hunted. Hence the few neutral e-alleles now presumably become less fit 
than the E-alleles and will be reduced in number. The case in which the h-mutant 
meets a group of e-mutants may occur so rarely, that it still gets excluded from the 
group advantage and becomes extinct. Hence the egoistic h-alleles will directly perish 
and as long as they are around the ignorant e-alleles will also have a disadvantage. 
It follows that based on the interaction between different organisms and different 
loci, which is often ignored, a synergetic advantage which would not exist outside of 
the group and which is advantageous particularly to those which create this whole, 
could be evolutionarily stable and will not be subverted by selfish organisms, which 
try to profit from that group and do not contribute to it.  
Below I shall argue that further radical cases of group altruism and group 
selectionism are possible. There the problem of subversion is graver. In this section 
the difference of loci and alleles has been clarified and an example of stable synergetic 
properties which are good for the group, involving a system of different interacting 
genetic loci on the population level, has been given. Here I only wanted to point out 
that less radical forms of cooperation and of synergetic properties exist, in contrast to 
                                                     
1024  Cf. for example: St. Gould, E. Vrba, Exaptation (1982/1998), pp. 60 f.; generally  p. 316 f. 
Part IV. Chapter 8: Transcendence of Substance Reductionism 289 
the assertion that there are merely selfish genes. Thereby I objected to the gene-
Darwinian spirit that selfish genes always undermine systems which serve the 
common good. If the population itself is endowed with the necessary internal 
mechanisms to sustain the course favourable to the common good, a subversion of 
this system may become prevented. 
(ii) Four Possibilities for Achieving the Good of the Group 
In my view ruthless genetic egoism on the one hand and radical group selectionist 
altruism on the other hand are extreme ends of a range of possibilities. In the 
polemics of some gene-Darwinians it is often wrongly assumed that the absence of 
radical sacrificing altruism implies the selfishness of genes. But the absence of one 
extreme does not imply the other. Without the concept of higher levels one is caught 
in this dichotomy, taking it into consideration, the world has more grades and this 
dichotomy appears to be a false simplification.  
Sober and D. S. Wilson focus predominantly on group selection of sacrificing altruism. But 
they have acknowledged that group selection of what I call sacrificing altruism and mere 
altruism have to be distinguished.1025 Nevertheless, as far as I can judge, they exclude lower 
levels of selection which may count in favour of group properties. This is the case although 
they have treated at length the fallacy of claiming gene-atomism tautologically. They may 
have excluded these phenomena, because these phenomena do not necessarily lead to higher-
level properties, although they may lead to these properties. Although I agree with Sober 
and Wilson that gene-Darwinism could in any case be shown to be wrong, to neglect the 
differences below group selection leaves, I think, to much ground to this approach. 
As I have elaborated in the above section on the tautological definition of gene-
atomism, it is not only reasonable to distinguish between ruthless egoism and 
sacrificing altruism, but also between ruthless egoism undermining a synergetic whole 
and the stabilisation of a system which is advantageous to the whole, even though the 
composing genes profit from it. We of course normally want to make a difference 
between a criminal robbing a bank and someone who is conscientiously working for a 
bank (thereby I do not want to claim that people working for a bank could not 
become criminals). 
In the above example, the genes, although not altruistic in a self-sacrificing way, 
are sustaining a system which is advantageous to a larger whole of contributors to that 
system, but also to themselves. It is a group hunting co-operatively and the excluding 
selfish mutants, which try to make use of the advantage of the group without 
contributing to that result is part of a strategy, which could secure this system. It 
would be wrong to redefine such an example in terms of gene-atomism and gene-
egoism. Besides the reality of single genes, a system has been established which 
changes the paths of evolution. Now a higher over-all fitness is achieved and 
individuals become advantaged who are, albeit not totally self-sacrificing, less ‘selfish’ 
compared with alternative alleles. They do not exploit and undermine the common 
good. A redefinition in terms of ruthlessly selfish genes misses the relevant questions 
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of the dispute and in its resulting simplified philosophical message is, I think, simply 
outright false and dangerous. 
Based on these considerations I now outline four ways in which properties which 
are advantageous for a group may become established. For the time being (despite 
differences) I follow Dawkins, Hull and others in distinguishing the profiting units of 
replication (on the genetic side) and the units of interaction. I showed earlier that in 
sexually reproducing organisms selection of individuals, against a common simplifying 
assumption, does not necessarily, but may lead to an adaptation on that individual 
level. This depends on frequency and fitness distributions in the basic population. 
Here I argue that ‘lower’ types of selection can also lead to advantages for higher types 
of entities. 
In particular the mechanism which I propose for systemic individual selection may 
be interesting where the interaction of several loci of different organisms is shown to 
lead possibly to a systemic stability of group properties, although without relying on 
group selection. Treating group selection in structured populations I largely rely on 
Sober’s and D. S. Wilson’s approach, but I add a proposal whereby the applicability of 
this model is strongly extended. Group selection of whole populations if combined 
with systemic individual selection may according to my proposal lead to stable wholes, 
even without the need for permanent group selection.  
 
(1) Individual selection which may promote the common good. To state this possibility may 
appear trivial, but I think it is not as trivial as one might think and anyway gene-
atomism has largely concealed this possibility.  
Let us assume that the running speed of deer evolved because it benefited the 
individual organisms.1026 For this trait only individual selection should play a role and 
it is assumed that neither synergetic properties nor a system of individual selection 
exist ( pp. 291 f.). Only those individual deer would have been successful in 
surviving which could individually run fast enough.  
We are hence concerned with absolute fitness values of individuals, but in principle one may 
construct similar arguments using relative values (not running fast but running faster than 
the rest in the group).  
For assuming an individual selection of the trait of running speed we in my view do 
not need to stipulate that deer in general are in all respects selected individually. 
Despite these assumptions it is in my opinion still possible that the survival of the 
fastest individuals, as a side effect, is also good for the group or for the species. The 
main objection to this claim is that in regard of this trait it does not make sense to 
speak of a larger whole which may benefit from this selection on the individual level, 
because according to the above stipulation, there is no such whole. Nevertheless in a 
selectionist context the intuitive claim that the individual good may sometimes lead to 
the common good can, I think, be justified. Here three possible arguments supporting 
this view will suffice.  
                                                     
1026  Cf.: E. Sober, D. S. Wilson, Philosophical Work on the Unit of Selection Problem (1994/1998), pp. 199, 
203. 
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(a) If we can not speak of wholes in regard to the particular trait of running fast, 
but we actually aim to distinguish whether individual selection does at the same time 
undermine a synergetic whole, we still may take other traits in that group into account, 
which may have a synergetic group property. Presumably, a greater individual running 
speed will not strongly undermine any other traits based on group selection. This, of 
course, would need to be analysed in each case and is a matter of degree. But in the 
example of the pack of wolves hunting together, a subversion of the allele for the 
exclusion of the cheater by individual selection, would clearly subvert the synergetic 
property of hunting in groups. 
(b) Individual selection may even increase the fitness of a group, at least in the 
sense of the fitness of all its members. We assume a second trait that the group would 
always to some extent wait for its slowest members, which should be stable for 
another reason, for example because it is advantageous for vital group coherence. It 
would result that the fitness of all group members would be partly dependent on its 
slowest member. Although this leaves the austere world of redical individualism, 
running speed should still predominantly be selected individually; the slowest 
members should still be the easiest prey for predators. Individual selection eliminating 
very slow deer, would have a particularly positive side-effect for the fitness of each 
other member, by enhancing their absolute fitness (here the resulting running speed). 
Hence, although the physical running speed itself is based here on individual selection, 
its interaction with the waiting trait leads to an increase of the fitness of all members 
of the group. 
(c) The most relevant positive side-effect of individual selection for a group may 
be that the group does not become extinct in the long run. Permanent individual 
selection pressure for running speed may also lead to a herd with enhanced running 
speed, which then may survive a new more dangerous species of predators migrating 
into their habitat. Survival is at least in some respects in sexual organisms a property 
of an evolutionary line, because no organism can reproduce alone and all genes come 
back to a gene-pool. An early strong selection pressure on individuals may sometimes 
lead to the survival of the group or species as a whole. 
These examples are obviously not meant as an exhaustive treatment of how 
individual selection may lead to group advantages. Definitely many aspects need closer 
scrutiny, further distinctions could be made and a classification might be developed. 
Here I only wanted to point out that this matter is neither completely trivial nor only 
leads to negative results. 
Individual selection does of course not necessarily lead to the good of the whole 
and to the good of most members of the whole. The subversion of altruist synergetic 
groups by selfish genes or individuals is the prototypic example where lower levels of 
selection lead to a disadvantage for the whole and thus for most of its members. 
Nevertheless, gene-Darwinism has concealed that sometimes lower levels of selection 
may, as a side-effect, also lead to an advantage for a higher-level. If gene-Darwinians 
do not contradict this claim explicitly, their approach in any case is different in spirit. 
 
(2) Systemic individual selection. This proposed type of selection is not based on group 
selection and can not guarantee that only properties which are good for the group 
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come into being. However, it likewise differs from plain individual selection, because a 
system of individual selection may determine the direction of evolution which is not 
explicable in terms of individual selection only. The whole is not understandable if 
one only looks at its parts. By chance or with only a little help of group selection, 
properties which are good for the group, but perhaps disadvantageous for the selfish 
individual, could become established by systemic individual selection. Systemic 
individual selection could, as I argue in the following, stabilise a property which has 
been established by group selection without the further need of group selection. 
(a) A first type of systemic individual selection concerns selection of alleles that are 
selected dependent on the frequency of other alleles in a population. 
Take, for example, the model of indirect reciprocity by Nowak and Sigmund. In a 
kind of successive prisioner dilemma situation individual selection causes cooperators 
to be outcompeted by defectors. But what happens, if one considers the following 
system of three alternative strategies: cooperating, defecting, and discriminating (here: 
cooperating only with those who have previously cooperated)? Nowak and Sigmund 
have shown that in the presence discriminators, the strategy of cooperating may 
become evolutionary stable. Moreover, also the strategy of discriminating depends on 
the frequency of the other strategies. So there is a mutual dependency. Under certain 
conditions a particular distribution of discriminators and cooperators can lead to an 
evolutionary stable system of strategies in a population.1027  
Although such situations are not concerned with group selection, it would be 
inadequate to characterize them as being governed by individual or gene selection 
only, since not single genes but configurations of genes are evoluaionary stable.  
(b) A second type concerns different genetic loci. The example given is linked to 
sexual selection, but one may also think of other examples without mate choice (cf. 
the earlier example concerning the traits ‘huntering’ and ‘excluding lazy hunters’). 
Let us considering, how for a pack of wolves the bravery of the attacking wolves 
could be evolutionarily stable. One possibility, discussed below is permanent group 
selection among those packs with at least some brave individuals, which have a higher 
overall fitness. Taking other loci into account, how could such a genetic system, 
leading to the good of the group, could evolve without the existence of group 
selection. Let us assume (in the usual simplifying way) that there is a mutant gene B 
for attacking prey in a particularly brave way. In standard terminology, a B-wolf is an 
altruist in making more effort and risking more than others in order to achieve the 
common good of bringing down the prey. This task could not be achieved by one 
wolf on its own. Now this gene, although good for the group at large, will not be 
evolutionarily stable. This is a kind of prisioner dilemma structure. The gene may 
nonetheless become established in a population for example by a founder effect, but 
in absence of group selection it will soon be subverted, because it is disadvantageous 
for the bearer. It will soon be outreproduced by less brave and comparatively selfish b-
mutants. Hence, mere individual selection would lead to the extinction of B.  
                                                     
1027 M. A. Nowak, K. Sigmund. The dynamics of indirect reciprocity (1998); M. A. Nowak, K. 
Sigmund.. Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005). 
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But if a system of interacting gene loci is considered, each regulated by individual 
selection, things do not remain that simple. Given, for example, that reproduction in 
these wolves would be based on female choice and that each of the wolf bitches only 
reproduces a few times. If a gene C were predominant in this pack that the bitches 
prefer to choose to mate with brave male wolves (B), the tables would have turned: 
the B-gene, which is also good for the group at large, will soon be more frequent than 
the comparatively selfish b-gene. 
But this is not really conclusive yet; it needs also to be shown that the choosing 
gene C is stable in the population. Mutant c-alleles appear to have an advantage if they 
would not always mate with the individually non-fit altruists, who always risk their life, 
and whose offspring will later often have the same individually disadvantageous 
property. But this conclusion is not valid, as long as C alleles are predominant in the 
population. The brave wolf and its descendants will actually, based on the interaction 
with the C-genes in other organisms, be better off. Of course if c-alleles already 
dominated the group, B and C would not become evolutionarily stable. A founder 
effect, genetic drift or group selection would be needed to first establish these starting 
conditions preferable for the whole, which then would be stable. 
It has been suggested, that groups need not become subverted by selfish 
organisms or genes, even if this is not secured by group selection. However, if certain 
conditions are not given, such a system may collapse. But claiming theoretically that 
such system does not exist and that there are nothing but atomic and selfish genes, is 
committing the outlined fallacy of claiming gene-atomism tautologically ( pp. 277 
f.). One may of course somehow redefine the systemic whole which has changed the 
adaptive landscape of each gene in terms of single genes, but this would miss the 
point of what is implied by ‘system’. One may also reinterpret the gene B, which was 
advantageous for the group, as being truly a selfish gene, since it ultimately survives 
and becomes evolutionarily stable. Any result can be redefined in this way, including 
the more radical forms of group selection, treated below. The composing genes have 
always survived, but it of course makes a difference if they survive because they serve 
a larger system or not. Here systemic individual selection leads to the stabilisation of 
genes with synergetic properties which are advantageous for the whole (in this sense 
they are not merely individual genes), although they would not have been 
advantageous on their own. Moreover, this system under certain conditions prevents 
the subversion by selfish individuals. 
Although systemic individual selection may stabilise synergetic properties which 
are advantageous for the common good (here still simply for survival), it needs to be 
pointed out that this does not necessarily lead to the adaptation on the group level.  
In principle one may imagine that in the preceding example the situation would have 
changed so that bravery of individuals would not be adaptive any more for the group. 
Nevertheless systemic individual selection would up to a certain point still sustain this 
property. The assumption that bravery becomes disadvantageous for wolves is implausible; 
it may in some respects be more plausible for humans, who also have a cultural system of 
medals, honours and personal appreciation supporting bravery. However, the point is that 
such a system could have its own stability and inner dynamics to some extent autonomous 
from external selection pressure.  
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One may think of the enormous antlers of the palaeontological titanotheres or of 
present species of deer. It has often been argued that the enormous size of the antlers 
in some cases is not adaptive, neither for the individual nor for the group.1261 
Something like this, as I will discuss later, may well evolve through systemic individual 
selection. In a way it may be wrong to call this evolutionary process selection at all. 
Although this is a type of selection in the trivial sense that some survive and others do 
not survive, it does not fulfil the externality of the selection process which is normally 
implied by this term, particularly in an adaptationist Darwinian context. 
It may appear disappointing that systemic individual selection leading to an 
autonomous system level above individuals, does not ensure that this system is best 
for the group. Actually, as given in our example systems which are advantageous for 
the group, could and presumably often are stabilised by such a kind of organisation. If 
this is not based on chance, it at least needs one instance of group selection 
( below). However, the process itself indeed gains a certain autonomy. This need 
not to be understood as a problem, instead it may point to the fundamental fact that 
evolution is not only an adaptation to an outside environment, but also has inner 
tendencies of its own, transcending individual and group selection.  
This work started with an interest in the evolution of the biological basis of 
morals. The outlined process firstly shows that adaptations which are good for the 
group, could be sustained based on certain frequencies and gene interactions in a 
population. Secondly, this is a basis for an internal definition of what becomes 
selected. Inner tendencies of groups may come to lead evolution in new directions, 
which are not necessarily adaptive on the whole, but in which in any case the 
individuals are urged to adopt. Although parts of our moral presumably serve the 
survival of the whole, helping the weak and wounded is not necessarily adaptive (at 
least not in any direct sense), neither for those individuals who show this behaviour 
nor for the group as a whole. This may point to the deeper truth that evolution is not 
only an adaptation, but is the establishment of new principles which from within may 
direct the further development. (For a treatment of auto-selection and autonomy 
 pp. 394 f., pp. 409 f.) 
 
(3) Group selection in structured populations. Group selection directly relates to the fitness 
of groups with advantageous synergetic properties.  
Many group selectionist models require that one group has an advantage over another to 
speak of group selection, similar to when one normally speaks only of a gene which may 
become selected if there is an alternative allele. “If all groups are exactly alike, there can be 
no group selection.”1028 Although this may be controversial, it will not be discussed here, 
since I only want to show that it is in principle possible that traits could be and are stabilised 
by group selection, because they are good for a larger whole. I only present one model here 
and make a proposal to extend the conditions of its applicability. 
Everything which is advantageous for a larger whole, but is not directly advantageous 
from the perspective of the individual or of the gene requires altruism. In evolutionary 
parlance no consciousness is required for ‘altruism’.93 Altruism is understood as a general 
matter, including all properties and all behaviour that is good for a larger group or for one of 
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its members. This of course does not imply vice versa that every altruism, where single 
organisms without an advantage help group member is necessary advantageous at the level 
of the group. This has to be shown in each particular case. However it is commonly 
accepted that we could think of properties which are good for the group; gene-Darwinians 
normally only argue that such properties could not be stable based on this effect. I have 
worked out above that it is not always necessary that advantage of group properties have to 
be disadvantageous to its bearer. Hence sometimes altruism, instead of sacrificing altruism, 
is involved. Still sacrificing altruism remains a particularly important question. 
I distinguish group selection of structured populations and group selection of whole 
populations. For structured population models groups do not need to be wiped out 
completely. The assumption behind structured populations has been central for the 
second phase of the evolutionary synthesis. 
Group selectionist models of structured populations differ considerably. They 
vary, for example, in regard to the assumed population structure, the conditions of 
mating, the mechanism of population subdivision, the selection pressures, the 
coherence of subpopulations or the incorporation of migration. Lloyd provides an 
overview of the differences of possible models referring to more literature on this 
topic.1029 Each model has its own advantages and constraints. They partly even 
contradict each other, but there may well be different valid models for different 
conditions. 
For simplicity reasons I here only summarise one model which has been proposed 
by Sober and D. S. Wilson.1030 Their model is restricted to certain conditions and it 
may also be treated as a model of a selection of whole groups. I shall add a proposal 
as to why their model could more generally be applied to groups of relatively small 
size, which mix with the basic population, in any case resulting in a model of 
structured populations par excellence. Sober and Wilson show that group selection in 
structured population can also lead to the evolutionary stability of sacrificing altruism. 
Sacrificing altruism presupposes that the organism which supports the whole or which 
helps other members has an evolutionarily relevant disadvantage on the individual 
level. The fitness of an individual who is a self-sacrificing altruist is by definition, in 
regard of mere individual selection, lower than that of the egoist. The synergetic 
advantage for the whole is here not coupled to the advantage of the individual. The 
problem is clear. If no synergetic multi-loci-system of individual selection secures the 
stability of that trait, as shown above, altruism will soon decline, even if advantageous 
for the group. How could group selection lead to and stabilise an adaptation on the 
group level? 
 
                                                     
1029  E. Lloyd, The Structure and Confirmation of Evolutionary Theory (1988/1994), pp. 48 f. see also 
M. J. Wade, A Critical Review of the Models of Group Selection (1978). On the relationship of group 
selection and kin selection: E. Sober, D. S. Wilson, Onto Others (1998), pp. 55 f.; E. O. Wilson, 
Kin Selection as the Key to Altruism: Its Rise and Fall (2005).  
1030  E. Sober, What is Evolutionary Altruism? (1988/1998), pp. 463, 470-474. E. Sober, D. S. Wilson, 
Onto Others (1998), pp. 23 f. 




Figure 6 shows that, albeit altruism is less fit within each group and will decline in 
every generation in each group where egoists are members, the synergetic advantage 
of a group with a high number of altruists could lead to quicker multiplying of the 
average member of those groups. Although this has also a positive effect for the 
egoists and the proportion of altruists decreases in each group, this could be balanced 
by the different contribution to the total number of offspring. Without here 
calculating the involved frequencies in detail, Figure 6 gives an impression of possible 
Figure 6: Although the proportion of egoists within each group increases in 
each generation, the proportion of altruists rises in regard to the total 
population, because the group advantage in this example more than balances 
the individual advantage of the egoists. Please note the differences on the y-
axis. (Similar to Sober and Wilson, 1998, p. 24. 
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outcomes.1031 The frequency of altruists in the two populations, taken together, first 
was 50%. Although the frequency of altruists in each population has declined in one 
(or several) generations in the largely egoistic group from 10 % to 5 % and in the 
largely altruistic group from 90 % to 80 %, the altruists on the total, paradoxically, 
have increased not only in number but in proportion! Now in our hypothetical total 
population 165 altruists and 135 egoists could be found. The relative frequency of 
altruists although falling within each group increases from 50 % to 55 %. 
Sober calls this non-intuitive statistical phenomenon that something on the whole may 
increase, although it decreases in each sub-class, in tribute to a statistician, Simpson’s 
Paradox.1032 
This model requires the additional assumption that from time to time new groups are 
formed otherwise the subversion effect within each group becomes stronger than the 
group advantage of altruistic groups. This differs for example to my above proposal of 
systemic individual selection, which could stabilise properties advantageous for the 
group and which requires a certain basic frequency within a group to be stable. Here, 
the groups need to be different enough in their composition that the difference of 
their synergetic effects can be ‘seen’ by group selection. This variation may be 
provided by certain population structures. Sober argues that this can be achieved by a 
permanent fragmentation particularly of the quickly growing altruist groups, without a 
mixing too strongly with other populations.1033 These groups will statistically vary in 
their composition. Sober and Wilson have also pointed out that this assumption is 
given in the case of sibling groups. Here in sexually reproducing organisms the 
frequency of 50% or of 100 % altruists could easily be achieved.1034 Although this is 
close to what has been called kin selection, Sober and Wilson show that this is a kind 
of group selection through working on kin groups.  
This, according to Sober and Wilson has actually even been advocated by W. Hamilton 
himself, who has contributed much to the development of the theory of kin selection. In his 
later publications, particularly in an article from 1975, Hamilton, based on equations 
developed by G. Price, has reconsidered his theory of inclusive fitness as representing a 
multilevel selection process. This continues to be ignored by gene-Darwinians.1035 
I want to propose two extensions of the conditions where these requirements for 
stable group selection could be met, where no fragmentation but a mix and a forma-
tion of new groups is sufficient. Particularly the second proposal may be of interest. 
                                                     
1031  For E. Sober, D. S. Wilson, Onto Others (1998), pp. 23 f. 
1032 E. Sober, What is Evolutionary Altruism? (1988/1998), pp. 470-473. 
1033  Ibid, p. 474.  
1034 E. Sober, D. S. Wilson, Onto Others (1998), pp. 62 f. 
1035 Ibem, pp. 71-77. Cf. E. Sober, What is Evolutionary Altruism? (1988/1998), his footnote 9. 
Cf.: R. Dawkins, The Extended Genotype (1982), pp. 187 f. 
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Figure 7: The distribution of the number of groups with a 
certain relative frequency or mean of altruists. The groups 
in each graph are randomly chosen out of a main 
population. Graph a may represent the means of 100 
groups with the group size n = 2. Graph b 100 groups with 
n = 10, Graph c for n = 20. 
 
(a) There may be the 
possibility that phenotypic 
altruists may recognise other 
altruists to form a group, ‘in 
order to’ guarantee that 
differences in groups are 
found. This altruism would 
not have to be based on the 
same genes and no siblings 
need to be involved.1036 The 
alternative blind formation of 
groups regardless of the 
properties of its members 
anyhow appears bizarre, 
particularly in regard to 
‘higher’ organisms. (However, 
this assumption is usual of 
most models which for 
mathematical reasons have to 
be simple.) 
(b) Groups which should 
vary enough can also be 
formed ‘blindly’, regardless of 
the properties of their 
members. Besides the 
conditions mentioned above, I 
shall show that Sober’s and Wilson’s model is also applicable, if the groups mix again 
and again with the basic population, even if they formed again in a random way and if 
no sibling structure were involved. It may appear that this would lead to groups which 
always have a number of altruists similar to the average of the population. But in my 
view this could be prevented if the formed groups are small enough, that they strongly 
vary by chance. In regard to small groups the statistical central limit theorem does not 
become applicable. Simple statistics could show that the average of compositions of 
each subpopulation (here the relative number of altruists) varies on average strongly 
from the average composition in the basic population if the normal population size of 
the subpopulation is small. 
                                                     
1036 This proposal in my opinion has not to be conflated with mere reciprocal altruism. Although, in 
any group selection, the individual somehow in average profits from the group, in group 
selection the synergetic property is essential, which is not necessarily given in the case of 
reciprocal altruism. Moreover, I have also argued that reciprocal altruism already transcends 
strict gene-Darwinism. (Cf. also the subsection on claiming gene-atomism in a tautological way, 
 pp. 277). 
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What in textbooks of statistics is taken as a sample of a larger population to esti-
mate a variable, for instance the mean value, of a certain property in a basic popu-
lation, here could be seen as a group. The property we are concerned with is altruism.  
Whereas one is usually interested in getting an as adequate measurement as 
possible, here we are interested in the opposite. When does the mean of the altruistic 
property in different groups vary enough from the mean of the total population to 
allow group selection to play a central role? The statistical central limit theorem 
shows, as visualised in Figure 7, that independent from the form of the distribution of 
the basic population, the distribution of the means of different groups  (or samples) of 
n members (or observations)1037 approaches a normal distribution, as n becomes high 
enough (normally, n > 30). Confer the graphs of a, b, c. More important is that this 
normal distribution of means of different observations (groups), has the variance of 
s2/n (where s2 is the variance of the population, which is not depicted). This implies 
that the smaller the groups are, the more they vary on average in their mean from the 
populational mean, even if the groups are random samples.1038  
Normally one also depicts the population structure in such a graph. Since we are concerned 
with a dichotomic property, ‘to be or not to be altruistic’, this would have resulted merely in 
two columns one at 0 the other at 1. It makes more sense to depict a graded property (which 
I have done only as an intuitive help). Normally the central limit theorem is used for cases 
with a graded property. Sober’s and Wilson’s model will presumably also work similarly with 
graded properties, but this would need to be shown in detail, since the basic model would 
need to be modified. However, the central limit theorem is applicable to all forms of basic 
distributions. Hence I have confined myself to this case. 
This shows that under the condition of small group sizes sufficient variance of the 
mean of the involved groups may be given, even if random group formation is 
assumed. Hence also small group sizes appear to fulfil the conditions required for 
Sober’s and Wilson’s basic model of group selection. 
 
(4) Group selection of whole populations. Another possibility of group selection is the 
wiping out of whole populations. In popular presentations of evolutionary biology 
this is sometimes falsely presented as the one and only model of group selection. I 
shall only mention it shortly and also only mention the possible combination with the 
proposed systemic individual selection. 
Let us assume that a group or a species of altruists which are advantageous for the 
group had become established by the founder effect or by genetic drift (phenomena 
well studied by the evolutionary synthesis). Now, the problem of subversion from 
outside and from within may become pressing. One simply could assume that if 
egoism becomes too predominant in a group this group simply will not survive, 
                                                     
1037 There is a difference between observations and groups relevant to the central limit theorem in 
its normal form. Observations are usually understood as random samplings with replacement, 
whereas the application above on groups is actually a random sampling without replacement. In 
our model members can only be member of one group. Also if we do not want to change this 
assumption (this would be interesting as well) the general lesson from the argument is in a 
different formulation also applicable to random sampling without replacement. 
1038 See, e.g., J. Bortz, Statistik (2005), pp. 91 f. 
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whereas other will. Similar to Sober’s and Wilson’s original proposal above, only 
assuming complete isolation, the permanent division of successful groups and the 
frequent elimination of whole groups could stabilise the altruistic trait. But one may 
also think of two other ways in which a subversion may be prevented without the 
need of permanently wiping out whole groups. 
(a) The concept of evolutionary constraints may provide the possibility that 
something which is advantageous for the group, but not advantageous for a single 
selfish gene, may once become established and may than be stable for other reasons. 
The concept of structural constraints has recently been reanimated for example by 
Gould and more radically by Goodwin. Evolutionary constraints stress that because of 
certain morphological (or functional) necessities not all directions are open to 
evolution. According to this view, pathways, once adopted, may have an inner 
direction, which do not allow their subversion.  
I shall also argue that the phenotypic structure is not only a result of the genome, but itself 
also an evolutionary factor, channelling possible evolutionary pathways ( pp. 324 f.).  
(b) Group selection may once establish a system of individual selection, which is 
advantageous to the group and is kept stable by the inner stabilising dynamics of the 
system. In this case only the installation of such a system requires group selection. 
(This concept will be treated in more detail when discussing species selection below.) 
Without such modifications frequent selection of groups is required. However, the 
elimination of groups in some species may play a role. Also in regard to the human 
species this might have played a role, if tribes were permanently at war with each 
other. But this is obviously not a promising model for the present day sociobiology of 
humans. If we indeed want to treat such matters biologically (I would advocate a 
relative strong autonomy of cultural aspects), there are, as have been shown, other 
alternatives to strict gene-egoism. In regard to present human sociobiology I would 
generally prefer a structured population model of the advantage of social groups, 
which mix with other groups, and also my model of auto-selection, because these 
models appear more adequately to resemble the presently given situation. 
Additionally, we should not forget that scientific models of human behaviour may 
also have the aspect of a self fulfilling prophecy. 
To sum up, there are at least four different ways, in which the good for a group 
may become achieved: individual selection, systemic individual selection, group 
selection in structured populations and group selection of whole populations. It has 
been shown that systemic individual selection may gain some autonomy relative to 
mere individual selection and if combined with group selection may secure the good 
of the group without the need of permanent selection. In regard to the presented 
group selectionist model of E. Sober and D. S. Wilson I have shown that its 
applicability could be extended to all groups which mix with the population, if the 
usual group size is small enough to guarantee the required inter-group variation. 
Finally, I would like to add a few remarks on an intereting recent debate in psychology and 
behavioural economics on human altruism. This debate shows that humans are actually 
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much more altruistically than one would have to assume on the basis of gene-Darwinism 
and neo-classical economics.1039  
Rigidly controlled experiments have shown that most humans do not regularly behave 
like assumed by the egoistic homo economicus model known from economics. Instead they 
often aim to act in a just way, even if this involves truly altruistic behaviour and high costs. 
Although the experiments regularly use anonymous settings, please note that the altruism 
found in such experiments is not blindly distributed, but bound to criteria, like justice in 
particular (see research on the so-called ultimatum game or dictator game1040).  
Moreover, in common good and prisoner dilemma situations it has been shown that the 
undermining of group-serving behaviour by egoist defectors can be prevented if other 
players can punish defectors. The experiments were designed in a way that punishment 
involves costs for the punisher and ultimately altruistic, group-serving behaviour. Hence, 
Fehr and collegues have justly called this phenomenon ‘altruistic punishment’.1041  
Interestingly this altruistic behavioural phenomenon on the one hand requires the 
evolutionary assumption of one or another kind of group selection, since there is a selection 
pressure against the punisher. However, given the system has evolved (for instance by a 
founder effect), much less group selection is needed than without altruistic punishment, 
since punishment selects against defectors, and due to the resulting low number of defectors 
the negative effect on the altruistic punishers gets low. Hence, this idea provides us with an 
example how an additional mechanism may reduce the required force of group selection to 
keep up an equilibrium that is good for the group. 
f) Stable Synergetic Properties and Selection above Groups – Species and Ecosystems 
Also at higher levels selection is conceivable. This has been proposed in the 
evolutionary discourse for species as wholes and in principle also for synergetic 
systems of several species up to whole ecosystems. 
It is questionable, as is in regard to group selection, whether the term natural 
selection could be appropriately applied in the sense of a full Darwinian process of 
blind variation and external elimination. Another less Darwinian proposal would be 
that only the second step of this process, differential external elimination, comes into 
play ( definition of Darwinism, pp. 102, 358 f.). Differential external elimination of 
synergetic wholes appears to be enough to make such wholes evolutionarily relevant 
(the evolutionary stability has to be discussed in any case). It may still be an interesting 
question whether there is a Darwinian blind variation of species and ecosystems? In 
regard of species this has actually been proposed. In the subsequent Chapter 9 the 
transcendence of universal process Darwinism will be discussed. Here I am not 
primarily concerned whether the particular evolutionary process is strictly Darwinian, 
but rather whether these higher levels of organisation could in any case reasonably be 
said to exist and possibly also secure their own stability. Here I can only touch upon 
the discussions on the possibility of the evolutionary relevance first of species and 
secondly of systems of species up to ecosystems. 
                                                     
1039 Cf.: J. Bauer, Prinzip Menschlichkeit (2006), Chapter 6. 
1040 E.g., J. Henrich, R. Boyd; S. Bowles; C. Camerer; E. Fehr; H. Gintis; R. McElreath  et al, 
“Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies (2005). 
1041 E. Fehr, S. Gächter. Altruistic punishment in humans (2002). Fehr, E.; Fischbacher, U. Social norms 
and human cooperation (2004). 
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(i) Species 
The evolutionary relevance and the selection of species in the present discourse has 
early been advocated by Ghiselin1042 and Hull. Hull has explicitly understood species 
as ‘individuals’, having a beginning and an ending in time and exhibiting a certain 
degree of integration. According to Hull, the evolution of such ‘individuals’ could be 
modelled along Darwinian lines.1043  
In biology particularly Gould and Eldredge have defended the autonomy of the 
explanatory level of species and argue that the involved processes are at least similar 
to those of Darwinian individual selection.1044  
Prior to this, the proponents of the evolutionary synthesis, Wright, Dobzhansky 
and Mayr have in principle also supported the existence of species as an evolutionary 
factor. They advocated that the species is the unit of evolution which provides a basic 
frequency distribution of genes. To them the phenotypic structuredness of a 
population, caused partly by environmental, is evolutionarily relevant and an 
evolutionary factor. The concept of species in this view is linked to a number of 
properties and evolutionary factors like sexual reproduction, recombination, migration 
and isolation. Additionally, at least some advocates have even advocated the 
possibility of species selection along similar lines to individual selection, i. e. a blind 
overproduction of species and an external selection ( pp. 127 f.). Heretofore, for 
example Wallace advocated that the species is itself a unit of selection ( p. 112).  
The properties and evolutionary factors linked to the concept of a species, in my 
view pose the question, how far a species should be regarded as being an object of 
selection or in how far it itself changes the process of evolution. At least for reasons 
of comprehensibility, I think, we better distinguish two aspects of the reality of 
species, on the one hand the existence of the basic properties of a species, which 
change the character of evolution itself and on the other hand the result of the 
selection process of different species with possible adaptations on this level. 
The basic properties which more or less define the very existence of a species, like 
a common gene pool, recombination of genes, the building of subpopulations, the 
possibility of isolation, inner-specific migration, founder effect etc. already make the 
reality of species, transcending the individuals, apparent. But why should these 
properties make the species real? In my view these properties are themselves changing 
the very process of evolution. Inner-specific groups which we have treated above only 
become possible based on the existence of interbreeding populations. But also the 
very notion of single genes becomes only reasonable based on meiosis in sexually 
reproducing organisms, transcending the asexual evolution of whole organisms and 
                                                     
1042 M. T. Ghiselin, A Radical Solution to the Species Problem (1974).  
1043 D. Hull, Are Species Really Individuals (1976); Individuality and Selection (1980). Cf. the proposal of 
B. Mishler and R. Brandon to decompose the different aspects of the notion of individuality, 
Individuality, Pluralism, and the Phylogenetic Species Concept (1987/1998), pp. 300-305. 
1044 N. Eldredge, S. J. Gould, Punctuated Equilibria (1972); S. J. Gould, N. Eldredge, Punctuated 
Equilibria (1977); cf.: E. Lloyd, The Structure and Confirmation of Evolutionary Theory (1988/1994), 
p. 97; St. J. Gould, The Structure of Evolutionary Theory (2005), Ch. 5. (On punctuated equilibrium 
 p. 149). 
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their genomes (also the concept of higher-level genes, presupposes single genes in the 
first place). Genes as treated by population genetics are dependent on the existence of 
interbreeding populations. Semi-isolated gene pools are also necessary to sustain the 
variability on the species level, but equally for evolution on lower levels. But, likewise, 
phenotypic properties of a species like geographical isolation contribute to the way a 
species evolves too. 
The existence of species makes evolution quicker and less blind, and also changes 
the direction of evolution. Based on recombination new genetic combinations could 
be found more quickly. From the viewpoint of the evolutionary line, now the species, 
this process is less blind, because these combinations are tested in subpopulations, 
and if successful may become predominant. Before new species evolve much will have 
been ‘tested’ before, within a species. Based on new combinations and on the fact that 
some genes are recessive, ‘valleys’ of an adaptive landscape could be crossed which 
could not be crossed before. But, what is even more important, also the adaptive 
landscape itself changes. If an evolutionary line is a species, as outlined, the evolution 
of inner-specific groups, as discussed above is possible and even probable. 
( Chapter 9, on the evolution of evolutionary mechanisms.) 
It is cardinal that a species is a central unit of heredity in the sense of our earlier 
emphasis on genetic context. All genes, all high-level genes and all gene-pools, 
although they may vary in their reproductive rate, are part of this river of information. 
The species, as interbreeding population, is the ultimate context in which all lower 
units are finally interpreted. However, this does not yet guarantee that all evolutionary 
products of the species are for the good of the species. 
Nevertheless these properties of a species, as far as they change the process of 
evolution, are in a way inherent in all adaptations which result from this changed 
process. The crossing of valleys which would not have been crossed otherwise, the 
change of the adaptive landscape, are products of species, in the sense that if the 
species would not have existed these things would not have happened. Therefore, 
species appear to be real in the sense that they change the very process of evolution 
itself. Although most evolutionary results in a species appear to rely on the basic 
properties which a biological species has, not all aspects which are enabled by the very 
existence of species lead to the good of the species. 
We come to the second aspect, that of the selection of species and whether 
properties could be established which are for the good of the species.  
Egoistic genes, which may have an inner-specific advantage at the cost of the 
adaptation of the whole species, may gain dominance in the species.  
It appears that species selection is the only way that this could be prevented. 
I have outlined above, that it has often been argued that the general properties of a 
species, could lead to the process of species selection, similar to the neo-Darwinian 
concept of individual selection. (Actually, as mentioned, I think that variation on the 
species level is less blind, because combinations usually become tested before a new 
population becomes founded. On blindness,  pp. 368.)  
Species selection and the problem of subversion could be understood in a similar 
way as the selection of whole groups, only a species is a group which is, 
reproductively, completely isolated from other such groups. Correspondingly, again a 
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frequent selection of species appears to be required if subversion is to be prevented. 
To arch-Darwinians in particular this precondition should be no problem, since to 
them evolution anyhow consists almost only of blind allies.  
Subversion may also be prevented by the existence of evolutionary structural 
constraints ( p. 300). Another possibility would be that species selection leads to the 
installation of what I described as a systemic system of individual selection, which has 
a stability against egoistic subversion ( pp. 291 f.). Such systems, as we have seen, 
have a certain autonomy relative to mere individual selection, but do not necessarily 
serve the group or the species. But if such systems which is advantageous on the 
species level once becomes established by species selection, this systems sustains it 
own inner stability. Species selection would only need to change these stable selection 
systems if they become non-adaptive for the species because of an environmental 
change or the inner evolution of other loci in the gene-pool. 
Species selection has often wrongly been understood in isolation from other 
evolutionary mechanisms. Here a combination of species selection and systemic 
individual selection is proposed, which, I think has a synergetic property and each on 
their own do not have. If both concepts are combined it becomes possible that 
adaptations for the good of the species are installed by species selection, but are stable 
without the need of permanent species selection. This may help to explain why some 
adaptations on the level of species, have not been undermined by selfish genes, if 
permanent elimination of species is, likewise, no plausible assumption. 
(ii) Ecosystems 
Ecosystems are obviously less integrated than species are. Different species are not 
reproductively linked to each other as the genes or sub-populations of a sexually 
reproducing species are. Moreover, ecosystems – unlike species – do not in any 
obvious way build evolutionary linages and thus an analogy to individual selection is 
less complete.1045 Actually, it is much more normal for members of different species 
to hunt, exploit and kill each other. Nonetheless, it is argued here that it is not a priori 
excluded that properties for the common good of systems of several species or even 
of ecosystems could exist.1046  
Ecosystems are dynamic complex systems almost defined by the interaction effects 
of their compounding different species, organisms and abiotic environments. As we 
are here still concerned with replicators only, one may rephrase this concept as a 
synergetic ecological interaction of several reproductively isolated gene-pools with 
their environment ( the following critique of germ-line-reductionism, pp. 311 f.). In 
either case ecosystems appear to be partly self-regulatory with frequent negative 
feedback loops, giving rise to new synergetic properties. (On the relevance of self-
referential causation,  pp. 409 f.).  
                                                     
1045 St. J. Gould, The Structure of Evolutionary Theory (2005), p. 612. 
1046 J. Lovelock has even radically advocated that the Earth as a whole should be regarded as one 
organism, Gaia (1979); The Ages of Gaia (1988).  
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The predator-prey relationship, as a simple two species system described by the 
Volterra-Lotka equations1047, exhibits neither exponential growth, nor linear stability, 
as usual patterns to describe single populations, but an oscillation of the population 
size of the two species with a phase lag. Although this oscillation could be regarded as 
a synergetic property, it is not directly apparent that this relationship is for the good, 
neither of this higher system nor for the involved species. In a predator-prey 
relationship it appears that only the predator species profits from this interaction and 
will always exploit this system without constraints. But even such a system may lead 
also to the common good and may have self-stabilising properties.  
First, restrains for the predator may evolve. If we imagine that in a predator 
species a larger mutation took place and that this species may ‘win’ the evolutionary 
race and capture all the existing prey, or so much that the prey species collapses. (We 
may likewise think of highly virulent bacteria killing almost all of its hosts.1048) In this 
case the winning of the evolutionary race could cause the extinction of the ‘winner’. 
Actually such close prey-predator or parasite-host relationships are quite rare. But in 
any case the winning mutant will have a disadvantage and a geographically isolated 
group without this ‘advantageous’ mutation, may have a better chance to survive and 
may one day also reconquer this area. On the species level the predator which does 
not wipe out the prey population may become selected by group or species selection 
and the stability of this feature may also be secured by what I called systemic 
individual selection ( pp. 291 f.). But the real cause here would be the breakdown of 
an ecological system on which a predator depends; in a way we would be concerned 
with ecological selection for the good of that ecological system.  
Secondly, if we assume that the prey would win the race, it appears that this would 
be only advantageous for the prey. But as long as the prey species is not completely 
wiped out by the predator it may, as mentioned before, profit from the resulting 
evolutionary race, because it may also become fitter in relation to other predators it 
may one day encounter. Additionally, this victory also in part due to the effects on the 
larger ecological system might turn out to be a Pyrrhic victory. For example the 
possibly exponentially growing population may disrupt the balance of the ecosystem 
on which the species relies.  
Besides maintaining a moderate population size, predators (and generally consumer species), 
have also other ecological positive ‘functions’, necessary for the stability of an ecological 
system. For instance, the consumer species in the fragile ecosystem of the tundra are 
probably necessarily for breaking down the dead plant matter. In the tundra the 
decomposers are not abundant enough to break down all the dead plant matter of the 
producers directly, to provide the nutrients and soil for the plants. 
Hence, even in the case of predator-prey relations something like ecological selection 
for the good of an ecological system may under certain preconditions take place. 
                                                     
1047 Lotka and Volterra took a systemic approach to evolution, albeit accepting natural selection and 
arguing for a more harmonious understanding of ecosystems than the ascendent Darwinism of 
the 1930s. 
1048 On the group selection of low-virulence strains, cf. E. Sober, D. S. Wilson, Onto Others (1998), 
pp. 48-49. 
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Nevertheless the probability of a subversion of such system is still high, since for 
example the predator may wipe out a prey species and if the disadvantage is not too 
high feed on another species. 
 
We now consider the less problematic example of a synergetic system of species 
which more directly serves the involved species. In such cases of symbiosis 
(mutualism) the interaction of species has a direct positive fitness effect for all in-
volved species. Following my general approach, it would be absurd to argue that these 
systems do not exist, because they are obviously more than the sum of their parts.1049 
Lichens, for example, are composite plants consisting of a fungus and one or more 
algae. The involved kinds of organisms are different in kind, but form a common 
body. The alga synthesises carbohydrate that is taken up as food by the fungus, the 
fungus provides a structure that protects the alga from dry and other harsh conditions. 
Some lichens have metabolic products which each of its composing forms does not 
produce themselves. Because of the symbiotic and hence synergetic advantageous 
properties of this system, lichens are able to live as pioneers for example on rocks, in 
deserts or in alpine regions. There are several examples of such mutualist relationships 
(e.g., the termite and its methanogenic gut biota, or the polyp-zooxanthella associa-
tion) and it is interesting that there are approximately ten times as many bacterial cells 
in the human flora (build of bacteria and fungi) as there are human cells in the body. 
But, returning to the main issue, a synergetic advantageous property of a system 
which could be selected, is, as we have seen, not enough for a synergetic whole to be 
evolutionarily stable. Additionally it has to be shown that a synergetic ecological 
system could prevent its subversion by an egoistic species. Again we may think of a 
‘cheating’ species, which profits from the system, but does not contribute enough to 
sustain the system and thus undermines the surplus fitness of the system. In our 
example of lichens a hypothetical mutant alga may produce not enough carbohydrate 
for the fungus and instead replicate within the lichen independent from the fungus. 
Those egoistic algae would undermine the symbiotic system, but would internally have 
an advantage relative to other algae. But the symbiotic system in which such a 
subversion would have taken place, would have had a much reduced probability to 
multiply as a whole. This is quite analogous with group selection of whole groups. 
Those groups which as a whole are less advantageous may become extinct. Although 
from the viewpoint of the single organism we are concerned with something like 
group or species selection the ultimate relevant property here, however, exists on the 
level of the ecosystem. Hence, this is an example of a synergetic property of a system 
of organisms of different species which is not easily subverted by selfish mutants. 
Although this is an example at odds with a view that there are no ecological 
properties with evolutionary relevance in their own right, lichens are based on a 
particular form of symbiosis, which pervades almost all aspect of the life of the 
species involved and where even the reproduction of the two species is usually linked 
to each other (only the involved alga can under some conditions reproduce 
independently). The symbiotic system of these organisms has caused or is partly itself 
                                                     
1049 On the problem of a tautological definition of wholes as parts,  pp. 277 f. 
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a selection system where normally ecological selection, via something like group 
selection, outweighs individual selection. The common reproduction of these different 
organisms guarantees that their synergetic properties are tested together in the next 
generation. Here the common reproduction in a way serves as the geographical 
isolation of different groups.  
That such stable symbiotic communities are not necessarily undermined by selfish 
mutants, also becomes apparent in regard of ourselves, as we, like all other 
multicellular organisms, are build out of complex, eukaryotic cells. According to 
L. Margulis hypothesis of endosymbiosis, the eukaryotic cell resulted from the 
association of various single celled species. Today these species – actually constituting 
us – form a permanent symbiosis obligatory for their, and our, survival. In this sense 
each of us humans is a symbiotic system. 
A strict link between the reproduction of two species (which still do not 
interbreed) appears to be a very successful strategy to secure a close and intimate 
symbiosis against subversion. It could also in a way be found, for example, in ants 
which tend and protect aphids and periodically ‘milk’ them. Although here the aphids 
could reproduce independently and the reproductive link is less close in some ant 
species, some aphids are taken with the queen when founding a new colony. But 
neither a strict nor a less strict reproductive link appears to be a necessary 
precondition for a stable symbiosis.  
In analogy, ecological selection can not only work like the inner-specific selection 
of whole groups, but also like group selection in structured populations, where the 
individual animals are not strictly bound to a group but mix again to form new groups. 
Concerning systems of species, a certain isolation or particular close interaction of the 
involved species also appears normally to be given, if this symbiosis should be 
evolutionarily stable. This common isolation and interaction of subpopulations of two 
species corresponds to what inner-specifically in respect of individuals is called a 
‘group’. But the common functional and geographical isolation and interaction of the 
sub-populations of both species need not be a strict one as in the example of lichen 
above. A link of the subpopulations of the species limited in time or in amount (in 
analogy one can think of a semi-isolation of groups) could obviously be sufficient to 
stabilise a symbiosis. For example, there are ant species where new colonies usually 
take new aphids. These sub-populations of two species are, for the time the colony 
exists, linked to each other. For this time they are in a way commonly isolated and 
dependent on each other, although their reproduction is not closely linked in the sense 
that the ants species also keeps the aphids in new colonies. But the link between the 
subpopulations of these species is close enough that ecological selection may act on 
this system and that a subversion becomes prevented. 
But symbiotic relations also appear to exist if the relation of the involved species is 
weaker, particularly in relationships where many species are involved. Up until here we 
were mainly concerned with two-species relationships, but ecosystems are vastly more 
complex. The interactions in these systems are only beginning to be appreciated, but I 
think, although this can not be shown in detail here, that also some properties of a 
larger system are for the good of such systems and have been object of ecological 
selection. Different species are linked in complex food chains and food webs. 
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Likewise, in regard to shelter and other aspects of life they are often mutually 
dependent, not necessary only in a one-to-one relationship. 
A more complex, but also quite clearly symbiotic, interaction is the coevolution for 
example between flowers and pollinators or similarly between fruit-bearing plants and 
birds or apes etc. Many flowers have nectaries to provide nectar which serves as food 
for butterflies and many other insects, which in turn pollinate them. The 
successfulness of the involved species relies on this symbiotic system they constitute. 
But for many-species systems the problem of a subversion is particularly obvious. 
Cases of subversive ‘cheating’ actually do exist, there are for example flowers, which 
imitate normal flowers with nectaries, but which actually do not ‘invest’ in producing 
nectaries. They do not support the synergetic symbiotic system, but still profit from it 
by being pollinated.  There are also insects which the other way round make use of 
nectaries without pollinating the flowers which provide the nectar. But obviously this 
cheating is not so abundant, since such symbiotic systems obviously still do exist. 
Some insects even actively, with no direct advantage (but presumably with an indirect 
ecological one), help in pollinating flowers. Here a kind of ecological selection appears 
to play a role securing that the mutual advantages of this system are not subverted. 
This would be rather analogous to group selection in structured population, because 
the involved species are not reproductively linked. How such complex ecological 
systems are stabilised against subversion is only beginning to be understood by 
evolutionary ecology (mosaic evolution etc.).1050 
The even much more complex interdependence of different species in an 
ecosystem becomes particularly apparent by the succession of different relatively 
coherent communities of plants and animals in areas which are either colonised by life 
for the first time, like the bare rock of a volcanic island, or which have been 
devastated, for example, by a forest fire. In the beginning of a succession only a few 
species constitute this system. The system is very fragile and the energy flux through 
the system is quick. Although the first species will soon be replaced they are normally 
the only species which can gain ground under these harsh conditions. As the 
succession proceeds the simple old communities are replaced again and again by 
characteristic new other ones, which are often more complex, often stratified, and 
enable more species to coexist with one another. If one is concerned with a 
resettlement of a devastated region by already existing species, the succession will 
cumulate in a constellation of an equilibrium, by ecologists called ‘climax’, where 
further changes usually take place only slowly. At this point the ecosystem, despite 
fluctuations, is stable and invading species largely fail to gain a foothold. Likewise if 
these species are able to enter this ecological system or if environmental conditions 
fluctuate, the increased richness of species and the complexity of relationships 
normally buffer the ecological system. The biomass, the number of species and 
individuals and the complexity of their relationships has increased. The energy flux 
has slowed down. The degree of organisation is sometimes expressed by the 
informational content and the entropy of a system, by the quotient of biomass (stored 
                                                     
1050 Confer also my defence of the evolutionary relevance of phenotypes, based on inter-specific 
interactions,  pp. 326 f. 
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energy, enthalpy) and the used energy (entropy). One may dispute this as a simplistic 
understanding of organisation, but in any case it is striking that this systemic property, 
which also if measured in such a simplistic way appears to increase in such 
successions. 
One may argue that the involved species during an ecological succession create an 
environment for each other. It is not denied that competition plays a crucial role in 
this development and that ecosystems may be subverted by egoistic species and may 
collapse. However, I oppose a mere reformulation of ecological phenomena in terms 
of single species or even single genes and their environments. This would be 
inappropriate, since this would neglect the supersummative aspects of the evolution of 
ecosystems and dependencies involved. 
Often the importance of inter-specific interactions unfortunately only becomes 
apparent after a system has become disrupted. The building of highly organised 
ecosystems in evolutionary terms also is assumed to need a long time, many millions 
of years, but their destruction can proceed much quicker. Although extinctions of 
species are something normal in evolution, we for example currently live in a period 
of mass extinction. Despite being caused by human activity, the concealed danger of 
the ecological problems lies in an inner dynamics based, for example, on the 
breakdown of food chains. We also experience the instability of the remaining fragile 
ecological systems if non-endemic organisms are introduced into a system or if pests 
could easily destabilise an ecological system. The current ecological crisis also leads to 
an abiotic problem, like the depletion and erosion of soil, or, since less water becomes 
stored in plants, flood disasters and catastrophic draughts. 
Palaeontologically, the beginning and end of the Mesozoic era, the ‘age of the 
reptiles’, is marked by the world’s largest mass extinctions. Besides external causes a 
dynamics of a collapsing ecosystem should also be considered. 
The difference between species and ecosystems remains apparent and the problem 
of subversion appears to be more pressing in the ecological case. Of course, not 
everything which a species does is necessarily positive for its ecosystem. Our own 
species gives an excellent example of this possibility. But if a species tends radically to 
destroy its ecosystem, it will not survive for long. A first step to prevent so-called 
Homo sapiens sapiens sharing such a destiny, seems to me, to stop denying the existence 
of ecosystems. 
 
The main results of the sections on the transcendence of gene-atomism can be 
summed up as follows:  
(1) It has been shown that gene-Darwinian gene-atomism is not defined to be true 
by definition. Single genes, which are claimed to be the units of selection, are not 
defined as any stretch of DNA. Despite some echoes of such a tautological approach 
to the unit of selection debate, it is apparent that gene-Darwinians argue that in 
sexually reproducing organisms short and selfish stretches of DNA are the only units 
of selection. 
(2) The general concept of higher genetic units is introduced and it is shown that 
the meiotic shuffle in sexually reproducing organisms does not prevent the existence 
of higher genetic units. Corresponding to my critique of the physicalist research 
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program ( pp. 245 f.), I advocate that genetic wholes with synergetic properties can 
be regarded to exist particularly in their own right. 
(3) Probabilistic higher-level genes have a top down effect on single genes. This 
downward selection or downward sorting is presumably the simplest kind of 
downward causation. But higher-level genes even within individuals need not become 
established by individual selection. High-level genes still may be subverted by selfish 
genes not serving the individual good. But, provided certain frequency distributions in 
the population, these high-level genes not only have an evolutionary effect, but they 
could become evolutionarily stable against subversion. 
(4) I discuss the fallacy claiming gene-atomism tautologically. Here wholes are 
excluded from the semantic framework, because wholes are simply redefined in terms 
of their parts. This is different from the first point, where such a tautology is given by 
the definition of a gene as a stretch of DNA of any length. Now larger wholes are not 
simple redefined to be called single genes as well, but wholes are defined in terms of 
their several composing single genes, with no regard whether the wholes are more than 
the sum of their parts or not and with no regard to whether these synergetic 
properties cause their own stability or not. This is linked to the claim that those genes 
which have survived are the fittest. This is true since fitness is defined by survival. 
This tautological view could even be applied to cases of radical group selection. Even 
there, of course, the genes are the fittest that have survived. This is true but does not 
contribute anything to the question of whether wholes can determine the course of 
evolution. This tautological defence of gene-atomism has never been seriously 
proposed by gene-Darwinians, but implicitly it may well have played a role in 
immunising gene-atomism against any critique. 
(5) Higher-level properties in different organisms of a species are discussed. I 
describe four ways in which the good for the group may be achieved. In my view the 
proposed concept of systemic individual selection, transcending mere individual 
selection, is of particular interest. Systemic individual selection, based on an 
interaction of alleles at different loci could lead to a stabilisation of traits which are not 
favourable on their own. If once combined with group selection, this process may 
stabilise properties for the good of the group without the need of further group 
selection. In regard to group selection itself, I largely only follow the model of Sober 
and D. S. Wilson, but propose an extension of the applicability of their model to all 
groups which mix with the main population, if they are small enough to lead to the 
required group variance. 
(6) The concept of species selection is discussed, which becomes particularly 
interesting in combination with the proposed process of systemic individual selection. 
Moreover, I have outlined that predator-prey relationships, symbiotic relationships 
and more complex ecological relationships could have a synergetic effect and their 
own stability. It appears possible that properties for the good of a larger ecological 
system may exist, which have been favoured by something like ‘ecological selection’. 
In conclusion, it generally appears to be wrong that – as gene-atomism suggests – 
an adaptation is never ‘for the good’ of a larger genetic wholes, but only for the good 
of selfish genes. Still, of course, we have not concluded that adaptations are only for 
the good of higher units and never for the good of selfish single genes. Based on the 
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refutation of strict gene-atomism and based on the supported view of higher 
ontological levels of existence, likewise William’s (1960) methodological assumption 
that the burden of proof should always rest on the higher levels of explanation, is 
called into question. It appears more balanced that the burden of proof should rest 
equally at all different levels. 
Even if we adopted the ‘principle of egoism’ in regard to substances and accept 
the classical dichotomy of substance and accident, genes have to a certain extent to be 
seen not as substances but to some extent as accidents of higher wholes. The survival 
of the whole is not only determined by its parts but the survival of the parts is to some 
extent also determined by the whole. In regard to Dawkins’ concept of selfish genes, 
both the exclusive existence and the ruthless ‘selfishness’ of single genes have in their 
radicalness been shown to be wrong. 
8.3  Genetic Reductionism II: Germ-Line Reductionism and Its Transcendence 
a) Germ-Line Reductionism – The Strong Interpretation of the Weismann Barrier 
The second form of genetic reductionism of gene-Darwinism, which is even accepted 
by some of its critics, is germ-line reductionism. This is a strong interpretation of the 
so-called central dogma of microbiology, the modern version of the Weismannian theory of 
the continuity of the germ plasm. Germ-line reductionism emphasises that there are 
only causal arrows leading from genes to body, but none “leading from body to 
genes.”1051  
If we replace ‘gene’ with ‘eidos’/idea, this, paradoxically, becomes reminiscent of a 
Platonic view. Genes are regarded as being somehow eternal, like ideas in the Platonic 
mundus intelligibilis they are the true underlying background of the actual, changing 
mundus sensibilis.1052 (Of course, neither Plato nor the modern germ-line reductionists 
would be happy about this parallel, because – as we have seen above – both employ 
opposed concepts of substance, the former focusing on form, the latter on matter. 
 pp. 248 f.) Although germ-line reductionists obviously do not regard vehicles as 
completely negligible (just as a Platonist would not completely ignore the actual world), to 
them the germ-line is the primary, approximately eternal, biological substance. 
Vehicles, like individuals or groups, according to germ-line reductionism, are less real, 
unstable and temporary “like clouds in the sky or dust-storms in the desert.”1053  
The view radicalises the general tendency of neo-Darwinism stressing that the developed 
exists for the undeveloped, the tree exists for the germ, and thereby opposes earlier 
traditional approaches.1054 
Weismann ( pp. 118 f.) stated that the germ plasm is never modified by the somato 
plasm. The modernised version of this view, the so-called central dogma of microbiology 
                                                     
1051 R. Dawkins, The Extended Gene (1982/1989), p. 97, see p. 98. 
1052  p. 71. 
1053 R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (1976/1989), p. 34; The Extended Phenotype (1982/1989), p. 99. 
1054 H. Jonas, Organismus und Freiheit (1966/1974/1994), p. 94. 
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(cf. J. Watson, 1952), states that the genotype, the DNA, is never modified by the 





This modernised Weismannian view, bound to the theory of random mutation and 
external selection, is the backbone of all neo-Darwinian paradigms. Since the end of 
the eclipse of Darwinism, this Weismannian theory has successfully refuted alternative 
Lamarckian approaches (e. g. T. D. Lysenko), and today it is a theory which is very 
widely held. 
I would agree that much evidence speaks in favour of this modernised 
Weismannism with its implications for our understanding of evolution, but I think 
one should also acknowledge the following three points in order to reach a balanced 
position. Firstly, even Darwinian subparadigms differ a lot in their interpretations of 
the Darwinain or Weismannian central dogma. The central dogma itself does not 
appear to entail germ-line reductionism. Secondly, even the central dogma has recently 
been challenged by a heterodox group of biologists and may become modified in the 
course of the molecular revolution. Thirdly, even if one accepts the basic 
Weismannian doctrine as a currently valid hypothesis, as I do, it does not give a 
complete account of the interaction between genotype and phenotype. 
(i) Different Interpretations of the Central Dogma 
The acceptance of the central dogma of microbiology does not necessarily entail 
germ-line reductionism. The central dogma is presupposed by germ-line reductionism. 
It is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for germ-line reductionism. Germ-line 
reductionism is a particularly strong interpretation of this dogma, which regards the 
genotypic side of evolution as being substantial and real, whereas the phenotypic side 
is regarded as only providing the temporary and less real vehicles for the genes. 
Dawkins advocates a clear and radical germ-line reductionism according to which 
interactors are mere ‘vehicles’, ‘gene-machines’ or ‘survival machines of the genes’.1055 
                                                     
1055 R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (1976/1989); The Extended Phenotype (1982/1989),  footnotes 561, 
875. 
Figure 8: Flux of information according to the ‘central dogma of microbiology’an updated 
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In principle Dawkins even goes further. “Fundamentally, all that we have a right to 
expect from our theory is a battleground of replicators”.1056 
This approach radicalises the general tendency of Darwinism that organisms are 
understood as being the object of and not subject to evolution. According to this 
approach organisms are not only externally moulded by natural selection but internally 
determined by genes, which in turn are determined by natural selection.1057 Gene-
Darwinism, of course, accepts statistical fluctuations in the phenotypic expression of 
the genotype, but the organism is, nevertheless, seen as a mere vehicle, which does not 
contribute anything to evolution that has not already been given by the single genes.  
Proponents of the evolutionary synthesis have differed from the strict gene-
Darwinian interpretation of the central dogma, which is also vital for their also largely 
Darwinian theory ( pp. 123 f.). Proponents particularly of the second phase of the 
synthesis do not support and partly explicitly oppose strict germ-line reductionism. 
They advocate that the phenotype plays a crucial role in selection. Notably E. Mayr 
has emphasised the role of the phenotypic organism.1058 But proponents of the 
second step of the synthesis generally also emphasised phenotypic properties at the 
level of populations, especially if the population structure of a species is 
phenotypically changed by geographic isolation ( pp. 127 f.). Nevertheless some 
aspects of the evolutionary synthesis particularly in its first phase of ‘bean-bag 
genetics’, also prepared today’s germ-line reductionism ( p. 193). However, in its 
second phase the synthesis can not be said to have advocated a full-blown form of 
germ-line reductionism. 
The importance of the phenotype is even more strongly emphasised by explicit 
critics of radical Darwinism ( pp. 92 f., p. 101.), who have reintroduced concepts of 
romantic biology to evolutionary theory. Despite many differences they all emphasise 
that evolution is not only determined by genes, but is also constrained and directed by 
morphology, body plans or morphological fields.1059 (Often this tradition only has 
focused on structural necessities, but, I think, in principle the idea of phenotypic 
constraints can and has to be extended to functional constraints as well.1060) Although 
proponents of such an approach may accept the Weismannian central dogma, they 
may still emphasise that interactors may also play their own cardinal role in evolution 
and are not mere ‘vehicles’ or ‘survival machines of the genes’.  
(ii) Violations of the Weismannian Dogma? 
Despite the considerable differences in the interpretation of the Weismannian dogma, 
all approaches would regard something like the systematic appearance of reverse 
transcription of RNA to DNA in germ cells as being rather contrary to the 
                                                     
1056 Idem, The Selfish Gene (1989), p. 256, see p. 266. 
1057 Cf.: K. Bayertz, Autonomie und Biologie (1993), p. 346.  
1058 E.g., E. Mayr, The Growth of Biological Thought (1982), p. 588.  
1059 E.g., G. Webster, B. Goodwin, Form and Transformation: Generative and Relational Principles in Biology 
(1996). 
1060 Cf.: J. W. Bock, G. v. Wahlert, Adaptation and the Form-Function Complex (1965/1998), pp. 119-
120. 
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Weismannian dogma and also to its radicalization, the germ-line reductionist ‘neo-
Weismannian’ dogma. 
Despite earlier refutations of a radical Lamarckism, some more recent findings in 
molecular biology render a more moderate comeback of such a view to be not totally 
implausible. Actually, the existence of reverse transcription was first observed in the 
late 1950s. It was fully confirmed in 1970 for retroviruses (H. Temin, D. Baltimore 
were awarded the Nobel Prize for their findings in 1975). Now many retroviruses are 
known to infect mammals or birds; HIV belongs to this class. Although this in a 
subtle way challenges the central dogma, retroviruses are, of course, not processes in 
healthy organisms.  
However, the general molecular revolution, and the modelling of complex systems, 
has increasingly unsettled the assumption of a totally stable organismic genome, which 
only becomes changed randomly during meiosis ( p. 148). We now know that DNA 
is capable of repairing itself. Generally, the Nobel laureate B. McClintock has shown 
that genes can be moved within or between chromosomes. If now the cellular ‘milieu’ 
had a systematic influence on such gene transpositions, especially in the germ cells, 
this would definitely violate the Weismannian central dogma.1061 
Also in regard of mutational change germ-line reductionism may become violated by further 
research. It is acknowledged that some chemicals cause mutation which are located 
specifically in certain chromosomal areas.1062 If an organism under certain circumstances 
would produce such mutagenic substances itself, this might once be interpreted as a 
systematic violation of the Weismannian doctrine. 
One may paradoxically argue that Darwinian adaptationists should in principle predict 
that Lamarckian mechanisms have evolved.  
The non-existence of such a Lamarckian mechanism would also point to the limits of 
adaptationism. An interesting objection to such an argument would be that the Weismann 
barrier may also have an adaptive advantage. It may, for example, serve as a defence against 
viruses or it may secure equal reproductive chances of the genes, rendering the organism as a 
whole more stable. 
Since the late 1970s Ted Steel has been proposing and developing a Lamarckian 
theory of the immuno system of higher animals based on somatic mutation and 
selection and the reverse transcription of the aquired properties to the DNA. 
Although some of his results have been disputed, he and his school in recent years 
appear to have come closer to a full confirmation of their theory.1063 If his theory 
                                                     
1061 Not all organisms have specialised germ cells. In many plants or fungi the variation of somatic 
cells can be inherited. From the viewpoint of the organism this violates the Weismannian 
dogma. L. W. Buss, Evolution, Development, and the Units of Selection (1983), quoted in E. Lloyd., The 
Structure and Confirmation of Evolutionary Theory (1988/1994), pp. 66-67. Although this indeed 
violates the classical Weismannian theory, it does in my opinion not equally violate its modern 
formulation and its radical germ-line reductionist interpretation. Modern germ-line reductionists 
do not accept organisms as real entities anyway and to them the germ line is not defined by 
certain cells but by DNA. 
1062 See e.g., R. Fahrig (Ed.), Mutationsforschung und genetische Toxikologie (1993), pp. 6, 50. 
1063 E. J. Steele, R. A. Lindley, R. V. Blanden, Lamarck’s Signature (1998).  p. 148. 
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became accepted, a moderate explicitly Lamarckian perspective in genetics would gain 
ground.  
Generally, I think, the self-organisation of the genome is still underestimated. Firstly, most 
research is still limited to very simple organisms, like viruses or the genome of fruit flies. 
Secondly, the evolutionary synthesis had reached a discursive equilibrium, allowing both 
pluralism and group properties. Despite their comparatively moderate interpretation of the 
Weismannian view, it assumed a simple relationship between genotype and phenotype as an 
artefact of their Mendelian methodology1064.  
Research which stresses the self-organisation of the DNA, even under somatic 
influences, may be promising, but it can not be evaluated here in how far particular 
Steel’s approach is empirically supported and whether, in the case of its confirmation, 
it is applicable to other phenomena besides the immune systems of higher animals. 
I shall hence not rest my argumentation on the validity of this empirical claim. 
Moreover, an enhanced interpretation of acknowledged facts, in my opinion, refutes 
the radical germ-line reductionist interpretation of the central dogma, and defends the 
evolutionary relevance of phenotypes in their own right.1065 
(iii) The Central Dogma as Only Partial Description of the Relationships between 
Genotype and Phenotype 
In the first point above we have distinguished the central dogma and its radical germ-
line reductionist interpretation. Here and in the following sections I argue that the 
central dogma is not an exhaustive account of the genotype-phenotype interaction, as 
claimed by gene-Darwinians. 
The central dogma merely states that the DNA could not be physically altered by 
the phenotype (of that organism). More radically, germ-line reductionism claims that 
“there is no causal arrow leading from the body to genes”1051 and hence “organisms 
are but the transient engines of long-term gene replication.”1066 Germ-line 
reductionism argues that there is no flux of information from the phenotype to the 
genotype and no autonomous role of the phenotypes in evolution. Phenotypes are 
regarded as mere vehicles which are in principle reducible to single selfish genes and 
which are ultimately the only agents of evolution.  
We have seen that there have been biologists who accepted the central dogma, but 
have still advocated the relevance of phenotypes in their own right. In the next 
sections I propose a justification for such a view which is at odds with strict 
germ-line reductionism. 
I argue that not only the information of the genotype but also what I call 
‘exformation’ influences the phenotype. I do not deny the existence of genes, but 
                                                     
1064 Cf.: R. Lewontin, Gene, Organism, Environment (1983/1985). 
1065 In any case I do not think that a purely Lamarckian view is in sight. If, for example, you start 
regularly to sunbathe or you went regularly to a solarium, your baby will presumably not be born 
with a darker skin colour than you have. But instead of seeing Lamarckism and Darwinism as a 
dichotomy, I shall argue that it is more appropriate to see them as extremes of a spectrum of 
theoretical options, which may even be valid in different respects ( pp. 359 f.). 
1066 R. Dawkins, Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype (1978), p. 68 
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argue that the phenotype based on exformational aspects is full of ‘stuffness’1074 as 
well. A reduction to the gene level in this view is a false simplification. The phenotype 
even determines what parts of the genetic code are read and how this code is 
interpreted, otherwise the cells with identical genes in different tissues would not 
behave completely differently. Moreover, the phenotype itself constrains and directs 
its possible evolutionary pathways. It will be argued that phenotypes themselves are 
evolutionary factors. I shall finally expose a somewhat more daring proposal of how 
mutual morphological resonance of co-evolving species may be evolutionarily 
relevant. For this argument the concept of form is replaced by the concept of a 
probabilistic morphological field. 
Hence, the ‘central dogma’ in the next sections will be shown not to be an 
exhaustive theory of genotype-phenotype relations and, thus, germ-line reductionism, 
as found in gene-Darwinism, is rejected. 
b) Information, Exformation and Phenotype as Evolutionary Factors 
(i) The General Concept of Exformation 
The concept proposed here of exformation can not only be applied to biology, but is 
intended as more general. It arises out of the critique of the modern materialistic con-
cept of substance and epistemological downward reductionism above. Ontologically, 
it has been argued that it is not reasonable to reduce all wholes to their parts. 
Epistemologically, it has been shown that it is not reasonable to favour downward 
reductionism as the only type of explanation ( pp. 248 f.).  
Somewhat analogous to the proposed types of explanation ( p. 254) an entity, 
according to this view, is itself understood as a form or a system, determined not only 
by its elements but also by the (irreducible) relations between its elements (form in the 
narrow sense).1067 For the ‘formation’ of an entity, it is not only its in-formational 
aspects but also ex-formational ones which are important. The elements and the 
relations between the elements are additionally co-constituted by an ‘external’ 
environment. Only those elements of the external world are relevant which are related 
to that entity (Uexküllian understanding of environment). The entities themselves will 
normally only be stable under certain external conditions. For instance atoms have not 
always been stable throughout the history of the universe. Also the relations of the 
elements are exformationally influenced; we may, for instance, think of a whirl in a 
wash-basin ( p. 254), where the direction of relative movements of the involved 
water molecules, the direction of the ‘Coriolis force’, is ultimately determined by the 
rotation of the whole earth. Neglecting these exformational explanations by restricting 
                                                     
1067 Aristotelian hylemorphism may also help us to reach more appropriate results in the mind-body 
problem as well. M. McGinn, Real Things and the Mind Body Problem (1999, unpubl.). It has even 
been argued recently that there “is nothing absurd in the notion of form without matter”. 
J. Lowe, Form Without Matter (1999). 
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oneself to only proximate1068 downward reductionist explanation of a whole by its 
parts, seemed epistemologically and ontologically inadequate to me. 
The concept of exformation becomes particularly apparent in respect to computer 
programs. The in-formation in a certain application program is always only 
interpretable if it is interpretable by the ex-formational operating system. Together 
they build, so to speak, a formational whole. Many functions of a certain application 
program refer to externally defined functions of a larger system. Likewise while the 
text file I am currently working with contains information, it only becomes readable 
when a certain exformational program which can interpret this file interacts with it. 
Yet in this view how should entities be treated which have no further parts but are 
in themselves final elements? The only physical entities which may have this character 
are the elementary particles in physics. To sustain the proposed position one could 
simply concede that these are the only entities where there is no need to refer to 
exformation since they exist in an unchanged way, independent of any inner relation 
and any outer conditions. Although not a physicist, I tend to interpret these entities 
differently in terms of exformation. Quarks and antiquarks only emerge and disappear 
in couples; the so-called baryon number is always preserved.1069 Thus a kind of 
context dependence, reminding one of positive or negative electrical charges, 
apparently exists here as well. 
In respect to human memory it is not difficult to find examples of exformation: we 
only have to think of a knot in one’s handkerchief or of a digital personal assistant. 
But exformation also plays a role in less obvious cases. Let us think of the activity of 
tying one's shoe-laces. Some aspects of this activity are obviously stored in our 
memory itself (information). But although we are capable of tying our shoe laces, we 
might not easily be able to carry out the exact movement without holding the actual 
laces in our hands. Exformation lies in the laces themselves and in the specific inter-
action of the laces while one is tying them. Exformation is most intimately linked with 
information. Exformation in respect to our own memory is also often present when 
we are not aware of it, for example, in the way we structure our rooms or we organise 
our desks etc. The external is not always really external but rather a part of us. 
Although the concept of exformation, and more specifically also that of external 
‘memory’, is in my view applicable to many areas, it will in the following sections only  
be developed in a biological respect, in contrast to biological germ-line reductionism. 
(ii) Exformation and the Stuffness of the Phenotype 
The phenotype, and also the extended phenotype, is not only a result of genomic 
information but of exformation as well. In the section on gene-atomism I have argued 
that together genes may form synergetic wholes with a higher fitness than each 
individual part ( pp. 264 f.). Also their synergetic properties can only be understood 
                                                     
1068 The terms ‘ultimate’ and ‘proximate’ are used here in a similar but different way from their usual 
sense in the evolutionary discourse. 
1069 Such a ‘contextual’ concept of preservation is also advocated in regard to the lepton numbers 
Le, Lµ, Lτ of the three lepton families. See e.g., K Stierstadt, Physik der Materie (1989), pp. 19 f. 
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if the phenotypes are considered. In this sub-section another context argument is 
proposed now for information and exformation. 
In this view ‘external’ environments of genes are not only mere accidental 
surroundings of these entities but also essential parts of their being. Lewontin, for 
instance, has stressed that genetic and environmental causes are “inseparable”1070. 
Nevertheless, I think that it is still possible to argue, for example, that the atomic 
structure of a hydrocarbon molecule itself is not coded into the genes. Although they 
make use of this structure, the structure is stored externally to the DNA. Likewise, the 
synergetic larger physical and chemical properties of a cell and of organs are neither 
completely stored in the genes. There is an exformational side as well and a 
morphological logic caused by the information-exformation interaction. From the 
viewpoint of the genetic informational side, exformational aspects simply appear as 
given, but they are nevertheless aspects of reality in their own right, essential for the 
genes and not themselves stored within the genes. Hence the phenotype is not only 
based on information, but on exformation as well. 
This argument appears to be linked to the argument that only the phenotype is 
visible to selection, whereas the genes or the genotype are not. This argument has, for 
example, been elaborated in a more formal way by R. Brandon, who makes use of the 
statistical concept of ‘screening of’. He argues that the phenotype and not the genotype 
determines and directly explains the fitness of an organism or a group. For example, 
the phenotypic property of the height of a tree may determine their fitness. Selection 
only ‘sees’ the phenotype irrespectively of the genotype.1071 
This claim, in my view, implicitly refers to two reasons why this may be the case. 
Firstly, the phenotype, as outlined above, is not determined by the genotype alone, but 
by exformation as well. A genotype alone does not determine the properties and 
fitness of a phenotype but exformational aspects like the soil in which the tree grows 
could equally change the ‘seen’ fitness. Secondly, given constant exformation, 
different combinations of genes may also lead to the same phenotype. If height is an 
advantageous property, then a certain gene is not favoured but possibly quite different 
combinations of genes. This refers to the contextuality within the genotypic side itself 
and is treated in detail in section 8.2 ( pp. 264 f.). In any case the interaction of 
genes occurs on the phenotypic side, which is entangled with exformation. 
Although Brandon is right in some respects, I partly agree with his critics Sterelny 
and Kitcher, who argue that one can indirectly still speak of genes being selected, if 
one takes all the different environments into account and abstracts from them.1072 I 
think they are right as far as they claim that one can investigate in which genetic and 
exformational environments certain genes are fit in. But in my view this does not 
imply that single genes are the only units of selection. (I have treated earlier larger 
units of the informational side of evolution  pp. 264 f.) and does not at all entail 
that phenotypes are epiphenomenal, a point which is more important for our 
present concern. 
                                                     
1070 R. Lewontin, Gene, Organism, Environment (1983/1985). 
1071 R. N. Brandon, The Levels of Selection: A Hierarchy of Interactors (1988/1998), pp. 180 f. 
1072 K. Sterelny, P. Kitcher, The Return of the Gene (1988/1998), pp. 165 f.  
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On the contrary, phenotypes are ontologically and epistemologically prior to 
genotypes. Brandon is, in my opinion, completely right in arguing that only the 
phenotype could directly be seen by natural selection. We, and in a way natural 
selection, can finally calculate the advantages and disadvantages of single genes, but 
this is always abstracted from properties phenotypes have, which are in turn not only 
dependent on genetic information but on exformation as well. Evolution selects 
certain phenotypic properties, which are the result of certain information-exformation 
interaction. Only based on the very existence of phenotypic properties, can we speak 
of a gene for such a property. Of course, today’s geneticists have a direct acquaintance 
with DNA, but they also still need phenotypes to interpret a sequence of DNA as 
being a gene for something. The sequencing of the genome in the human genome 
project only reveals the informational code, an understanding of the meaning of the 
code, will only be acquired if the phenotypic interaction of the parts of this code and 
their interaction with exformation is understood.1073 I do not deny the reality of genes, 
but I advocate the reality of phenotypes as well, which have properties not stored in 
the genes. Moreover, phenotypes are the very basis from which we and selection 
abstracts the meaning of genes. This gives us a first impression of why “anatomical or 
morphological structure is full of ‘stuffness’.” 1074 The phenotype is based on a 
synergetic interaction of information and exformation. A view centred exclusively on 
information has to be rejected. It is not possible to reduce phenotypes completely to 
genic information. 
(iii) Phenotype Interpreting Genotype 
Although I have accepted the Weismannian central dogma, I think one does not need 
to accept the neo-Weismannian dogma that the phenotype needs not to be reducible 
to the informational side of evolution. I now argue that the phenotype, or indirectly 
also the outer exformation of genes, is crucial for the interpretation of the DNA itself 
(cf. Figure 9). It would be wrong to assume that in a phenotype the genetic 
information itself interacts in an unaltered way with exformation. It is more 
appropriate to argue that, although the physical DNA structure is not altered, the 
information content (its meaning) of the DNA itself is often changed by different 
exformational contexts. The ‘semiotics of the genotype’ is not context free and 
unambiguous.1075 The last decades have revealed not only ways how genes control the 
phenotype, but also how genes are themselves controlled by the phenotype.1076 The 
influence of the phenotypes and the cellular milieu on the interpretation of genotypes 
is apparent even without discussing specific experiments, if one conciders, for 
instance, the known different functioning of cells in different tissues, which all 
                                                     
1073 Cf.: H. Markl, Von der Mediengesellschaft zur Wissensgesellschaft (1997), p. 16. 
1074 P. Beurton, Organismic Evolution and Subject-Object Dialectics (1981), p. 49. 
1075 E. L. Khalil, Neo-Classical Economics and Neo-Darwinism: Clearing the Way for Historical Thinking 
(1992), p. 34. Contextualism, normally used in cultural epistemology has recently been 
advocated e. g. by Putnam and Derrida.  
1076 J. Bauer, Prinzip Menschlichkeit (2006), Chapter. 5. D. Nobel, The Music of Life: Biology Beyond Genes 
(2006), Chapter 7. 
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physically have the the same code of DNA. However, synchronically even single cells 
– like nerve cells, skin cells, and heart cells all differ in their organisation. Moreover, in 
developmental biology it becomes apparent that during the phases of ontogenesis – 
diachronically – different genetic sections of the identical cells may be decoded by the 





The importance of somatic and extra-somatic ex-formation was, for example, stressed 
earlier on by Driesch, who showed that during the early growth of a frog the cells of 
the frog’s head could be transposed to its foot and vice versa. Their function at this 
stage solely depends on their position, i. e. their morphological and functional relation 
within the body.  
Exformational aspects could even change the mode of reproduction. For example 
the Alpine Meadow Grass (Poa alpina var. vivipara L.) or some orchids reproduce either 
sexually or asexually depending on their environment.1077 The informational side, of 
course, allows this possibility, but to ignore the importance of exformation in such an 
example is particularly absurd.  
On the other hand the genotype likewise, in a Uexküllian sense, determines to a 
certain extent itself what exformational or environmental aspects become important. 
In turn the resulting somatic and extra-somatic exformation determines to a certain 
extent which aspects of the genome are read and how they are interpreted. Despite 
their differences information and exformation mutually determine each other 
dialectically. P. Beurton argued that “the evolutionary nature of genes is non-existent 
                                                     
1077 Personal communication with Simon Pierce (Univ. of Durham, Dept. of Biology, 1997). 
morphological and ecological exformation 







Figure 9: Flux of formation, including information and exformation, according to the points (1.) to 
(5.) of this section. The phenotype is not only determined by genic information, but by 
exformation as well. Even if one accepts the central dogma of microbiology, the resulting 
phenotype has itself a certain influence on the genotype, interpreting the information and 
influencing what is transcribed (dotted arrows). Also the transfer of cytoplasm from phenotype to 
phenotype is indicated (dashed arrows). Moreover, not depicted here, the phenotype constrains 
and directs the viable evolutionary pathways (5.). 
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outside the whole.”1078 I would not go that far, but, despite the existence of genes, I 
think it is true that biological information and exformation are concepts which are 
mutually dependent on each other. The information plays a role in interpreting the 
environment, as the exformation and the inner dynamics of the phenotype do in 
interpreting the DNA. 
The importance of exformation particularly becomes obvious in human culture as a special 
example of exformational memory ( pp. 324 f.). Medicine has mainly changed not the 
genetic makeup of humans, but has exformationally achieved the improvement of 
phenotypes. Particularly in a philosophical treatment of biology one should be aware that 
general biological concepts are often equally applied to humans as well. It would be wrong 
to conceal the evolutionary importance of exformation terminologically. 
(iv) Stuffness and Inner Dynamics of the Phenotype 
Stressing the information-exformation interaction one may still neglect the inner 
dynamics of phenotypic development. For example, Lewontin has turned against the 
view that organisms can be seen merely as effects with internal and external causes.1079 
He continues: “The fundamental general fact of phenogenetics is that the phenotype 
of organisms is a consequence of non-trivial interaction between genotype and 
environment during development. [...] The phenotype at any instant is not simply the 
consequence of its genotype and current environment, but also of its phenotype at the 
previous instant. That is, development is a first order Markov process in which the 
next step depends upon the present state. [...] Organisms as entities are one of the 
causes of their own development”1080 
When cells divide and generate new cells, they transfer the information concerning 
their ‘aquired pattern of gene expression’ to daughter cells (‘epigenetic 
inheritance’).1081 In contrast to purly genetic transfer of information in ontogenesis 
this is due to exformation; the process is either based on continuous signals from the 
body, or a kind of permanent molecular marking outside the DNA itself, determining 
which and how genes are expressed (genetic imprinting). 
One may reasonably object that this might only be a plausible concept for 
ontogenesis, not for phylogenesis, since organisms die and only genes are transferred 
to the next generation. Indeed there are substantial differences between the processes 
of inheritance involved. 
However, later I shall propose how phenotypic structures are not only 
exformationally influenced, but that in a limited sense properties can be inherited by 
morphological resonance ( pp. 324 f.).  
Here I only want to point out that it is not correct to assume that the genotype at 
any time of reproduction is bare of any phenotypic context. Cytoplasm always embeds 
the nuclear genes even in the germ cells. A phenotypic context with which to interpret 
the DNA appears to be needed.  
                                                     
1078 P. Beurton, Organismic Evolution and Subject-Object Dialectics (1981), p. 49. 
1079 R. Lewontin, Gene, Organism, Environment (1983/1985), p. 274. 
1080 Ibid, p. 277, 279.  
1081 D. Nobel, The Music of Life: Biology Beyond Genes (2006), Chapter 7. 
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More controversially, it has been argued, by M. W. Ho, that the cytoplasm also 
stores acquired characteristics of the phenotype, which may be transmitted to the next 
generation in this way.1082 In any case, the continuous phenotype provides a necessary 
context for the interpretation of the genome, not reducible to genic 
information alone. 
(v) Phenotype as Evolutionary Factor in Its Own Right 
The phenotype is not only irreducible to the genotype because of its partly 
exformational basis and its inner dynamics, but can itself be regarded as an 
evolutionary factor in its own right.  
Opponents of gene-Darwinism have often criticised the germ-line reductionist 
position which ignores the phenotypic morphology constraining or directing 
evolution. The concept of evolutionary constraints and inner direction is also 
historically rather opposed to Darwinism and is a hallmark of Platonic, Aristotelian, 
idealistic (eidos = form) or romantic biology, which claim a structural logic of 
development, rather in terms of form than in terms of matter  ( pp. 92 f., 95 f.). 
Notwithstanding the triumph of Darwinism there has always been a more or less 
continuous, presently iconoclastic, research tradition of structurally orientated 
approaches in biology. H. Driesch, D’Arcy Thompson and C. H. Waddington are 
some of the main figures of this heterodox tradition. Today, the British biologist 
Goodwin, a disciple of Thompson, appears to be the most well known proponent of a 
morphologically orientated school of thought in the English speaking countries.1083 
But implicitly also proponents of the evolutionary synthesis, particularly Mayr (despite 
his critique of essentialism) may still have been somewhat influenced by this research 
tradition through their acceptance of a realist stance towards phenotypes. S. J. Gould, 
who is, modifications aside, largely a Darwinist, even more explicitly advocates the 
non-Darwinian concept of structural necessities and constraints. 
Structural phenotypic necessities and resulting pathways in developmental biology 
have led Waddington to coin the metaphor of an epigenetic landscape. This notion 
has been applied to individual ontogeny and to phylogeny as well. Similarly, the 
concept of a body plan stressed phenotypic constraints. Arthropods (i. e. crabs, 
centipedes, spiders and insects) for example have exoskeletons, which protect them, 
but which are somewhat ineffective if the organism increases in size, since it needs to 
repeatedly burst out of its old skeleton. The body plan of an exoskeleton constrains 
the evolution of larger arthropods. 
The notion of a body plan need not necessary be understood in a Platonic way favouring 
only one ideal realisation but could also be understood in a rather Aristotelian sense, 
allowing variance, where the form, despite its own causal relevance is established by its parts. 
Later I shall for similar reasons replace the concept of forms by the concept of fields.1084 
                                                     
1082 See: M.-W. Ho, P. T. Saunders (Eds.), Beyond Neo-Darwinism: An Introduction to the New 
Evolutionary Paradigm (1984). pp. 280 ff.  
1083 G. Webster, B. Goodwin, Form and Transformation: Generative and Relational Principles in Biology 
(1996). 
1084  pp. 324 f. (cf also footnote 1002) 
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The emphasis on forms, morphology and evolutionary constraints has been alien to 
Darwinism particularly because this aspect of the evolutionary process is not 
necessarily adaptive.1085 Organismic constraints limit the number of possible pathways 
which selection may take. Hence not all aspects of evolutionary change are adaptive. 
Moreover, the traditional focus of Darwinism is on matter, not on form, and on a 
structural developmental logic. The focus is on the selection by an external 
environment and not on directions resulting from the inner phenotypic morphology. 
Some gene-Darwinians have simply excluded such structural questions from the 
scientific agenda. They are just simply interested in adaptive phenomena. If one then 
claims the truth of pan-adaptionism one commits a tautological fallacy ( pp. 339 f.). 
Despite my critical attitude to radical Darwinism ( Chapter 9), I, like Gould, think 
that morphological approaches could be harmonised with a modified selectionist 
account.1086 But since adaptation is closely entangled with structural aspects I agree 
with Lewontin that the metaphor of adaptation has to be generally replaced – or has 
at least to be complemented – by a metaphor of construction.1087 
It is not only these phenotypes of organisms but also those of groups that are full 
of stuffness and can be regarded as evolutionary factors. Earlier I showed why gene-
pools could develop properties which are good for the group and which are not 
necessarily subverted by selfish genes ( pp. 284 f.). These properties have been 
discussed on the genotypic side (gene-pools). Nevertheless, these properties, which 
are similar to the properties of individuals, can only be understood when based on an 
interaction of genetic information and exformation. This view would also rehabilitate 
the view of the evolutionary synthesis that the phenotypic structuredness of 
populations and the intensity of their geographical isolation are themselves 
evolutionary factors. 
Phenotypes, organisms as well as groups etc. have to be taken seriously. They are 
full of stuffness, are not reducible to the genetic side and their constraints have an 
own evolutionary effect. The results of the last five sub-sections are partly visualised 
in Figure 9. The phenotype is not formed by genetic information alone, but by 
exformation as well. It is full of stuffness and can not be reduced to the germ-line. 
Despite accepting the Weismannian central dogma, the phenotype also plays an 
important role in regard to how the genotype is interpreted and which sections of the 
DNA-code are transcribed at all. Finally the phenotypic structure has its own causal 
relevance in constraining, enabling and facilitating certain evolutionary pathways. The 
phenotype is not only irreducible to the genotype but itself shapes evolution. Hence it 
is wrong to regard phenotypes merely as accidental vehicles or temporary 
epiphenomena without their own causal role, instead it is more appropriate to regard 
them as evolutionary factors in their own right. 
                                                     
1085 A more differentiated account on different relations of constraints and adaptation is given by: 
R. Amundson, Two Concepts of Constraint: Adaptationism and the Challenge from Developmental Biology 
(1994/1998), pp. 96 f 
1086 In my view selectionism in a very broad sense, does not imply a strict Darwinian process of 
blind-variation-and-external-elimination,  pp. 358 f. 
1087 R. Lewontin, Gene, Organism, Environment (1983/1985), pp. 279-280. Cf. also: M. Ruse, The 
Mysteries of Mysteries (1999), p. 167.  
Part IV. Chapter 8: Transcendence of Substance Reductionism 324 
c) Forms, Fields and the Concept of External Memory 
After having shown the stuffness of the phenotype and even its role as an 
evolutionary factor, I shall now advocate the more controversial case that, rather than 
only having phenotypes influenced by exformation, changes of exformation may, in a 
way, be stored systematically outside the phenotype in question. This additional 
argument is, in my view, not essential for my critique of germ-line reductionism, but it 
may still be an interesting proposal based on the concept of exformation. 
In the claimed ‘external’ memory other genotypes do play an essential role, but 
from the viewpoint of a certain organism or evolutionary line this is a flux of 
exformation, since another evolutionary line is involved and the phenotypical 
interaction of this line is cardinal. This proposed alternative interpretation would also 
have consequences for our taxonomy, rendering some folk biological assumptions 
truer than a strictly Darwinian taxonomy would concede. 
I first want to develop why we may speak of more or less given environmental 
forms. This merely resembles a phenotypic formulation for the concept of a niche. It 
will be argued that since these forms are probabilistic in nature we should rather in-
terpret them as fields. Secondly, the concept of morphic resonance and exformational 
memory will be developed. Thirdly, possible taxonomic consequences are explored. 
(i) Environmental Forms and Fields 
Based on the stuffness of phenotypes shown above one can also interpret the 
interaction of phenotypes in terms of phenotypic forms. We have seen that despite the 
crucial role of genes, a fitness advantage is a property of a phenotype. The height of 
trees is advantageous and not directly assigned to a certain gene for height. But this 
property of an organism is not only a property of that organism, but a property of the 
interaction with phenotypes of other organisms, here with an interaction with other 
trees with a certain height. A structure is advantageous only in relation to a phenotypic 
context of the organism or species in question.  In this sense a form is at least partly 
environmentally given.  
This concept of an external form is largely identical with that of an ecological 
niche. In both cases the concept of potentiality is involved. An increase in height 
would increase the fitness of the phenotype. Environmental form is, firstly, a very 
broad application of the niche concept and, secondly, interprets it in a phenotypic 
sense. Contrarily germ-line reductionists regard a biotic niche, as a short cut with 
which to talk about genes. Despite the importance of genes, such a view, I think, neg-
lects the stuffness of niches, based on the stuffness of the compounding organisms.  
This form or niche is environmental since its location is external to the organism. 
Nevertheless, it is not strictly external, for, according to our partly constructivist view, 
it is related to the interaction of a certain phenotype. A niche is a part of the specific 
environment of a phenotype. Environment is here understood in a subjective 
Uexküllian sense1088. A niche for bacteria does not equally exist for mammals. 
                                                     
1088 J. v. Uexküll, Theoretische Biologie (1928/1973). A. Pobojewska, Die Umweltkonzeption Jacob von 
Uexkülls (1993). Also: R. Lewontin, Gene, Organism, Environment (1983/1985), pp. 280, 282. 
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We are confronted with a dialectics of the inner and the outer. The phenotype partly defines 
what aspects of the external world are exformationally relevant and the exformation partly 
moulds the phenotype. 
The resulting notion of an environmental form is here used in a partly adaptationist 
and a partly constructivist way. The niche is partly given, partly constructed by 
features of the phenotype itself.  
  
Despite the venerable tradition of the concept of form (reaching back in different 
ways to Plato and Aristotle) I think that it is important in the current context to 
replace the concept of form with the concept of a field, or, to denote the subject area, 
with a ‘morphogenetic field’. 
Also, for example, R. Sheldrake proposed that biological forms, should in an evolutionary 
context rather be regarded as fields.1089 Goodwin and Webster in detail have elaborated a 
morphological approach and have advocated a concept of hierarchical fields.1090 
Also proponents of biological systems theory, not influenced directly by a 
morphological tradition often advocated the reality of the phenotype. I think also these 
approaches may in principle be open to a field idea (L. v. Bertalanffy, B. Hassenstein, 
E. Jantsch, R. Riedl, G. P. Wagner, F. Wuketits,  p. 152.). 
In my view the concept of form should be replaced with the concept of fields, 
because a phenotype encounters these external forms in a probabilistic way. 
For example flowers are not adapted to and ‘exformed’ by individual bees, 
although each pollinating bee contributes to this process. In this sense, the property of 
pollination refers rather to the ‘beehood’ at large or even to the ‘pollen 
collecting insecthood’ ( pp. 301 f.). 
Hence in their effect environmental forms are rather reminiscent of physical fields 
or patterns in a neural net, where there are only fuzzy borders. Their effect is not that 
of rigidly defined forms or moulds with defined borders. Here, the negative aspect of 
essentialism, neglecting pluralism (as criticised by Hull, Mayr and Popper) can be 
prevented. Nevertheless, we may still think of an evolutionary logic of such 
probabilistic forms in an environmental context too. The actual forms or fields can be 
understood in an Aristotelian sense to be also determined by their parts, but still a 
cause in its own right. Only a probabilistic fit between the form of the organism and 
                                                     
1089 R. Sheldrake has contributed to the development of the notions morphogenetic field and 
morphic resonance. Sheldrake’s book The Presence of the Past is inspiring, but some of his basic 
notions stay opaque. I shall try to contribute to a further clarification of these ideas. 
E.g., R. Sheldrake, Das Gedächtnis der Natur (1988/1991), pp. 130 f., 143 f. 
1090 G. Webster, B. Goodwin, Form and Transformation: Generative and Relational Principles in Biology 
(1996). I only had a glance at this book upon correcting this work. Although I have partly taken 
the book into account I had not the opportunity to elaborate in detail on the similarities or 
differences of my field conception to the one in that very interesting book. See also:  
B. Goodwin, G. Webster, J. Wayne-Smith. The 'Evolutionary Paradigm' and Constructional Biology 
(1992). 
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varying instantiations of the niche is needed (whereby the niche is partly externally 
given, partly a result of the organism and similar organisms).1091 
Once more, such an argument requires also an adaptationist component complementing the 
constructional component (On the critique of process reductionism  pp. 333 f.).  
(ii) External Memory 
The proposed external biological memory does not reflect a fundamentally new 
mechanism, but is rather intended as a different interpretation of known facts. Besides 
the stuffness of the phenotype being an evolutionary factor constraining and directing 
evolution, I, of course, agree that genes are the main stores of evolutionary change. 
Nevertheless, I think that exformation not only plays a role in constituting the 
phenotype, but also that changes in the exformation may in a way become inherited. 
This inheritance is normally based on the inheritance of another germ-line, but from 
the viewpoint of a focused evolutionary line this is still exformational. 
Firstly, I suggest that organisms normally not only adapt to a given environment, 
but that they also choose, alter and construct that environment (Figure 10). The result 
of this changed exformation sometimes also affects their descendants. Secondly, I 
propose that from the viewpoint of a certain evolutionary line other evolutionary lines 
may in a way serve as dynamic external memories as well. This could be formulated as 
the morphological resonance of morphological fields. 
(1) Organisms do not only adapt to the external world, as Darwinism has always 
emphasised ( pp. 358 f., 394 f.), but they construct their environment to some 
extent themselves.1092 A strong exformational change could be achieved by migration. 
Even locomotion as such creates statistical patterns of environments. Of course 
genetic information plays a role in what exformation will become chosen, but 
nevertheless these exformational aspects can not be reduced to genes. Acquired 
exformational properties could at least to some extent – in interaction with genetic 
information – be passed on to progeny as well. A migrating organism may have the 
property to stay at the place where it had found favourable conditions. These positive 
experiences are in a way passed on to the progeny since the progeny is from its birth 
onwards exposed to the same favourable exformation. 
But organisms also more directly alter the external world as it becomes part of 
their environments. They tread down paths, dig out burrows, build nests and establish 
signals.1093 Often, although not always, these changes are advantageous to certain 
genes, individuals, groups or species.1094 For example, paths or nests may be used by 
several successive generations of one kin group. 
Even more obvious are cases of the transfer of acquired knowledge to other 
organisms in an exformational non-genetic way. Young birds have been shown in 
                                                     
1091 Still a process like selection in its broadest sense is required. On process reductionism, 
 pp. 333 f. 
1092 Cf.: R. Lewontin, Gene, Organism, Environment (1983/1985), pp. 273-275, 279 f. 
1093 See: R. Margalef, Perspectives in Ecological Theory (1968). Quoted in E. Jantsch: Die Selbstorganisation 
des Universums (1982/1988), p. 202. 
1094 On the units of selection debate  pp. 264 f. 
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experiments to imitate the songs also of ‘foster’ parents. More complex observational 





But Dawkins in a certain sense is right when he argues that “the accidental 
incorporation of a pine needle instead of the usual grass is not perpetuated in future 
‘generations of nests’.”1095 Nevertheless, firstly there are, as the previous point shows, 
also extra-genetic traditions which are passed on in animals. Here direct observational 
learning and learning from the products of the parents can transfer changes 
exformationally. The change of the exformation is also transferred in the migration 
example. Secondly, when the information transfer is in principle limited to the 
existence, for example, of a particular nest which is used for several generations only, 
the role of exformation indeed differs considerably from that of the germ-line. But 
this does not imply that this exformation transfer is an evolutionary irrelevant 
phenomenon. Thirdly, even in the nest example exformational changes may be 
preserved, for more than the lifetime of a particular nest. If in the pine population 
certain pines with needles, normally used for nests, with an improved water resistant 
property become predominant, this will cause a permanent change in the exformation 
of the nest building bird. This phenotypic change of the pine may take place because 
of an environmental change or because of some genetic mutation. Even if this change 
in the pine is genetically caused – informationally from the viewpoint of the pine – it 
is still exformational from the viewpoint of the DNA or the phenotype of the bird. I 
do not deny differences between informational and exformational inheritance, but I 
do oppose the terminological neglect of exformation. The main difference here is that 
the exformational change, if advantageous, is not an adaptation, but rather – to use 
Gould’s and Vrba’s terminology – an exaptation.1096 Those birds which profit from 
this change will also presumably have a reproductive advantage, but the changed 
exformation itself has been and is currently not selected for this reason, but because 
                                                     
1095 R. Dawkins, Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype (1978), p. 68.  
1096 S. J. Gould, E. Vrba, Exaptation – A Missing Term in the Science of Form (1982/1998). 
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Figure 10: Flux of formation also considering the concept of external memory. 
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of an advantage for pines with such a property. I do not want to limit my approach to 
evolution in cases of adaptations. Although not being an adaptation, here a relevant 
permanent change in the exformation of the bird species actually has occurred. But I 
think there are also examples where the storage of a structure based on another 
evolutionary line may even be interpreted as an adaptation.  
(2) Now two coevolving symbiotic species (mutualism) will be interpreted as their 
mutual external memory.  
This idea may in some regards also be extended to predator-prey relationships. This may 
appear peculiar: “After all, hares do not sit around constructing lynxes! But in the most 
important sense they do”1097. I have pointed out before that a predator-prey relationship 
may not only have synergetic properties, but, in an of course limited sense, also certain 
properties advantageous to both species ( p. 305). But here I confine myself for simplicity 
reasons to cases of symbiosis (mutualism). 
As an example we discuss the co-evolution of flowers and pollinating insects. During 
their evolution flowers evolved presumably from at first wind-pollinated plants, and 
became increasingly adapted to insect pollination. Pollinating insects in turn evolved 
from non-pollinating arthropods, and became increasingly adapted to flowers. Flowers 
and pollinating insects can be understood as mutually interdependent environmental 
fields for each other. Both are not only influenced by the others environmental field, 
but each in turn influences the other’s field – a feedback-loop is closed ( pp. 409 f.). 
In the section on the unit of selection debate I have advocated the existence of 
ecological wholes which are not necessarily subverted by selfish species ( pp. 304 f.). 
Here I take ecological wholes with an increased fitness for granted. The evolutionary 
interaction of two (or several) symbiotic species, which are fitter than each species on 
its own, may lead to a coevolutionary process, where the involved species are mutually 
adapted and build a synergetic whole. Such a whole may indeed be an irreducible level 
of description, but this whole may still be described from the viewpoint of a single 
species as an adaptive transformation of each species to the structure of the other one. 
This results for each species in an advantageous change in their exformation. 
Nevertheless the ecological unit as a whole should not be neglected, since the sum of 
the involved species is fitter than each one on its own. In this (of course limited) sense 
the pollinating insect species is part of the flower species and vice versa. Analysed on 
the species level, the co-evolving species provides a changing exformation, which is 
rather an adaptation than an exaptation1096 for the species in question. 
This approach may resemble Dawkins’ concept of an extended phenotype, which I have 
approved. However, this application rather turns this concept upside down. 
If a pollinating insect species on an island becomes extinct because of a hurricane, we 
cannot conclude from the fact that the informational evolutionary line has died out 
that the external memory of the species will necessarily immediately vanish as well. As 
long as the corresponding plant type does not immediately also become strongly 
diminished, insects of the same or a similar species could become blown to this island 
and will find perfect environmental conditions there. And why should it not be 
                                                     
1097 R. Lewontin, Gene, Organism, Environment (1983/1985), p. 282. 
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appropriate to interpret this in the sense that the exformation of their predecessors is 
still present? 
It should not be denied that genetic inheritance in the co-evolving species is a 
precondition for this process as well. But firstly, phenotypes play a crucial role in this 
interaction, because the interaction of species is defined phenotypically ( pp. 317 f.) 
and the advantageous phenotypic property may be realised by different gene 
combinations.  Secondly, from the viewpoint of a certain evolutionary line its evo-
lution is in any case not shaped by its information and its own genetic code alone, but 
by the dynamic change in the other co-evolving species as well. That, from this 
viewpoint exformational, species, is of course itself based on its information and 
exformation as well as the feedback from the dependent evolution of the first species. 
This dynamic, possibly even adaptive, change in exformation, which is normally 
based on other organisms, I call a bit anthropomorphically ‘memory’. 
The term memory here should not imply a full identity of the stored and retrieved 
information. Although this is implied by the use of this term in computer science, this is not 
a defining characteristic for example of human memory. Here a further information pro-
cessing takes place and thus the information becomes somehow changed ( pp. 316 f.).  
The idea of an external memory may possibly generalised to other cases of larger 
wholes. We have discussed other wholes in the section on the unit of selection debate. It 
might be generally possible to regard the components of a whole as (synergetic) mutual 
external memories of each other.  
In this section the concept of an external memory has been proposed as an additional 
argument against germ-line reductionism. However, the existence of exformation and 
of inner phenotypic constraints as its own evolutionary factor already refutes this 
particularly radical interpretation of the here accepted central dogma of microbiology. 
d) A Partial Revival of Morphological Taxonomy? 
In how far are the preceding considerations relevant to the dispute about universalia and 
biological taxonomy. The unit of evolution or unit of selection debate has been 
treated above ( pp. 264 f.), and here I only argue that exformation and phenotypes 
are evolutionary factors in their own right. Still this also could have bearings on the 
unit of evolution debate. 
Not only gene-Darwinians, but Darwinians in general have in principle denied the 
existence of higher taxa and asexual species. This is due to the missing flux of 
informational between different species and between different asexual organisms. 
Moreover, this is due to the general neglect of form as an evolutionary factor in its 
own right. Hence, higher taxa or asexual species were regarded not to have any causal 
relevance. In this sense asexual organisms do not exist as species. Higher taxa and 
asexual ‘species’ were regarded as mere notions of convenience, which catalogue 
organisms or species according to their distance of informational descent. Although 
we have seen that advocates of the evolutionary synthesis have rejected germ-line 
reductionism, they still have not explicitly claimed that the form of the phenotypes is 
an evolutionary factor in its own right. 
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Based on the assumption that the goal of taxonomy is to of reconstruct the 
(informational) phylogenetic tree, the analysis of DNA sequence data has largely 
replaced morphological analysis (euphemistically called ‘traditional phylogenetics’) as 
the standard methodology. Only recently it became acknowledged that even for this 
goal, morphological studies are necessary means for a proper taxonomy.1098 But here 
we are concerned with an even more fundamental issue.  
Opposed to standard taxonomy, transcendental and romantic biologists have 
always held that asexual species and higher taxa are real and have stressed the 
relevance of the morphological structure. 
Given that taxonomy should only mirror the line of informational descent in a 
phylogenetic tree, Darwinians appear to be right to focus only on species (as long as 
we are concerned with sexually reproducing evolutionary lines). There is no direct 
exchange of information between asexual organisms of one phenotypic ‘species’ or 
generally between different species of the same taxon (appart from specific effects of 
bacterial transfer). Nevertheless, this taxonomic criterion that equates taxonomy with 
the reconstruction of (informational) phylogenetic relationships may be seen to be 
particular to a specific philosophy of nature, including Darwinism. 
If one accepts this account of genetic information, does this imply that the view of 
romantic biology or folk biology is completely wrong in saying that ‘species’ of asexual 
organisms and higher taxons are at least in some way real as well? Do we have to 
except the premiss that restricts the goal of taxonomy to ‘information’ and a priori 
rules out the study of ‘exformation’? 
(i) The Evolutionary Factor of Constraints as Object of Taxonomy 
If the morphological and functional structure of phenotypes is understood as an 
evolutionary factor, taxa could be used to express such causally relevant properties 
species (or organisms of an asexual ‘species’) have in common, like the exoskeletons 
of arthropods which partly determine the evolutionary pathways of these species 
( pp. 322 f.). In a morphological view one might argue that it is of secondary 
importance whether this group has a common descent. It is important that they have 
the same basic morphological constraints, a similar body plan (Baupläne), because this 
is causally relevant. One may object that there may be no flux of information between 
morphologically similarly constrained organisms or species. One may reply that 
questions of descent are, in such a view, not the relevant questions anyhow, but that a 
focus on the structural (and functional) similarities and differences raises the more 
interesting questions. 
I regard the indicated different views as complementary rather than opposed. It 
may be systematically helpful to order organisms or species according to such factors, 
in principle regardless of their descent. But since adaptation also plays an important 
evolutionary role, the ordering of species according to their informational line of 
descent also provides us with much interesting information about their former 
environment and their properties as well.  
                                                     
1098 W. Sudhaus, Die Notwendigkeit morphologischer Analysen zur Rekonstruktion der Stammesgeschichte 
(2006). 
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(ii) Morphological Resonance as Object of Taxonomy 
Could a mutually external memory of a system of co-evolving species somehow unify 
similar species (or similar organisms of an asexual species)?  The environmental mem-
ory of flowers is neither built by a single bee nor usually by a single species of bees. A 
flower species will normally be adapted to the pollination of the beehood or to a cer-
tain extent to the pollen collecting insecthood. Such relationships hence may render 
the (exformational) existence of (some) species of asexual organisms and of (some) 
higher taxa possible. These partly adaptationist and partly constructivist aspects may 
also play a role in homologies and evolutionary convergence ( pp. 326 f.). 
It may be still more convenient to order organisms and species only according to 
their line of informational descent. The proposed criteria may force the taxonomist to 
abandon the convenient hierarchical classification, which has the advantage of clearly 
localising certain species within only one taxon of each level. In my proposal one 
species may in principle be a member of several taxons at a time based on 
morphological constraints or morphological resonance.  
In any case a refutation of gene-atomism and germ-line reductionism is much 
more urgent. It is possible to accept the importance of exformation and phenotypes as 
evolutionary factors, and still to advocate a systematics which focuses exclusively on 
informational lines of descent and neglects morphological constraints and resonance. 
I here only wanted to point out, that it is in principle possible to advocate changes in 
taxonomy as well. It is not given a priori that systematics has to limit itself to the lines 
of informational descent. 
e) Summary 
In this section 8.3 on germ-line reductionism we were concerned with the question of 
whether the different levels of genetic selection, which we discussed in a previous 
section ( pp. 264 f.), are the only relevant aspects of evolution and whether the 
corresponding phenotypic entities can be regarded to be the mere vehicles of 
genotypic units of evolution. 
(1) The central microbiological dogma has been described as an updated version of 
Weismann’s germ-plasm theory. Some challenges to this theory were outlined. 
Nevertheless I took this theory as a currently valid hypothesis and focused on the 
critique of the particular radical germ-line reductionist interpretation of this theory. 
(2) A concept of exformation has been proposed, reminiscent of the earlier 
critique of a downward reductionist understanding of substance. A hylomorphic 
understanding of substance has been advocated instead.  This understanding 
challenges a simple view of inner and outer. It has been argued that phenotypes are 
not completely reducible to the germ-line, since they are not only based on genetic 
information, but on exformation as well and exformation is not itself coded (in all its 
details) in the genes. Although not denying the importance of the genotype, the 
phenotype determines what genetic information is read and how it is interpreted. 
Moreover, phenotypes are causes of their own development. As Lewontin puts it, a 
phenotype is a “first order Markov process in which the next step depends upon the 
present state”. Accordingly, an organism bears evolutionary constraints and, vice 
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versa, possible directions. These constraints need not be adaptive. Nonetheless, the 
morphological and functional constraints of phenotypes can be understood as 
evolutionary factors. 
(3) A concept of environmental forms (similar to a niche) has been suggested, 
which exist in relation to a certain phenotype. The concept of forms is replaced by the 
concept of fields in order to account for probabilistic pluralistic influences, which 
have been ignored by some earlier morphological traditions. Goodwin and Weber, for 
example, propose a field understanding of form as well. Based on the co-evolution of 
symbiotic species, it is advocated that some properties of a focused species may in a 
way even be exformationally stored in the co-evolving species and hence inheritable 
outside of its own genome.  
(4) It has been pointed out that taking the phenotype seriously, may have 
consequences for taxonomy as well. Darwinism regards asexual species and higher 
taxa as not truly existing, but as mere nominalistic conventions to describe the (in-
formational) distance of descent. Based on the concept of morphological and 
functional constraints as evolutionary factors one may have to treat species or 
organisms with similar constraints as members of a taxon even if they are not united 
by common descent, since their structure independent of their descent is 
evolutionarily primary. Hence, common taxonomy would need to be supplemented by 
a truly morphological kind of taxonomy. Another aspect which systematics may have 
to take into account is the morphological resonance which may have an equal effect 
for similar species or organisms of asexual species. I have conceded that one may, for 
reasons of convenience, reject these taxonomic proposals without necessarily rejecting 
the proposed concepts.  
Here the primary goal was to show that although the central dogma is accepted as 
a (currently) valid hypothesis, germ-line reductionism does not need to be valid. The 
phenotype has been shown to be partly based on exformation and to be full of 
stuffness. Additionally, morphology and function of the phenotype constrain and 
direct evolution. The proposals focus attention upon the neglected but fundamental 
evolutionary role of the phenotype itself. The phenotype needs to be rediscovered not 
only a vehicle of selfish genes, but as an evolutionary factor in its own right. 
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Chapter 9: Transcendence of Process-Reductionism 
A metaphysic that was truly evolutionary would have to deal with the evolution of its 
own evolutionary mechanisms. Opposed to this, universal Darwinism advocates a 
process monism. In this chapter Darwinian process reductionism is discussed and 
criticised and some proposals are made, concerning how a more evolutionary theory 
of evolution may be achieved. 
Universal Darwinism, in its gene-Darwinian but also in its process-Darwinian 
version ( pp. 205 f.), advocates a static monistic view of the evolutionary process 
itself. According to these approaches all evolutionary processes can in principle be 
reduced to the unmutable process of blind-variation-and-external-selection. 
Darwinians often regard the evolutionary mechanism of natural selection as itself 
externally and eternally given and in principle exclude a true self-transcendence of 
processes. Hence, paradoxically the arch-opponents of fixism and essentialism – those 
such as Darwin, Dawkins and Dennett – are, in respect of processes, radical 
promoters of fixism and essentialism.  
Darwinian process monism refers back to its historical Paleyan Newtonian roots. 
Although Darwinism also undermined this, the soil on which it is built, it in a Paleyan-
Newtonian manner still advocates one eternal law of nature, simple and invariant, as if 
it were preordained. Natural selection in some regards ironically resembles natural 
theology. There is still a certain Platonism inherent in Darwinism – albeit 
materialistically and mechanistically transformed.  
Also, for example, Lyell’s actualism influenced Darwin and thereby Darwinism. Actualism 
also stresses that forces are not changed in quality or in quantity throughout time. According 
to actualism the observation of present geological processes, could fully explain the change 
of geological formations during the history of the earth.  
The concept of an unchangeable law of evolution can often be found in Darwin’s 
own writings, even before he formulated his specific theory of evolution.1099 The later 
evolutionary synthesis, despite some pluralistic aspects, stressed the unchangeable 
blindness and externality of selection. Finally, gene-Darwinism advocates a radical 
version of Darwinian process monism and, likewise, promotes the idea that a process 
like sexual selection is essentially the same process as the natural selection of selfish 
genes ( pp. 142 f.). 
In this chapter I oppose a radicalised Darwinian process reductionism. In the 
introduction I have already clarified that my approach still draws strongly from 
Darwinism and that in a very broad understanding of Darwinism my approach could 
even be regarded as a quite Darwinian approach in itself, since it, for example, accepts 
the importance of variational evolution ( pp. 12 f.). Many concepts of the different 
paradigms of Darwinism and ‘pseudo-Darwinism’443 are, in my view, indispensable 
                                                     
1099 E.g., Ch. Darwin, Notebook B (Ed. by D. Kohn, 1987), orig. p. 101. Confer also Notebook E, 
orig. p. 3 (refering to Malthus). Generally,  pp. 162 f. 
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to evolutionary theory. Nevertheless, I do oppose radical Darwinism in criticising pan-
adaptationism and pan-selectionism.  
Moreover, my criticism is not only concerned with this radical Darwinism, but 
with some aspects basic to Darwinism in general. To prevent misunderstandings, 
I concede and agree that the Darwinian process (natural selection), if understood in a 
very broad (up to an almost tautological) sense, is the central mechanism of evolution. 
But I think that such a broad understanding of Darwinism, conceals the fact that the 
evolutionary mechanism is itself evolving and the role of developmental constraints 
and chance processes. Natural selection itself, in my view, is actually not one constant 
mechanism, valid in an equal way from the amoeba to Einstein, but, when put under 
close scrutiny, many mechanisms become apparent. These processes may have some 
aspects in common, but in others they differ essentially and have changed during 
evolution. To make these changes apparent and to exclude tautological aspects of the 
definition ( next sections), I propose a stricter definition of Darwinism, but one 
which is still in accordance with the evolved meaning of that term. I shall show that 
evolutionary processes differ from that more strictly defined Darwinian process. 
I shall argue that variation on certain explanatory levels is not necessary equally blind 
and that ‘hetero-selection’ becomes supplemented by ‘auto-selection’. I argue that 
evolutionary processes can gain a limited autonomy from natural selection. Of course, 
here only some proposals were made about how such a more evolutionary theory of 
evolution might be achieved by outlining what may count as a process in its own right. 
This work could not exhaustively deal with all possible mechanism, it only advocates a 
different line of research. 
Taken together with the above argumentation that there are different evolutionary 
levels ( pp. 264 f.) and that phenotypes can be regarded as evolutionary factors in 
their own right  ( pp. 311 f.) this results in an interpretation of evolution, which in 
any case differs considerably from gene-Darwinism – but also from Darwinism in 
general. A differentiation between evolutionary processes would also render 
simplifying claims absurd, like, for instance, the claim that the human emotional 
system, the hypothalamus and limbic system “evolved by natural selection”1100. This 
does not distinguish between the levels of evolution, or whether say this was due to 
what I call ‘auto-selective’ or ‘hetero-selective’ processes. Darwinism, despite its 
indispensable contribution to evolutionary theory, has to be replaced by an 
evolutionary theory of evolution ( p. 12). 
 
One may be inclined to argue that Darwinism in a strict sense has been already refuted 
by the previous critique of entity reductionism (Chapter 8), since strict Darwinism was 
often also defined by its reductive attitude towards groups. In our discussions of 
different kinds of genic reductionism this aspect of Darwinism has been challenged. 
                                                     
1100 E. O. Wilson, Sociobiology (1975), p. 3. Wilson apparently has a much more complex 
understanding of evolution. (Cf.: Ch. J. Lumsden, E. O. Wilson, Genes, Mind, and Culture (1981), 
but the metaphor of an unchangeable mechanism of evolution, i. e. of natural selection still 
dominates his writings.  
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However, a refutation of Darwinian process-monism, which I here take as the core of 
Darwinism, does not follow – at least not directly. 
Because Darwin’s own Darwinism was individualistic, or generally reductionist, gene-
Darwinians have sometimes been regarded as the only true – albeit more radical – 
successors of Darwin, since they advocate a completely reductive view of evolution. Under 
this definition the last chapter has to be understood as a critique not only of gene-
Darwinism but also of Darwinism in general. I, however, define Darwinism, more 
cautiously, with regard to processes. 
If one accepted the above results of different levels of evolution, one would still be a 
multi-level Darwinist ( pp. 152 f., 264 f., 284 f., 301 f.). In particular some of the 
main opponents of gene-Darwinism and defenders of a richer ontological inventory 
(e.g., Campbell, Hull) became supporters of universal process Darwinism ( p. 152). 
Process-Darwinism is even possible if one accepts the autonomy of cultural processes. 
It has been shown that Darwinian processes could be found in psychological trial-and-
error theory, the theory of science and some economic proposals ( pp. 207 f., 
216 f., 221 f.).  
Nevertheless, an acceptance of synergetic or emergent entities and of top-down 
causality, in some respects puts reductionism, also in regards to processes, into 
question. Why should there not be any synergetic and emergent processes as well? 
This becomes particularly problematic in the light of a Whiteheadian process philosophy, in 
which entities are regarded as processes, and processes vice versa are regarded 
as entities.1101  
I have argued that the concept of a single gene somehow corresponds to the 
concept of a Darwinian process of blind replication and external elimination 
( p. 218). I shall argue in this chapter that, for example, species can also be regarded 
as evolutionary processes. But these processes, despite some similarities, are not 
identical to natural selection. For instance, a species allows for a synthesis of 
evolutionary lines (sexuality and mixture of subpopulations). Although there is no 
blending inheritance, the splitting up of evolutionary lines is complemented by a 
certain, and of course limited, possibility of synthesis. Moreover, species may be 
regarded to be less blind than single sexual organisms, since new adaptive valleys can 
be crossed, based on the recombination of genes from a larger gene pool. Further-
more, a species changes the adaptive landscape itself, since, for example, new forms of 
cooperation can now become adaptive. From a Whiteheadian perspective it should 
not be a surprise to regard phenotypes, as I argued in the last chapter, to be evolu-
tionary factors in themselves, constraining and directing possible evolutionary path-
ways. But morphological ‘logic’ is not identical to a Darwinian process; the changes 
can differ from those predicted on Darwinian adaptationist grounds ( pp. 322 f., 
368 f.). Here, I shall show that selection is not necessarily blind and externally given 
on all levels and that evolutionary processes can gain a certain autonomy. 
Hence, in this proposed view of nature, Darwinian processes are not a sufficient 
explanation of biological and cultural evolution. “Darwin’s dangerous idea” – 
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understood not in too broad a sense – is not the “universal solvent, capable of cutting 
right through the heart of everything in sight”.1102 Organisms are not only objects but 
also, to some extent, subjects of evolution, whereas the evolutionary mechanisms are 
not only subjects but also objects of evolution. Since Universal Darwinism, in its 
gene-Darwinian or only its process-Darwinian versions currently ‘cannibalises’ the 
social sciences, time has come to put emphasis on the inconsistencies of this view and 
on the evolving nature of the evolutionary mechanism itself.1103 Only in a truly 
evolutionary framework, not delimited only to one algorithm, we can realise the full 
range of freedom we humans have, to change these mechanisms, especially in 
the social stratum. 
I shall first point to some inconsistencies in the process Darwinian approach and 
discuss two possible Darwinian tautologies (9.1). This discussion results in the already 
mentioned redefinition of Darwinism and a proposed spectrum of theories reaching 
from radical Darwinism to approaches, which stress inherent tendencies and a less 
wasteful evolution (9.2). Subsequently, I discuss the single aspects of this definition 
and show the existence of synthesis, auto-selection and directed variation. I focus 
mainly on biological evolution, since this is the most controversial case. Finally, it is 
shown that new processes can gain some autonomy and, based on Kant, systemic 
circularity or selfreferentiality is discussed as a criterion for the emergence of a ‘new’ 
synergetic process (9.3). 
9.1 Inconsistencies and Tautologies of a Darwinian Mono-Mechanistic 
Metaphysic 
In this section it will first be shown that the claim of process Darwinism that there are 
different levels describable as evolving exclusively by Darwinian processes, leads to 
inconsistencies and actually to changed or compound processes which not equally 
appear to be Darwinian. Secondly and thirdly, Darwinian pan-adaptionism and pan-
selectionism will be scrutinised. It is argued that both claims could only be made due 
to a partly tautological definition of adaptation and of natural selection. This dis-
cussion will build the basis for my stricter non-tautological definition of Darwinism. 
a) Inconsistencies of Different Levels of Multilevel Darwinism 
Universal Process Darwinism ( pp. 216 f.) is a metaphysic focusing on the simplest 
possible evolutionary algorithm, the Darwinian algorithm of natural selection. This 
metaphysic interprets all other evolutionary processes in a downward reductionist 
way. All (relevant) evolutionary change comes into being through Darwinian 
algorithms. Although a theoretical unification under the one and only flag of process 
Darwinism has much appeal (exactly because of its simplicity), the exclusive 
application of Darwinian algorithms in many ontological strata leads to contradictions, 
                                                     
1102 D. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995), p. 521. 
1103 This may in some respects for example correspond to Lewontin’s view that evolution should be 
represented by the metaphor of construction instead of that of adaptation. R. Lewontin, Gene, 
Organism, Environment (1983/1985), pp. 279-280. 
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even if a particular application of process-Darwinism appears to be justified on its 
own. If one favours many different levels of selection (as I did above,  pp. 221 f., 
264 f.) these levels are not independent from each other.  
Selection processes, particularly if they belong to a part-whole relationship, like 
individuals and species, may have effects on each other. As mentioned, the 
proliferation of species may be less blind than thought, because more combinations 
could be tried than in evolutionary lines of asexual organisms and, likewise, 
combinations could be tested in advance in sub-populations. From the viewpoint of 
the whole – which I argued to exist – evolution is less blind. Moreover, the whole, as I 
have shown, could now have an inner dynamic leading to a limited but real autonomy 
from environmental selection ( pp. 291 f.). But, I think, as far as parts – the 
individual organisms – are concerned, matters also from their viewpoint have 
changed; their reproductive prospects change as does their evolutionary landscape. 
The organisms, for example, can now be members of interbreeding synergetic groups, 
and may thereby enhance their fitness. 
The process-Darwinian claim of the equivalence of higher evolutionary levels to simple 
natural selection generally conceals the resulting autonomy of new processes 
( pp. 396 f., 409 f.). 
The other type of relationship between selection processes one may call nested 
(secondary) selection. Darwinian selection processes of that kind are, for example, claimed 
to enable the development of the immune system, the brain or is given in 
psychological trial-and-error learning ( pp. 227 f., 235 f.). Let us take the example of 
organisms with an ability to learn by trial-and-error, which is describable as a 
Darwinian process. What is the difference between such a nested relationship and a 
part-whole relationship of selection processes? The trial-and-error learning, which is 
also a part of the functions of that organism, does not directly change the information 
of the organism, the whole. This is different in the part-whole relationship of 
species and individuals.  
However, here one can also argue that nested selection processes could reduce the 
blindness of evolution in a way. At the level of the organism nested selection 
processes lead to plasticity. This plasticity, of course, may itself be an object of natural 
selection. Still, the process of evolution has changed considerably. In the interaction 
with environmental influences (exformation,  pp. 316 f.) new optima may be 
reached without or with only a little change in the biological information. On the 
explanatory level of the organism a feedback loop with the environment is created, 
leading to a flexible adaptation of the organism. The organism does not need to 
explore every single possibility of the environment genetically, but does this via trial-
and-error learning. This way of exploring the evolutionary landscape at the level of 
organisms is less wasteful – and in this sense less Darwinian – than achieving the same 
result, by the proliferation and selection of particular ‘hard-wired’ instincts. Still a 
fundamental change may only be achieved by biological mutation, but now the 
organism could flexibly and quickly adapt to smaller fluctuations in the environment 
without the need for biological mutations. Although this is different from the part-
whole multi-level selection process, the genetic makeup itself is not altered by the 
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nested selection process and the evolutionary line is to some extent open to respond 
to new challenges by trial-and-error learning. The line to some extent gains an 
independence from momentaneous changes in the environment.  
One may of course argue that this does not make a difference, since – according to 
the assumptions we have accepted – the composing processes of individual selection 
and the trial-and-error process are both Darwinian. But the resulting effect for the 
organismic level differs considerably.  
And I think we also should and want to make a difference whether we as 
biological entities have to die, or whether only our trials, thoughts and theories die 
instead of us.1104 A theory concealing this difference is in my view wrong – at least 
in its emphasis. 
Moreover, this is a good example which shows that, even if we assume both 
composing processes were purely Darwinian processes, the resulting synergetic whole 
of an evolving asexual organism or species can be said to be less blind. This may be an 
example which shows that the concept of synergetic wholes, developed above with 
regard to the unit of selection debate, is applicable to processes as well. In regard to a 
part-whole relation we discussed earlier the case that successive individual selection 
within a self-referential system could lead to the synergetic property of a certain 
autonomy from adaptation to an external environment ( pp. 291 f.). Even if the 
processual atoms are Darwinian processes, the resulting processual whole can behave 
quite opposed to Darwinian processes.  
Another example for such a synergetic property is that habits, which may become 
established in a trial-and-error way, may, as Popper has shown, change what becomes 
selected. In this regard use could somehow direct inheritance, although only in a quasi-
Lamarckian sense.1105 
Equally the initial universality of the theory of operant conditioning has also been 
challenged the other way round by biological Darwinism. I have outlined earlier that 
the theory of conditioning was intended as a general approach to psychology and it 
has even been proposed to subsume classical conditioning as a particular case for 
operant conditioning. In which case the universality of trial-and-error learning, which 
is today only rarely supported, would have been shown. Since we have shown operant 
conditioning to be a process-Darwinian approach – despite being opposed to biolog-
ism – a universality of process-Darwinism in psychology would have resulted. But, 
besides other influences, the understanding of the biological underpinnings of human 
behaviour and learning – mostly understood in Darwinian terms – have in particular 
undermined the universality of this approach. Biological preparedness has been shown 
to constrain and direct which associations become established and which trials are 
made. 1106 Also other more complex types of learning and understanding have been 
                                                     
1104 This has been stressed by P. Munz, although he draws rather Darwinian conclusions, 
Philosophical Darwinism. (1993). 
1105 K. Popper, Objective Knowledge (1971/1992), pp. 272 f. This, I think, refers back to the Baldwin 
effect.  
1106 J. Garcia and M. E. P. Seligman played an importaint role in exploring the concept of biological 
preparedness. 
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established, with a biological basis partly of its own, like observational learning or pro-
cesses of problem solving. Additionally, the general cognitive turn claiming a multi-
tude of – partly learned – different cognitive processes, challenged the universality and 
exhaustively of the trial-and-error process of operant conditioning ( pp. 227 f.). 
Likewise, process-Darwinian economics – which have to be distinguished from 
biologistic Darwinian economics1107 – come into contradiction with a partly 
biologised psychology. According to this type of Darwinian economics the ‘struggle 
for life’ and the ‘survival of the fittest’, in a way similar to that of the biological 
process, takes place on a new ontological level, on the level of economic agents. I 
have mentioned, that the Friedmanian belief in severe competition was actually 
historically influenced by the concept of natural selection and survival of the fittest ( 
p. 198). But economists of the Chicago school have also to assume that some 
preconditions have to be met under which severe competition in fact leads to the 
economic survival of the fittest economic agent. Such preconditions are complete 
information and rational choice of the economic agents. But Darwinian biology and 
psychology shows that exactly these assumptions are violated, since the information 
processing capacity of humans is limited and rational thinking is to some extent 
domain specific and not free from systematic errors.1108 Hence, Darwinian biology 
and psychology undermine pan-adaptationism of Darwinian economy. 
In conclusion it is apparent that components of process-Darwinism in different 
subject areas not necessarily support each other theoretically, but can and often do 
contradict each other. I do not deny, that despite such inconsistencies, Universal 
Darwinism still has a certain appeal. This may also partly be due to the tautological 
aspects of this theory. In the next two subsections we will try to separate the tauto-
logically true, but largely meaningless, aspects of Universal Process Darwinism from 
the testable and meaningful aspects of it, before going on to achieve a more precise 
definition of a Darwinian process. 
b) On the Tautological Basis of Pan-Adaptationism 
There is a broad dispute about whether and to what extent Darwinism is marked by 
tautological aspects.1109 We have already briefly discussed the tautological aspects of 
                                                     
1107  pp. 236 f., also pp. 173, 198. 
1108 See, for example, the recent evolutionary literature on the implication fallacy and the Wason 
selection task: L. Cosmides, J. Tooby, Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange (1992). 
G. Gigerenzer, Domain-Specific Reasoning (1992),  footnotes 886 f. 
1109 Only a selection of literature on this matter can be mentioned here. It is not unproblematic to 
distinguish between two camps of writers, since different authors have discussed different 
aspects of potentially tautological aspects of pan-selectionism or pan-adaptationism. 
Nonetheless, as an introduction it may be helpful to distinguish two opposed directions, one 
stressing the tautological aspects the other denying it. Tautological aspects of pan-selectionism 
or pan-adaptationism have, for example, been criticised by: Midgley (1978/1995), pp. xx, 139, 
161. S. J. Gould, R. C. Lewontin (1979) and Spaemann and Löw (1981), p. 242, von Sydow 
(2001). After the current work had first submitted as a PhD thesis the excellent analysis by 
Rosenberg and Bouchard (2002/2008) has been published. Another group of authors have 
objected to the idea that tautologies play an important role in immunising the Darwinian 
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psychological trial-and-error theory, which are analogous to those in biological 
Darwinism ( pp. 227 f). 
I distinguish between two aspects of process monism, as promoted by universal 
Darwinism, which are related to corresponding possible tautologies. Firstly we discuss 
pan-adaptationism and, secondly, pan-selectionism. In both sections it will be shown 
that the views, if valid, are in certain respects based on a tauto-logical argumentation, 
which according to the etymological meaning of the original Greek term means that 
what has been said or assumed before is merely restated. Both interrelated tautologies 
are in different ways linked to a certain interpretation of the concept of the survival of 
the fittest, resulting in a concept of the survival of the survivor.  
I do not, of course, advocate that Darwinism as a whole, either in respect to 
adaptation or in respect to selection, was thoroughly tautological, but I intend to point 
out tautological aspects which may often have been endorsed only implicitly, but still 
may have helped to immunise the Darwinian paradigm against criticism. I try to 
disentangle the tautological and the more empirical aspects of universal Darwinism 
and to show that, without a tautological argument, the universality of Darwinian 
processes – although not the existence of Darwinian processes – becomes doubtful. 
The tautologies discussed at this point differ from other tautologies treated in this work. But 
the tautological aspect of the falsificationist refutation of inductivism, discussed previously, 
is closely related ( pp. 213 f., 371 f.). We have also discussed a tautology of defining genes 
so broadly that they, by definition, become the unit of selection ( pp. 264 f.). Instead of 
redefining genes, one can similarly redefine wholes as being only their parts, even if a whole 
is more than the sum of its parts. Provided such a definition, it becomes a tautological and 
empty truth that larger wholes are not evolutionarily relevant, since they, by definition, do 
not exist ( pp. 277 f.).  
Darwinian pan-adaptationism, often called ‘adaptationism’ for short, is the claim of the 
universality of adaptation which, in the present context, is understood as being based 
on natural selection. All evolving entities have adapted and adaptation is the only 
direction giving evolutionary process.  
Adaptation, as a state, is often understood as the fit of an entity to its 
environment.1110 Adaptation, as a process, is normally understood as the increased fit 
of an entity to an environment. To assume that, in this sense, adaptation exists, is, of 
course, not yet tautological.  
                                                                                                                                 
research programm: Dennett (1995), pp. 238-51; Hodge (1983/1985), pp. 58-59; Vollmer 
(1985/1988), pp. 274 f.; Wuketits (1995), pp. 99 f. Even Gould justly turned against some 
radical charges that all central aspects of Darwinism are formulated in a tautological way 
(e.g., 1973/1991). 
Several authors cannot be grouped on either side of the line, since they do accept that there may 
well be tautological aspects of Darwinian explanations, but they do not advocate that this is 
necessarily a grave problem:  Dawkins (1989/1982), pp. 179-194; Campbell (1960/1987), p. 385 
f./p. 109 f.. Popper (1972), pp. 69 f. (cf. Popper, 1973, 83 1974, pp. 133 f., 1987). For a general 
discussion of these issues, cf: Bowler (1984), pp. 327-334; Isak (1992), pp. 150-152; E. Sober 
(1996/1998). 
1110 Gould and Vrba have called this an ‘aptation’. St. Gould, E. Vrba, Exaptation – A Missing Term in 
the Science of Form (1982/1998), p. 54. 
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Moreover, I myself even would stress that all entities (perhaps apart from ultimate 
elementary particles in physics) have, to some extent, to be adapted to their 
environments.1111 For example, molecules are stable only under certain chemical 
conditions. Even today atoms are known to be stable only under particular conditions 
of the physical evolution of the universe. Macroscopic objects of our day-to-day life 
trivially under certain conditions become unstable as well. Actually no biological 
organisms can exist, if they are, for example, exposed to fire for too long. A certain 
adaptation, in the sense of a minimal fit of entity to environment, is necessary and hence 
ubiquitous. All entities are to some extent adapted to their environments, otherwise 
they would not exist. If adaptation as state is in a certain degree a necessary condition 
for existence, a process of adaptation appears to follow. Those entities – atoms, 
biscuits, genes and species – which are not adapted will simply not survive.1112  
Does this argumentation hence entail pan-adaptationism? No, pan-adaptationism 
is not entailed as long as one does not modify the meaning of adaptation in a 
tautological way. To argue that a certain minimal adaptedness is necessary, is not the 
same as to argue that entities are strongly adapted and only formed as result of 
adaptive processes. Even if adaptive processes play an important role, this does not 
imply that non-adaptive processes did not exist. 
Still, pan-adaptationism has implicitly at least often been assumed to be valid, and, 
I think, this has been made possible by a subtle modification of the underlying under-
standing of adaptation. Pan-adaptationists implicitly or explicitly often seem to argue 
that all those entities which survive are generally more adapted, since they survive. 
Fitness becomes defined – as has actually often been done – by survival. Thereby the 
Darwinian claim of the survival of the fittest results in the tautological claim of the 
survival of the survivor. Such a tautological proposition, is obviously true, but 
meaningless.1113 In regard to such a basis for adaptationism M. Midgley is completely 
right in being pessimistic when she asks “whether it is possible to invent any trait so 
disadvantageous that it could not be whitewashed in this way”1114. Of course, any 
entity, which survives, survives. Only those drops of water, those trees, tigers, tables 
and theories survive, which survive. In this sense adaptation is always given and in 
each and every existing respect valid; thus pan-adaptionism seems to follow. The 
result would be reminiscent of the pan-adaptationism of early design arguments and 
Paley’s natural theology or of Leibniz’s pre-established harmony.1115 But current pan-
adaptationism is linked to Darwinian naturalism, associated with struggle and not with 
preordained harmony. The earlier pan-adaptationism was based on theology, but 
Darwinian pan-adaptationism is – at least partly – based on tautology.  
                                                     
1111 See also my concept of exformation,  pp. 316 f. 
1112 Here we implicitly use a definition of natural selection which is later criticised as being too 
broad,  pp. 350 f. 
1113 It is meaningless in the sense of not being falsifiable or verifiable. It of course still confers an 
ideological load. 
1114 M. Midgley, Beast and Man (1978/1995), p. xx. 
1115 Cf. also: R. Dawkins, Universal Darwinism (1983), p. 404; The Blind Watchmaker (1986/1991).  
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Pan-adaptationism in general, in regard to a state of being, may indeed be called a 
‘Leibnizian paradigm’1116, although, in regard to processes, Leibniz’s concept of a pre-
established harmony is rather diametrically opposed to the wasteful mechanism of natural 
selection. However, with regard to a tautological pan-adaptationism I, in any case, prefer to 
use Gould’s and Lewontin’s term of a Panglossian Paradigm. This term is named after Dr. 
Pangloss, Voltaire’s caricature of Leibniz.1117 
But how does this tautological argumentation differ from the non-tautological one 
above, which I supported myself? Previously we defined adaptation as the fit (or the 
process of an increase of fit) of an entity to an environment, a certain relation between 
inner and outer. In this definition adaptation is in principle falsifiable. Entities may 
become adapted to an environment, or – based on an internal dynamic or on chance – 
may evolve in another direction. Opposed to this, tautological pan-adaptationism 
defines any entities which survive as having adapted. Accordingly, properties which in 
the former sense would have falsified that an adaptation took place, like a stable inner 
dynamic in a non-adaptive direction, would also still count as adaptation, since this 
also confirms the survival of the survivor. Based on a definition leading to such a 
tautological claim, I am and everyone else is, of course, a pan-adaptationist. But, it 
should be obvious that an unmodified definition of adaptation by survival is not a 
reasonable premiss, particularly since the claim of the survival of the survivor is not at 
all informative. 
If one instead adopts the non-tautological definition of adaptation which is based 
on an increasing fitness to an externally given environment, adaptation will definitely 
play an important role in evolution – but pan-adaptationism can be shown to be false. 
I name three types of explanation where this is the case. 
(1) Systemic individual selection could, as I have argued, lead to trends which are 
not adaptive ( pp. 291 f.). I have shown that the self-referential interaction of 
individual selection processes – which on the individual level appear to be adaptive – 
could stabilise or develop properties which are not adaptive in regard to the 
environment of the system. Such inner dynamics could be stable until either the 
system breaks down or another system is installed by group selection. In regard to the 
environment of the system, neither the system nor its parts become more adapted. 
The evolutionarily relevant dynamic at the system level is not adaptive. Based on the 
self-referentiality of the internal selection processes, a new synergetic property of 
autonomy from the outside world comes into being on the system level. I later shall 
discuss this as a case of auto-selection, which does not necessary lead to an adaptation 
to an external environment ( pp. 394 f). 
(2) Chance processes, playing a role in genetic drift or in the founder effect, may 
also lead to the establishment of non-adaptive gene-combinations in a gene-pool. But 
if one allows for many units of evolution, these processes can be regarded as parts of 
a larger adaptive process. For example, if one assumes a selection process at the group 
or species level, chance effects within the population could lead to the adaptive result 
                                                     
1116 D. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995), section 9.2 The Leibnizian Paradigm, pp. 238-251. 
1117 St. Gould, R. Lewontin, The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm (1982/1989). 
 footnote 813. 
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that, if accumulated in a certain sub-population, for example by a founder effect, it 
may become possible to cross adaptive vallies which would not have been possible 
otherwise. Hence chance processes may be part of a process which is itself adaptive 
( pp. 302 f.). 
But chance effects are also presumably equally often only side effects which, for 
example result from a given population structure, and may really lead to the 
establishment of partially non-adaptive properties. Also mutations, as the neutralists 
have stressed, are often neutral and can often by chance drift to genetic fixation 
in a population.1118 
(3) Inner morphological dynamics or, more apparent still, developmental 
constraints of an evolutionary line have, according to the non-tautological 
understanding of adaptation, also to be regarded as counter-evidence to the claim that 
only adaptation to an environment determines the course of evolution. The 
morphology itself constrains and directs the pathways evolution could take. 
Morphology can either constrain possible variations or can itself act as a selecting 
force. The phenotypic morphology, besides the adaptation to an external 
environment, is an evolutionary factor in its own right ( pp. 322 f.).  
It is actually difficult to disentangle internal and external causes in regard to 
morphology, but this, according to the above argumentation, is not only a problem 
for developmentalists, but for adaptationists as well. If it were not somehow possible 
to disentangle these two aspects then adaptationism does, as argued, not have its own 
empirical content, but only refers to the survival of the survivor (the empirical content 
of a Darwinian process is discussed separately in the next section). This distinction, 
however, does not lead leads to a problem in regard to point (a), nevertheless the 
distinction seems problematic here. It appears as if there are no evolutionary cases 
where either internal dynamics or a certain environmental adaptive pressure were 
completely absent. Evolutionary accounts have in fact always been concerned with 
entities in certain environments, the inner and outer of which seeming to be 
inseparable, related in an dialectical way. But this, I think, does not need us relapse 
into claiming adaptation tautologically. Despite the interrelationship between inner 
and outer, we seem to be able to distinguish what is relatively more due to outer than 
to inner factors. For example, it seems reasonable to regard the exoskeleton of 
arthropods as morphological constraints on the size of organisms, whereas those 
characters of the whale – originally a land living mammal – which are fish like, can, 
rather reasonably, be regarded to be adaptations to the aquatic environment. To 
evaluate the relative importance of internal or external factors may possibly involve 
comparisons to other species1119. 
But other proposals have also been made to disentangle the role of the inner 
dynamics of organismic morphology and external adaptationism. For example, 
R. Amundson, referring to P. Alberch, describes a thought experiment to test whether 
                                                     
1118 Cf. e.g., D. J. Futuyma, Evolutionsbiologie (1986/1990), p. 161 (mainly refering to M. Kimura), 
also pp. 75, 85, 509.  
1119 Cf. e.g., G. Lauder, Historical Biology and the Problem of Design (1982/1998), p. 513. Lauder also 
points out the necessity of comparisons, but does this, perhaps, in a slightly different way. 
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and in how far the separation of two species of organisms in morphospace (whose 
dimensions show in how far certain phenotypic properties x, y, z etc. are expressed) is 
caused by adaptations to an external environment or by internal constraints. If one 
were to reduce external selection to a minimum and increased mutation (by mutagens) 
to a maximum, the strict adaptationist hypothesis would be that the descendent 
morphologies would tend to be no longer (or much less) clustered, whereas the 
developmental hypothesis would predict that the clusters would – with certain 
modifications – roughly stay the same.1120  
An acknowledgement of evolutionary side-effects is weaker than the stress on the existence 
of inner developmental constraints and dynamics in evolution. The concept of properties 
which are evolutionary side-effects does emphasise that they do not have own causal 
relevance. They may one day of course become evolutionarily relevant as constraint or 
adaptation (more correctly: as exaptation1121). However, a side-effect without adaptive 
relevance actually refers to an inner causal necessity and the property itself is in fact not an 
adaptation, it may even be counter-adaptive. If the formerly adaptive trait perishes and the 
neutral side-effect continues to exist, one can, only even based on the weak notion of side-
effects, argue that traits could exist which neither actually have any adaptive use, nor have 
had any adaptive use for themselves earlier on. Although still being relatively close to an 
adaptationist view,1122 it also, on these grounds, would be wrong to argue that all evolved 
traits are adaptations.1123 
As a preliminary conclusion a neglect of the difference between internal and external 
causes of survival appears to entail a tautological understanding of adaptation. If one 
instead accepts that the survival of the fittest does not necessarily mean survival of the 
survivor, but survival of those entities which fit best to a given environment, an 
adaptationist claim is not tautological any more. For this case it has been shown that 
adaptation is essential to evolution, but that it is not the only direction giving force. 
Hence, in this understanding, pan-adaptationism is wrong. It appears that pan-
adaptationists actually often waver in their use of the term ‘adaptation’. If concerned 
with testability they refer to the non tautological fit to an environment and if 
concerned with its universal validity they refer (implicitly) to the tautological concept 
of survival of the survivor. Only when based on such a peculiar mixture of 
argumentations, can pan-adaptationism neither be criticised for being tautological nor 
for being empirically false. 
 
But we have not reached our final conclusion on this matter yet. I can think of two 
general objections that pan-adaptationist may raise to the argument I have put 
forward above. 
(1) They might argue that evolutionary theory should not primarily be concerned 
with non-adaptationist explanations, like inner dynamics, chance effects and 
                                                     
1120 R. Amundson, Two Concepts of Constraint (1994/1998), pp. 96 f. I would add that a moving of still 
equally existing clusters in morphospace would indicate an internal dynamics. 
1121 S. Gould, E. Vrba, Exaptation – A Missing Term in the Science of Form (1982/1998). 
1122 Cf.: E. Sober, Six Sayings about Adaptationism (1996/1998), pp. 76-80. 
1123 See: S. Gould, R. Lewontin, The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the 
Adaptationist Programme (1979).  
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morphological constraints.1124 But if evolutionary theory limits its investigations to 
adaptations from the outset and if then adaptation is found to be ubiquitous, then 
pan-adaptationism is again a mere vacuous tautological truth. 
(2) One may argue that the currently used notions of fitness are much more 
refined than the ones I have treated above and do not lead to a tautological 
understanding of adaptation, even if one did not adopt the requirement of an 
increased fit to an external environment. Moreover, if current technical definitions 
would still lead to tautological results, one could argue that these definitions could be 
modified in another way to make the claim of the existence of adaptations a non-
tautological claim, without thereby directly leading to a refutation of pan-
adaptationism. These objections need to be treated in more detail, but finally I shall 
conclude that my argument above remains largely valid. 
Do the existing technical definitions of fitness in evolutionary biology – 
particularly the ones prefered by gene-Darwinians – prevent a tautological 
understanding of the ‘survival of the fittest’, without refering to the internal-
external distinction?  
(a) After a period of unprecise and speculative use of the term fitness 
( also p. 347), fitness became to be used in a general way that was designed to show 
that natural selection always leads to adaption (higher fitness). Fitness – as discussed 
above – became defined by survival. Also Dawkins concedes, biologists redefined the 
intuitive term fitness more exactly by “whatever it takes to make the survival of the 
fittest into a tautology”.1125 One still, of course, had some idea of what adaptation 
should mean apart from a tautologically empty usage of the term. But this, I think, has 
either been due to implicitly adopting the above concept of an increased fit to an 
environment or has been due to specific additional theories on what traits will actually 
have a high probability of future survival. In any case these existing additional theories 
where not the core of adaptation as survival always remained the ultimate test for 
fitness. Understood in this sense, the claim of adaptationism, taken as such, has no 
predictive value at all and only gains predictive power by other theories with which it 
is implicitly associated. Despite its intuitively, based on these implicit or additional 
aspects, adaptation itself, as far as it is understood in this sense, is merely the 
tautological concept of the survival of the survivor. 
(b) Later fitness becomes defined, in a slightly different way, by reproductive success, 
and no longer by the survival of a single organism.1126 If taken as basis for pan-
adaptationism, this, in my view, still carries the burden of the same tautological 
project. Actually ‘survival’ had presumably even earlier on never just meant the length 
of life span, since it would be absurd to assume that only this is optimised in 
evolution. If this had been the case, the definition would itself not have been tauto-
logically enough in the Dawkinsian sense given above. Natural selection may well lead 
to a reduction in the life-span if reproductive success is enhanced. To measure the 
fitness of an organism by its reproductive success seems a more relevant way of repre-
                                                     
1124 See e.g., R. Dawkins, Universal Darwinism (1983), p. 404; The Extended Phenotype (1982), pp. 29, 32.  
1125 R. Dawkins, The Extended Phenotype (1982), p. 182. 
1126 Cf. e.g., R. Dawkins, Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype (1978), p. 63.   
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senting survival. But, if fitness “is measured as the number of children born it neglects 
juvenile mortality and fails to account for parental care. If it is measured as number of 
offspring reaching reproductive age it neglects variation in reproductive success of the 
grown offspring. If it is measured as number of grandchildren it neglects.... and so on 
ad infinitum.”1127 Hence the concept of reproductive success too, if defined in a 
precise way, is not a strictly appropriate measure of fitness. One still aims at the 
probability of survival in general. But this general aspect of the term ‘fitness’, which 
seems to be its core, leads, without additional qualifications, to an interpretation of 
adaptation as the ‘survival of the survivor’. Post hoc, it is of course possible to 
determine which organism was fit or which survived, but the general tautological 
understanding of adaptation is not itself linked to any specific prediction. I think that 
any definition of fitness which tries to emulate the general concept of survival through 
the use of another term, remains in the sense given above, at its core tautological.  
Nevertheless, a term which is not identical with the term ‘survival’ is also 
entangled with non-tautological aspects as well. To define adaptation by reproductive 
success, assumes the existence of reproductive success, i. e. an evolutionary line and a 
varying number of descendants. This may even be linked to some central aspects of a 
Darwinian process, which we discuss below. Nevertheless the core of the concept of 
adaptation remains in this case the tautological claim of the survival of the survivor – 
and not an increased fit to an external environment.  
(c) The notion of inclusive fitness is concerned with survival not only in terms of the 
number of descendants of an organism, but also in terms which also consider the 
organism’s effects on the reproductive success of its relatives (weighted by 
their relatedness). 
It seems to me that here an additional non-tautological aspect, linked to the 
concept of kin selection, is introduced besides keeping the generally tautological view 
of adaptation. A certain claim in regard to the possibility of certain evolutionary 
mechanisms or of the unit of selection debate is involved in this definition. The 
concept appears to emphasis the possibility and advantage of mutual help within a kin 
group. That theory of kin selection is (presumably) a falsifiable theory. But the con-
cept of kin selection has been interpreted in a gene-atomistic,1128 an individualistic or a 
group-selectionistic way1035 ( pp. 37 f.), and would lead us on to a discussion about 
what that specific additional non-tautological aspect is involved in our definition.  
However, also here fitness is measured by future survival. Now survival, however, 
is that of the descendants of a particular gene in a certain gene-pool including its effect 
on its copies in other relatives. The still present basic tautological aspect may more 
easily become apparent if one adopts Orlove’s reformulation of Hamilton’s ‘inclusive 
fitness’. Orlove has reformulated the inclusive fitness of an organism in a way which 
does not focus on the organism’s effect on its relatives, but on the equivalent effect of 
relatives on a certain (average) organism. This equivalent reformulation he calls 
‘personal fitness’. This is the same ordinary reproductive definition of fitness, “but 
                                                     
1127 Idem, The Extended Phenotype (1982), p. 184. 
1128 Idem, Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype (1978), p. 63 
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don’t forget that this must include the extra offspring he gets as a result of help from 
his relatives”1129.  
Apart from possible additionally integrated non-tautological aspects, the concept 
of the survival of the fittest still points generally to the tautological survival of 
the survivor. 
An alternative to such, still at least partly tautological definition of adaptation, 
would be to define ‘fittest’ in the sense of its ordinary meaning, as the strongest, the 
quickest and the most intelligent. These ‘athletic’ common sense meanings may 
actually have provided the context in which the actual tautology did not become 
apparent. It is, of course, not tautological to claim that the strongest will survive. Each 
of these concrete properties we may – or may not – personally value. But besides the 
problem of priorities of these properties, fitness in this concrete sense obviously does 
not necessary predict survival: we only have to think of the still living order of 
amoebae or of the extinct Mesozoic order of dinosaurs. Thus, if one adopted such a 
concrete definition of fitness, the claim of the survival of the fittest would at least in 
many cases plainly turn out to be wrong. 
Likewise if one uses the definition of fitness as increased complexity, one can object that 
bacteria in terms of number are quite predominant. Moreover, such a claim on directed 
evolution would in any case not resemble the spirit of Darwinism.  
Another alternative would be to define fitness in an abstract way by the probability of 
survival in the long run, the long-term probability to survive.1130 A pan-adaptationism 
under such a definition of fitness would be much more justified in being called a 
naturalised analogy to Leibniz’s claim that we live in the best of all possible world than 
the formulations above.1116  For some reasons such a definition of fitness may be 
useful. But on these grounds the claim of the ‘survival of the fittest’ would be 
interpreted in a way that would mean especially those entities survive in the short run, 
which have the best chances at surviving in the long run. This formulation is not 
tautological and also appears not to be true, especially in regard to natural selection. 
Natural selection can in fact, in single cases, lead to long term adaptation. But 
particularly since natural selection is assumed as being blind towards long term 
development and as acting instantly, it is not at all guaranteed that those entities 
survive which will be adapted in the long run. Any extinction of a species after a time 
of development would be a counter-example to pan-adaptationism. Paradoxically, 
pan-selectionism appears to be particularly inconsistent with pan-adaptationism. 
Moreover, for example, subversion of altruistic co-operative groups by egoistic 
individuals too leads to the survival of selfish individuals which are less adapted in the 
long run. This would lead not only to a reduced fitness of the group, but also to a 
reduced fitness of its average members and even of those now predominant 
selfish individuals.1131 
                                                     
1129 R. Dawkins, The Extended Phenotype (1982), p. 187. 
1130 Cf.: S. Mills, J. Beatty, The Propensity Interpretation of Fitness (1979). J. M. Thoday, Components of 
Fitness (1953). 
1131 E. Sober, What is Evolutionary Altruism (1988/1998), pp. 463-467. E. Sober, D. S. Wilson, 
Philosophical Work on Units of Selection Problem (1994/1998), pp. 206-207.  Also  pp. 284 f. 
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Hence, also these alternative non-tautological proposals to circumvent a tautology 
do not lead to pan-selectionism. 
But if one does not adopt these alternative definitions, the largely tautological 
definitions above, likewise seem to have more non-tautological aspects than we have 
worked out here up until now. Otherwise, it would be implausible that a mere 
tautological definition could apparently still yield fruitful results. 
It is obviously possible and even useful to check, in a post hoc way, which entities 
survived and which did not. Nevertheless, we have also seen that the concept of 
adaptation, if directly or indirectly defined as the survival of the survivor, does not 
itself have any predictive power; it could not be exposed to a proper testing and does 
not itself contribute anything to an explanation. In my view, more specific theories of 
why organisms or species survive contribute to the missing predictions, but they are 
additional theories. These theories could also be tested.  
Also the previously proposed concept of an increased fit to an external 
environment is a testable assumption (and which is actually sometimes not given). On 
the other hand the hypothesis that internal factors direct evolution is also testable. But 
besides these aspects and the already mentioned non-tautological components of the 
mainly tautological definitions of adaptation, especially additionally adopted theories, 
in my view render the general – tautological – concept of adaptation as a 
seemingly testable claim. 
Sober, rather critical of the existence of tautological aspects in Darwinian explan-
ations, conceded that although specific adaptive explanations are testable, the general 
claim that there, in a particular case, exists an adaptive explanation is hard to prove 
wrong.1132 This, I think, still somewhat resembles Gould’s objection to adaptationism 
that it is always possible to invent a new “just so story”. In my view, the problem of 
testing adaptationism in general is due to the often implicitly adopted tautological 
definition of adaptation as the survival of the survivor, which is never ever challenged 
by any refutation of a specific theory about which entity will probably survive. Only 
those additional specific theories about what will evolve and survive can be tested. 
These theories are crucial since we in fact want to predict what traits are evolutionarily 
stable. Indeed these reasonable specific theories sometimes become falsified as well. 
For this reason the measurement of, for example, gene-frequencies, numbers of 
offspring or life spans is central in order to evaluate these theories. But it adds 
nothing, to call, without qualification, any trait which survives an adaptation. In this 
sense the actual use of the term ‘adaptation’ seems to be modified in each case, based 
on the involved specific theories. Specific hypothesis on evolutionary mechanisms 
could be tested. General adaptationism could not be tested and does not contribute to 
an explanation, if adaptation is merely understood as survival in whatever possible way.  
In conclusion, firstly one may abandon the term adaptation all together, since 
adaptation in its non-tautological usage is too often entangled with a tautological 
usage. Secondly, one may keep the notion, as an empty tautological umbrella notion 
referring to all the traits which according to currently valid and more specific theories 
are regarded as leading to survival. In this sense pan-adaptationism can not be refuted, 
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since any specific theory, which is shown to be false, is by definition no longer 
covered by this umbrella notion. In this way of thinking any causes, also internal 
trends, orthogenesis and chance effects would simply be called adaptations as long as 
they had some effect on evolution. Thirdly, one may keep the notion of adaptation, 
but purge it from its tautological aspects. This possibility is advocated here. I have 
advocated understanding adaptation as an increased fit to an external environment. I have 
shown that this understanding is not tautological. This particular non-tautological 
understanding has also always been an ideological core of adaptationism, but easily 
becomes neglected when this understanding proves pan-adaptationism to be wrong – 
as it does. If adaptationism wants to be taken seriously, I think, it ought to take its 
own conceptual core seriously itself. 
Nevertheless, it may, for other reasons, be useful to keep the general notion of fitness, 
defined by survival. It is only wrong to apply this definition to adaptation in a way which 
leads to the absurd tautological claim of the survival of the survivor. It is of course 
reasonable and interesting to examine what entities survive or which have a probability to 
survive, but it is absurd to call any kind of survival adaptation, since then everything is an 
adaptation. Besides this, we still want to have a language with which to express our more 
specific hypothesis of which trait will or will not survive, independently of whether it is an 
internally directed development or an adaptation to an external environment. Also the non-
adaptationist hypothesis that an internal dynamic may lead a certain trait (and not to another 
trait) may be expressed by the short cut that this internal dynamic enhances the fitness of 
that trait. But in this case an enhanced fitness is not an adaptation to an externally given 
environment. Here the concept of fitness itself does not contribute anything to the 
explanation, but is only a short cut for the probability of survival. Of course, any evolu-
tionary entity survives or does not survive. Fitness in its general understanding, only pro-
vides a terminology to express our more specific adaptationist or non-adaptationist hypo-
thesis which forces lead to survival, it is in this respect not a theory which can be tested.  
Darwin himself, in the period in which he wrote the Origin, believed in pan-
adaptationism, based only on natural selection and thus in later editions took over the 
Spencerian slogan of the survival of the fittest to characterise his theory. As far as I know 
he, like many of his followers, did not distinguish between the tautological and the 
non-tautological aspect of pan-adaptionism. Darwin, although challenging the 
ontological fixity of natural theology, still stood in Paley’s wake with regard to his 
belief in pan-adaptionism. The term ‘natural selection’ even mirrors the imagery of 
God’s guiding hand, similar to the ‘invisible hand’ of another Christian inspired pan-
adaptationist, Adam Smith. In Darwin’s later period, when his religious belief was 
shaken (mainly by his own theory), he in the fifth edition of the Origin abandoned 
strict pan-adaptationism and the exclusiveness of natural selection ( p. 109). 
Although it has been to Darwin’s merit to see that the simple mechanism of natural 
selection could in fact lead to some adaptation, the strong pan-adaptationist assertion 
inherent in it becomes highly doubtful if we do not base it on either a tradition of 
natural theology or interpret the concept of natural selection in a tautological but 
vacuous way. 
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c) On the Tautological Basis of Pan-Selectionism 
Since selectionism has become universal ( pp. 205 f.), I, perhaps with a different 
intention, have to agree with Dawkins when he says that it “is time to go back to first 
principles. What really happens in natural selection?” 1133 
Pan-selectionism, which is opposed to approaches which favour the synergetic 
emergence of processes, normally asserts that besides natural selection – which itself 
once emerged – no other essentially new types of evolutionary processes ever have 
emerged. Natural selection is understood as a universally present ontological principle 
to which all other evolutionary processes can be reduced ( pp. 142 f., 209 f.). 
Natural selection in this view is as basic and exhaustive in respect of processes as 
elementary particles are to radical supporters of physicalist substance reductionism. 
The pan-selectionist claim of process-Darwinism can be formulated as ‘all relevant 
evolutionary processes are processes of natural selection’. This often is formulated in a 
more specific way as ‘all adaptive processes are processes of natural selection’. Even so, 
the two formulations are equivalent providing that pan-selectionists advocate pan-
adaptationism as well. If this is so however, then developmental constraints, an 
internal dynamics or the fixation of traits based on chance, which (as we have seen in 
the last section) do all not necessarily lead to an adaptation to an external 
environment, are ignored as limiting the scope of this claim. Tautological pan-
adaptationism simply calls these non-adaptive processes adaptations because they also 
play a role in shaping future existence. Another assumption leading to the mere tauto-
logical truth of the equivalence of the two formulations is that one is only interested in 
adaptive processes anyhow ( the preceding section on pan-adaptationism).  
Based on an assumed equivalence of (relevant aspects of) evolution and adaptation 
a pan-selectionist may additionally simply define natural selection as an equivalent to 
any adaptation. Natural selection would then merely mean that entities survive or do 
not survive, which is, of course, always true. Such an approach, which by definition 
regards any evolutionary change, without qualification, as being naturally selected, 
trivially and tautologically implies pan-selectionism. The proposition ‘this evolves by 
natural selection’ would then not be able to make any more predictions than the 
proposition ‘this evolves because of Gods will or because of Providence’, since no 
particular cause or direction is explicitly specified (nevertheless the connotations of 
these propositions obviously differ considerably). Pan-selectionism, if based on this 
tautological argumentation, is obviously too absurd to merit closer discussion. 
Perhaps, no one has ever explicitly promoted this understanding of natural selection, 
but, presumably, it often plays an implicit role in statements, which in regard to 
certain properties and without any closer scrutiny of the involved process, assume that 
these properties evolved by ‘natural selection’. 
 
Alternatively, a Darwinian process can still quite broadly, but more appropriately, be 
defined as being characterised, firstly, by different trials and, secondly, by the existence 
of a selecting force. Often a Darwinian process, is, as we have already seen, defined 
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even more strictly. But such a definition from the viewpoint of a pan-selectionist may 
appear to be able to navigate between the Scylla of being a mere tautology and the 
Charybdis of obviously proving pan-selectionism to be wrong.  
I shall argue that this definition of a Darwinian process is still generally too 
unspecified. In regard to the first criterion, it is argued that the concept of different 
trials is almost – although not totally – empty and requires further qualification. The 
second criterion, the existence of a selecting force, is shown to be a completely empty 
tautological condition – as long as one does not assign a more specific meaning 
to this term. 
Before I come to discuss the afore mentioned criteria of a Darwinian process, it 
has to be mentioned that the definition above is still generally so broad that it can be 
applied to almost any subject area and even to many physical objects. This seems 
appropriate since we are concerned with universal Darwinism and not necessarily just 
with biological Darwinism. But universal Darwinism, if not claimed in a tautological 
way by calling any change as being a Darwinian process, usually limits itself to 
biological and cultural entities. However, the concept of ‘natural selection’ has, for 
example, also been proposed by a known physicist to be applicable with regard to the 
order of atoms in a laser beam.1134  
Let us take another example – single drops of rain – which may appear particularly 
implausible. A drop of rain is an entity with certain properties such as cohesion etc. The 
starting point at which a drop is formed can be regarded as a chance process when H2O 
molecules come together during condensation (trials). Small drops then evolve, one may say, 
based on natural selection, due to the density of H2O molecules in the air etc. 
If we would accept that in some cases at least the two criteria (at least in their broad 
and, as we shall see, almost empty sense) would be fulfilled by merely physical entities, 
we might still argue that in these cases no inheritance and replication is given.1135 I, of 
course, think that inheritance and replication are crucial to biological evolution, since 
they are preconditions with which past experiences could become accumulated and 
transferred to the future.  
None the less, it should at least be annotated that it is, in my opinion, not entirely 
trivial that such a necessary additional criterion of inheritance and replication would 
necessarily exclude all merely physical processes from counting as objects of a 
Darwinian process.  
Even in regard to a drop of rain, whose order in a way stabilises itself, and one might say 
‘inherits’ its structure to the next moment: the drop although possibly loosing some 
molecules, collects smaller droplets upon falling. (It is astonishing to learn that there are 
intensive scientific studies also on the matter of precipitation.) Moreover, it is known that 
drops which have become very large tend to be broken into smaller drops. Here the 
macroscopic structure of a drop in a way even duplicates itself. Something like this may 
cause a domino effect and may play a role when it is raining. 
                                                     
1134 E.g., H. Haken, Indeterminismus, Wahl und Freiheit – Wie sind diese Begriffe im Bereich des Anorganischen 
zu verstehen? (1984), p. 18. Haken’s general theory of synergetics, in my view, still seems rather 
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1135 Cf.: R. Dawkins, Universal Darwinism (1983), p. 421. 
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Also in more obvious cases of self-organisation in physics something like ‘inheritance’ 
seems to be involved. There is a huge field of study concerning non-equilibrium irreversible 
thermodynamics, a field to which the Nobel laureate I. Prigogine has made considerable 
contributions. It seems that in this subject area states of macroscopic order come into being 
by chance fluctuations. These once established states of order in a process of self-
organisation again influence the future range of possible fluctuations. One may doubt 
whether such an inner self-organisational dynamics may violate other criteria of a Darwinian 
process, which refer to an adaptation to an external environment. However, if successive 
irreversible states of order dependent on each other, this process in a way may be said to 
have a memory. Also in regard to the physical or chemical evolution of the universe in 
general, the present structure obviously determines to some extent the future structure. An 
extended physical notion of inheritance may possibly question whether the biological notion 
of inheritance is formulated sufficiently general. 
Leaving aside the question of whether or not properties in physical processes also are 
somewhat inherited from former states, we, in any case, add that for a Darwinian 
process one also requires inheritance. 
 
(1) The criterion of the existence of different trials, although not totally vacuous, is, 
nevertheless, too broad to represent properly the essence of a Darwinian process.  
The concept of different trials – in biology, particularly different mutations, 
recombinations and speciations – merely excludes the possibility that there is only one 
possible development or direction. All trials or steps in more than one direction, 
however directed they may be, would then qualify as being parts of Darwinian 
processes. Instead of one determined direction a Darwinian process requires a 
probability function of trials with different directions. 
This criterion is not completely empty, since processes which really only produce 
steps in one direction are excluded from being Darwinian processes. This aspect of a 
definition would indeed exclude historical pure Lamarckism from being a Darwinian 
process, because in a purely Lamarckian process each adaptive step is assumed to be a 
‘trial’ in one adaptive direction, which is directly informed by the environment. This 
shows the non-tautological aspect of this definition without leading to a refutation of 
pan-selectionism, since radical biological Lamarckism – besides some open questions 
( pp. 148, 313 f.) – largely has to count as having been refuted. 
But according to this definition, all semi-directed processes would count as 
Darwinian processes as well. Likewise, all evolutionary inner constraints, if still 
allowing at least two minimally different directions, would be counted as natural 
selection. The concept of constraints on variation leading only to precisely one 
possible direction, is, admittedly, a concept, which can be thought of, but since all 
morphological processes are rather fussy, this would at best be approximated by the 
actual facts. None the less, I think we do want to distinguish between more or less 
directed processes.  
In the cultural area, which, according to process-Darwinians, is also exclusively de-
scribable by Darwinian processes, it is simpler to find a counter example even for the 
very cautious definition of pan-selectionism given above. For instance, the possibly 
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directly correct response to a mathematical problem, not known to the solver before, 
would, at least on the level of the individual, obviously not be a Darwinian process.1136 
One may object that internally, cognitively, there has perhaps still been a production of a 
broad variety of proposals. Firstly, this would be a hypothesis which is not proven at all and 
which even seems difficult to test. Secondly, such a general perspective seems to neglect the 
particular properties of different forms of exploration, here of rational reasoning. Thirdly, 
even if on some basic level there indeed were a broad variation of trials, this would provide 
us with an example of a processual synergetic whole, since the level of the individual is 
directed in any case. This interpretation would confirm process emergentism, by showing 
that the combination of Darwinian processes, does not lead to another Darwinian process 
itself, but may, for example, gain properties of directed evolution. 
But also in regard to this example the criterion of ‘trials’ in any case seems not to 
differentiate appropriately between different processes. In problem solving it does not 
only make a difference whether we directly solve problems or not, but also how many 
trials we need or how directed the process of solving the problem is.  
The criterion of different trials defines a Darwinian process so broadly that 
processes which are partly directed would simply be counted as Darwinian processes. 
Pan-selectionism is not claimed in a strictly tautological way, but reinterprets almost all 
counter-evidence that suggests it is still close to a tautology. Hence a stricter definition 
appears to be needed.  
 
(a) Directed non-adaptive variation. Developmentally constrained variation may only 
lead to evolutionary products which are not optimally adapted.1137 If the range of 
variation is so narrow that no proper adaptation can be achieved one may not regard 
it as a proper Darwinian process.  
Developmentally constrained variation can in my view partly be interpreted as a 
form of auto-selection, which in any case will be shown to be non-Darwinian as well. 
Somewhat differently, Amundson, for example, interprets all developmental 
constraints as constraints on variation and I agree that they may play a role. If, for 
example, mutations are always interpreted along the predominant established 
developmental pathways, certain phenotypic variation – and we are of course 
concerned with phenotypic properties – will, at least probabilistically, not occur. In 
regard of an evolutionary line as a whole, one can in both cases speak anyway of 
variational constraints. 
Whales, mammals which earlier lived on land, are in many respects adapted to spending their 
whole life cycle in water. For example, the broad horizontal tail flukes which provide the 
main propulsive thrust bear no anatomical connection to the lost hind limbs. Nevertheless, 
whales still have, for example, lungs and have not evolved secondary gills to breath air 
resolved in water, which possibly would have been advantageous for their deep dives. This 
may be interpreted either to be due to the developmental pathway making such a mutation 
                                                     
1136 One may object that here the basic information is already given by the axioms of logic. 
Nevertheless it obviously requires in some sense a ‘new’ knowledge to solve new mathematical 
problems. In this regard I tend to follow Kant in regarding complex mathematical judgements 
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1137 Confer also in section (b) the treatment of the necessary range of variation,  p. 355 f. 
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highly improbable, or because any mutation in this direction in an auto-selective way turned 
out to be disadvantageous.  
The difficulty, but necessity, of distinguishing between an internally caused direction 
and adaptation to an external environment has been discussed before ( pp. 343 f.). 
This has been shown to be particularly important in preventing a mere tautological 
understanding of adaptation. 
Amundson, as mentioned above, exposes an interesting proposal about how to 
distinguish what features of given populations are due to internal constraints on 
variation and to adaptation to an external environment.1138 
 
(b) Directed adaptive variation. With regard to adaptations, I think, we should dis-
tinguish between cases where a blind vast abundance of trials is needed for an adap-
tation and cases where an adaptation may be possibly achieved in a more directed way.  
It appears reasonable to require for our definition that the trials of a Darwinian 
process are blind, as has actually been assumed by the majority of neo-Darwinians.1139 
Trials are blind if no trial has an enhanced probability for being adaptive, relative to 
other actual or hypothetical trials.1140 The probability function of the different trials 
causing changes should not correlate with their adaptability. 
The strict blindness of a trial could be interpreted as radical antithesis to inductivism. Blindness 
assumes that former experiences, former adaptations, do not improve the probability of 
solving new problems in the future. Dawkins’ in Universal Darwinism, argued – on a generally 
anti-inductivist basis – that Darwinism “is probably the only theory that can adequately 
account for the phenomena that we associate with life”1141 Elsewhere he states, that 
“Darwinism is the only known theory that is in principle capable of explaining certain 
aspects of life. If I am right it means that, even if there were no actual evidence in favour of 
the Darwinian theory (there is, of course) we should still be justified in preferring it over all 
rival theories”1142. “The ‘Darwinian world-view’ is not only the theory which happens to be 
true, but it is the only theory which is possibly explaining our existence”1143 ( pp. 209 f.).  
Although we aimed at making our definition of a Darwinian process more testable by 
requiring trials to be blind, at this point another tautology seems easily to creep in if one 
pleads for pan-Darwinism based on an assumed refutation of inductivism. I have argued 
before that anti-inductivism can simply be based on a trivial tautological truth: one does not 
know what one does not know ( pp. 210 f.). If this were the claim of the inductivists they 
would of course simply be wrong. I have argued earlier, that this has never been upheld by 
inductivists. Inductivists argue that old knowledge has a certain enhanced probability to be 
valid in new situations. We are entitled to think that the sun will rise tomorrow as well. This 
is the claim that our knowledge has a higher probability than a chance guess of also being 
valid tomorrow, although the world may have changed. Also if situations change an 
inductivist may either argue that we are directly informed by the environment or, in a less 
                                                     
1138 R. Amundson, Two Concepts of Constraint (1994/1998), esp. p. 108,  footnote 1120. 
1139 Including most proponents of the evolutionary synthesis and of gene-Darwinism, also 
 footnote 1173. Darwin himself had still allowed directed adaptations, even based on an 
explicitly Lamarckian mechanism,  pp. 106 f.  
1140  also e.g., footnote 1174. 
1141 R. Dawkins, Universal Darwinism (1983), p. 403. 
1142 Idem, The Blind Watchmaker (1986/1991), p. 287. 
1143 Ibid, p. xiv. 
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radical way, that we may to some extent be able to skilfully rearrange our knowledge so that 
the resulting generalisations, transformations etc. have normally a higher probability of being 
right than mere chance guesses. The question is not whether the unknown could be known 
(of course not), but, whether former knowledge in its generalisations and other 
transformations could also – on average – have any validity in new situations.  
In evolutionary theory the question is whether variation (mutation, recombination etc.) 
is always necessarily blind whether, earlier adaptations, newly combined have a higher 
probability of being adaptive, than completely chance trials. Of course here an aspect of 
chance is necessarily involved. The question is whether all trials really in principle have to be 
assumed to be completely blind. Linked to this discussion is the question of whether an 
evolutionary line of a species could appropriately be said to be less blind in finding an 
adaptive optimum than a line of asexual organisms. If biological or cultural processes of 
knowledge acquisition could be speeded up, we would presumably not call them all equally 
blind, at least not on the level of the focused whole. 
Since I have discussed anti-inductivism earlier on and argued against an a priori 
refutation of inductivism, we here continue with the assumption that the blindness of trials 
is not a priori given, but a matter of empirical investigation ( pp. 212 f.). 
 
If blindness could be assumed, but the Darwinian process should still lead to 
adaptation, an abundance of trials and a certain range of their variation appears to be required. 
If the range of variation or the number of trials is small, either the assumption of 
adaptation or of blindness would have to be abandoned. With a very limited number 
and range of blind trials it is not guarantied that in a given adaptive landscape within a 
reasonable amount of time even a close adaptive optimum will be found. 
Alternatively, if adaptation is assumed to have taken place, only a few trials with a 
limited range of variation leading to that adaptation, would not properly be regarded 
as blind and more variation in non-adaptive directions as well would have needed to 
occur in order to sustain the assumption of blindness. Hence, if we do not want to 
abandon adaptation or blindness of trials as essential aspects of a Darwinian process, a 
certain range and number of trials appears also to be required. 
Hence for a comparison of different theories on evolution the amount of claimed 
variation seems to qualify as a yardstick as to just how Darwinian they are. We may, 
for example, think of two theories of language evolution, one of which claims the 
elimination of a vast number of populations with different language structures which 
in turn, led to the existing language structure, other of which claims only very few 
eliminations. Whatever position one holds on this matter (I am personally not com-
mitted to any position on this specific dispute), it appears to be reasonable to distin-
guish these theories according to where natural selection is ‘doing more work’.1144 A 
theory which assumes that only a few trials have led to the evolution of a property 
either implies that the trials have somehow been directed towards this adaptation or 
that the trials, if they are assumed to be blind, have probably not reached a very 
adaptive result. It would in my view be absurd to claim alternatively that, for instance, 
Chomsky, advocating a minor role for blind trials and for external elimination, 
basically supports the same theory as someone who pleads for its omnipresent role. 
                                                     
1144 Cf.: E. Sober, Six Sayings about Adaptation (1996/1998), p. 78. 
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In spite of this Sober, pointed out that in respect to a given observed variation it is 
difficult or even impossible to judge how far this variation is directed towards an ad-
aptation, since there are no fixed standards for how broad variation has to be.1145 
It should be noted that this is not only a problem for the critics of Darwinism but equally 
for Darwinism itself. If not solved, it would mean that any possible empirical evidence for 
directed variation would become excluded, not empirically but theoretically. Moreover it 
would equally be possible to regard all processes as directed, because one could also always 
think of a larger range of variation. Directionalism and Darwinism were in danger becoming 
mere matters of opinion, not of empirical evidence. 
Although I agree with Sober that there is a difficulty since no strict general standards 
are available, this does not mean that we cannot make any distinctions. In regard to 
specific traits we may well think of a sufficiently broad variation of blind trials leading 
to a certain adaptation. We are definitely concerned with a question of degree, but in a 
specific context may still determine whether the range and the number of blind trials 
will probably lead to an adaptation in a given time. This becomes particularly apparent 
in regard of alternative hypotheses, like in those of language acquisition above. It 
would be wrong to call both in an equal way Darwinian. 
In regard to directed adaptive variation, we can generally conclude that we require 
blindness as a criterion for a Darwinian process and not only different trials. 
Moreover, it appears reasonable – although remaining slightly more problematic – to 
require that the trials are also abundant and varying enough if it is another 
precondition that they should lead to adaptation. 
 
(2) The second criterion proposed for a Darwinian process – the existence of a 
selecting force – represents, if taken as such, not a substantial assertion at all. Without 
a more restricted use of the term ‘selector’ this criterion is vacuous. If a selector, dif-
fering from the original connotation of the word, is broadly understood as all external 
and internal conditions under which an entity is formed, then simply all conditions and 
causes which lead to its existence are meant. If possible non-adaptive inner constraints 
or an inner dynamics are also taken as selectors then selectors are by definition always 
given, since simply any cause is meant. If any explanation is defined to fulfil this 
criterion of a Darwinian process, the claim of its universal validity is tautological and 
vacuous. (Cf. the problem of the definition of adaptation,  pp. 339 f.). 
An alternative, which would not make this criterion of pan-selectionism a mere 
tautology, would be to define the selecting force as being external. This is actually 
often done and it is only this that also guarantees that selection leads to an adaptation 
to an external environment.  
Given this, internal developmental constraints leading to a certain evolutionary 
direction would, appropriately, not be interpreted as being Darwinian processes 
( pp. 343 f.). An external selector is also absent in regard to the dispersion of genetic 
neutral genes or to genetic drift, and hence these processes also, as it is often argued, 
would not fulfil this criterion of a Darwinian process. (Drift, however, may sometimes 
play a role in the variational step of a Darwinian process on the population level.) 
                                                     
1145 Idid, p. 79. 
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Likewise, what I have called systemic individual ‘selection’ ( pp. 291 f.) is, on the 
level of the system, not a Darwinian process. Here internally a Darwinian process 
leads to the adaptation (in the afore outlined non-tautological sense) of organisms to 
other organisms belonging to that system. Even so the system as a whole has gained a 
certain independence from external selectors and, as such, the direction of evolution is 
not necessarily adaptive but determined by the inner dynamics of this system. Hence, 
the system as a whole is not ruled by a Darwinian process. This is, I think, a good 
example of the synergetic properties of compound processes, in which in regard to 
processes a whole is not merely the sum of its parts ( pp. 394, 409).Hence, if a 
selector is defined more appropriately as being external, this criterion of the pan-
adaptationist claim, is not tautological any more – but often false.  
 
Conclusion. If simply identified with pan-adaptationism, pan-selectionism is fully 
tautological and merely claims the survival of the fittest in the sense of the survival of 
the survivor ( previous section).  
Another seemingly much more differentiated way of defining a Darwinian process 
is to define it as a process of trial and selection. I argue that this is in fact no longer 
tautological, yet still close to a tautology.  
First, the criterion of trials, strictly understood, only completely excludes directed 
stages of evolution. All processes with a minimal variation would fulfil this criterion, 
even if we are either concerned with a strong internally constrained variation not-
leading to adaptation or with an adaptively directed variation which very quickly leads 
to an adaptation. Hence, processes which are appropriately called non-Darwinian, 
because they do not lead to an adaptation at all, or because they are directed towards 
adaptation, would absurdly still count in favour of Darwinism. Also in accordance 
with the generally strict neo-Darwinian understanding of a Darwinian process, I argue 
that a stricter criterion for a Darwinian process is required: trials have to be blind; 
there should be no enhanced probability that they lead to adaptation. Moreover, there 
should be no strong constraints on this blind variation if we want to assume that these 
blind trials lead to adaptation. 
Secondly, the criterion for the existence of a selecting force is vacuous, if 
understood so broadly that any cause and condition, whether internal or external, can 
be taken as such force. Since any entity has internal and external conditions of 
existence, a claim that there is a selecting force only refers to the trivial fact that there 
are some explanations for the existence of an entity. This is, of course, true, but 
vacuous. If internal constraints and internal tendencies not leading to adaptations were 
also all called selecting forces, since they are causally relevant and thereby contribute 
to the survival of a particular kind of entity, then this criterion would be, of course, 
universally fulfilled – without saying anything. I argue that the second criterion for a 
Darwinian process has thus to be understood as selection by an environment. This 
aspect of a refined non-tautological definition is also in accordance with the core of 
the Darwinian tradition. Processes based on an inner dynamics which are not leading 
to an adaptation, could then not be redefined as Darwinian processes. I have pointed 
to some examples which prove pan-selectionism to be wrong. In the next section the 
resulting definition of Darwinism and its alternatives will be discussed. 
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9.2 Re-defining the Notions of Darwinism and Lamarckism 
a) A Strict Definition of Darwinism 
From the universal application of Darwinism1146 and from the last two sections on its 
tautological aspects it is apparent that a strict definition of Darwinism is needed which 
is not tautological but which aims at a conceptual resolution that distinguishes 
different types of processes in the physical, biological and cultural spheres as 
effectively as possible. Aiming at a conceptual resolution is something like an a priori 
condition (roughly in the Kantian sense) to make process emergentism visible. If we 
believe in the existence of the evolution of evolutionary processes, the probability of 
detecting such an evolution will be higher the more strictly we formulate our 
definition of Darwinian processes. 
Still in accordance with the normal use of the notion, but strictly excluding its 
possible tautological or semi-tautological aspects that were discussed before, I define a 
– pure – Darwinian process as follows. 
(0) The basis for a Darwinian process has to be a direct continuous line of descent 
and heredity, which preserves information. (1a) The first step of a Darwinian process 
is signified by a diversification or variation of informational lines. (1b) That variation 
of the informational line is completely blind. Moreover, variation should be abundant 
and broad enough that relatively close adaptive optima can be found. (2) The second 
step of a Darwinian process is external selection leading to adaptation in respect of a 
temporally given environment. 
A Darwinian process as a whole leads to the survival of those blindly produced 
entities, which are most opportunistically adapted to their momentaneous 
environment.  
Proposition zero is normally uncontroversial, and is accepted by most critics.1147 
The other propositions also boil down only to a stricter formulation of our working 
definition, which is widely accepted ( pp. 102 f.). However, it also becomes apparent 
that tautological formulations of Darwinian processes too may often have helped to 
immunise the Darwinian paradigm and, equally, that a stricter definition may challenge 
pan-adaptationism and pan-selectionism ( pp. 339 f.). Despite the resemblance to 
our working definition, the definition is now more precise and we have aquired 
certainty about the essential role of the components of the definition. The most 
important aspects of the definition above can be summarised in the following phrase, 
                                                     
1146  pp. 205 f. Cf. e.g., K. Shrader-Frechette, Should Epistemologists Take Darwin Seriously? (1990). 
1147 Nevertheless, in a way, this aspect has also been challenged here as being an exclusively valid 
description of evolution. The concept of an informational line has been complemented by the 
concept of exformation. Although the storage of exformation is itself partly based on the 
information of another evolutionary line, it has been stressed above that certain features of one 
species may, in a way, be stored in another co-evolving species. ( The concept of external 
memory, pp.  326 f.) 
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which I already occasionally have used earlier in this work.1148 A Darwinian process is 
a process of blind variation (1) and external selection (2). 
This conceptualisation is also historically appropriate in respect to modern 
Darwinism. Modern Darwinism is a synthesis of Darwin’s externalism and Mendel’s 
belief in the internal factors of evolutionary variation.1149 But the evolutionary 
synthesis transformed the originally anti-Darwinian Mendelian and mutationist 
contribution, so to speak, in a way that was radically Darwinian: the internal force of 
variation, was now understood to be a completely undirected, blind force, producing 
random material on which natural selection could work. The Darwinian evolutionary 
process is generally described as “genetic chance and environmental necessity”.1150 
Likewise Mayr regards modern Darwinism in essence as a synthesis of mutationism 
(in the sense of random events or accidents) and externalism.1151 
Although it may have been the originally intended consequence of Darwinism to explain 
progress,1152 I suppose that Darwin’s believe in progress became shattered by his own theory 
( pp. 112 f.). At least based on the modern strict definition of Darwinism, progress is not 
at all an essential aspect of that theory. Bowler similarly argued that “Darwinism does not 
really guarantee progress or at least makes it very difficult to define.”1153 Particularly gene-
Darwinism is clearly opposed to any progressive interpretation of evolution.1154 Also Gould 
adequately stressed that from the viewpoint of Darwinism, understood as the negation of 
innate progression and as adaptation only to present and local environments “we are 
glorious accidents of an unpredictable process with no drive to complexity.”1155 
In the section which directly follows I propose to regard regarding Darwinism, 
defined in the strict way that I previously elaborated, as one extreme of a spectrum of 
approaches. In the subsequent sub-sections different aspects of this definition will be 
clarified and discussed separately in detail. In addition to our earlier discussion of pan-
adaptationism and pan-selectionism this will lead to a critical evaluation of the 
universality of Darwinian processes. 
b) A Spectrum between Darwinism and Lamarckism 
Darwinism has, sometimes been understood only negatively by the absence of a strict-
ly Lamarckian type of evolution. If one accepts such a negative definition, Darwinism 
seems to gain strength because of the weakness of radical Lamarckism. All middle 
positions then would simply count in favour of Darwinism, which would then wrong-
ly mostly still be associated with the implications of Darwinism in the strict sense.  
For another reason such a negative definition of Darwinism via Lamarckism is 
problematic. The term ‘Lamarckism’ leads to a preoccupation with Lamarck’s 
                                                     
1148 This appears to resemble Campbell’s terminology, but in the second aspect voluntarily differs 
from his formulation. 
1149 R. C. Lewontin, Gene, Organism, Environment (1983), pp. 273 f. 
1150 E.g., E. O. Wilson, On Human Nature (1978/1995), p. 1. 
1151 E. Mayr, Animal Species and Evolution (1963), pp. 1-2. 
1152 R. Richards, The Meaning of Evolution (1992), pp. 89-90. 
1153 P. J. Bowler, Evolution (1984), p. 310 (refering to Simpson and other authors), cf. pp. 315-316. 
1154 G. C. Williams, Adaptation and Natural Selection (1966), pp. 4, 34, 22 f., 34 f., 42 f, 47 etc. 
1155 S. J. Gould, Full House (1996), p. 216, quoted in M. Ruse, The Mystery of Mysteries (1999), pp. 146. 
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alternative theory of aquired characters only, which, in regard to biology – with some 
reservations – has to count as having been refuted ( pp. 311 f.). In regard to the 
blindness of evolution Lamarckism might still represent an extreme antithesis to 
Darwinism although only less radical theories may appear possible today. Darwinism, 
however, was also opposed by different theories. Lamarck’s original theory 
( also pp. 90 f.) even resembles Darwinism in understanding evolution as a process 
of adaptation to an externally given environment. Lamarckism stressed that organisms 
“take their fate into their own hands”1156 only in respect of the directedness of trials. 
Nevertheless, Lamarckism was originally an essentially adaptationist approach. But 
Darwinism has not only been criticised for the concept of the blindness of trials, but 
also for being – like Lamarckism – a theory which stresses adaptation to an external 
environment. Pre-Darwinian and post-Darwinian idealists or romantic biologists, until 
today, have stressed the internally directed unfolding of forms ( also pp. 95 f., 
156 f.). Also today’s criticism of adaptationism, in my view, still partly follows – albeit 
often only implicitly – in this wake. Other critics of adaptationism stress that chance 
processes, like drift and neutral mutations, not directly controlled by any survival 
value, play an important role in evolution. Another kind of criticism of Darwinian 
adaptationism – although closely resembling a Darwinian argumentation – is found in 
my proposal that self-referential systems of selection, could acquire some autonomy 
from adaptation to an external environment ( pp. 291 f., 394 f.). In any case, 
Lamarckism, if used as an antithesis to Darwinism conceals the fact that criticism of 
Darwinism is not confined to Lamarckism in its narrow sense, but itself even 
sometimes differs considerably from Lamarckism. 
However, I am not aware of a more appropriate notion designating all approaches 
to evolution that are less blind, but more directed and internally governed. 
Presumably, it would be correct to use the purely negative term ‘non-Darwinism’. In 
the headline of this section I have kept the misunderstandable, but well known, 
positive term ‘Lamarckism’ which is meant here in its broad sense. The broad usage is 
actually found in the later nineteenth century, where ‘Lamarckism’ often referred 
generally to theories which advocated a less blind and more progressive evolution, 
orthogenesis and inner trends included.1157 Although Lamarckism in the narrow sense 
has been confined to the inheritance of acquired characteristics, it has only been one 
aspect of these non-Darwinian or anti-Darwinian approaches. Lamarckians in a broad 
sense generally favoured a more directed and internally governed form of evolution 
than Darwinism, and in principle do not need to be considered Lamarckians in the 
strict sense at all. However, one may choose a different term that would be less easily 
misunderstood to cover the different non-Darwinian theories. Here I am mainly 
concerned with developing the concept that Darwinism in our strict definition should 
be understood as one extreme of a spectrum of theories. 
                                                     
1156 D. J. Depew, B. Weber, Darwinism Evolving (1995), p. 45. 
1157 Cf. e.g., P. J. Bowler, Charles Darwin (1990), p. 21; The Non-Darwinian Revolution (1988), 
pp. 99-103. (Bowler himself, as already the title of the latter book indicates, prefers to use 
Lamarckism in the narrow sense.)  
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From a Darwinian starting point, it appears reasonable to define a non-Darwinian 
antithesis with regard to the two components of the above definition of Darwinism, 
i.e. blind variation and external selection. This does not result in only one spectrum, 
but in two spectra or rather one spectrum with two dimensions.1158 One dimension 
reaches from blindness to the directedness of trials, the other reaches from stress on 
increasing fit with an external envir-
onment to stress on internal, for 
example developmental, dynamics 
(Figure 11).  
The first dimension contrasts 
blindness versus directedness. 
Darwinism, in the above sense, is 
characterised by the blindness of 
trials, which – if linked to adap-
tationism – requires a wasteful 
abundance of trials if they were to 
lead to adaptation ( pp. 354 f.). 
Strict Lamarckism in the narrow sense – 
which is also an adaptive process – 
would compose the other extreme 
only on this dimension (upper left 
corner of the figure), since for each 
evolutionary step only one trial is 
needed, because it is directly infor-
med by the environment. 
Approaches which neither support strictly blind trials nor direct informedness by the 
environment could be more appropriately located somewhere in between these radical 
poles. Likewise, approaches, of course, which concede a role to both aspects would be 
located between theses poles. Darwin himself was partly Lamarckian ( pp. 106 f.), 
and neo-Lamarckians came to accept Darwinian concepts. But although strict 
Lamarckism – in regard to biology – has to be taken as having been largely refuted, an 
approach which showed that variation is itself adapted and could be more or less 
blind (without upholding Lamarckian omniscience) would also be in contradiction to 
strict Darwinism as defined by our above understanding. Furthermore, a theory would 
differ from strict Darwinism, if it stressed that processes which themselves may be 
described in a Darwinian way could lead on another level of synergetic wholes, which 
are less blind.  
I shall argue below, that even in the biological stratum – although they are more 
obvious in the cultural stratum – mechanisms can gain a certain ‘sight’. In this sense 
none of the radical positions, be it Darwinism or Lamarckism, appears to me to be 
true. I do not want to deny the role of chance. Blindness and wastefulness play an 
important role in evolution. (Even authors like Aristotle admitted the existence of 
                                                     
1158 This should not imply that these dimensions in regard of a particular theory were completely 
independent. 
Figure 11: Visualisation of the two-dimensional 
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chance.1159) But in a certain sense I dare to argue that even in the field of biology the 
blindness of processes can be reduced. This becomes even more apparent with 
respect to culture. Universal Darwinism is wrong to stress the unchangeability of 
blindness and wastefulness. I shall propose that it appears possible and appropriate to 
reinterpret the given evolutionary facts in such a way, that variation is neither 
omniscient nor necessarily completely blind. 
 
The second dimension in Figure 11 represents approaches to evolution which understand 
evolution as an adaptation to an external environment in contrast to those which 
stress an internal unfolding. In short a contrast between externalism and internalism. 
The externalism of Darwinism becomes apparent by the very word selection – a 
selector being normally regarded to be external to the entity which becomes selected. 
The whole Darwinian stress on adaptation to a certain environment is linked to this 
externalism ( pp. 339 f., 350 f). A. N. Severtsov, who himself was an influential 
Russian Darwinian, places Darwinism together with Lamarckism on the side of 
external causes, ectogenesis, and opposes them to autogenesis.1160 Also Mayr contrasts 
Darwinism with theories advocating changes from intrinsic forces.1151 This 
dimension corresponds to the traditional alternative of whether the evolving entity is 
regarded as the subject or the object of evolution.1161  
I have argued above and I shall argue in the further course of this chapter that 
internal dynamics not only constrains evolution, but that inner dynamics can gain 
some autonomy from external selection ( pp. 291 f., 339 f., 394 f.). 
In the following sections I shall neither advocate strict Lamarckism nor strict 
internal developmentalism, but shall oppose the universality and unchangeability of 
the Darwinian blind, wasteful and externally imposed mechanism of evolution. The 
position I want to contribute to appears to be located somewhere in the middle of the 
two dimensions shown in Figure 11. Although this would be the best approximation 
for localising my position, it would still misrepresent it, since I argue that the process 
itself evolves and hence its properties vary along both mentioned dimensions 
according to the focused evolutionary line. I am even inclined to argue that there may 
be an overall tendency away from blind externally governed evolution towards seeing 
internally governed evolution, but this lies beyond the scope of this work. Since actual 
evolutionary processes will never be ‘omnicient’ there will always be cases where the 
process itself becomes less seeing. A different interpretation of the understanding of 
evolution favoured here would stress the full openness of evolution in regard to 
processes also. This is equally consistent with my argumentation put forward in this 
work. Here I more generally argue that the Darwinian stress on universality, 
unchangeable blindness and externality of evolution is misconceived. 
 
                                                     
1159 Aristotle. Physics, II, VI, p. 197 b, but see also p. 198 a. 
1160 M. B. Adams, Severtsov and Schmalhausen. In: E. Mayr, W. Provine, The Evolutionary Synthesis (1980), 
pp. 193 f. 
1161 Cf.: K. Bayertz, Autonomie und Biologie (1993), p. 346. M. Weingarten, Organismen – Objekte oder 
Subjekte der Evolution? (1993). 
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Although I am concerned with universal process-Darwinism in general – also at the 
cultural level –, I confine myself in the following discussion mainly to biological 
Darwinism, which is the paradigm case for Darwinian evolution. Instead of trying to 
build another protective dike in the cultural sciences against the rising Darwinian 
flood,1162 I mainly try to tackle this flood at source.  
In the remaining sections, it is, of course, not possible to provide a full genealogy 
of evolutionary processes. Instead the inappropriateness of universal process 
Darwinism will be shown and some alternative proposals which may contribute 
towards a more evolutionary theory of evolution are made. 
9.3 Toward Radical Evolutionism –  
The Evolution of Evolutionary Mechanisms 
Subsequently I shall show more systematically that, if we apply the above definition of 
a Darwinian process to existing processes, it becomes doubtful that evolution on all 
its different explanatory levels could appropriately be described by a Darwinian 
process alone.1163 
It will be argued that even in the biotic stratum it becomes necessary to accept at 
least limited evolution of evolutionary mechanisms. Early critics of Darwinism, from 
scientists to theologians, although wrong in many respects, may have, to some extent, 
been right in their critical stance towards what Herschel, astronomer and predominant 
philosopher of science in Darwin’s times, called the “higgledy-piggledy” mechanism 
of natural selection. A Darwinian process, in the strict sense set out above of course 
can lead to some adaptation. (Logically it is presumably the simplest process which 
does this.) We have seen that the concept of a simple replicator even entails the 
concept of a chance process of natural selection. This may be accepted as a starting 
point, but I argue that evolutionary processes come into play which are less wasteful 
and externally governed in the same way that I have argued that single genes become 
organised and unified into more complex systems of organisation, which have their 
own synergetic properties. More complex entities, on some explanatory level, may also 
involve the existence of more complex and less blind and externally governed 
evolutionary mechanisms. Although I, of course, do not deny the millions of years of 
evolution, I agree with the old criticism that if blind-variation-and-external-selection 
had remained the exclusive mechanism of evolution, the velocity of biotic evolution and 
then, even more so, of cultural evolution could not be properly explained. 
Based on our strict non-tautological definition of natural selection, the pointed 
proposition of G. C. Williams that “the laws of physical science plus natural selection 
can furnish a complete explanation for any biological phenomenon”1164 will be 
challenged. Such views, which are also claimed to include the cultural sphere as well 
( pp. 209 f.), still mirror aspects of a Newtonian-Platonic Weltanschauung, although 
Darwinism has forcefully undermined other aspects of these philosophies. As far as 
                                                     
1162 Described by: D. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995), pp. 64 f. 
1163 Cf. also the results of section 9.1 on pan-adaptationism and pan-selectionism,  pp. 336 f. 
1164 G. C. Williams, Adaptation and Natural Selection (1966), pp. 6-7. 
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Darwinism is concerned, there still is only one type of process of evolution, natural 
selection, which is regarded to be externally and eternally given, although physics too 
has started to stress the unfolding of the universe as well as of its inner forces and 
laws ( also pp. 168 f.). Although drawing strongly upon Darwinism myself, I think 
the time has come to transcend the Newtonian-Platonic static understanding of 
process, particularly because its only concern with the very simplest process of 
evolution one can think of, and to transform our evolutionary theories in a way in 
which they become coherent with a more truly evolutionary world-view. 
In the following sections, based on the definition of a Darwinian process above, 
I start from within the Darwinian paradigm. Firstly the phenomenon of diversification 
is contrasted with the phenomenon of synthesis. Secondly, blind variation is 
contrasted with directed variation – at least on certain levels of explanation. Thirdly, 
the concept of hetero-selection, characteristic for Darwinian adaptationism, is 
contrasted to the phenomena of auto-selection, which may lead to a certain amount of 
autonomy. Finally, Kant’s concept of self-referentiality is discussed as a possible 
criterion for the autonomy of processes.  
a) Synthesis versus Pure Diversification of Information –  
Discussion of the First Criterion for a Darwinian Process 
A Darwinian process ‘is signified by the diversification or variation of informational 
lines.’ This is one defining aspect of our strict definition of a Darwinian process, given 
above. The conceptual core of Darwinism only predicts the diversification of 
evolutionary lines, not their synthesis (cf. Figure 12). This is associated with the 
picture of a branching and diversifying evolutionary tree. In order to differentiate 
strictly between Darwinian aspects of evolution and non-Darwinian ones, we apply 
this widely accepted aspect of definition in a strict way. This may be considered 
unusual, because one is usually concerned with finding explanations rather than 
answering meticulous questions of delineation involved in differentiating different 
evolutionary paradigms. Another reason for the neglect of this topic is that, perhaps, 
the beauty of unified pan-Darwinism has rendered a less strict application – leading to 
fewer problems – more suitable.  
In respect to physical processes we can exclude some processes from classified as 
Darwinian due to this aspect of the definition. Planets, for example, – like drops of 
water ( p. 351) –  may in fact be said to have a probability curve indicating where 
the mass concentrations will unify in order to form a larger planet, depending on the 
general density concentrations of interstellar mass. This physical process resembles a 
Darwinian process in regard to the existence of the necessary variation of the starting 
points and different ‘trials’ of unification. Moreover, one may also, perhaps, speak of 
external conditions for the emergence and further accumulation of mass 
concentrations. However, this process differs from a Darwinian process particularly in 
the sense that the ‘evolutionary lines’ (mass concentrations) do not diverge, but rather 
converge. Instead of a multiplication of such lines, one could more reasonably speak 
of a synthesis of different mass concentrations: different concentrations of interstellar 
mass unite at the place of their gravitational centre. In this respect a process like this is 
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Figure 12: Visualisation of the diversification of informational lines, 
one criterion of a Darwinian process. 
 
diametrically opposed to a Darwinian process, whose emphasis is on the 
diversification of evolutionary lines (and elimination of those which are less adapted 




Despite the claims of universal Darwinism, cultural evolution cannot, I think, in regard 
to the criterion discussed in this section, be described by exclusively 
Darwinian processes.  
 
As biological-cultural integral wholes, humans can obviously acquire some experiences 
and transfer them to other humans. On such a level of explanation, evolution, if 
including culture, is in part radically Lamarckian, since acquired knowledge could be 
transferred to offspring, and, of course, also even to unrelated organisms. 
But promoters of process-Darwinism ( p. 216) – which in its consequences is 
less radical, compared with gene-Darwinism – do not normally take the perspective of 
human biological-cultural wholes. They hold that thoughts, theories and cultural 
habits, what I have called ‘logoi’ ( p. 57), gain a life on their own, which has to be 
dealt with separately. According to process-Darwinism these entities are competing 
with each other and their evolution is to be described by Darwinian processes.  
I also support the view that logoi have to some extent a life of their own. But, this 
in my view does not have to entail the belief that the biological-cultural human as a 
whole does not exist and can not provide proper unit of investigation. The interaction 
of these two independently existing levels is crucial for both. Hence, the perspective 
on the biological-cultural whole of a human is both possible and suitable. But within 
this perspective one has to acknowledge the strictly Lamarckian aspects of culture. 
Furthermore, even if one accepted that one always – not only for specific reasonable 
purposes – has to disentangle biological and cultural levels, cultural knowledge itself is 
A Darwinian Process A Non-Darwinian Process 
t 
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not adequately describable by Darwinian processes alone.1165 Here the criterion for 
differentiation versus synthesis is focused – whereas other equally problematic criteria, 
such as the blindness of trials, are left aside. If one traces some units of cultural 
development, for example concepts or symbols, throughout intellectual history (the 
daily bread of any historian of thought) it appears that diversification, which obviously 
plays a vital role, is balanced by the synthesis of different meanings.1166 Especially in a 
connectionist understanding of the cortical functions of the brain it becomes plausible 
that representations of different concepts are not independent from each other, but 
influence each other and even may melt into each other. 
Likewise, theories and schools of thought diversify and compete with one another, 
but they may also influence and improve each other, and may even melt and develop a 
common synthesis. The most important intellectual triumphs appear to be the 
syntheses of views which were previously regarded as being opposed to one another – 
Mendelian genetics and Darwin’s original theory provide an example of such a 
synthesis.1167  
Furthermore different cultures are also strongly interwoven. One may, for 
instance, think of the fact that the occidental philosophical heritage of Greek 
Antiquity was preserved and partly developed by philosophers of the Arab world. 
Hence, it appears to me that on all levels of cultural evolution diversification is 
complemented by synthesis. 
 
Similarly in biological evolution Darwinism has stressed the diversification of evolutionary 
lines and their differential survival. The only diagram in Darwin’s Origin illustrates the 
branching character of the tree of descent, without any synthesis.1168 This concept 
appears to be valid at least in respect to the level of species. This is almost true by 
definition, because today species are normally defined by the absence of any 
interbreeding. However, in 1994 S. Bartl, D. Baltimore and I. Weissman have 
influentially argued that through viral infection genes appear to be transmitted 
between what are normally regarded as species.1169 One may also argue that what I 
have called ‘external memory’, in a way involves a synthesis of common effects of 
different organisms ( pp. 326 f.).  
But one does not need to trouble oneself with such, perhaps, rather specific or 
peculiar points, since the obvious process of biological sexuality involves the unification 
of organismic informational lines. It may appear senseless to criticise Darwinism 
                                                     
1165 Cf. generally: D. Holdcroft, H. Lewis, Memes, Minds and Evolution (2000). 
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Nature of Knowledge (1994), pp. 220 f. 
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1168 Ch. Darwin, Origin of Species (1859/1868), pp. 160-161. 
1169 Cf. also: E. J. Steele, R. A. Lindley, R. V. Blanden, Lamarck’s Signature (1998), pp. 168 f. 
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based on a process of which all Darwinians have been aware and which has even been 
at the very core of the evolutionary synthesis (itself at least largely Darwinian). But 
generally, it is not impossible to use aspects of a theory against itself. In this way 
Darwinism incorporated previously-opposed Mendelism. If we take my (non-
idiosyncratic) definition of a Darwinian process seriously, it turns out that the 
synthetic aspect of sexuality is not Darwinian at all. Diversification, opposed to 
synthesis, is anyhow normally regarded as an essential aspect of Darwinism,1170 but 
even if this were not the case we set out to find a particularly strict definition of a 
specifically Darwinian process. Although sexuality also serves the proliferation of 
varying descendants – being perfectly compatible with Darwinian views –, the 
synthetic process equally involved here is itself not a predicted or essential part of 
Darwinism. Dawkins is in my view right about Darwinism in general, when he argues 
that, fundamentally, “all that we have a right to expect from our theory is a 
battleground of replicators”.1171 If one does more than to pay lip service to the 
definition above, the replicational and variational aspect of sexuality at once becomes 
Darwinian and the role of synthesis entangled with these forms of variation is no 
longer describable as a Darwinian process. 
A true entity reductionist would object that biological sexuality is not a true 
synthesis in any case, and hence no truly new mechanism has come into being. Genes 
– as we have known since Mendel – do not blend. In regard to single genetic elements 
this is correct, they are genotypically not themselves altered in a physical way during 
sexuality. If one were only to focus on single genes, there would be no true syntheses 
– although one may object in this case that the genetic context, as we have seen, also 
changes the interpretation of single genes (cf: epistasis). But I have argued previously at 
detail that in my view it is not adequate to regard single genes only as units of 
evolution ( pp. 264 f.). In a more holistic interpretation organisms that sexually 
reproduce are biologically a synthesis of the different genomes of their parents (and 
their current environmental conditions). In that synthesis genes have a certain, slightly 
changed phenotypic expression. (If the new whole did not somewhat influence the 
interpretation of the parts, the genic features from the mother and the father would 
not normally fit together.) Only if the synthesis is harmonious enough, will the 
resulting organism have the chance to reproduce. The variation aspect, the 
reproduction aspect, and the survival aspect of sexual reproduction are easily linked to 
Darwinism. But the aspect of synthesis itself, is, as mentioned above, not itself part of 
a Darwinian process.  
The specific aspect of synthesis in sexual reproduction is, if we keep the above 
strict definition of a Darwinian process in mind, not only thoroughly opposed to a 
Darwinian process, but may also be linked with non-Darwinian consequences. The 
trials in sexual reproduction could be said to be less blind than mutations. Although it 
is possible that the genes of the parent generation do not harmonise with each other, 
they are, one may say, pre-selected. In a roughly similar genetic context the genes were 
tried out during the life of the parents and many other combinations will have been 
                                                     
1170  pp. 102, 358 f., also footnote 1173. 
1171 R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (1989), p. 256. 
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‘tested’ before in the population. Although proponents of the evolutionary synthesis 
may have expressed this fact differently, the apparent differences to mutations, led 
them to regard recombination as an evolutionary factor in its own right ( pp. 130 f., 
378 f.). Moreover, the evolutionary line is now broader than one organism, and rather 
becomes an evolutionary river of one basic population or gene-pool into which all 
changes are flowing back.597 If combinations of advantageous mutations are a 
limiting factor and populations are large enough, a population with synthesis (as part 
of sexuality) will on average find advantageous combinations of mutant genes faster 
than asexual populations can.1172 Based on synthesis new forms of inner organisation 
also become possible, for example some mechanisms which I shall later call ‘auto-
selection’, which in regard of a system as a whole not necessarily lead to an adaptation 
to an externally given environment. 
If one accepts explanatory levels higher than that of single genes, sexuality does 
not only involve proliferation but also, in a rather non-Darwinian way, synthesis. This 
also leads to the situation in which populations are not necessarily closed entities, but 
on some level of description may also melt their best – or worst – features. 
b) Directed Variation versus Blind Variation – Discussion of the Second Criterion 
‘The variation of the informational line is completely blind’. This is the next criterion 
of our strict definition of a Darwinian process. It is a criterion that is largely accepted. 
A Darwinian process is normally regarded as being composed of the two steps of 
variation and selection371, the first of which – which is scrutinised here – is regarded 
as being completely blind or random.1173  
Campbell has pointed out that the word ‘blind’ should be preferred to the more 
usual ‘random’, because equiprobability is not needed – and is actually often not given. 
But the criterion of blindness nevertheless requires that variations are produced 
without prior knowledge of how adaptive they will probably turn out to be. Moreover, 
their occurrence is assumed to be independent of environmental conditions. No trial 
should be more likely than another one to be correct, and later trials should not make 
use of the direction of the previous ones.1174 Thus Campbell has described a 
                                                     
1172 D. J. Futuyma, Evolutionsbiologie (1990/86), pp. 317 f. (referring partly to J. F. Crow, M. Kimura, 
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1173 D. T. Campbell, Evolutionary Epistemology (1994), pp. 421-422. R. Dawkins, The Extended Phenotype 
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Darwinian process generally as a process of “blind-variation-and-selective-
retention”.864 
To define Darwinism in such a way contrasts Darwinism with more directed and 
predictable approaches to evolution.1175 It is assumed that variation does not ‘see’ 
what will be positive for the survival of the entity in question; in this sense Dawkins 
uses the phrase the ‘blind watchmaker’.1176 If a Darwinian process were to guarantee 
adaptation, the blindness of variation would require an abundance and wastefulness of 
trials ( e. g. pp. 355 f.).  
Universal Darwinism ( pp. 205 f.) claims that Darwinian processes are the only 
relevant evolutionary processes. In its more moderate version of process Darwinism 
( pp. 216 f.), which accepts cultural entities, this blindness should equally hold for 
different types of biological variation like, for instance, psychological variation or the 
variation of theories. In this section I mainly focus on the discussion of variation in 
the biotic sphere. 
I think it is disputable to rest the burden of proof one-sidedly on the view that there is 
directed variation. Despite my objections to pan-adaptationism ( pp. 339 f.), Darwinians 
(as Lamarckians and other adaptationists) no doubt have shown that adaptation plays an 
important role in evolution, and it is hence implausible to assume that adaptation plays no 
role in improving the trials of evolutionary mechanisms themselves. 
An often repeated general argument for the implausibility of an unchanged blindness 
of evolutionary processes has been that the limited time span to produce the multitude 
of different complex organisms. Historically the period of time for evolution was 
estimated incorrectly as being much shorter as we know it to be today. This point was 
used to render Darwinism absurd (e. g.  Lord Kelvin). None the less, this argument 
may appear to contain a core of truth, particularly if unchangeable blindness is taken 
in a strict sense, and likewise if the present estimations of the time of the origin of life 
are taken as a basis for it. 
The following argument follows an early, but in principle still applicable, calculation of G. 
G. Simpson which has been re-interpreted by some critics of Darwinism as showing the 
implausibility of a strict blindness of trials. Simpson assumes, strongly simplifying, a general 
mutation rate of 0.000 01. (Simpson makes some additional assumptions which slightly 
change the outcome of the calculation but are not important for the line of argument.) The 
probability for only five simultaneous mutations in five specific genes according to 
Simpson’s calculations is not larger than 0.000 000 000 000 000 000 000 1. Such an event in 
100 million individuals with a generation period of only one day will on average take place 
every 274 billion years. But according to the present scientific estimations the first organic 
life arose about 3 or 4 billion years ago. Hence, given the complete unchangeable blindness 
of this process, it appears very improbable that such an event (in regard of certain specified 
genes) will have taken place only once in a species of the above parameters.1177  
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One may object that evolution has found natural ways in which mutations have an 
enhanced probability of being phenotypically expressed together. The fact that many 
mutations for a time remain silent if they are part of long undecoded strands of DNA 
(introns) allows variation to spread by drift also, if the mutations would not be advantageous 
outside a certain combination (when they would be transcribed). The mutations which have 
not appeared at the same time, but successively, by a, as we shall see, relatively frequent 
mutation of switching on a certain peace of genetic code, causally appear together. 
Moreover, sexuality and recombination in particular leads, as mentioned, to a quicker 
evolution by combining (earlier tested) mutations from different organisms with one another 
( e. g.: pp. 336 f.; 364 f., 378 f.).  
But such arguments need not to be taken as a defence of Darwinism. In contrast, they 
are close to the point I want to make. I am also looking for ‘natural’ evolutionary 
explanations. But if the tempo and mode of evolution has actually changed systematically, 
enabling a quicker adaptation, it may be possible to reinterpret this as a change in the 
evolutionary process itself, a change involving the production of variation which, perhaps, 
on some level may suitably be said to have become less blind. 
Here the orthodox neo-Darwinian view is challenged that evolution was and is 
unchangeably blind. Since I shall not advocate something like radical biological 
Lamarckism, this criticism is based on the assumption that there are not just two poles 
in the theoretical debate, but a whole spectrum of approaches on the dimension of 
blindness versus directedness of variation ( pp. 358 f.). 
The trial aspect of Darwinism has been discussed before in the section on the 
tautological basis of pan-selectionism ( pp. 350 f.). In it I have already elaborated 
the possibility of developmentally constrained variance ( p. 353) and of a lacking 
abundance of variance. This is also inconsistent with Darwinism, but rather on the 
other dimension of our definition of our two-dimensional spectrum of Darwinism 
and non-Darwinism ( p. 355, pp. 359 f.). Here we are more concerned with the 
possibility of adaptively directed variation which has been mentioned as well. I am 
concerned with a re-interpretation of given evolutionary and genetic mechanisms in a 
way that some adapted mechanisms, may systematically produce trials with a higher 
probability of leading to survival. Instead of the fitness of the organism, a certain 
variation producing mechanism could in my view be fit as well, and  enhance the pro-
bability of producing varying organisms with comparatively good chances to survive.  
Although most examples will be concerned with directed adaptive variation, the aspect of an 
adaptation to an external environment and the inner dynamics is here particularly difficult to 
disentangle, because they often go in the same direction. However, we are here concerned 
with the aspect of blindness and this blindness is in my view by some mechanisms in any 
case apparently reduced. 
Since I am advocating a spectrum of approaches, an alternative to radical Darwinism 
does not necessarily entail a violation of the Weismann doctrine in the sense required 
for radical Lamarckism.1178 Nevertheless, I advocate that several evolutionary 
mechanisms have evolved which on some appropriate levels of explanation render the 
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average trials less blind. Whether this is logically possible is closely linked to our 
understanding of explanatory levels and particularly of change, newness and induction 
( pp. 371 f.). I do not challenge any commonly acknowledged empirical ‘facts’, but 
only their interpretation in Darwinian evolutionary biology. One may either regard the 
point I make as a daring interpretative shift or as an almost trivial plausible truth. My 
re-interpretation of long acknowledged facts is based on the strict definition of 
Darwinism given above ( pp. 358 f.) and the elaborated multi-level account of 
evolution ( pp. 264 f.). It draws strongly from findings from the rapidly developing 
field of microbiology ( generally pp. 147 f.). 
Firstly, it is discussed, whether trials should be regarded as being blind by 
definition, based on a certain understanding of newness. Secondly, different types of 
variation are distinguished, like mutation, genetic recombination and specification. 
This appears to follow from a multi-level account of evolution. Thirdly, we come to 
the main point in which it is shown that not all variation appears to be equally blind. 
Some processes producing evolutionary variation seem, themselves, to be adaptations 
leading to trials which, on average, have a higher fitness than they would have on the 
basis of pure chance. Although evolution may have started in a purely Darwinian way, 
it appears not always to have remained strictly blind. Fourthly, some cases will be 
mentioned where one may, perhaps, additionally speak of a particular kind of adapted 
variation as a direct response to an environment (without necessitating a violation of 
the Weismann barrier). 
(i) Not Blind by Definition 
It appears possible that biological or cultural knowledge is blind simply by definition, 
because evolutionary trials explore changed conditions and change might be defined 
as the totally unknown and something which cannot be seen in advance. This problem 
has been discussed above under the keyword of the problem of induction 
( pp. 210 f., also p. 354). Here I am not particularly interested in the direct transfer 
of information from the outer to the inner, since I do not promote radical 
Lamarckism. Instead I am concerned with the more original question, of whether 
knowledge could in principle have any predictive power, since the ‘reality’ to which 
knowledge refers – if knowledge is referential at all – may always have changed. 
I should also like to shortly examine the first question of a direct information transfer. To some 
extent I share the critical attitude of process-Darwinism towards inductivism as direct 
information transfer, even on the level of psychology and sociology. As equally held by 
constructivists and idealists knowledge is in my view at least in some respects based on an 
elaboration of prior existing (biological, psychological or social) knowledge. 
All the same, a radical blindness also in this sense and a radical denial of bottom-up 
processes appears to be one-sided. Psychologically we are for example apparently able to 
‘see’ things about which we had no particular hypothesis before. (Here seeing could equally 
be understood literary and figuratively for other ways of perception.) If such phenomena are 
conceded, obviously bottom-up processes take place, otherwise one would not be able to 
see, for example, an unexpected candle placed on the table.  
A process-Darwinist and any other anti-inductivist, may have two objections against this 
argument. Firstly, an anti-inductivist may claim that this openness to see an unexpected 
candle is a result of former (biological and cultural) trial-and-error learning. As a result, it is 
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absurdly claimed that one, in a way, has the permanent hypothesis that candles could be on 
the table. The ability of sight itself is regarded in the usual simplifying parlance to be a 
product of natural selection. Sight includes the ability to detect entities of roughly the size, 
density, wavelength etc. But even if this is conceded, nonetheless, our perceptive capacities 
have a remarkable openness to see objects, which did not exist earlier in evolutionary history 
or in our individual biography of learning. We may actually perceive something like a candle, 
even if we had not encountered a specific candle before (we ourselves and any of our 
predecessors). This apparent openness to new forms and combinations obviously transcends 
the earlier experiences we have made. In this sense inductivism seems to be right. 
Secondly, an anti-inductivist may object that there are still trial processes – possibly 
blind trial processes – on lower levels, fluctuations of attention, receptivity of our retina or 
our neural system. Such aspects, of course, exist, but the question is whether there are 
synthetic bottom-up aspects as well. On some level of explanation there are apparently 
bottom-up processes, for instance the causation of a nerve impulse is controlled by the light 
density on a certain area of the retina.  
Moreover, even if this were not so, it has been argued above that nested levels of blind 
Darwinian processes could be organised in a way which still allow for a broad openness on a 
higher level of explanation. In this interpretation the whole is not blind even if its parts are. 
The concept of synergetic properties on higher levels of explanation has previously been 
discussed in respect to processes, for example, in regard to biological specification 
( pp. 336 f.). Such an approach would, I think, not correspond to pan-Darwinism, but 
rather to a process-emergentist viewpoint, which nevertheless largely draws from the 
concept of processual Darwinian ‘atoms’. 
Hence, even if it would be correct to evaluate the inductivist aspect of a direct infor-
mation transfer critically in the two outlined ways, I hope to have shown that the inductivist 
equally makes a valid point. Hence also in the respect to information transfer, it appears 
plausible to me that neither inductivism nor non-inductivism are generally valid alone. 
The question which I am mainly interested in here, is the more original question of 
induction, concerned with the possibility of prediction, which is here applied in a 
biological context. Hume’s problem was that ‘all inferences from experience suppose, 
as their foundation, that the future will resemble the past’. It appears to me that some 
proponents of universal Darwinism base their claim of a universal blindness of trials 
on a supposed negative ‘solution’ to the problem of induction. They argue that pre-
diction, which compared with chance guesses has an enhanced probability of being 
right, is, strictly speaking, not possible at all.1179 This ‘solution’ has generally been 
critically discussed before in this work ( pp. 212 f.).  
With respect to biology it is often ignored that this problem would not only affect 
changes in an evolutionary line, like mutations, but also evolutionary stability. Actually 
any concept of fitness, any survival and identical replication of an organism would be 
affected by this problem! Argued the other way round, the very survival of organisms 
and their unchanged replicas proves already a certain stability of the (external) world. 
It is apparent that replication of formerly advantageous properties often brings an 
advantage for the future. If this were not the case not only would pan-adaptationism 
be wrong, but the concept of adaptation would be completely without any foundation. 
Whether this should be regarded as referring to a probabilistic logic of induction or 
rather to the factual advantage of such a heuristic, in any case the existence of a 
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minimal stability of the world, which Hume doubted, is supported on these grounds. 
On the other hand obviously fallibilism was right in stressing that old knowledge 
could always turn out to be wrong; induction never has, of course, the security of 
deduction ( also pp. 339 f.).  
Despite this parallel the question of the possible probabilistic advantageous use of 
old knowledge in regard to evolutionary change is more difficult. One can, I think, in 
this respect easily commit the fallacy of claiming blindness on tautological grounds 
only. If change is defined as the unknown and the unpredictable, then it is by 
definition true that no aspect of change can be predicted and that every trial to reach 
an understanding of this change is necessarily completely blind. But such a definition 
does not face what is actually controversial, rather it simply excludes any alternative 
view from being possible in our semantic framework. The very question is, whether 
change is actually completely unpredictable and whether old knowledge can help us in 
facing the changed world by reapplying the old in a changed way. Change, does not 
necessarily imply unpredictable change. There may be a certain stability in the first 
derivation of existence (in change) as in existence itself. There can be stability in the 
change of knowledge itself, which may systematically enhance the probability of a 
correspondence with the external world (relative to mere chance changes). This could 
firstly be the case if there are continuities in environmental change to which internal 
change has become adapted. Other possibilities are internal continuities of change, 
which are particularly advantageous when facing external change, because they do not 
need a continuous external dimension or direction of change. We may think of 
building blocks which have turned out to be particularly advantageous in quite 
different situations. A trial based on such building blocks and containing a higher 
probability than a chance process of producing a system which fits a changed 
environment, could not properly be said to be just as blind as chance guesses. On the 
view expounded here, the question of whether variation is completely blind or not is 
not a logical, but an empirical one. Are there adaptive continuities in biology and has 
evolution developed mechanisms which make use of possible internal or external 
adaptive continuities? 
Change still mostly contains an unpredictable component, even more than stability 
itself does. However, I shall argue in the following sections that evolutionary change 
does not always mean change to the totally unknown. Trials are never as certain as 
being completely externally informed or as deductions, but trials are neither blind by 
definition nor are they actually always blind. We could think of continuities of change, 
and we may think of changes which have a higher probability of being adaptive than 
blind chance trials. I shall argue, in a quite Darwinian way, that those evolutionary 
lines with a higher probability to produce trials which have an enhanced probability to 
lead to a higher fitness than mere chance trials, have themselves a higher chance of 
surviving. If one speaks of organisms with an increased probability of surviving, one 
may also speak of mechanisms which have an increased probability of leading to the 
survival of an evolutionary line (particularly since I have previously defended a multi-
level account of evolution). A certain amount of continuity in the changes of the 
organism-organism or the organisms-environment interaction, has – as we will see – 
been shown to be advantageous by evolution. Although a certain degree of blindness 
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always remains, the trials are not equally blind throughout. But this empirical question 
is the topic of the next sections. 
Humean scepticism and the Darwinian concept of blindness are, in my view, right 
in their fallibilism, which stresses that empirical knowledge, both biologically and 
culturally, could never reach absolute certainty. But even so I think the metaphysical 
dichotomy of blindness versus certainty conceals the possible degrees of sight and 
short-sightedness. Advanced internal model construction, which is still fallible, is not 
the same as simple blind trial-and-error learning. 
In this section I have argued that we cannot judge a priori that biological change is 
always equally blind, but that this has to be investigated empirically. Elsewhere I have 
provided a more thoroughly treatment of Hume’s fundamental problem 
of induction.1180 
In the broader cultural context, which as we have seen also seems to have 
influenced the evolutionary synthesis ( pp. 188 f.), I think H. Putnam is right: “The 
idea that correct ideas just come from the sky, while the methods for testing them are 
highly rigid and predetermined, is one of the worst legacies of the Vienna Circle.”1181 
(ii) Different Types of Variation 
Because Darwinian processes are characterised by the blindness of variation of an 
informational line, we should take a closer view at the phenomena described as vari-
ation, before we come to discuss whether empirically they always appear to be blind.  
Here variation means changes in an evolutionary line, and not in what one may call 
‘stable variation’. Stable variation refers to given unchanged distributions of genes as 
expressed in the Hardy-Weinberg equation. This does not mean that all continuities of 
change are excluded because, as set forth above, this resulted in claiming the blindness 
of trials in a tautological way. Yet stable variations, and not stabilities in change itself, 
correspond on the population level to an identical replication of genes on the level of 
genes or individuals and is part of the statics rather than the dynamics of evolution. 
We are hence concerned with any evolutionary change – opposed to identical 
reproduction – which still possibly includes continuities of change itself (preferred 
dimensions or directions of change). 
There are different types of such variation. The most prominent and basic class of 
evolutionary changes are mutations. There are simple point mutations (mutations of 
single base pairs), but also more complex mutations like inversions, translocations, 
frameshift mutations or mutations in which the whole genome is restructured.  
I shall argue that some particularly complex mutations may often make systematic use of 
structures evolved earlier and can often be said to be systematically less blind than 
mere chance. 
Alternatively, genetic cross-over and recombination do not lead to new sequences of 
base pairs at a certain locus, but only to new combinations of such base pairs. 
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Nevertheless, new combinations also have to be blind to count as being a 
Darwinian process.  
I have already indicated above that I regard these trials as less blind, because they are 
somewhat pre-selected. Although they lead to new combinations, they are tested beforehand 
in a similar context. Moreover, mate choice may enhance the probability of certain new 
combinations, even if the places where cross-overs happen were random. This is discussed 
in the next section.  
 
 
Figure 13: Simplified visualisation of types of variation of informational lines or their 
phenotypic expression. (Here we are only concerned with variation in the sense of 
evolutionary change.) In the diagram only one generation of reproductive entities (e. g. 
complex genes, organisms or species) is shown. The vertical dimension in each diagram is 
time. The horizontal dimension is something like genetic difference or, differently, distance in 
the morphospace. Although making some distinctions, naturally, this visualisation still makes 
simplifying assumptions. In regard to species it could, for example, be disputed if the 
genotypic variance were to emerge suddenly, which is indicated by the sharp edged corners 
of the trees. Also the emergence of new lines does not need to take place only when old lines 
have declined. 
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If multi-level Darwinism, which is defended above ( pp. 264 f., 152 f.), is to be 
taken seriously, specification also has to be regarded as a factor producing 
evolutionary variance in its own right.  
I have mentioned already that specification may not necessarily be blind. Besides the 
possibility of adaptive speciation rates, there may be a pre-selection on the level of 
individuals or sub-populations, so that specification, on the defended level of the species, 
may well not be totally blind. This has been discussed before ( pp. 336 f.) and we will also 
touch on this topic in the next section. 
In a truly multi-level account one may also think of other levels of variation, like the 
level of groups or the level of ecosystems. But for reasons of simplicity this is not 
elaborated in the following section. 
Tendencies in the process of group formation determine what genetic combinations will 
actually have newly been tested at the group level. There are presumably mechanisms with 
which a group is formed at least in ‘higher’ animals, which may systematically enhance the 
fitness of the group. If this were the case then variation would not be blind. I have 
discussed, for example, the very simple mechanism of the influence of a – perhaps partly 
inherited – average group size on the stability of certain genetic combinations which are 
advantageous to groups. One may well think of the possibility that the average group size 
itself is a product of group selection, which leads to a stabilisation of this group structure 
and favours group selection ( pp. 284 f.). In this case groups would vary in a way which is 
particularly adaptive for these groups and not blind in the most radical sense. 
Independent of the level at which variation takes place, evolutionary change can have 
different characteristics. We can distinguish, for instance, the average amount of 
variants, the average difference of the variants in relation to the reproducing entity, 
and the average specific direction of variation. In a diagram of different evolutionary 
trees these types of variation can be visualised (see Figure 13).  
These possible characteristics of variation are actually partly quantified by 
biological measures. The amount of variation of organisms or genes is usually gauged by 
their general or specific mutation rate as well as by their recombination rates. In 
regard to species the same is measured by the general speciation rate.1182 The average 
difference of variants and the direction of variation (column two and three) are normally not 
actually assessed, but they are in principle given by the distribution between how new 
genotypes or phenotypes differ from the old ones. 
With our distinctions between the different types of variation made, the stage is set 
to discuss whether it is reasonable to regard evolutionary variation as a result of blind 
chance. Firstly, I discuss whether aspects of the actual variation can be regarded as 
adaptations rather than as the direct results of blind chance (we are concerned with all 
three columns). Secondly, I briefly consider, whether some variations could possibly 
be interpreted as occurring systematically even as a particular reaction to certain 
environmental conditions. 
                                                     
1182 Indirectly also the individual birth, death rate and extinction rate play a role here. 
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(iii) Is There Adaptive Variation? 
There seem to be different classes of cases where one, using a fine grained 
terminology, wants to speak of particularly adaptive variation. We are interested in 
variation which is systematically less blind than the production of trials, exclusively 
based on chance, even if the central dogma of microbiology (in its most constrained 
sense) is not violated. I distinguish here between two types of adaptive variation. 
 
(1) In a multi-level account of evolution, which has been supported above ( pp. 152 
f., 264 f.), there may be interactions between different evolving levels which may 
render the variance on a certain level less blind. For example in speciation the variance 
on the species level of newly evolved species, may be directed by the earlier selection 
process on the level of individuals or sub-populations. Even if the variance at the 
individual level were completely blind, the species level, which we have argued exists 
as well, is not necessarily equally blind. One may argue that only blind processes count 
as true evolutionary processes, but this again makes the claim of blindness a mere 
tautology. If one accepts many evolutionary levels it may well be that selection 
processes can be arranged in such a way that blindness is reduced on a certain level of 
explanation, that may even provide the reason for why a particular multi-level 
arrangement has turned out to be evolutionarily more stable. Moreover, as argued 
before, synthetic aspects playing a role on the species level may reduce the blindness 
( p. 367). Previously I also discussed two sub-classes of interactions between 
selection processes, multi-level selection and nested selection, which may both lead to 
an adaptively directed variation ( p. 336 f.). However, in both sub-classes adaptive 
variation relies on a selection process at another level, without itself necessarily being 
blind. These forms of directed variation are flexible in their response to a certain 
environment. They do not need, like the next class, to assume a certain stability 
inherent in the evolutionary change itself. 
 
(2) Some dimensions or directions of change may on average be more advantageous 
than totally blind trials. In this section I argue that internal molecular structures and 
sometimes macroscopic morphology provides evidence that a repetition of already 
existing structures was often more advantageous than the production of completely 
new structures by single steps. There are preferred building blocks, dimensions of 
change and sometimes, perhaps, even directions of change, themselves partly the 
result of adaptation. A recycling of old structures, equal to that in the class above, 
both refers to a previous selection process and to the empirical fact that the use of 
these particular continuities often – but not always – has turned out to be more adaptive 
than mere chance combinations. If such arguments are admissible, then one can no 
longer claim blindness in a tautological way ( p. 371). I do not, of course, deny that 
most changes (particularly mutations) are still harmful,1183 but I think the building of a 
complex structure from scratch without ‘recycling’ pre-selected structures would 
normally require many more harmful steps. In this sense it is reasonable to speak of 
                                                     
1183 D. J. Futuyma. Evolutionsbiologie (1990/1990), pp. 69, 76. 
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comparatively less wasteful and more directed trials. Certainly, it is never certain 
whether a particular dimension or tendency of preferred change will not become 
disadvantageous, in the same way as that any adaptation may one day turn out to be 
no longer adaptive. In such a case a tendency may even constrain possible adaptation 
and in this sense adaptive tendencies – although being for a certain time less blind – 
will remain short sighted. In any case, the facts from microbiology, as we shall see, 
indicate that preferred dimensions and directions of change have played a role in 
evolution and can often be regarded as adaptations. Such tendencies have allowed for 
an often much quicker evolution than one would otherwise think possible, on the 
basis of totally blind mutations alone. Opposed to the class of directed adaptations, 
which were firstly dealt with, here a stable fitness increasing dimension or direction of 
change is needed. This is either due to external continuities or internal building blocks, 
which are particularly advantageous in many different contexts.  
It is not always easy to distinguish between these two classes, because in both 
cases some sort of pre-selection takes place and because these classes of a more 
directed variation are in principle applicable to most of the mentioned levels on which 
evolution can take place. 
Speciation, which is described at the species level, may be directed because of a 
pre-selection at the level of sub-populations (class 1). But one can also think of a 
regular and itself adapted speciation rate (class 2). It is actually known that different 
evolutionary lines have different speciation rates,1184 and it is possible – although the 
object of a vigorous debate – that speciation rates (or even more radically also 
specification directions) may themselves be the object of adaptation at the species 
level. One might, for example, explain the actual differences in the production of 
evolutionary change in generalists or specialists in such terms.1185 
I now clarify the two possible classes of directed variation in respect to genetic 
recombination of sexual reproduction and crossing-over.  
(a) Recombination is indeed largely random in the sense that alleles at a locus coming 
from both parents are normally mixed in a purely random way, so that both have an 
equal 50% probability of being included in a certain sperm or egg cell. This 
randomness is a key presumption of the Hardy-Weinberg equation, itself pivotal to 
population genetics. It has also been proposed that the adaptedness of sexual 
recombination would break down if its randomness were not secured.1186 
Nevertheless there are actually cases of so-called segregation distortion or meiotic 
drive which violate this random mixing and are, perhaps, best explained by selfish 
DNA.1187 However, I do not question that, apart from such exceptions, sexual 
reproduction in this respect is generally largely random. 
                                                     
1184 E.g., mentioned in: N. Eldredge, Reinventing Darwin (1995), p. 120. 
1185 Instead this is often explained exclusively by E. S. Vrba’s so called ‘effect hypothesis’. Ibid, p. 
139. 
1186 R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (1989, added chapters), pp. 264 f. Although Dawkins presumably 
also regards this aspect as gene-Darwinian, it appears to me that the benefit of the whole 
evolutionary line may equally be regarded to be the cause for the existence of the randomness. 
This refers back to the discussion of the levels of evolution  pp. 264 f.  
1187 R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (1989), pp. 235-37; The Extended Phenotype (1981/1989), pp. 133 f.  
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(b) Even so in an important and, I think, often neglected respect, the blindness of 
recombination is reduced. Here I am referring to the first class of directed adaptive variation 
above. Recombination only recombines genes which have previously existed at the 
same gene locus and survived. More radically mutations create new base pair 
sequences at a given locus. However, recombination, as argued above, is a kind of trial 
in combining genes. Interaction effects of new combinations are tested, which might 
have never been tested before. At least on the level of what I have called ‘higher-level 
genes’ ( pp. 267 f.) new genes are formed. Such trials still involve the risk that some 
gene combinations may prevent the building of a coherent organism. Nonetheless 
these trials only use material which has been tested before on another level. Thereby 
the risk involved in the new trials is reduced. Although recombination is limited in its 
range of which combinations could be achieved, recombination within this range is 
less blind than mutation. The positive results of the more daring mutations which 
took place in different single organisms using this less risky method are combined. In 
this sense, I think it would be wrong to neglect that the process of recombination, on 
the level of the whole evolutionary line, reduces the blindness of evolution 
(also p. 367). 
(c) Similarly in respect to the other class of possible directed adaptive variation, 
recombination seems not always to be necessarily blind.1188 Moreover, the strength at 
which the two groups of alleles are mixed, i. e. how many crossovers take place, is not 
random. There is a finite number of crossovers that take place, and there is a specific 
average number for each species (such ‘arm-chair’ arguments could be as conclusive 
as expensive laboratory work). Of course, it would be possible that this specific 
number of crossovers strongly varies inner-specifically and that its average is constant 
in all species. This is implausible, because the number of crossovers is a function of 
many properties of the reproductive system. Actually there are rates for different 
species as regards how many inter-allelic recombinations take place (recombination 
rate). Also any two specific gene loci have a recombination rate or recombination 
frequency indicating how many crossovers will usually take place between them1189. 
Moreover, there is no reason why an inherited specific number of cross-overs 
should not itself sometimes be the result of adaptations (sometimes it may, certainly, 
only be the result of drift or constraints etc.). If there is an inherited rate, it appears 
plausible that this rate is itself an object of adaptation. The recombination rate may 
either be due to differences in the distribution of genes on their chromosomal basis or 
to different probabilities of recombination at certain points. Both could be based on 
adaptation. The simple distance of genetic loci is definitely at least one determining 
factor in their recombination frequency. A large portion of the genome is constituted 
by so-called ‘introns’, which do not become decoded.1190 The length of an intron, 
whether evolved for this reason or for a different reason (being an adaptation or an 
exaptation1096), may give an advantage to particular adaptive distances. Advantageous 
                                                     
1188 I am not concerned with sexual selection here, also leading to an enhanced probability of certain 
combinations, possibly even of adaptive ones. 
1189 E.g., D. J. Futuyma, Evolutionsbiologie (1986/1990), p. 59. 
1190 Ibid, pp. 55, 57. 
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distances causing advantageous phenotypic recombination frequencies will enhance 
the probability of an evolutionary line to survive. The direct modification of a specific 
recombination frequency of two loci has even been experimentally shown. Chinnici 
has shown that the rate of crossovers of two gene loci pairs in drosophila melanogaster (as 
far as I know, without changes to the introns) can become selected.1191 Another 
phenomenon which supports an adapted (not blind) aspect of recombination is, for 
example, that crossovers are suppressed if an inversion took place where crossover 
would only lead to gametes with almost no probability of surviving1192. 
In the following, I shall mainly focus on particularly controversial question, 
whether it is plausible to speak of less blind variation in regard to mutations as well. 
Here it will not always be clear which particular level of evolution is involved. In 
regard to mutations one may make the distinction between the two classes of adaptive 
variation made above, but it is more suitable to structure the discussion along 
different lines. 
It will, firstly, be shown that the production of new patterns out of repeated 
genetic and microbiological patterns is more effective than production based on single 
chance mutations. Such microscopical repetitions will be shown to be found 
abundantly in surprisingly different parts of the body. Although this may partly refer 
to constrained evolution, such repetitions have apparently enabled very complex 
adaptations, which otherwise would not have been possible. A certain blindness 
remains, however, as it appears not only possible, but even necessary to distinguish 
between different degrees of blindness and of changed velocity of evolution. 
Secondly, I shall discuss reduced blindness based on preferred macroscopic 
dimensions of change or on the repetition of morphological structures (compared 
with mere chance structures). The advantage of such preferred macroscopic 
dimensions of change may either lie in the (external) relevance of a particular 
dimension of change over a long period of time or in the (internal) advantage of 
certain macroscopic building blocks, like repeated segments (compared, as in the case 
of the above repetitions, to chance building blocks). 
If these two points can be shown, it would follow that even if one accepts the cen-
tral dogma of microbiology (in a restricted sense) it is nevertheless still necessary, also 
in regard of mutations, to distinguish between different degrees of blindness or sight.  
 
(3) The adaptive role of genetic continuities in evolutionary change. Some internal continuities of 
change may be said to be themselves adaptive. Here I discuss mutation rates at 
specific loci, the general interpretation of any mutation in terms of the genetic code, 
the overwhelming role of iterations in adaptive sequences and the role of transposable 
elements. These phenomena, I argue, strongly suggest that evolutionary trials could 
reasonably be said to be not always totally blind.  
(a) Mutation rates1193 of genetic loci may also enhance the fitness of an evolutionary 
line. For certain point mutations a low rate may cause less harm. A higher rate may be 
                                                     
1191 J. P. Chinnici, Modification of Recombination Frequency in Drosophila (1971). 
1192 D. J. Futuyma, Evolutionsbiologie (1986/1990), p. 71. 
1193 See e.g., R. Fahrig (Ed.), Mutationsforschung und genetische Toxikologie (1993).  
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advantageous if the phenotypic dimension controlled by this gene has played an 
important changing role in evolution. A relatively high mutation rate – also in the 
sense of a predetermined break point – may cause larger mutations (transpositions, 
duplications etc.). The role of resulting repetitions is discussed below ( pp. 382 f.).  
A precondition for regarding mutations as being adaptive is that mutation rates are 
inherited and can themselves be modified. Advances in genetics have shown that 
mutation rates do not simply fall from the sky, but are at least partly caused by the 
inherited and modifiable structure of the reproductive system. There are also 
systematic causes which can change the mutation rates of certain types of mutations, 
like specific chemicals or other genes (mutator genes). Mutator genes, playing a role in 
regulating replication, may for instance enhance the probability of a certain direction 
of base pair mutations in the whole organism.1194 The mutation rate of single loci can 
also be modified by transposable elements, as elaborated further down ( pp. 384 f.).  
If there are predispositions to certain mutations, provoked by genes or chemicals, 
and if there are certain trials, which are systematically more advantageous than others 
(as I argue below), then it is plausible to assume that those rates become inherited 
more often. If a species or a certain gene of a species has a particular average number 
of variants (column one of Figure 13), or an average amount of change (column two), 
those species will flourish which produce such variations. Then mutations, like other 
evolutionary processes should (partly) be understood as having an enhanced fitness. 
Without advocating pan-adaptationism, the process of evolution itself, as I have em-
phasised in this work, is also object to evolution as well as partly object to adaptation. 
(b) Genetic code. Before discussing the phenomenon of repetition, I briefly want to 
treat the general and seemingly trivial phenomenon of the genetic code. Even if the 
mutation rate in question is not internally advantageous or externally adaptive, the 
genetic code, I think, already renders any mutation less blind than one would 
otherwise conceive.  
At the lowest level of this code, only the four base pairs, the four letter alphabet of 
the nucleotides, is used. Theoretically, one may well think of mutations which do not 
use this code. But actually the code is universal (neglecting some minor differences in 
the code of mitochondria) and, likewise, mutations are almost always expressed in this 
code. More deviant changes do seldom take place and are largely excluded by repair 
mechanisms. One may argue that this inner dynamic is constraining evolution and 
preventing the evolution of a fundamentally new code. This would also be 
problematic to universal Darwinism. However, the nucleotide code is widely regarded 
as having particularly positive properties for information transfer. Hence the exclusion 
of other trials from the outset can, at least partly, be interpreted in an equally 
problematic way for Darwinism as for adaptive directedness and the reduction of 
evolutionary blindness. 
The next level of the genetic code organises the four letters into three-letter 
syllables: triplets. These so-called codons are the blueprints for the basic amino acids. 
There are 43 = 64 possible triplets. But not all combinatorial variations are used. The 
calculation already presumes a unified left winding of these amino acids. Moreover, 
                                                     
1194 Cf.: D. J. Futuyma, Evolutionsbiologie (1986/1990), p. 83. 
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these 64 variations are actually only interpreted in 20 different ways; the code is 
redundant. There are only 20 amino acids used as the basic building blocks for the 
protein synthesis. Hence the space for possible mutations is already drastically reduced 
– or one may say directed –, since any genetic code for protein synthesis is interpreted 
in terms of these 20 amino acids.1195 A mutation which hence only again leads to one 
of these amino acid – only at another locus –, in any case produces a building block of 
high usefulness and internal compatibility; this mutation has an enhanced chance of 
being adaptive or non lethal compared to a hypothetical production of another 
completely random molecule. In so-called frame shift mutations, where the pattern of 
how the triplets are decoded is radically shifted, at least still amino acids are 
produced1196. Although mutations that only change the used amino acid may still well 
be harmful and, on the level of the metabolism, may lead to relatively new molecules, 
such directed and constrained mutation will generally be more adaptive than a trial 
based on chance only. 
The genetic code itself appears to repeat structures which have generally turned 
out to be advantageous building blocks (and to some extent may also have 
constrained evolution). In this sense mutations which are almost all expressed and 
interpreted in terms of the genetic code can for this reason already be regarded as 
being somewhat less blind and wasteful than, theoretically, one may conceive. 
(c) Repetitions. We now come to the role of more complex repetitions in the genetic 
code and the microbiological structure. The duplication of complex genes is 
apparently a central aspect of evolution, based on inherited mechanisms and linked to 
different mutation rates, mutator genes, the organisation of the genome and movable 
elements ( below). The existence of repetitions within and between different 
complex structures appears to support the view that a ‘recycling’ of old complex 
tested structures could more easily lead to complex adaptive structures than a process 
which builds such structures by blind single steps. 
It is argued here that it is false to ignore the common phenomenon of a 
duplication of genes and the largely identical repetitive sequences as an evolutionary 
factor; they appear to be indispensable for most complex adaptations.  
Especially in eukaryotic ‘higher’ organisms can many repetitive sequences be 
found, whereas almost non are found in the genome of viruses and prokaryotes, 
which where long the main objects of genetic research. Sequences of single copies 
only still build 90 % of the genome of the lower eukaryotes, like fungi, but only 20 % 
of the DNA of some plants and amphibia. In higher organisms, generally the 
repetition of existing complex genes, and not only point mutations, appear to be a 
highly important phenomenon.1197  
                                                     
1195 The redundancy of the code also leads to the fact that many mutations are ‘silent’ with no direct 
effect on the phenotype. 
1196 Cf.: D. J. Futuyma, Evolutionsbiologie (1986/1990), p. 75. 
1197 Ibid, pp. 57, 74 f., 85, 512 f. When I am quoting Futuyma in this section I mainly refer to the 
facts provided by his profound textbook. My interpretation seems to me to be suggested by 
these facts, but Futuyma himself in a more guarded way does not – at least not explicitly – give 
the interpretation I am promoting here. 
Part IV. Chapter 9: Transcendence of Process Reductionism 383 
A part of these repetitive sequences however, seems to be counter-adaptive at the 
level of the individual, the group or the species. A class of such repetitive sequences 
indeed appears best explained in the sense of selfish DNA ( below). But, as we shall 
see, complex repetitions also play a role in almost any complex adaptive structure. The 
two cases can not always be strictly distinguished. Selfish DNA may, as a side effect, 
produce an adaptive sort of variation (this mechanism would be an exaptation). This 
will then be less counter-selected at the level of the organism, group or species and 
may be regarded as an adaptation on these corresponding levels. In such cases the 
border between selfish and adaptive repetitions is blurred. There also seems to be 
different types of repetitive DNA; highly repetitive DNA, for example, is often not 
transcribed1198. I do not promote the idea that all cases of repetitions are adaptive, but 
think it is enough to show that without repetitions the complex adaptations which 
have been achieved would not have taken place in the given time. In this sense, I 
argue that inclinations to a certain kind of repetitions may have made 
evolution less blind. 
Repetition is found in many functionally important sequences of the genome. In 
the coding sequences (exons), for example, the regulation for a starting point of a 
transcription is regularly controlled by the same repeated code.1199 Also many, if not 
most structural genes, which code the proteins of eukaryotes, are members of families 
of gene-complexes1200, whose members have a similar structure. Even gene-complexes 
with many thousands of members are found to be very homogeneous in their 
nucleotide sequence.1201 There are, for example, over ten nucleotide sequences which 
are very similar to the overall sequence of haemoglobin. Moreover, the haemoglobin 
protein of human adults itself consists of the repetition of two α and two β 
polypeptides (α2β2). But besides the repetition of each polypeptide α and β, α and β 
also strongly resemble each other in their exons and in their groupings of exons. It is 
actually assumed that the different haemoglobin chains of vertebrates have evolved 
through gene-duplication from much simpler structures. Also many so-called pseudo 
genes, which do not become expressed phenotypically, have this structure.1202 If 
reactivated, they may have a higher – although still low – probability of being adaptive 
than a random nucleotide sequence of the same length. It actually appears that both 
the repetition of large genetic sequences as well as an repetitive internal structure are 
quite general evolutionary phenomena, which appear to be crucial for many 
adaptive structures.1203 
                                                     
1198 Ibid, p. 57. 
1199 Ibid, p. 55. 
1200 I here use the term ‘gene complex’ to indicate the difference to single genes, as defined by gene-
atomists. Gene complexes are longer strands of DNA, which may code a whole long 
polypeptide ( pp. 264 f.). 
1201 D. J. Futuyma, Evolutionsbiologie (1986/1990), pp. 57-58, 526 f., 535. 
1202 Ibid, pp. 58, 79, 509, 513, 514. 
1203 Cf.: Ibid, pp. 530, 537. 
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Repetitive and only slightly differing structures, interrupted by long introns, can also lead to 
what is called ‘exon-shuffling’.1204 Such a ‘recombination’ of codons presumably leads with a 
higher probability to a protein which works better than other mutational changes. The long 
introns may lower the probability of cutting through an exon. 
The duplication of existing complex genes appears to be more advantageous for the 
building of new structures than building them in single chance trials only. Single steps, 
do of course also play a role in the divergence of these duplicated genes,1205 but it 
appears that evolution has shown that the use of formerly tested building blocks in 
another context can often lead to quicker adaptation than the production of each 
newly used building block completely from scratch. In this sense building blocks 
which have turned out to be advantageous may, systematically, have survived better, 
and hence more often became used in further trials. In this – of course limited sense – 
such trials are less blind than trials based on untested building blocks.  
(d) Transposable genetic elements play a role in the production of duplicated repetitive 
DNA and gene-families. Other causes for repetitive DNA are adaptive points of 
fracture, mutator genes and the general structure of the reproductive system. 
Transposable genetic elements appear to be a general characteristic of eukaryotes. 1206 
There are two types of transposable elements, one type of which is replicated only 
if integrated in the genome (transposons) and another type of which whose replication 
is not bound to the replication of the nuclear DNA at all (episomes).  
Transposons seem to have a characteristic sequence-structure at their endings and 
in some species build 10 % of their DNA. Some transposons code RNA which by 
reverse transcription is introduced as a new copy into the DNA. It appears that the 
fidelity of transposons is regulated by general factors and by specific other genes. 
There seem to be different probabilities for an insertion at different regions of 
the chromosome.1207 
Both types of transposable elements seem to play a role in the reverse tran-
scription of DNA sequences. In the human genome the so-called Alu-group produced 
by reverse transcription has over 500 000 copies. A relevant part of the mammalian 
genome seems to be based on reverse transcription. Transposable elements could 
particularly lead to mutations by inserting regulatory stop and start signals.1208 
Some transposable elements multiply genes with apparently adaptive phenotypic 
effects. In bacteria particularly genes for resistance against medicaments and for the 
metabolism of new substrates are often found in episomes and transposons. 
But there are also many transposable elements where the adaptive function is not, 
at least not directly, apparent, because they mainly carry the information to reduplicate 
themselves. Here Dawkins’ concept of selfish DNA seems to be appropriate.1209 Such 
selfish genes may flood the genome with sequences which are not useful to the 
organism as a whole. 
                                                     
1204 Ibid, pp. 76 f., 538. 
1205 Ibid, p. 537. 
1206 Ibid, pp. 57, 78 f., 516 f. 
1207 Ibid, pp. 518. 
1208 Ibid, pp. 79, 81, 512, 518. 
1209 Ibid, p. 519;  footnote 1187. 
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Nevertheless, here also one has to consider that such a proliferation will 
sometimes lead to exaptations. The abundantly copied structure may still be more 
similar to a possibly adaptive structure than to a mere chance base sequence, because 
the sequence is at least coding something and only relatively small changes may be 
necessary to change the sequence in order to code something useful. Moreover, such 
genes may reactivate or deactivate genes and seem to play a role in causing the 
inversion and deletion of genes. Although most mutations are lethal, an increased 
overall rate of a certain mutations may also be positive for an evolutionary line. An 
effect started as selfish DNA can become an adaptation. Alternatively, if the effects of 
selfish genes are too radically counter-adaptive at the level of the organism (or group 
or species) they will have a higher probability of either facing counter-selection within 
an evolutionary line or of dying with the whole line which they had subverted. It is 
actually known that selection can regulate the number and the sort of transposable 
elements. For instance, selection may favour transposons or episomes which produce 
genes that transcribe rRNA, to be found some hundred times in the genome1210. 
The similarities of the above mentioned families of gene complexes become even 
more remarkable, since these similarities are not even always due to their common 
origin. The central role of repetitions, independent of this point, is remarkable on its 
own, since the recycling of used complex structures in my view has to be interpreted to 
be less blind than the totally blind production of single trials. However, members of 
gene-families which evolved based on duplication long ago, often additionally show 
the obvious effects of parallel evolution, a phenomenon called ‘concerted evolution’. For 
example, a certain genetic change which is not observed in apes at all, is found in all 
400 copies of a certain human gene family, whose members are also mostly found in 
apes. Either this parallel mutation arose in all 400 cases incidentally and became fixed 
– something that is quite implausible –, or one mutation was transferred to other 
mutations in a more systematic way. Concerted evolution appears to propose that 
members of a family of gene-complexes do not evolve totally independently from 
each other.1211 There are different hypotheses about how this may become explained. 
Transposable elements may play a role here as well. In any case concerted evolution 
points to a relatively organised way of changing different sequences of the genome. It 
appears plausible that there are adaptive mechanisms which secure the compatibility 
of different processes and codes, i. e. which lead to trials which are in this sense less 
blind. More research on the phenomenon of concerted evolution is required.  
Not only in respect to gene-complexes but also in respect to complete parts of 
chromosomes, chromosomes as wholes and sets of chromosomes repetition seems to 
be crucial for evolution.  
We have already seen that close species are often only distinguished by re-
structured karyotypes created by reciprocal or non-reciprocal translocation of parts of 
chromosomes ( p. 273). Duplication of single chromosomes and also general poly-
ploidy appear to be important evolutionary factors. In plants, for instance, polyploidy 
is known to be a prevailing form of specification. In such cases the trials, in a way, can 
                                                     
1210 Ibid, pp. 522 f. 
1211 Ibid, pp. 526-535. 
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be interpreted to be less blind – although such mutations are also often lethal. The 
mutation can often directly lead to enhanced robustness and organisms of a larger 
size. But, perhaps more important, such organisms, if they survive, have a pool of 
identical genes which work, and which then through a few small (blind) modifications 
can adopt new differentiated complex functions. The evolutionary line again becomes 
diploid. A process like this is known, for instance, in the fish family salmonidae.1212 A 
process which would have evolved new complex functions from scratch through 
many little mutational steps, would have taken much longer. In this sense I think it 
would also be false to call this recycling of existing complex structures as equally 
unchangeable, blind and wasteful as an evolution of such structures by single point 
mutations (although these point mutations certainly here have their role as well). 
 
In conclusion, it appears plausible to assume that in regard to change there seem to be 
certain internally advantageous continuities. The ubiquitous ‘recycling’ of complex 
adaptive structures at least in ‘higher’ organisms seems to show that repetitions and 
recombinations of apparently generally useful building blocks produce new complex 
adaptive structures more easily than single chance steps. If blindness is understood as 
strictly as possible, it is reasonable, even based only on the present evidence, to 
assume, that there are degrees of blindness and sight. I think that, based on the 
current evidence, it is plainly wrong to claim that it is decided that evolution is 
unchangeably blind. It appears plausible, and is clearly possible on the basis of present 
genetic knowledge, that mutation rates, building blocks and mechanisms like 
transferable DNA are themselves at least partly adapted to produce trials which on 
average have an increased fitness, compared with totally blind trials. 
 
(4) The adaptive role of macrobiological continuities in evolutionary change. The role of a 
macroscopic advantage of preferred dimensions of change or of repetitions is a more 
specific topic than that of genetic continuities, since macroscopic continuities are 
somehow based on genetic ones, whether directly or mediated by developmental 
mechanisms. A continuity, for example, of adaptive building blocks, as we have seen, 
can sometimes also be advantageous, without an apparent macroscopic continuity, if 
based on the usefulness of such building blocks in quite different structures. However, 
here we are concerned with properties which show continuities in a more direct 
relation to an environment (in the sense of all columns of Figure 13). 
One may even think of adaptive directions of change (third column), as being 
based on a trend in the changing environment. But are there trends in the changing 
environment? One possibility would be the permanent change in a certain 
environmental variable, another an arms race in a predator pray relation, where the 
same evolutionary direction may be permanently advantageous for each species. A 
further possibility for adaptive trends could be given even if the relevant aspect of the 
environment is stable and if many steps in only one direction are adaptive for a long 
time. Such trends do not in any case last forever. Nevertheless, if they last long 
enough it appears, based on the above microbiological grounds, reasonable to assume 
                                                     
1212 Ibid, pp. 69 f, also 74, 512, 514-516. 
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that an adaptively biased production of variation evolves. Although there is, of course, 
never a complete guarantee for the future, such trials are adapted, as static 
characteristics are also adaptive only a certain period of time. But if trials are adaptive 
they are less blind.  
In any case, not only evolutionary trends with a certain direction (third column) 
could give rise to less blind mutations, but also only the evolution of a preferred 
dimension of change with many different trials in all directions would violate the 
assumption of strict blindness (first and second column).  
If there are externally given preferred dimensions, or even directions, of change 
there is no reason why corresponding inner tendencies should not become inherited 
as adaptations, particularly if we think of the mutation genes and mechanisms 
mentioned above as causing genetic duplication and concerted evolution. If a dimen-
sion of change has played a role over long periods of time it appears probable that 
those organisms in particular have survived which produce more variation on one 
such adaptive dimension than on another one. It is not difficult to think of examples in 
which such a general view appears to shed light upon empirical facts.  
First, physical height or size have often been important dimensions of adaptation 
in the evolution of many species, independently of whether it is adaptive to be of large 
or of little size. The view expound here would predict that variation rates (also the 
mutation rates) regarding this dimension are higher than on the average (at least for 
organisms which are known to have evolved most of the above microbiological 
mechanisms).  
Secondly, one may predict a high mutation rate, for example, of the colour of fur 
of those prey species, which conceal themselves from beasts of prey and which have 
lived in changing environments, favouring different colours. The muridae in its 
different species may be an example for such an animal. In evolutionary time spans 
presumably the different colours of fur were advantageous for evolutionary lines of 
this class. Mouse species today are active at different times of the day and in very 
different surroundings. The fur of the muridae is black, grey, brown, reddish brown, or 
in some species even bright yellowish. It is known that mouse species have a relatively 
high mutation rate in the colour of their fur.1213 
Thirdly, there appears to be a phenomenon of evolutionary integration, when changes 
of certain phenotypic properties are (statistically) linked. The biologist R. Riedl has 
argued that many traits do not appear to vary independently from each other, because 
then many more non-adaptive mutations would actually occur. There seems to be a 
regulatory system which leads to the fact that, for example, the length of legs more 
often vary together than alone.1214 Although this is proposed within the framework of 
the evolutionary synthesis, this, I think, to some extent refers to the concept of 
correlation of parts, which historically was promoted earlier rather by romantic 
biology ( pp. 92 f.). Independent of how such regulation is genetically and 
developmentally realised, the question is whether it leads to variation which is pre-
adapted. If this is given, as it apparently seems, the strict definition of blindness 
                                                     
1213 Ibid, p. 83 (referring to Dobzhansky, 1970). 
1214 Cf.: Ibid, p. 497. 
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should in my opinion be taken seriously, which would entail that such phenomena are 
in contradiction to the assumption of complete blindness of variation. Even if, say, 
the genetic regulation for legs were simply based on one genetic locus, the variation at 
the phenotypical level would not be a maximally blind. Another possibility how such a 
mechanism may be realised, is the coupling of genes based on either a close location 
on the same chromosome or on genetically concerted evolution, which is treated 
above. In any case, if the occurrence of non-adaptive variations is probabilistically 
reduced, then it is false to assume an unchangeable blindness of evolution. 
Finally, we may think of a typical phenomenon, in which explicit morphological 
repetition is central – a phenomenon which is also particularly pondered on by 
romantic biology. Goethe claimed that the parts of plants could be understood as the 
transformations of one underlying structure, that of an ‘ideal leaf’.1215 I have argued 
above that genetic repetition should be regarded as an evolutionary factor in its own 
right, which has often reduced the blindness of variation. Closer scrutiny of 
developmental logic and self-iterative mathematical structures may show that Goethe 
was not totally wrong in stressing the role of macroscopic repetition in its own right 
(although he apparently took his claim too far). Although totally new changes caused 
by point mutations obviously play a role in evolution, I think research should be much 
more concerned with the role of repetition as a developmental and evolutionary 
factor. (Phenotypic repetition is even found in such basic phenomena as the structural 
units of the body, the cells.) 
In regard to macroscopic structures, here I here only mention the one example of 
body segmentation, which is particularly well exemplified in the taxon of articulata, and 
especially in the annelids (worm-like animals) and the arthropods (e. g. the millipedes), 
but can also be found in humans. Could a totally undirected variation really be said to 
lead to such immense receptions of highly structured modules? Although matters are 
presumably more complicated, than I suggest here, as a rule of thumb, in species with 
a high segmentation, all other things left equal, there will be more mutants which vary 
in regard to the number of segments, than in species with no or few segments. 
It is not a priori evident that there is really a simple link between genetic and 
morphological repetition. But actually, the phenomenon of segmentation is known to 
be linked to the phenomenon of genetic repetition, shown above as itself being 
possibly adaptive. The correspondence of phenotypic segmentation and repetitive 
genetic sequences support the hypothesis of the central importance of repetition of 
whole gene complexes (and only their later specialisation) for macroscopic 
morphological properties as well.1216 
A last example, in which the role of a preferred dimension of change may have 
played a role, is the phylogenetic increase in volume and in the microstructure of the 
human brain. The acceleration of evolution in this adaptation has often been regarded 
as a problem for strict Darwinism and might partially have been made possible by an 
increased probability of variation in these dimensions. 
 
                                                     
1215 J. W. Goethe, Die Metamorphose der Pflanzen (1790).  
1216 D. J. Futuyma, Evolutionsbiologie (1986/1990), pp. 491 f. 
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If there are any systematically preferred adaptive dimensions of change, as actually 
suggested by empirical evidence and theoretical plausibility, this would violate the 
assumption of the total blindness of trials. This is independent of the question of how 
such mechanisms are genetically and developmentally realised. But the repetition of 
complex morphological structures is sometimes linked to the repetition of complex 
genetic structures, as was shown in the last section, and is often based on mechanisms 
which themselves appear to be inherited and the object of adaptation. The production 
of complex morphological structures out of adapted building blocks, appears to be 
easier than simple production out of chance elements. Although naturally a degree of 
blindness always remains to be given, certain dimensions of variation which have 
turned out to be particularly adaptive may have accelerated evolution and reduced its 
blindness. The more radical claim, that there are not only adaptive dimensions, but 
also adaptive directions, can not be supported explicitly here. This represents an open 
question, which may soon become resolved by evidence from the growing field of 
genetics. In respect of adaptive dimensions of change I hope to have provided some 
evidence which supports the view of a less radically blind evolution. Also here 
genetics should, in principle, soon provide us with more rigid investigations. Based on 
present evidence, however, I think, it appears reasonable to assume that there are 
preferred dimensions of biological variation which are partly adaptations and hence 
less blind. Given this, it is plainly false to assume that evolutionary variation has, 
systematically, never a “bias towards bodily improvement”1217. 
(iv) Adaptive Variation as Reaction to the Environment? 
It might even be possible to go one step further: some aspects of variation may be 
regarded as an active reaction of the biological entity to certain environmental 
conditions. In this sub-section I focus mainly on the level of organismic variation. 
If there are adaptive dimensions of change or adaptive mutation rates, then there 
is, in principle, no reason why there should not also be cases of environmentally 
triggered adaptive types of variation. Although this presupposes a slightly more 
complicated mechanism, one does not need to assume direct instruction by the 
environment, but simply a process of triggering a dimension of variation or certain 
mutation rate which has become adapted. More research has to be done on the 
correlation of mutation rates, about which we know increasingly more, with certain 
environmental situations. Here only a few possible examples, mostly of unspecified 
reactions of variation rates to environmental situations, will be discussed. We 
consider, whether apparent systematic changes in organismic variation in response to 
environmental change, might be interpreted as a systematically advantageous strategy 
for an evolutionary line that is used to better get out of an adaptive valley. 
(1) It is commonly acknowledged that, when “stressed, most organisms quickly 
stop reproducing, conserving energy and waiting for better times.”1218 This is a quite 
common phenomenon which is also found in humans (lecturers, for example, may be 
acquainted with passion killers such as stress). 
                                                     
1217 R. Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker (1986/1991), p. 307.  footnote 1174. 
1218 This is commonly acknowledged. N. Eldredge, Reinventing Darwin (1995), p. 187. 
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Such influences on the reproductive activity do not directly influence the 
percentage of mutants in a population. Nevertheless, an adaptively reduced number of 
offspring may still be regarded as a less blind way of producing variation. Here only 
indirectly is the number of variants (column one in Figure 13) affected, not the 
breadth of the variation. At least in respect to the abundance of trials (offspring) it is 
worth noting that this is not totally blind. 
I have to concede that this example does not strictly fulfil the criterion which I defined as 
evolutionary variation at the outset of this treatment of evolutionary blindness. Nevertheless 
this phenomenon appears to suit in my interpretation of evolution as a process with 
changing blindness; therefore I mention it here. The following two examples b and c more 
strictly fulfil the outlined understanding of evolutionary variation. 
Another passion killer for human beings is, for instance, depression. In this example 
the influence of cultural values on the reproductive system is apparent. Missing 
contentment could also influence activities necessary to sustain one’s own survival, 
like eating and concentration etc.  
Even something like what Freud called ‘Thanatos’ may play a role here. This 
assumes that the self destructive tendencies of an individual, which are at odds with 
the values of his or her group, have an advantage at the group level. I am aware that 
this might have some similarities to Wynne-Edwards’ conception of group selection, a 
theory which is still widely in disrepute. Nevertheless, we have seen that the gene-
Darwinian denial of any properties which are good for the group went too far. It has 
also been shown that there are different more refined models in which traits 
advantageous to groups do not have to be undermined by subversion from within 
(not even always requiring permanent group selection,  284 f.). Hence in the light of 
such models, also some phenomena discussed by Wynne-Edwards may become 
rehabilitated, and shown to, in fact, be referring to the good of the group.  
Mechanisms that cause self-destruction or reduced reproductive activity may 
possibly not be adaptive at all, but the mere side effects of the exhaustion of an 
organism. But actually most opponents of group selection also interpret this partly as 
adaptation but now on the individual or gene level. I also think that, independently of 
the question of the evolutionary level, this behaviour, at least in part, seems to be an 
adaptation. In this case, the number of variants produced (column one) seems to be 
changed as an adapted reaction to the environment. This is normally acknowledged, 
but not taken to point to a fundamental aspect of evolution. I think one should stress 
it as an aspect of the general possibility of reduction of evolutionary blindness that 
offspring, in higher organisms, are not blindly born into an unknown future, but with 
respect to their probable chances of survival. In this limited sense of affecting the 
number of offspring, variation is not totally blind, but is itself tuned in an adapted way 
( but see small print above) 
(2) It is known that the rate of incidence of cancer is higher when the immune 
system is running at a low level. From psycho-immunology we know that problems of 
the immune system are often caused by general frustration or stress in the organism. 
The normal interpretation of this phenomenon is that full functioning of the immune 
system simply cannot be kept up if the organism is stressed.  
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An alternative explanation would – somewhat cynically – consider the possible 
adaptedness of the mutations themselves, at least for the evolutionary line as a 
whole.It may be plausible that an increased mutation rate in those evolutionary lines 
where organisms are stressed is advantageous. It could be assumed that the generally 
increased probability of mutations occurring also enhances the probability of 
mutations in the germ line. If organisms, which are stressed over long periods, 
develop an especially high number of mutant offspring, this would ensure that 
organisms or populations in a disadvantageous situation have an increased probability 
of finding a way out of a maladaptive valley. 
(3) Actually, under stress genetic transposition elements seem to be released more 
frequently leading to a higher probability of genomic change. Their copying of other 
genes seems not to be based on mere chance, but is regulated by a set of rules, 
probabilistically prefering often used streches of the genome.1219 
(4) Sexual selection, in a way also produces variation that may be adaptively 
directed. This directedness may even react to very particular changes in the 
environment. At least in human beings it is plausible to assume that in the complex 
cognitive processes of human partner choice, aspects may be involved  which react to 
the needs given in a changed environment. Human partner choice also seems to be 
linked generally to changing cultural values. These values may, apart from a certain 
autonomy of culture, also partly lead to a flexible adaptive response to a changed 
environment – as well as in respect of biological reproduction ( on the concept of 
auto-selection, pp. 394 f., 409 f.). 
In respect to the above examples I have to concede that they are partly in danger of being 
just-so stories and may actually rather refer to side-effects than to adaptations. Although I 
think it is reasonable to apply the idea of adaptation to the evolutionary process itself, which 
has been strangely separated by Darwinians, I do not want to commit the criticised fallacies 
of promoting an unqualified pan-adaptationism. Moreover, although the examples appear to 
me to make sense, only a more concrete empirical foundation for such claims render these 
views secure. Here only a certain plausibility of such views should be pointed out. 
Furthermore, I have not argued in favour of a even more radical position, claiming the direct 
chemical control of particular directions of mutations. Although also such a position may in 
principle have some plausibility, particular of one thinks of the known phenomena of 
reverse transcription, mutator genes and chemical catalysts of mutations, it may well be 
given that such a more complex mechanism has never evolved. Actually, Ted Steele, as 
mentioned earlier, has defended such a more radical view. In any case, such a more extreme 
position, as we have seen, is not necessarily required for a concept of adaptive variation as a 
reaction to the environment. 
These more daring concepts have not been so clearly supported as, for example, the 
concept of simple adaptive dimensions of change, discussed in the last section. But 
based on a multi-level account and a strict understanding of blindness, it at least 
appears not implausible, that, following my general interpretation, there is also 
adaptive variation in a particular response to the environment (without assuming a 
violation of the Weismann doctrine). In this sense variation may even directly react to 
the changing ‘needs’ of an evolutionary line. 
                                                     
1219  J. Bauer, Das kooperative Gen: Abschied vom Darwinismus (2008), p. 187. 
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(v) Summary and Conclusion 
It has been shown that it is reasonable to regard biological variation rates (e. g. 
mutation rate, recombination rate, and speciation rate) as not being totally blind in 
every case, but in being partly themselves adaptations. Such a view gains plausibility if 
one takes into consideration that these rates can be shown to be somehow inherited. 
Even at the level of mutation rates there are certain chemicals, genes and extra-
chromosomal episomes which appear to catalyse mutations in a systematic way. It 
seems reasonable to regard some aspects of variation itself as meta-adaptations. In 
such cases adaptations are not a given state of an organism, but an enhanced 
probability to mutate along a certain evolutionary dimension.  
First, we were concerned with the possibility of claiming the blindness of trials in a 
tautological way. If change in an evolutionary line is defined as being that which is not 
known in advance, then by definition every trial is blind. Aiming at a strict definition 
of Darwinism I have had to abandon this tautological definition, which would 
otherwise build an impregnable bastion of Darwinism, build on merely terminological 
grounds. I rather regard the blindness of evolutionary lines as a topic for empirical 
research. Although trials are concerned with change, there may be continuities in that 
change, which may be used for mere adaptive strategies. If in particular those lines 
survive which produce trials which are more adaptive, then the evolved direction of 
trials could itself be regarded as being adapted, i. e. not blind. It is hence inappropriate 
to argue tautologically that all change is blind. Likewise in regard to change there may 
be continuities, so that the old may help to explore the new. In the subsequent 
sections, I argued that there actually are, for instance, adaptive dimensions of change, 
adaptive mutation rates and an adaptive linkage of genes.  
Secondly, I distinguished between different levels, in which evolutionary variation, 
in a multi-level account of evolution, is appropriately regarded as taking place. 
Different descriptive aspects of variation have also been disentangled. 
Thirdly, in a longer treatment, I gave support to the view that variation is not 
always and not on all explanatory levels equally blind. I have distinguished between 
two types of adaptive variation. There is a flexible type of adaptive variation, which in 
a multi-level account of evolution is based on pre-selection at another level. Although 
the composing processes are blind, the relevant fact is that the trials at the level of the 
whole are not equally blind. The other type of adapted variation requires an enduring 
importance of a certain dimension of change over a long period of time. I have 
clarified these two types of adaptive variation for the level of species and for 
genetic recombination. 
The most problematic topic is the possible directedness of mutations. Here I did 
not structure the discussion along the lines of the above distinction, but firstly treated 
genetic and microscopic continuities and secondly macroscopic, mainly 
morphological, continuities.  
In respect to the genetic level I have discussed the genetic basis of mutation rates, 
the role of episomes, concerted evolution and repetition. I can here only mention 
some aspects of this discussion. Mutation rates are shown to be inherited and also 
genetically changed. They appear to be the basis for adaptive dimensions of change. 
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Another important point is that the genome of higher organisms shows an enormous 
number of repetitive sequences – also in most coded adaptive structures. This 
suggests the interpretation that the repetition of previously tested complex genetic 
structures builds the basis of most complex adaptations. Genetic repetitions do not 
necessarily imply macroscopic repetitions, instead they could also contribute similar 
building blocks to quite different macroscopic structures. These building blocks seem 
to have turned out to have a generally higher probability of producing advantageous 
mutations than plain chance mutations. Without denying the role of blind point 
mutations, it appears that without the duplication of complex sequences, evolution 
would not have been able to design complex structures in the time given. There seem 
to be particular mechanisms that enhance the probability of the duplication of whole 
gene-complexes. Transposable elements also seem to figure in causing these 
phenomena. The apparent repetitive use of adapted building blocks, and other 
phenomena which have been discussed, clearly speak in favour of the concept of 
directed variation.1220 Despite the constraining aspect of resulting directions, the 
strong amount of repetition in complex structures seems at least partly to point also to 
an adaptive directedness, for example, of a repeated use of such advantageous 
building blocks. 
More briefly, I discussed possible macroscopical and morphological continuities. 
There may be preferred dimensions of change or even certain directions of change. It 
appears plausible to assume that some dimensions of change over long periods of 
time were important for evolutionary lines. If many steps are needed for a certain 
adaptation or if there is a permanent external trend, then even a certain adaptive 
directedness of mutations is thinkable (I have, however, focused on the less daring claim 
of adapted dimensions). Likewise morphologically, repetition, I argue, appears to play an 
adaptive role. Of course not any repetition is adaptive, but repetition in average may 
be more adaptive than complete randomness (although this on the other hand may 
lead to constraints). Another class of macroscopic adaptively directed variation that I 
mentioned appears to be an adaptive coupledness of genes, which can systematically 
decrease the blindness of trials.  
Finally, I have argued that these adaptive aspects of variation may even be 
regulated more particularly in direct response to a situation in the evolutionary line.  
 
In conclusion, without favouring any strictly Lamarckian kind of evolutionary 
mechanism in biology, variation does not necessarily seem to be equally blind in its 
strictest sense. This position is at odd with Darwinian metaphysics, if we do not allow 
a tautological notion of Darwinism. Variation even on the level of mutations appears 
itself to be adapted, but be it only in the sense of a preferred dimension of mutations. 
If this is given, the strictly interpreted assumption of a Darwinian blindness of 
evolution is violated. Likewise, if variation is not totally blind, but could to a certain 
                                                     
1220 It is an old idea of critics of Darwinism that trials are more directed, either in an adaptive or in a 
more constrained sense. E.g., Ch. v. Guttenberg, Biologie als Weltanschauung (1967), p. 43. 
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extent itself be adapted, the other extreme, proposed earlier by the mutationists1221, 
that mutations are very well informed and almost omniscient, is also false.1222 The 
variation step of evolution seems to be neither strictly Darwinian nor strictly 
mutationistic. It is neither totally blind, nor omniscient, but located somewhere in 
between on the dimension I have outlined above ( pp. 359 f.). A precise value in 
how far variation is adaptive can not generally be given. The adaptedness, for 
example, of mutation rates depend on the specific evolutionary line and the specific 
locus under discussion. Moreover, blindness has always its share. 
A Darwinian might object that he or she regards this position as still being 
predominantly Darwinian. I indeed have not criticised universal adaptationism in this 
section, but have done earlier on ( pp. 339 f.). I have shown here that it is wrong to 
regard the process of variation as being unchangeably blind, and to artificially exclude 
it from becoming adapted itself. Variations, for example, in respect to preferred di-
mensions, could also be adapted. In this sense Darwinism, if thoroughly applied, 
undermines its own basis. Measured against the vast number of variants that are 
theoretically possible (a more than astronomical number1223), many actual mutations, 
according to my strict interpretation, appear to be less blind and rather directed. The 
degree of their sight differs, as the wastefulness of evolution appears to differ as well. 
The dogma of an unchangeable blindness, if based on a differentiated understanding 
of blindness and sight, can in my opinion not be sustained. Hence it appears that a 
Darwinian process in regard of the criterion of blindness has been transcended by 
evolution. Evolution evolves and in this respect too has not remained unchanged 
from the amoebae to Einstein. 
c) From Hetero-Selection to Auto-Selection – Discussion of the Third Criterion 
The last criterion for our strict definition of a Darwinian process ( p. 358) is 
concerned with the second step in the process. This could either, be positively called 
‘selection in the narrow sense’ or, negatively, ‘elimination’. In our definition we have 
mentioned two aspects of how this step should be specified: selection is (1.) external 
and (2.) an opportunistic response to the moment. Subsequently, I summarise the 
justification for why an externality in the second step of a Darwinian process should 
be assumed. Following this, I discuss the aspect of the opportunistic response to the 
moment. Finally, I come back to criticise the concept of externality and introduce the 
concept of auto-selection. 
                                                     
1221 The term is alluding to a school of biologists at the turn from the 19th to the 20th century, who 
saw (directed) mutation (mutation pressure) as the main driving force of evolution, opposed to 
natural selection. Proponents were H. de Vries (who still accepted natural selection), W. Bateson 
and T. H. Morgan.  
1222 See: R. Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker (1986/1991), p. 308. 
1223 D. Dennett (referring back to Dawkins, Quine and J. L. Borges) has nicely illustrated the 
hugeness of such a number in his section on the ‘Library of Mendel’, Blind Variation and Selective 
Retention in Creative Thought as in Other Knowledge Processes (1960/1987), pp. 107 f. (The number is 
even much bigger since Dennett does not consider the code argument, given above, 
 pp. 381 f.). 
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(i) Darwinian Externalism 
The characterisation of Darwinism as externalism has been justified earlier in this 
work and was part of my strict definition of Darwinism. I had the intention of 
formulating a strict definition in order to reveal an evolution of evolutionary 
mechanisms which is possibly concealed by often imprecise usage of the term 
‘Darwinism’. The afore mentioned characterisation has arisen naturally from my 
historical treatment of Darwinism, out of the need to contrast Darwinism with 
alternative approaches and out of the discussion of a mere tautological understanding 
of pan-adaptationism. 
Historically, Darwin took over the passive Newtonian understanding of matter 
( pp. 168 f.). Like matter on which an external force impinges, organisms, according 
to Darwin, are “not actively adapting, but are adapted by the external force of natural 
selection”. Organisms, like planets, have an inertial tendency, and – without any force 
acting on them – they would tend to reproduce similar organisms. Their 
transformation is only brought into existence by the force of natural selection, which 
(like gravity) acts externally upon them.1224  
For example, Lewontin has argued that for “Darwin, the external world, the 
environment, acting on the organism was the cause of the form of organisms”, 
whereas organisms themselves are the “passive objects moulded by the external force 
of natural selection”.1225  
Darwin devised his theory to explain organismic adaptations to changes in the 
environment in natural ways. Darwin inherited this interest in adaptation from Paley. 
Although Darwinism, of course, can today, not simply be equated with Darwin’s 
theory ( pp. 102 f., 106 f.), this assumption is still part of the core of this paradigm. 
The concept of an exogenous force moulding evolution is also found in process-
Darwinism and not only in respect to biological processes, but also in respect to other 
levels as well; this has also been a main object of criticism.1226 However, Darwinism 
has always understood evolution mainly as an adaptation of the body to an 
environment, or, more generally, an adaptation of the internal to the external.  
Thereby Darwinism contrasts itself with other evolutionary theories, which have 
rather emphasised internal direction and internal constraints. Generally Darwinism, in 
arguing that evolution is “brought about solely in response to local environmental 
pressures”1227, is opposed to approaches which promote an inherent tendency 
towards perfection, a Bildungstrieb or an internal autonomy of processes. 
One may object that not only did Darwin formulate the theory of natural selection, but that 
of sexual selection as well. Sexual selection, however, can, likewise, be regarded as stressing an 
active aspect of the evolutionary line itself.  
But Darwin in his middle period, his most ‘Darwinian’ period, focused predominantly 
on natural selection. The title of the Origin is significantly ‘The Origin of Species by Means of 
                                                     
1224 D. J. Depew, B. Weber, Darwinism Evolving (1995), pp. 9, 89. 
1225 R. C. Lewontin, Gene, Organism, Environment (1983), pp. 273, 275.  Also footnote 1149.  
1226 For example, in respect to economics: E. L. Khalil, Neo-Classical Economics and Neo-Darwinism 
(1992), pp. 35-36.  G. Soros, Die kapitalistische Bedrohung (1997), p. 26. 
1227 P. Bowler, Darwin (1990), pp. 155, also 156, 161. 
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Natural Selection’ and even in other editions of this main work there are only few paragraphs 
on sexual selection. Hence, why should sexual selection be regarded as being more at the 
core of Darwin’s theory than the evolution of acquired characters, which he also mentions 
in about the same length?  
Moreover, Darwin in his middle period only believed in the existence of single organ-
isms. But if there were no larger units of explanation, then sexual selection is also exogenous 
simply in respect to each organism. Only in a multi-level account, which I have also 
supported in this work, may sexual selection be said to transcend Darwinian externalism.  
Proponents of the evolutionary synthesis in its second phase, as we have seen, have 
partly accepted higher explanatory levels, but as also mentioned, sexual selection was also 
met with disapproval by important advocates of the synthesis.1228 
Gene-atomists again have rehabilitated sexual selection, but have not regarded it as an 
emergent new mechanism but, rather, a phenomenon reducible to (external) gene-selection 
( pp. 142 f.). 
I think Rensch summed up the spirit of Darwinism excellently: “All known 
evolutionary rules can be explained by mutation and selection. The assumption of 
autonomous creative principles or driving forces is inappropriate. Only alterations to 
environmental factors are decisive for the formation of new species and higher 
categories.”1229 
 
Furthermore, if selection were to be defined differently as being external or internal, 
then the claim would lose any meaning. If, for example, internal tendencies and needs 
determining the course of evolution were called Darwinian, then simply everything 
would be called a selection process and the second step of a Darwinian process would 
itself become a completely vacuous claim. In the earlier section on pan-adaptationism 
I elaborated in detail upon the fallacy of making Darwinian claims in a tautological 
way, something which also redefines internal tendencies as being adaptations. If any 
internal direction giving force is called adaptive then simply any process can be called 
adaptive, since the survival of the survivor is a true but an empty tautology ( pp. 339 
f.). Similarly, as discussed in the section on tautological aspects of pan-selectionism, 
the second step in a Darwinian process becomes vacuous (and also does not 
necessarily lead to adaptation in any meaningful sense) if simply any cause of survival 
is meant. I do not dispute that there are causes in general for an entity ‘to be or not to 
be’ ( pp. 350 f., particularly pp. 356 f.).  
We come back to a critical evaluation of Darwinian externalism, after the concept 
of momentaneous opportunism, the other defining aspect in the selective step of a 
Darwinian process, has briefly been expounded and discussed. 
(ii) Opportunistic Response to the Moment? 
As I am aiming at a strict definition of a Darwinian process in order to achieve the 
conceptual resolution necessary to distinguish different evolutionary processes, 
another criterion for the discussed selection step of a Darwinian process becomes 
                                                     
1228 S. J. Frankel, The Eclipse of Sexual Selection Theory (1994),  also p. 133. 
1229 B. Rensch, Historical Development of the Present Synthetic Neo-Darwinism in Germany (1980), p. 298; 
here quoting an article of himself from 1943, p. 52. 
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evident. In Darwinism, the term ‘selection’ – despite its almost theological conno-
tations – points to a process of differential survival, which is, as Mayr states, a totally 
“opportunistic response to the moment”1230. If we were not to demand this criterion 
for Darwinian selection, then it would also be possible to call any forward-looking, 
foresighted selection process, even a provident external selection undertaken by God, 
Darwinian. Darwinians have always stressed that the present and local environment 
alone is relevant to selection. Hence, it is appropriate, to require of a proper 
Darwinian process that its second selection step be such an opportunistic response to 
the moment and that it be taken without any foresight. (This is somewhat similar to 
the concept of the blindness of variation which I dealt with earlier  pp. 368 f.).  
This criterion is normally accepted and is even fundamental to the ideological 
message which Darwinism conveys. But if taken seriously and applied without double 
standards, I think, it becomes apparent, that not all selection processes actually fulfil 
this criterion. This, however, would be in contradiction to the claim of a general 
validity of universal Darwinism ( pp. 205 f., 333 f., 350 f.). This can only be 
sketched here. 
For example, artificial selection by human breeders is not necessarily Darwinian in 
this strict sense. Breeders may, for example, select cattle for breeding because they are 
resistant to a certain virus, which has not yet become epidemic. Selection, of course, 
happens at the very moment it happens, but in this example the selector uses his or 
her knowledge in order to anticipate selection pressures which might occur in 
the future. 
A similar line of argument appears to be applicable to biological ‘selectors’ (even to 
what in the next section should be called their ‘auto-selection’). Here I give an 
example concerning involuntary abortions which seem to occur during the human 
gestation period. From 100 fertilised egg cells only about one fifth survives until birth. 
About 70 % of these abortions are involuntary, while 30 % are deliberate.1231 Of 
course, perhaps, all involuntary abortions might simply be regarded as accidents. But 
partly, at least, they appear to be explainable as adaptations. In the long run, those 
organisms or species, which in the case of a developmental monstrosity or of a 
breakdown of large parts of the embryo’s metabolism, develop a mechanism of an 
early natural abortion will save resources and have advantages in survival. Actually 
55 % of aborted embryos die very early and are even unrecognised by their mothers in 
the first weeks of pregnancy. In terms of evolution it would be plausible – particularly 
if starting from a Darwinian viewpoint – that, if there is apparently no chance for 
survival in the long run, involuntarily abortions may take place as adaptations (and, 
perhaps, also constrain evolution). How fine such a process could be and how well 
tuned it is is disputable, but there is in principle no reason why the existence of such a 
                                                     
1230 E. Mayr, One Long Argument (1991), p. 44; Evolution und die Vielfalt des Lebens (1978/1979), p. 204. 
1231 These statistical numbers relate to Germany, but they, I think, should, in principle, roughly be 
similar for other countries as well. H. Rauh, Frühe Kindheit. p. 137. In: R. Oerter, L. Montada, 
Entwicklungspsychologie (1987). Particularly the number of deliberate abortions will vary, but also 
the number of involuntary abortions may well differ due to differences in health systems, 
environmental factors and their genetic basis. 
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mechanism should be denied. Given the existence of some mechanism like this, 
selection can no longer be seen as totally an ‘opportunistic response to the 
moment’1230. According to our definition it is, hence, not strictly and purely 
Darwinian. Based on an adaptive process of its own, an internal selection process may 
on the whole render evolution a little less wasteful and even somehow more 
directed.1232 This can be regarded as another type of example for the tendency of 
Darwinism to undermine and transcend itself. 
(iii) Auto-Selection and Autonomy 
In the last but one section ( p. 395) the externality of selection has once more been 
justified as being a defining criterion of the second, selectional, step in a Darwinian 
process. This has been based on historical as well as on systematic considerations. In 
the present section, it is shown that the criterion is not always fulfilled by existing 
evolutionary processes. In respect to it the universality of Darwinism, as sometimes 
assumed, is also shown to be wrong. It is also in this regard that the evolutionary 
processes themselves appear to evolve. Given a concession to an evolutionary multi-
level account, which I elaborated upon previously ( pp. 245 f.), the necessity in 
acknowledging – in an of course limited way – that the evolutionary mechanism itself 
even changes in the biological stratum will be shown. In this sense evolutionary 
processes that have evolved themselves are not always Darwinian in the strictest sense 
of the word. 
 
The criterion for the externality of selection adequately contrasts Darwinism with 
certain classes of alternative schools of thought ( pp. 359 f.), which have actually often 
criticised this aspect. As mentioned, Darwinism was historically opposed to earlier 
evolutionary theories, which stressed the role of internal form. This concept was 
cardinal both to early essentialist conceptions in biology, which denied evolution 
( pp. 92), and to romantic biology ( pp. 95), that stressed an inner evolutionary 
unfolding of form. 
Later on, these research traditions partly continued to exist as relatively unimport-
ant heterodox schools of thought. Likewise, the evolutionary synthesis had and has 
difficulties in integrating in particular the disciplines of morphology, developmental 
                                                     
1232 There are many other empirical facts which may be interpreted in this way. We may, for 
example, think of a combination of group selection and, what I called, systemic individual 
selection, in which a once installed system which may internally stabilise a property whose loss 
could result in the extinction of the whole group. Systemic individual selection was discussed in 
a detailed way, earlier on ( pp. 284 f.). Even the gene-atomist view, with its metaphors of 
almost conscious genes, not only proves to be a most radical form of Darwinism, but also once 
more to undermine its own approach. It has become commonplace to emphasise the 
investment of genes (e. g. of parents) into their future. E.g., R. Dawkins, Parental Investment, Mate 
Desertion and a Fallacy (1976), p. 132. In my opinion these phenomena should rather be 
interpreted in the sense developed here and in the subsequent section. The active internal 
process of autoselection may replace the passive Darwinian concept of heteroselection, and may 
include a foresightful pre-selection which is itself an adaptation.  
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biology and palaeontology into a common, mainly Darwinian, framework.1233 In these 
disciplines these heterodox schools still have a certain hold, which is presumably part-
ly due to the disciplines’ demand that a focus be placed on the internal logic of forms. 
However, in contrast to the radicalisation of Darwinism, the role of internal 
constraints and internal direction have recently once more became a topic of increased 
interest ( pp. 144 f., 343 f.). Critics of ultra-Darwinism have partly even favoured a 
full paradigm shift to a more morphological or developmental biology, as, for 
instance, advocated by the biologist Goodwin. Likewise the school of so-called critical 
evolutionary biology (Senkenberg Museum), for example, focuses on the internal process 
of reconstructing body plans by determining invariant necessities.1234 Theories of self-
organisation (autopoiesis) too, which are based on system theory and the complexity 
revolution, stress the complex internally governed organisation of change. But many 
critics of pure Darwinism do not favour a full paradigm shift, but, for instance, like 
Gould, only stress the incompleteness of current Darwinian evolutionary theory. The 
critical stance towards strict Darwinian externalism and the support of a more active 
role for the internal in an evolutionary process of construction, is not necessarily re-
stricted to the above mentioned disciplines, but may today, for instance, also be found 
in microbiology ( pp. 147 f., cf. also pp. 380 f.). Moreover, there are phenomena at 
the core of Darwinian evolutionary biology, which reveal the necessity of accepting 
the relevance of internal dynamics in evolution ( pp. 291 f., 409 f. and below).  
Even authors who clearly regard themselves as Darwinians sometimes seem to accept such 
internal tendencies which are here treated as the hallmarks of theories opposed to 
Darwinism. For instance, the (perhaps rather existentialistic) Darwinist Monod stresses that 
to a certain extent the organism itself chooses its selection pressure.1235 
Even phenomena pivotal to sociobiology, which are often interpreted as evidence for 
militant gene-Darwinism, could in this respect be interpreted as undermining Darwinism. 
The concept of investment, crucial to the theories of kin selection and reciprocal altruism, 
presumes a self-selection on the level of related or co-operating organisms, which takes 
probabilities of future happenings into account ( also footnote 1232 and pp. 371 f.). 
Before discussing particular cases myself, I discuss this phenomenon of internal 
selection in general and introduce a clearer terminology. 
As concluded above, Darwinism in its strict sense requires the selection step in a 
Darwinian process to be external. In order to make this requirement more transparent 
and explicit here I use the term ‘hetero-selection’. This term is in a way a pleonasm, 
since selection in any case appears to refer to an external selector. Moreover, it has 
been shown, that alternatively if one were to understand selection as any cause relevant 
for the survival of a certain evolutionary line, then selection in an empty tautological 
sense would always be given, since it is an apparent truth and not a particularly 
Darwinian assumption to suggest that there are, of course, always reasons why 
                                                     
1233 Cf.: E. Mayr, W. Provine, The Evolutionary Synthesis (1980). 
1234 This school seeks invariants not in pure morphology, but rather in bio-mechanical terms. 
Cf., M. Weingarten, Organismen – Objekte oder Subjekte der Evolution? (1993), p. 280,  footnote 
644. 
1235 J. Monod, Le hasard et la nécessité (1970/1991), pp. 27, 115-116. 
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survivors survive ( pp. 356 f.). Such a largely empty claim would entail that selection 
became understood in such a broad sense that it is not required to lead to adaptation 
to an external environment at all, since internal trends would also be redefined as 
processes of selection ( also pp. 339). Nevertheless, selection is actually sometimes 
used in such a tautological way. This is the reason why I explicitly use the term 
‘hetero-selection’ here.  
To refer to internal, rather non-Darwinian, causes of survival which do not 
necessarily lead to adaptation, I use the corresponding opposite term ‘auto-
selection’.1236 If one uses ‘selection’ in its restricted and proper sense, it is a contradictio 
in adiecto. But since ‘hetero-selection’ is used here in this proper meaning, the term 
‘selection’ is set free to mean in fact merely any cause of survival. ‘Auto-selection’ 
should in this sense refer to any internal – not necessarily externally adaptive – cause of 
preferred survival of an evolutionary line. In auto-selective processes the entity in 
question is itself, in a rather non-Darwinian way, a main cause of the direction of its 
own evolution. The term ‘selection’ within ‘auto-selection’, if restricted to the second 
step in a Darwinian process, is also still conceptually linked to the Darwinian aspect of 
the variation of evolutionary lines. The concept of variation, however, has been dealt 
with previously ( pp. 364 f., 368 f.). 
But why introduce the term ‘hetero-selection’ at all, if one can use Darwin’s 
original term ‘natural selection’ instead? The notion hetero-selection, as introduced 
here, is not, at least not directly, synonymous with natural selection. Hetero-selection 
is a more general notion since it can be directly applied to very different ontological 
levels, not only to biological ones, but also to other levels accepted at least by process-
Darwinism. To take an example from the history of ideas, historically, ‘Darwin’s 
dangerous idea’ had a difficult start. Presumably this was partly due to the external 
counter-selection represented by certain theological convictions of that time. (The 
clash between Huxley and Bishop Wilberforce has become the icon of the conflict 
between Darwinism and theology356.) It is inappropriate to call such a process 
‘natural selection’, since the selecting force in this example is not meant in any direct 
sense to be nature, but rather other ideas. Since the selector may still be exogenous 
one can still speak of hetero-selection.  
None the less, hetero-selection and natural selection are closely linked and not 
only in the sense that natural selection is a specific type of hetero-selection. If one 
assumes that only processes of hetero-selection are involved at different levels, it 
appears plausible that hetero-selection – indirectly and possibly with a time lag – is 
ultimately only a mediation of natural selection. In opposition to this, the approach 
I favour in this work, can be seen as regarding hetero-selection as not always referring 
ultimately to natural selection, since, for example, on the level of culture many 
relatively autonomous processes of auto-selection take place, so that cultural hetero-
selection may not necessarily only mediate natural selection but also autonomous 
tendencies of culture. However, process-Darwinism, which does not accept auto-
selection in general, has, I think, to claim that hetero-selection ultimately refers to 
                                                     
1236 On possible ways to disentangling internal and external causes even in respect of morphology, 
 p. 343. 
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natural selection. In this view there is no true autonomy; biological external nature 
remains the only ultimate selector. As we have seen, in this understanding, cultural 
entities, like words, concepts or theories, finally only serve the biological survival of 
the entity in question. Hetero-selection and natural selection finally coincide, and in 
this respect process-Darwinism becomes identical to biologistic Darwinism. Indeed, it 
only differs from it in assuming the existence of mediation processes. In such a view it 
is in fact justified to conclude that “no species, ours included, possesses a purpose 
beyond the imperatives created by its genetic history”1237. 
Now particular mechanisms are considered which may be interpreted as auto-
selection, without, of course, thereby intending to deny or to neglect processes of 
hetero-selection. In respect to the cultural stratum, only cases should be mentioned in 
which auto-selection seem to be involved. Then I turn to examples of biological auto-
selection, which have partly been discussed at depth in this work before. Biological 
processes are scrutinised more closely, since their existence appears to be 
more controversial. 
To a great extent human beings appear to be ‘selected’ by the cultural world they 
themselves have created. Human survival is in general not only determined by the 
changing climate (even this is influenced by humans), but also, for instance, by a 
system of values, morals and laws. These created values also appear to have a certain, I 
think partly positive, autonomy. They somehow ‘reproduce’ themselves without 
referring to an advantage in biological nature. These norms, for example, to some 
extent help the weak and vulnerable, and sometimes also those who help them 
(but cf. also  pp. 51 f.). 
Similarly theories, even if we regard them as a problem, may to a certain extent 
select themselves. This becomes apparent, for example, when we look at Lakatos’ 
concept of theoretic protective belts (something that we have come across repeatedly 
in this work). 
In respect to economic processes, previously I pointed to some structural 
similarities among the thinking of certain economic schools of though and 
Darwinism. E. L. Khalil, who has pointed to many similarities between neo-Darwinian 
biology and neo-classical economics, particularly criticises the concept of an externally 
given selector likewise found in neo-classical economics.1238 
According to Khalil, neo-classical economics idealises consumer preferences as an ultimate 
selector. Consumer satisfaction was wrongly assumed to be the externally given gauge of 
economic efficiency. Actually, however, consumers do not have perfect knowledge and may 
even have, for instance, a certain ‘irrational’ loyalty to firms. Additionally, firms are not 
simply externally selected in regard to how far they satisfy consumers’ needs and interests, 
but may themselves have the power to shape the preferences of consumers and even 
possibly to manipulate their knowledge.1239 
                                                     
1237 E. O. Wilson, On Human Nature (1978/1995), p. 2. Cf., more recently, Th. Junker, S. Paul. Der 
Darwin Code (2010), pp. 189 f. 
1238 This has generally been criticised, for example, by Boulding and Th. Veblen. H. Driefenbacher, 
U. Ratsch, Verelendung durch Naturzerstörung (1992), p. 241. 
1239 E. L. Khalil, Neo-Classical Economics and Neo-Darwinism (1992), pp. 35, 50-52. 
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Equally evolutionary biology has, in my view, to acknowledge that selection (here 
broadly meant as the causes of survival) are not always external in a Darwinian way. 
(Cf. generally,  pp. 342 f., p. 356) Alternative internal auto-selective processes can 
generally lead to two results. 
First, auto-selection may reduce blindness in the evolution of an evolutionary line 
and in a way may even accelerate the adaptive process. This resembles the possible 
reduction of blindness of variation, as elaborated above ( pp. 377 f.). Likewise, auto-
selection may itself be adapted to accelerate the adaptive process and may eliminate 
the variation of organisms with particularly small prospects very early on. Some 
microbiological examples have been discussed which can, presumably, be subsumed 
under this interpretation. An example of this is provided by the genetic repair 
mechanisms that prevent mutations not expressed in the established genetic code 
from taking place ( p. 381). Here mutations using different molecules to the usual 
ones in the genetic code are eliminated in advance. Thereby mutations which on 
average have very little chance of producing an improvement that would be 
compatible with the metabolism of the organism would be eliminated. Similarly sexual 
selection can accelerate the process of natural selection, by pre-selecting, for example, 
those which are perhaps particularly brave hunters ( pp. 291 f.). Although here the 
direction of evolution may largely remain the same, its wastefulness and blindness is 
reduced. Despite referring to adaptation, the interpretation that the mediation of auto-
selection may reduce the blindness of an adaptive process is, I think, still 
rather non-Darwinian. 
Secondly, auto-selection always contains the possibility of autonomy. Since the 
evolutionary entity in question becomes one of its own causes, it may also internally 
turn evolution in a direction that, if judged in relation to the external environment, is 
not advantageous. From this external viewpoint, self-determination may sometimes 
appear as a constraint on adaptation to an external environment. Auto-selective 
processes may often have evolved as blindness reducing adaptations in the sense illu-
strated above, but because of the self-referentiality involved, they may have acquired a 
certain autonomy. If internal criteria were to come to dominate, by chance or through 
some other means, then simply those entities would survive which best fulfil these 
internal criteria. In this case the causes for selection are partly sui generis. In this sense 
autocatalytic circular causation1240 and autopoiesis, opposed to passive adaptation to an 
external environment, should be acknowledged as playing a relevant role in evolution. 
Throughout this work phenomena have been dealt with, which may be interpreted 
as auto-selective processes. 
At the level of individual morphology and genetic mechanisms auto-selection is generally 
discussed under the keywords of internal constraints and direction. Starting from 
amidst the Darwinian paradigm, terminologically, these internal constraints and 
directions may also refer to certain variational processes, which I dealt with earlier on. 
I have already shown that – despite difficulties – it is generally possible and even 
necessary to distinguish between the internal and external causes of a trait, particularly 
                                                     
1240 An excellent treatment on the importance of such processes in nature is, for example, given by: 
E. Jantsch, Die Selbstorganisation des Universums (1979/1988), pp. 255 f. 
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if one wants to speak of adaptations to external environments in a reasonable way 
( pp. 343 f.). Although this work did not clarify the differences between the 
variational and auto-selective causes of constraints,1241 the main argumentation will be 
repeated here, because it has become apparent that both causes can be involved and 
that the given argumentation is equally applicable to either case. 
Auto-selection in a similar way may play a role but not in respect to 
microbiological and genetic mechanisms (which we may distinguish from 
macroscopical morphological constraints). In this section I have already mentioned 
the repair mechanism that selects those mutations which are not expressed in the 
genetic code. Although this case is most appropriately regarded as an adaptation, as it 
has been treated above, such genetic auto-selective processes can also lead to 
constraints on the direction of evolution (as seen from the viewpoint of an 
adaptationist) or to an autonomous tendency of evolution. The exclusion mechanisms 
and auto-selective repair mechanisms might, perhaps, have prevented the evolution of 
a much more adaptive evolutionary code ( also pp. 381 f.).  
Systemic individual selection provides an example of auto-selection at group level 
( pp. 291 f.). In the detailed treatment of this case it has become apparent that many 
cases of hetero-selection at the level of individuals or of single genes may compose a 
system, which has new systemic properties. The system they compose may possibly 
have the additional property of stabilising a certain distribution of properties or a 
certain internal trend. This distribution or trend need not result in an adaptation for 
an environment external to the system as a whole. Based on the internal self-
referentiality of selection processes as a whole, the system is auto-selective, and, for 
good or bad, may have a certain autonomy in relation to external selection pressures. 
The most obvious class of such auto-selective systems of individual selection is 
sexual selection (above I gave different examples, and this interpretation can, perhaps, 
also be applied to evolutionarily stable strategies). Sexual selection, as has been 
mentioned before, does not necessarily have to be regarded as auto-selection. On the 
contrary, surprisingly Darwinians have often failed to acknowledge the auto-selective 
aspect of sexual selection or have not been concerned with sexual selection at all 
( p. 395, small print). If one only regards individual organisms as being real it is 
actually consistent to also conclude that sexual selection is – in respect to individual 
organisms – external, and, hence, only another example of hetero-selection. But, 
following the above refutation of gene-Darwinian nominalism1242, we are entitled to 
regard sexual selection at a certain relevant level of explanation as being a auto-
selective process.1243 If those organisms are, internally, strongly selected, because they 
follow an – perhaps externally non-adaptive – trend, only those organisms will survive 
that follow this trend and that mate with organisms which follow this trend. The 
autonomy of the internal tendency is, of course, restricted – a too strong internal 
tendency would simply end in the extinction of a whole species. Yet, it is plainly false 
                                                     
1241 At certain levels of explanation this distinction may not be reasonable anyhow. Particularly 
where any autoselection leads to constrained variation. 
1242  Chapter 9 on the transcendence of substance reductionism. 
1243 Sexual selection can be interpreted in this autoselective sense,  pp. 291 f. 
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to assume that on all relevant evolutionary levels evolved characteristics are only 
moulded by an external environment as they may also be the product of such 
internal dynamics.  
 
The behaviour, particularly learned behaviour, of organisms (or groups of organisms), 
provides us with a particular kind of auto-selection. Learned behaviour may change 
the way in which the parts of the body are used. Thereby behaviour could determine 
what features are actually adaptive and which are not. A change in behaviour may 
render formally adaptive properties to be particularly non-adaptive. This can be 
understood as a special kind of auto-selection, because here the organism contributes 
to the direction of evolution. It is particularly interesting that by such a mechanism 
learned habits indirectly exercise a systematic influence on the direction of bodily 
evolution and on the genetic makeup of an evolutionary line.1244 
This effect is called the ‘Baldwin effect’, after the psychologist James Mark 
Baldwin, who – although not opposing Darwinism throughout – sought to infuse 
some mind and rationality into the evolutionary process. Like Baldwin, C. H. 
Waddington proposed a mechanism of genetic assimilation (1957) and Sir Alistair 
Hardy (1965) argued that innovative behaviour and habits in this way could influence 
the course of evolution, without requiring a violation of the Weismann barrier1245. 
Popper, when considering inborn central behaviour-controlling parts of an 
organism rather than learned features, argued that a change in the central parts is less 
likely to be lethal and, what is more important here, that changes in these parts direct 
the evolution of the executing parts.1246  
Phenomena in which the central organismic propensity structure, or even learned 
behaviour, determines the direction of evolution (more than simply being selected 
themselves), were often regarded as evidence which was counter to strict 
Darwinism.1247 Such phenomena, if explained as I have done so above, do not, I 
think, support Lamarckism in its strict sense; nevertheless neither do they support 
strict Darwinism. An emphasis on the active organism, on internal goals and on 
learning stand in contrast to the main message of unchangeably blind and passive 
adaptation to an external environment. Particularly if we aim at defining Darwinism as 
strictly as possible in order to reveal an evolution of evolutionary mechanisms, one 
will not subsume such a changed mechanism as being purely Darwinian. In respect to 
the criterion which is presently to be discussed, the Baldwin effect involves auto-
selection in which the central propensity structure of the organism, and perhaps even 
its learning, and not only blind external selection, guides the direction of its evolution.  
This Baldwinian kind of auto-selection, which is based on self-referentiality, may 
also lead to both, increased sight or increased self-determination – effects which were 
                                                     
1244 Critically see e.g., J. Watkins, A Note on Baldwin Effect (1999). 
1245 Mentioned by: P. J. Bowler, Evolution (1984), p. 321. 
1246 K. R. Popper, Objective Knowledge (1972/1979), Chapter 7; particularly p. 278. 
1247 G. Masuch, Zum gegenwärtigen Stand der Diskussion. (1987), p. 49. J. Schlüter, Kritische Aufarbeitung 
des gegenwärtigen Forschungsstandes (1987), p. 94. R. Nachtwey, Der Irrweg des Darwinismus (1959), 
pp. 171-173. 
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mentioned before generally. If organisms can find more advantageous ways of 
behaving through learning, the selection pressure caused by this behaviour, itself 
becomes changed to support the further evolutionary biological refinement of it. On 
the other hand there may be behaviour, which is itself so deeply build into the 
propensity structure of an organism, that it canalises evolution in this direction. The 
effect of which is that evolution tends to refine that behaviour, although, perhaps, 
different behaviour may have favoured evolutionary changes which would have been 
more consistent with the overall bodily endowment of the organism.  
In this section I have justified the third criterion of our strict definition for a 
Darwinian process. It is part of the core of Darwinism to regard selection as external 
and as an opportunistic response to the moment. But if this is given, it has also been 
shown that both aspects of this criterion of our non-tautological definition are not 
always factually fulfilled. Paying considerable attention to the role of external and 
internal causation in respect to the second step of a Darwinian process, I have shown 
that not all evolutionary processes fulfil the Darwinian criterion of externality. If we 
understand Darwinism and non-Darwinism as the two extremes of a spectrum, 
instead of being the only two alternatives, then neither Darwinism nor the non-
Darwinian position opposed to it – advocating inner dynamics as the only 
evolutionary force – appears to be generally right. Without aiming to diminish the role 
of hetero-selection, the claim of a universality of Darwinian processes has to be 
criticised. The necessary assumption of externality is not only problematic in respect 
to process-Darwinian economics, but also in respect to biological Darwinism itself. 
Instead the phenomena discussed here, rather point to an evolution of evolutionary 
processes – which already exists in biology. 
d) The Evolution of Evolutionary Mechanisms 
In this final section of this chapter on process reductionism, it is first argued, that, 
based on the results of the preceding sections, a theory of evolving evolutionary 
mechanisms is generally required. It should replace universal Darwinism, which 
regards the evolutionary process as being unchangeably blind, wasteful and externally 
governed. Secondly, it is discussed in detail how the emergence of evolutionary 
processes may become conceptualised, and how some cases of process emergence 
that we came across, are linked to the notion of autonomy. Since this chapter is only 
intended as a critique of Darwinian process reductionism and not as a full proposal 
for an alternative approach, it is only shown that such an approach generally proves to 
be necessary and, additionally, provides some concepts and examples helpful in 
imagining such an approach.  
(i) The Necessary Concept of an Evolution of Evolutionary Mechanisms 
Darwinism has been characterised by a materialistically transformed Newtonian-
Platonic concept of an eternally given pre-existing law of nature ( e. g. pp. 168 f.) 
The ubiquity and unchangeability generally inherent in a Darwinian view of life, is 
fully expressed in some recent proposals, in which the Darwinian process is regarded 
in a strait forward way as “the universal solvent capable of cutting right to the heart of 
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everything in sight.”1248 We have dealt with universal Darwinism in its gene-
Darwinian and process-Darwinian forms in detail before ( pp. 205 f.). A Darwinian 
approach, be it applied to biology and repudiative of all other ontological levels, or 
also to psychology, economy or theory of science, entails, in either case, a theory in 
which the evolutionary mechanism is essentially regarded as being unchangeably a 
Darwinian process. 
Our previous discussion of different criteria for a Darwinian process is based on a 
strict definition of such a process ( pp. 358 f). This definition avoids tautological 
justifications of Darwinism ( pp. 339 f.), and has been formulated in order to 
enhance our conceptual resolution and to make the possibly concealed evolution of 
evolutionary mechanisms detectable. A Darwinian process has been defined – for 
short – as a process of blind-variation-and-external-selection. A definition which, as I 
have shown, does no injustice to the essence of the Darwinian paradigm. A strict 
definition made it possible to regard Darwinism as one extreme of the dimensions of 
blindness of variation and the externality of selection ( p. 359). Only the externality 
of the selection process secures a certain adaptation to an external environment. 
Based on this definition, processes, as we have seen, may well be located somewhere 
between being blind or omniscient ( p. 368) or between being determined externally 
or internally ( p. 394). Hence, in this view a denial of radical Lamarckism does not 
necessarily imply Darwinism and vice versa.  
In the preceding sections, we have discussed in detail to what extent actual 
processes fulfil these criteria. Although we partly discussed cultural processes, we did 
not patrol the borderlands between biology and the social sciences extensively. 
Although I regard culture as the most relevant change in the evolutionary process, 
here I focused on biology itself.1249 Despite the relevance of process-Darwinism to 
other fields, the core of the Darwinian paradigm is located in biology and the 
alternative theory of an evolution of evolutionary mechanisms (transcending 
Darwinian processes) which I have suggested will be most controversial in this field.  
The last sections proved that even in biology all the criteria for Darwinian 
processes, if applied in a strict way, are violated by actual evolutionary processes. It 
became evident that there is not only variation, but also true synthesis, that variation 
on many explanatory levels cannot always be regarded as being blind, that variation 
does not always remain equally wasteful, that selection is not always an opportunistic 
response to the moment and that there are auto-selective processes which do not 
necessarily lead to adaptations in respect of an externally given environment. 
But given such processes which reduce the blindness and wastefulness of 
evolution and which gain some autonomy from external selection, it plainly follows 
that, according to our definition, evolutionary processes do not always remain strictly 
Darwinian. Evolutionary processes evolve themselves and can be changed, composed 
into new wholes or emerge completely new. 
As far as they increase the sight of an evolutionary line, the processes which I have 
discussed already, like the re-use of adaptive building blocks, the re-shuffling and 
                                                     
1248 D. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995), pp. 521, see also 21, 40, 42, 51, 133, 232, etc. 
1249  also e.g., pp. 365 f., 337 f., 401. 
Part IV. Chapter 9: Transcendence of Process Reductionism 407 
recombination of pre-selected genes, adaptive auto-selection etc., in my view, have 
presumably played a role in enabling an increased velocity of evolution, or better of 
particular evolutionary lines ( also p. 369). Such mechanisms, I think, made it 
possible to cross over maladaptive valleys which prior to that may have been 
unsurpassable parts of the adaptive landscape. Without elaborating upon this, it 
appears – and here I follow in the footsteps of a whole tradition of authors –, that the 
palaeontological record itself could well be interpreted in a way that would suggest 
that evolution in its early beginnings occurred at a slower rate than it did later on. The 
oldest fossils indicate that life started about 3.1-3.4 billion years ago. For a long period 
of about two billion years only prokaryotes, a simple type of unicellular organisms, 
populated the earth. After which eukaryotes, still single celled organisms with a more 
complex cell-structure, started to predominate. The first multicellular organisms 
emerged only about 640 million years ago.1250 Then in many further steps the course 
of evolution seems to have speeded up somewhat.1251 In my interpretation the 
apparent increase in evolutionary velocity is not only an irrelevant epiphenomenon, 
but appears partly at least to reflect changes in the evolutionary processes themselves. 
Such a view may gain more plausibility through the use of an analogy using 
algorithms in information technology. Darwinian processes can be regarded as a 
representation of a certain algorithm.372  The same simple mechanism always 
becomes repeated. In information technology, evolutionary strategies have been 
modelled for technological problem solving as search strategies in an 
(multidimensional) adaptive landscape. A strictly Darwinian process of chance-
variation-and-external-selection in these models indeed leads to some adaptation. But 
although a purely Darwinian process has the advantage of being very simple, and is 
still open to all directions, it has in most settings been shown to have the important 
disadvantage of being slow and resting on only local maxima.1252 
It has been shown that many evolutionary processes are not Darwinian processes 
in their strict sense – strict Darwinian processes may even be rare. I have argued, for 
example, that variation rates at many levels are not always systematically blind. In this 
view many processes, which are often loosely said to be Darwinian processes, should, 
under closer scrutiny, not be characterised in this way. To elaborate a theory of the 
evolution of evolutionary processes in more detail, it will be important to disentangle 
the Darwinian and non-Darwinian aspects of the processes. In this way processes 
which are commonly accepted have to be scrutinised as to how far they change the 
wastefulness and the direction of evolution. Evolutionary processes generally have to 
be understood not as being externally and eternally given, but as evolving and 
themselves being partly inner properties of the evolving entities in question.  
                                                     
1250 E.g., D. J. Futuyma, Evolutionsbiologie (1986/1990), pp. 365 f. 
1251 Ironically even the evolutionary trees given in D. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995), 
pp. 86-90, could be interpreted in roughly this way.  
1252 See: Th. Blümecke, Wunder der Evolution: Optimierung mit Evolutionsstrategien und genetischen 
Algorithmen (1991). Cf. also: K.-P. Zauner, Vorbild Natur. Biologische Viren unter dem 
informationstheoretischen Mikroskop (1992). 
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Besides a reinterpretation of acknowledged evolutionary phenomena, other 
phenomena which would normally not be focused upon in this field need to become 
understood as evolutionary mechanisms in their own right; the mechanisms of 
duplication of complex genetic structures, evolutionary constraints and some 
neglected mechanisms of auto-selection provide good examples of this. 
Generally, I am even inclined to take the somewhat Whiteheadian stance that 
whether a new type of entity has evolved (e. g. a species opposed to asexual 
reproducing single organisms only), or whether a new process has come into being, 
changing the speed or course of evolution is largely equivalent.1253 Although one has 
to note that this parallel has some limitations,1254 someone who accepts the synergetic 
emergence of new independent levels of organisation in respect to things, a view 
which is supported in this work as well ( pp. 248 f.), will not be startled by a similar 
emergence of processes. 
For example the emergence of biological sexuality, not only brings a new entity 
into being, a species in the reproductive sense, but equally changes the evolutionary 
process itself. As argued elsewhere, this process can, be characterised by the 
recombination of pre-selected genes, a process which in part does not fulfil our strict 
definition of a Darwinian process ( pp. 378 f., 366 f.). Moreover, sexuality enables a 
bunch of other evolutionary processes, like genetic drift, founder effect or frequency 
dependent evolution.  
Apart from considerations about the speed of evolution and about the, so to 
speak, Whiteheadian parallel of processes and things, which may render the view of an 
evolution of evolutionary mechanisms more plausible, it, as shown, in any case plainly 
follows from the exposed differences of actual evolutionary processes to strict 
Darwinian ones that evolutionary processes themselves evolve, transcending strictly 
Darwinian processes. 
This general position suggests the possibility of an accelerating cascade of evolving 
evolutionary mechanisms, although the adaptability of these processes may sometimes 
be outbalanced by an increase of constraints throughout evolutionary time. However, 
the increased adaptability, for instance, of sexually reproducing spezies (the creation of 
species) may allow not only for more easily reaching adaptive local optima and 
corresponding particular adaptations, but it may allow for a quicker creation of 
evolutionary mechanisms. This idea builds on the idea of an evolution of evolutionary 
mechanisms differing from Darwinian processes elaborated here. But the idea of such 
a cascade of mechanisms in genetics and evolutionary biology needs to be elaborated 
in the future and may be a challenging task for future generations of biologists and 
philosophers. 
In cultural development such cascades of mechanisms appear to be common. For 
example, in technology in the narrow sense, early computers (think of an abacus) were 
built using much simpler tools, and not much later we started to use programs for 
complex computers to design even more complex computers, machinerie or 
                                                     
1253 On the parallel of a truly Darwinian process and a truly atomistic replicator,  pp. 218 f., 258 f. 
1254 A new kind of entity may refer to a new process of an old kind, only on another level. However, 
often the different levels will be linked and may nevertheless lead to new systemic properties. 
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programms. But aside from technological revolutions, also in our daily life such 
accelerations are ubiquitous; they occur and they are often intended to occur when 
one improves as different things as one’s tools, concepts, macros, or simply one’s 
furniture. Although it is an important and task to personally and politically evaluate 
for instance rapid technical accelerations, it needs to be acknowledged that cascades of 
accelerating prosesses seem to be not only part of our second nature, but appear to be 
essential to our first nature as well. 
(ii) Process-Emergence, Circularity and Autonomy 
The preceding sections have shown that the defining criteria of a Darwinian process 
are all violated by existing processes. Darwinian processes may nevertheless serve as a 
base line, against which more complicated and less blind processes can be measured.  
This section is concerned with summarising the discussion of the different new 
processes considered earlier. In this section, the emergence of processes are 
characterised in a positive way and this is linked to different notions of freedom. 
Although the negative characterisation shown by the difference to Darwinian 
processes remains the ultimate criterion for the discussion of a transcendence of 
Darwinism, and although no general positive criterion for new processes is found 
(apart, of course, from the almost tautological aspect in which way the new process 
works has somehow to have a causal effect which is systematically changed), the 
differently elaborated ideas in this section may possibly contribute to a general theory 
of process emergence. 
I start by discussing causal feedback or circular causation. This can be regarded as 
one possible condition for the emergence of new processes. To be cause of oneself 
(lat., causa sui) has been linked to the notion of substantiality. Here we are concerned 
with entities partially causing themselves. One may also argue that the properties found 
in such a partial self-causation, only reveal hidden previously given inner necessities. 
In regard to things, Kant argued that it is a precondition for the oneness of parts that 
they are mutually cause and effect for each other.1255  
This is discussed in the context of Kant’s moderate teleological understanding of nature, in 
which the mutual interdependence of parts is understood as a precondition which is entitled 
to assume (as a regulative idea) that parts serve a certain purpose (not only lying in 
themselves). This had a general impact on romantic biology.1256 
One may argue that new wholes can be formed by closing a causal circle, this means 
that they are formed by mutually relating entities which have not been causally related 
or only related in one direction before. If one also applies this thought to processes, 
the two independent linear causal processes, A → B → C, and C → A, can be 
assumed to form a new whole, which would, potentially, contain new properties, if the 
feedback loop is closed: A → B → C→ A.  
This concept of emergence is similar to that found, for example, in the later work 
of K. Lorenz. Generally, self-referentiality is fundamental to cybernetics, system 
                                                     
1255 I. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790/1793/1799), orig. pp. 290-291. pp. 80 f. 
1256 T. Lenoir, Morphotypes and the Historical-Genetic Method in Romantic Biology (1990), pp. 120-121. 
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theory and theories of self-organisation ( p. 152), by which Lorenz appears to have 
been influenced.1257  
Lorenz in his book Die Rückseite des Spiegels (1973) applied such a emergence 
concept in an, I think, illuminating way, to organismic learning processes, starting with 
a treatment of the amoeba and ending with a treatment of cultural development. 
However, although the emergent learning processes, which have already been 
discussed may indeed be interpreted as parts of the evolutionary process, it appears to 
me that Lorenz does rather dissociate evolved processes from the evolutionary 
process itself. In any case Lorenz does not treat processes which are close to 
evolutionary biology and, perhaps, does not sufficiently clarify the relation of nested 
learning mechanisms in terms of their being part of this process.1258 
In general the proponents of the evolutionary synthesis have to a certain extent worked with 
the concept of emergence ( p. 137).1259 They introduced mechanisms on the species level, 
which are now, as has been shown, underrated by proponents of gene-Darwinism. None the 
less, they have promoted the complete blindness of trials, which on different explanatory 
levels has been questioned in this work and but have not developed a concept of auto-
selection (they even played down the role of sexual selection, which may be interpreted as a 
type of auto-selection.)  
I see no reason why Lorenz’s idea of new feedback loops should not be applied to 
evolutionary processes themselves. 
Implicitly, this concept has been essential to the concept of auto-selection, as I 
have dealt with it above ( pp. 394 f.). We were concerned with morphological, 
genetic and systemic auto-selection. It has been shown, that these mechanisms can 
either lead to the systematic pre-selection of the adaptive direction or to an internally 
determined tendency which does not result in an adaptation to an 
external environment. 
In this sense this type of process is linked with the possibility of autonomy. The 
circularity of the process may induce an inherent dynamic, which can have an 
independent influence on the further course of the evolution of the entity or the 
system of entities in question. Thereby, it is not only the speed of evolution that may 
be changed, but also the direction that can be changed in a way which need not be 
adaptive in respect to an external environment.  
Here sexual selection well be discussed once more, which, in the interpretation of 
the current work is a particular case of auto-selection that may lead to non-adaptive 
trends and even in the long run may be able to sustain such an inner tendency. Above 
it has been outlined why such an interpretation of sexual selection is to be regarded as 
different to a strictly Darwinian one ( p. 395, cf. also: pp. 291 f.).  
Sexual selection often evolves as an adaptation. In this respect auto-selective 
aspects which are involved in it may work to accelerate the work of hetero-selection. 
                                                     
1257 K. Lorenz, Die Rückseite des Spiegels (1973/1777), pp. 48-50 (Lorenz regards this as an important 
subtype of emergence) 
1258 Ibid, p. 66, e.g., the evolved processes were always “bound to results of the trial and error 
method of the genome” (translation by the author).  
1259 E. Mayr, The Growth of Biological Thought (1982), pp. 63-64. 
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Even this, according to our strict definition of Darwinism, is non-Darwinian, since 
systematically this reduces the average blindness of trials. Sexual selection, selecting in 
an adaptive way, for example, those animals which are strong in combat, so to speak, 
selects earlier than natural selection does. In a population where sexual selection is 
developed it is not necessary that a huge mass of organisms are raised and nurtured, 
which only go on to have extremely bad chances of survival. Hence, the number of 
dead-ends gets reduced and in this sense evolution becomes somehow less wasteful 
and, in our understanding, less Darwinian. Moreover, species which have evolved the 
process of adaptive sexual selection may gain a certain independence from short term 
fluctuations in the environment, which would otherwise produce many blind alleys.  
But the adaptive advantages of this auto-selective mechanism are linked to the 
possibility that this process gain a certain independence. From an adaptationist 
viewpoint autonomy would rather be described in terms of disadvantageous 
constraints. If every wrong path does not have to be tested, then some advantageous 
paths may also be missed. If the process of sexual selection produces counter-adaptive 
results it will possibly be counter-selected itself. But a counter-adaptive tendency to 
some extent and for a certain time is continued.1260 
Moreover, sexual selection, interpreted as a kind of auto-selection, can even lead to 
a stronger form of independence. It might not only gain a certain autonomy which 
after a while will still be reduced by natural selection, but an autonomy with which to 
determine its own direction quite independently of natural selection. As an example I 
take the enormous antlers of palaeontological (and perhaps also present) deer, the 
existence of which represents a phenomenon which, historically, was important to 
proponents of inherent possible non-adaptive evolutionary trends.1261 Let us assume 
that the remarkable relative size of the palaeontological species titanothere’s antlers have 
evolved by sexual selection, be it by male combat or by female choice. In terms of 
natural selection, the enormous size of antlers may well be regarded as maladaptive. If 
one takes this as given, I think, sexual selection could have led to such an autonomous 
trend which is even maladaptive from the viewpoint of natural selection. I have 
shown earlier that sexual selection does not need to become reduced to a strength 
which would be suitable from the viewpoint of natural selection. The auto-selective 
process of sexual selection, could, up to a certain extent, take over and may itself 
determine the direction of the evolution of a given line. On average only those 
animals will be able to reproduce, that have followed the, in terms of natural selection, 
maladaptive trend to big antlers. In a way then it will only be these animals that are 
exposed to natural selection. If the process of sexual selection is strong enough, this 
                                                     
1260 Strangely enough even R. A. Fisher has conceded that: “The importance of this situation lies in 
the fact that the further development of the plumage character will still proceed [...] so long as 
the disadvantage [in natural selection] is more than counterbalanced by the advantage in sexual 
selection.” In: The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection (first 1930), pp. 135-136. (Quoted in S. J. 
Frankel, The Eclipse of Sexual Selection Theory (1994), p. 182. 
1261 The concept of an inner momentum of change has been cardinal to orthogenesis as for instance 
advocated by T. Eimer. One main research interest of H. F. Osborn, another proponent of 
orthogenesis, was the evolution of antlers of the paleaontological mammal titanothren, which in 
the following is taken as example.  
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may lead to continuing inner dynamics, although natural selection may work against it. 
The process of sexual selection itself will not necessarily be reduced, because those 
organisms that mate especially with organisms with big antlers, obtain an advantage 
through mating with these organisms, since based on this very trend in the filial 
generation their offspring have an increased relative probability of reproducing. Both, 
the genetic basis of antlers and that of the preference of mating are stabilised by this 
tendency.(for a more technical elaboration of this argument,  pp. 291 f.). If, 
however, such a trend becomes too maladaptive, and does not at some point become 
balanced (not even reduced) by natural selection on the level of individuals or groups, 
it is, of course, possible that the whole line becomes extinct. The species of titanotheres 
has become extinct – possibly partly for this reason. In this sense the freedom from 
natural selection, remains limited. But nevertheless, mechanisms could in this way 
have a certain inner autonomy, without the need for indirect dependence on 
natural selection.  
In respect to such possible autonomous tendencies (and equally in respect to the 
mechanisms of reduced blindness) it is not only false but also irresponsible to claim – 
even if only meant as a popularisation – that the human limbic system, our emotional 
structure and hence1262 our morals have “evolved by natural selection”.1263 
Homo sapiens spend an exceptional amount of time and endeavour on their sexual lives and 
on matters of partner choice. There may well be much ground for autonomous tendencies 
here as well. Matters are actually even much more complicated in regard to humans because 
of the additional stratum of culture. Also at the level of culturally transmitted ideas (what I 
have called logoi), such autonomous processes may take place. For instance the idea of the 
Good may foster self-sustaining tendencies, which may not always be necessarily adaptive in 
respect of the outside world. (This may be due to the particular character the notion of the 
Good has, which cannot be discussed here.) Such autonomous cultural trends may then also 
have a downward effect on the, partly autonomous, biological feedback loop of 
sexual selection.  
We have shown that feedback, the establishment of a partly self-referential causal 
circle, is one mechanism, which can lead to the emergence of processes with new 
properties. Moreover, emergent processes of this type can potentially not only lead to 
a less wasteful process of adaptation, but also to auto-selective trends, which do not 
have to be adaptive in respect to an environment external to the system in question. 
Kinds of auto-selection may even lead to permanent autonomous inner dynamics, 
which, up to a certain extent, are no longer controlled by natural selection.  
 
Not all the processes mentioned in this work, which differ from the elaborated base 
line of a strictly defined algorithm of a Darwinian process fulfil (at least in its full 
sense) the positive criterion for self-referentiality ( pp. 409 f.). Apparently other 
changes also seem to qualify as changes in the evolutionary process.  
We turn to the class of processes which have been characterised by their adaptively reduced 
blindness of trials at different explanatory levels ( particularly pp. 368 f., 336 f.; here I 
                                                     
1262 Such a conclusion actually silently assumes an emotive theory of ethics.  
1263 E. O. Wilson, Sociobiology (1975), p. 3; On Human Nature (1978), p. 6,  also footnotes 147, 161. 
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do not deal with the concept of constrained variation). Within this class one can 
distinguish between processes which have changed themselves and processes which 
are combined in such a way as to acquire new synergetic properties as a whole. 
In respect to composed processes we may think of nested selection processes (I 
shall mention the part-whole relationships of processes below;  also pp. 337 f.) 
Examples of nested selection processes were operant conditioning and, according to a 
certain theory, the neural development of organisms ( pp. 227 f, 235 f.). One may – 
opposed to the view supported here – assert that the biological process has, as a 
whole, not changed, since the underlying evolutionary process remains a Darwinian 
one. Although, if the processes are judged in isolation, this proves to be true, it does 
not remain so if they are judged in their natural unity. Taken as a whole, processes of 
compound nested selection, could much more quickly find adaptive optima. Special 
niches, which only exist as environmental fluctuations for a short period of time, can 
still also be used even if they do not exist permanently. Biological selection alone 
would not have been quick enough to find these niches, which for the basic biological 
process alone, would only lead to blind alleys. In this sense, I think, one has to 
acknowledge, that on some level this process involves a reduced blindness 
( pp. 337 f.).  
In respect to processes which have themselves been changed, the possibility and, 
even, plausibility of the evolution of processes with a reduced blindness of variation 
on different levels of the multi-level account of evolution have been discussed in 
detail earlier in this work ( pp. 377 f.). Even at the level of mutations, this is 
rendered plausible by the many phenomena which we treated in the different and 
quickly developing fields of genetic research: the heritability and selectability of 
mutation rates, transposable genetic elements, the pivotal role of repetition of gene-
complexes in most complex adaptive structures, the apparently adaptive evolutionary 
integration of certain genes, the phenomenon of so-called concerted evolution, etc. 
( pp. 380 f.). Taken together with our above dismissal of the tautological argument 
that any change has to be blind, it has been argued that it is highly plausible that, on 
this level too, variation is not actually always blind, but sometimes itself systematically 
adapted. One may, for example, think of building blocks, which are apparently useful 
in many respects and found in many adaptive genetic codes, in which quite different 
macroscopic properties are encoded. Those species which, through one of the 
mechanisms which I have mentioned and which are acknowledged today, have 
evolved a higher probability that these multi-purpose building blocks are copied 
within the genome, have an increased probability of evolving in an adaptive way, 
relative to other species which have not evolved such mechanisms and building 
blocks. Today genetic facts provide enough of a basis to assume – without thereby 
proposing a strictly Lamarckian theory – that mutations are often to a certain, but 
limited, extent themselves adapted. But the adaptation of variations implies a 
systematic reduction of blindness and an increased evolutionary speed in reaching a 
new adaptive optima.  
It may seem that the preceding example of a new and changed variational 
mechanism, may entail a certain circularity, by which we originally characterised 
another group of mechanisms, that were dealt with previously. Repetition seems to be 
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linked to circularity. Here we discussed the repetitions of complex structures which 
have turned out to be adaptive in many contexts. There is in fact a certain interaction 
between variation and external selection, but, it would, I think, be misconceived to 
regard this as a circular process in the sense I gave earlier. Here we are concerned with 
a linear repetitive causal process. None the less this iterative aspect has in fact played a 
role in the evolution of the changed properties. (A similar argument seems to me to 
be applicable to the above example concerning composed nested selection processes. 
Yet this cannot be elaborated upon here.)  
Hence, such emergent processes (as long as they are adaptive1264) are not linked 
with the autonomy that I discussed before, i. e. with an inherent and possibly non-
adapative tendency which is independent of selection by an external environment. But 
in another sense, processes, which I have just discussed, which increase the general 
adaptability and reduce the blindness of a certain evolutionary process, can also be 
said to be free.1265  
In philosophy autonomy is often distinguished to imply two meanings the first is a 
negative notion of freedom from external determination, the second is a positive notion 
of freedom to do the things which are necessary. Above I have once more outlined that, 
even in biology, processes can evolve a certain negative autonomy from hetero-
selection. It may be suitable to say, that, in a way, processes have also evolved a 
certain positive autonomy which still leads to an adaptation to an external 
environment, but which has become less blind in achieving this adaptation.  
I am aware that the notion of positive autonomy in respect to ethics usually has 
crucial connotations, which are not fulfilled by such a simplistic application of this in 
biology and which still normally only refers to an adaptive necessity. But equally I 
agree with Jonas, that we should build the basis of the notion of autonomy into our 
basic ontology.1266 Otherwise, evolutionary accounts, as shown in this work, will tend 
to sweep away the notion of freedom altogether ( on the natural fallacy, pp. 42 f.). 
Indeed, in respect to the level of human culture both aspects of autonomy may 
become combined. If in culture the notion of the Good (due to a certain inner reason-
ableness of this notion) or, likewise, more specific values, became the basis of an inner 
and autonomous self-replicating trend, then processes which in a less blind way lead 
us to do good – to follow these specific values – would fulfil the outlined positive 
criterion for freedom, without thereby necessarily referring to natural selection. 
In the preceding sections, many more processes have been discussed, which are not dealt 
with here. Finally I mention a class of mechanisms which are enabled by the aspect of synthesis in 
biological sexuality that I dealt with earlier. I have discussed at several places in this work why 
                                                     
1264 An adaptational directed variation (for instance, an enhanced probability of the repetition of 
adaptive genetic building blocks), may also lead to an evolutionary constraint or non adaptive 
trend. Although such trends are in my opinion not as stable as those based on sexual selection, 
they still have a certain independence.  
1265 This, as shown, can be a property of an autoselective process as well. Strictly speaking both, 
processes of increased variation and processes of autoselection, can, at least indirectly, be linked 
with both types of freedom outlined below. 
1266 H. Jonas, Evolution und Freiheit (1984); Organismus und Freiheit (1973/1994), pp. 17 f.,  footnotes 
128 f. 
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evolutionary lines of sexually reproducing species could, on the level of the whole, be 
regarded as being less blind. It made it apparent that sexuality enables an evolutionary line to 
cross broader and deeper valleys of an ‘adaptive landscape’, than would be possible for lines 
of single asexual organisms,1172 whose evolution in this respect is more closely modelled by 
a simple Darwinian process. It has been pointed out before that a Darwinian process in 
information technology is known to get caught at local optima easily.1252 It has also been 
shown that such an evolutionary line not only becomes quicker at finding adaptive optima, 
but also changes the adaptive landscape itself, by, for example, rendering certain kinds of co-
operation between individuals possible, which had been impossible before. Generally the 
phenomenon of sexuality, aside from its obviously Darwinian aspects, partly appears to 
point to aspects of positive freedom as well as negative freedom, since a quicker adaptation 
is partly secured and a certain inner tendency can also be involved. 
The synthetic aspect of sexual reproduction is also linked to, or provides the basis for, 
many other processes, which may be said to partly transcend Darwinian processes in their 
strict sense as well. Here I only mention two of these mechanisms, which may be re-
interpreted in this way: the part-whole relationship of the processes of individual and group 
selection and also the process of genetic recombination. They have both been dealt with 
before as involving a certain preselection and leading to a somewhat reduced blindness of 
evolution on some relevant evolutionary level.  
The part-whole relationship of individual selection and group selection are somehow linked 
by sexual reproduction. Of course, not every adaptation on the individual level, as we have 
seen, is adaptive at the group level. But any adaptation at the group level also requires a 
minimal adaptation at the individual level (and vice versa). In this – limited – respect it might 
be possible to argue that individual selection – despite the possible differences with group 
selection that I have conceded – will often produce less radically absurd trials as a 
preselecting factor for group variation than blind chance alone. In this sense this 
combination of Darwinian processes might, at the level of the group, often lead to more 
adapted trials than mere chance trials. In this sense the trials at the group level may possibly 
be regarded as being of reduced blindness. 
More clearly, the process of recombination, i. e. the cross-overs of chromosomes different 
parental organisms, – although actually remaining blind in some respects – have been 
interpreted as a less blind type of secondary selection. Only new genetic combinations, 
which at their particular locus have been pre-selected before, are combined. Although this 
recombination still involves a risk and some blindness, it is less blind than a process without 
such a preselection ( pp. 378 f.).  
 
To sum up, it has become apparent that a theory of evolution of evolutionary 
mechanisms is generally needed. The strict definition of a Darwinian process has been 
taken as base line against which the differences in other processes can be measured. In 
this section the mechanisms elaborated upon earlier have been reviewed. Self-
referentiality as an important cause of process emergence has been discussed 
(a proposal whose basis can at least be traced back to Kant). We have seen that in 
regard to both the main defining Darwinian criteria, that of blindness and externality, 
that processes can evolve and that this can be linked to proposed notions of positive 
and negative autonomy of processes. 
9.4 Summary of the Chapter on Process-Reductionism 
This chapter has been concerned with a refutation of the claim of universality, as 
found both in biologistic Darwinism and in process-Darwinism and which were 
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elaborated upon in earlier chapters. The influence of Universal Darwinism seems to 
be increasing and D. Dennett has pointed out, while new waves of Darwinism keep 
coming, new protective dikes are busily being built always at the expense of the land 
on the inward side. Here I have supported endeavours to reverse this process, not by 
trying to build another dike, but by critically scrutinising the concept of a Darwinian 
process itself, especially in biology. This chapter objects to the transformed 
Newtonian-Platonic view of Darwinism which states that in its essence evolution can 
exclusively be described as a Darwinian process, which is itself eternal, essentially 
unchangeable and ubiquitous. I think that this view conveys a pessimistic message, 
which is also found in the work of Spencer: “But there is bound up with the change a 
normal amount of suffering, which cannot be lessened without altering the very laws 
of life.”1267 Although I mainly focus on biology, I think that through my critique of 
Darwinian process reductionism ‘light will be thrown on the origin of man 
and his history’. 
First, it has been shown that an application of process-Darwinian at different 
levels, as proposed by proponents of a Darwinian multi-level account, may lead to 
inconsistencies. Darwinian processes, whether in a part-whole relationship or whether 
nested, may, as a whole, have different properties to their parts. I have, in detail, have 
scrutinised the tautological aspects of pan-adaptationism and pan-selectionism. In 
these, presumably the most refined sections of the work, it is shown that pan-
adaptationism and pan-selectionism can not be sustained if they are not defined 
tautologically. Based on the treatment of possible tautological aspects of Darwinism, a 
strict definition of a Darwinian process has been formulated. This definition has led 
us to a two-dimensional spectrum of theories, in which Darwinism in both 
dimensions can be regarded as an extreme pole. It follows, that if one denies strict 
Darwinism, one does not have to adopt strict Lamarckism or a romantic inner 
unfolding of evolution either.  
Subsequently different criteria of Darwinism have been discussed critically, partly 
in great detail. It has been illustrated that variation in biological evolution can not 
reasonably be said to be always and in all respects to be ruled by blind chance (despite 
its undeniable ‘short-sightedness’). Equally it has been shown that not all evolutionary 
processes are based on external selection, which is a precondition for adaptation to an 
external environment. Instead to some degree internal trends can determine the 
direction of the evolution of a certain line. Although essential for the validity of my 
argumentation, the complexity of these sections can not be reflected in this summary. 
However, it became apparent that the discussed criteria are all violated by existing 
evolutionary processes, most of which are violated on many levels. It is concluded 
that the difference between actual evolutionary mechanisms and Darwinian processes 
(in a strict sense) necessitates a concept of an evolution of evolutionary mechanisms. 
Finally, it has been discussed how the emergence of processes may be conceptualised, 
linking them to the two different notions of autonomy, which, in a way, can be said to 
have already been found in biology. Nonetheless, the notion of autonomy in respect 
to human beings is additionally related to ethics and morals. 
                                                     
1267 H. Spencer, Social Statics (1851), p. 325. 
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In the previous chapter, substance reductionism was criticised and a multi-level ac-
count of evolution was proposed; in this chapter, partly along similar lines, Darwinian 
process reductionism has been criticised and a view of nature has been proposed 
which stresses the evolution of, to some extent, autonomous evolutionary processes. 
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Chapter 10:  
Towards the Transcendence of Selfishness 
 
“Not only does man need the earth for his life and activity but the earth also needs man.” 
 
 C. G. Carus, 1820. 
 
“Nur wer Sinn sucht, wird Sinn finden.” 
 
Hans Georg Gadamer, 2000 
 
 
This work on Universal Darwinism and its transcendence does deal not directly with 
ethics, even so it has some ethical bearings and represents an investigation that has 
also partly been led by moral intentions. Proponents of the theories I have criticised 
have actually claimed that these theories have a strong impact on ethics. Without in-
tending to favour a naturalistic fallacy, one’s ethics somehow appear to depend on 
one’s ontological and metaphysical stance (and vice versa). It is important to ethics 
which entities exist, whether there are only genes, or also organisms, groups, species 
and ecosystems. It is likewise relevant to ethics to know whether the ontological 
framework only allows Darwinian processes to exist, or if it also allows new processes 
to come into being which are less blind or which may possess a certain autonomy and 
intrinsic direction. 
The limits of gene-Darwinism in respect to the claim that it should be taken as an 
exclusive basis for ethics were discussed at the outset of this work. After later on 
having gained a deeper understanding of gene-Darwinism and process Darwinism in 
Part II and III, I criticised their substance reductionism and process reductionism at 
detail in Part IV. Our treatment ex negativo resulted in an approach which recommends 
different evolutionary levels and an evolution of evolutionary mechanisms. 
Although the ethical implications of my metaphysical and ontological proposals 
have not been discussed within the main parts of the work itself, I, here at least, want 
to give a rough sketch of some ethical considerations, which may follow from the 
general spirit of the previous work. In the concluding outlook on ecological idealism 
( next section) some more features of a corresponding metaphysics will be clarified. 
In respect to ethics, it appears to me that the view of nature suggested in this work 
leaves more room for ethics than, in particular, that of gene-Darwinism. Here only 
three aspects of ethical relevance can be sketched (and a sketch, of course, is 
not a fresco).  
(1) The idea that we are, to a certain extent, part of larger wholes is a feature of many 
metaphysical systems. It has been a main purpose of this work to show the falsity of 
the gene-Darwinian claim that the ontological inventory is limited to single selfish 
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genes only. Without denying that even these sub-organismic entities exist to some 
extent in their own right, I have shown that strict germ-line-reductionism and gene-
atomism, inherent in gene-Darwinism, are false and have to be transcended. It was 
demonstrated as being reasonable to accept the ‘stuffness’ of the organism and to 
some extent also to accept the existence of ontological wholes, like groups, species 
and even ecosystems. Although mainly concerned with biology, I, likewise, advocated 
the existence of different cultural entities.  
Even in the biological stratum it has, for example, been shown that true individual 
altruism towards a group can under certain conditions be evolutionarily stable, 
whether it is based on structured population models of group selection which are 
more refined than those originally criticised by gene-Darwinism, or whether without 
ongoing group selection by a certain systemic constellation of individual selection 
processes ( pp. 284 f.).  
I am aware that the claim that higher ontological levels have to some extent an 
existence on their own, is not only controversial but also at some point may perhaps 
even become dangerous. In this work I have therefore tried to steer a course between 
the Scylla of atomism, with its danger of venerating the ruthless selfishness of its 
elementary parts, and the Charybdis of holism, with its danger of rendering a rather 
totalitarian interpretation. Surely, we should not completely surrender to larger 
wholes, but we have and we should still have a feeling of responsibility for some of 
them, as we should also have one for ourselves. 
(2) Another aspect of the view of nature advised in this work, which appears 
relevant for ethics, is the possibility of a notion of autonomy which is not incoherent 
with a theory of evolution. 
It appears necessary to me that the notion of freedom already becomes build into 
our basic ontological concepts. In this point I differ from a Cartesian position and 
generally follow Hans Jonas,1268 notwithstanding that I, of course, also favour a 
particular role for culture and consciousness. If a notion of freedom, essential to many 
ethical systems, becomes not built already into our basic ontological concepts, at least 
as a potential, I think that it might easily become swept away by approaches which 
demand consistency with such a basis.  
In this work I have shown that even biological processes are not always reducible 
to natural selection. Processes can to a certain extent become autonomous. (Since 
process reductionism and substance reductionism was discussed along similar lines, 
the notion of autonomy may – in a Whiteheadian wake – be similarly applicable to 
both processes and substances.) The germ of that notion of autonomy, which we have 
found in biology, is, of course, not as refined as the notion we want to use in respect 
to culture and consciousness. An approach which starts in a bottom-up way will 
always have problems explaining the highest phenomena, which can partly only be 
understood if treated directly. But, I think, once a certain basis for such a notion and a 
general evolution of evolutionary processes itself is conceded, approaches that more 
                                                     
1268 H. Jonas, Evolution und Freiheit (1984); Organismus und Freiheit (1973/1994), pp. 17 f.,  footnotes 
128 f., 1266. 
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directly deal with such higher phenomena in culture will also tend to be taken 
seriously more easily. 
In this work, a basic notion of autonomy has been developed both in a positive 
and in a negative sense. At this point I focus on a notion of negative freedom 
( generally, pp. 409 f.). 
The positive freedom to do what is necessary in the biotic world will still normally refer to 
adaptation, here, however, it will be interpreted as the increased reduction of blindness and 
wastefulness of the evolutionary processes themselves.  
I think the general idea that a reduction of blindness and wastefulness is possible may 
also somehow be of interest for ethics. But the general possibility of a certain directedness, 
may become particularly interesting if in cultural history it becomes linked to values partly 
transcending adaptation. This leads us to the second, negative, notion of freedom. 
The notion of negative freedom from external determination can in a basic sense 
already be used in biology. It has been shown that processes can acquire a certain 
autonomous inner dynamic, which need not lead to adaptation to an external envi-
ronment. In this sense processes could, to a certain extent, become self-governed and 
free from external determination.  
Generally, this concept of inherent tendencies may also make intrinsic autono-
mous tendencies in culture more plausible. The cultural sphere in general may already 
appear to be free, but only because it is, as I also supported in this work, based on an 
informational stratum of its own. For example, concepts can themselves be stored, 
transferred and copied – without a change in biological information (cf. also the 
treatment of ‘memes’ and what I rather called ‘logoi’). Culture can thereby accelerate 
the adaptation process and reduce its wastefulness and blindness. Such tendencies 
have here also been regarded as being rather non-Darwinian.1269 But this does not yet 
directly imply negative freedom from external, natural determination. Yet, it has been 
shown that such autonomous inherent tendencies even exist in biotic nature, parti-
cularly if auto-selection is involved. If this is conceded, it will, I think, become even 
more plausible for culture, in which there is such an additional level of information 
transfer above biological inheritance. Autonomous cultural tendencies in turn may 
have strongly influenced, for example through sexual selection, even our biotic nature.  
The war-cry of some radical sociobiologists that morals have evolved “by natural 
selection”1263 and that morals only serve survival, neglects the multitude of actual 
evolutionary processes within the biotic world, which involve autonomous tendencies; 
moreover it wrongly, I think, denies the possibility of autonomous dynamics in culture 
(3) The idea of the good, in the most general understanding of the term is 
fundamental for most philosophical and religious systems. Here it can be regarded as 
being to a certain extent an autonomous idea, which itself regulates the organisation 
of other ideas. A proper treatment of the idea of the good, even if conceived roughly 
along such lines, would refer to the complex discourse of ethics itself, and hence lies 
rather outside the scope of this work. Nevertheless, I still dare to make at least some 
speculative suggestions on this topic. 
                                                     
1269 Such tendencies may be regarded as being linked to positive freedom in its most basic sense. 
Cf. small print above.  
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The approach of an evolution of evolutionary mechanisms, which can , up to a 
certain degree, lead to autonomous inner trends, suggests, as mentioned above, that 
presumably even more autonomous internal trends exist within culture. Although this 
cannot be elaborated upon here, the view may allow for intrinsic values which, in turn, 
may have an influence on our daily lifes. A discussion of these trends would require to 
consider the historical character of human culture, the complexities of human reason 
as well as all the processes involved, in the case values evolve and change. My 
emphasis on the autonomy of values (understood in a broad sense) should not 
conceal the fact that values obviously also partly serve survival on the biotic level. 
Biotic survival is, in a way, a precondition for all other values. Yet, even survival, as I 
have shown in this work, need not be restricted to the interests of single selfish genes 
( point one) and, moreover, values may also achieve this survival in a rather non-
Darwinian, less wasteful, way. Values may lead, for example via sexual selection, to the 
effect that properties which are favourable for the group become evolutionarily stable 
without necessitating permanent group selection. But it is likewise plausible, in an 
analogy to the autonomous processes even in the biotic sphere that I have already 
discussed, that values can also acquire some autonomy from adaptation to an external 
environment. It is, for instance, widely held that one should value the absence of pain 
or the pursuit of happiness as being positive. This is the case – at least to some extent 
– even if these values no longer serve survival (otherwise the pains of those who are 
dying should not bother us).  
Autonomous values, however, are not unrelated to each other and often acquire 
their autonomy not only by direct auto-selection, but by being related to what we 
regard as being good. The abstract notion of the Good may be regarded as the supreme 
value towards which other values could become directed.  
But how does the notion of the Good come into being? Only a few possible 
aspects can be mentioned here. Early on this notion may have at least primarily served 
adaptive purposes at the biotic level. It may have served to secure group cohesion or 
social exchange etc. The notion may have also been linked also with advantages it 
gave to the members who fulfilled the culturally and flexibly defined values of 
prehistoric societies. But one may also think of a certain inner stabilisation and 
autonomy of such a trend from external criteria, along similar lines, as it has been 
discussed in regard to sexual selection before. In culture, of course, the process of 
increasing autonomy will presumably have been much more refined, based on aspects 
of our rationality and certain processes which only appear on the level of culture itself. 
For instance, open discourses, on how things should develop seem to necessitate, at 
least, a very simple version of such a notion: it is actually difficult not to agree that we 
should organise our relationships or our society in such a way as good as possible. 
Even most dictators – who seem not to have relied on open discourses – often have 
tried to justify their rule as being good. However manipulative such discourses on 
what is good sometimes may have been, the notion of the Good somehow refers to a 
search for a common perspective ( pp. 423 f.).  
The more concrete aspects of particular understanding of the Good that certain 
individuals or groups hold, can, I think, also be regarded as a unification of all the 
more particular values. In this perspective, the Good is the hypothetical and always 
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changing point of synthesis for all values which are regarded as being positive. The 
notion of the good, then, would, like the single values from which it draws, refer to 
survival aspects and equally to some autonomous tendencies, such as the afore 
mentioned value of the absence of pain. Such a synthesis would, of course, not have 
to be understood as a mere additive list of values, but a complex and self-referential 
(reflective) process which is based on all our cognitive-emotional capacities, which are 
in turn strongly moulded by the notions and procedures that we have learned. Our 
rationality and all involved processes have their own inner necessities. (The concept of 
selfreferentiality and multitude of processes will, perhaps, be plausible if one adopts an 
approach advocating the evolution of evolutionary mechanisms.) The good in this 
concrete sense is always constructed anew and is based on the multitude of processes, 
which in its most developed form may be called reason or wisdom. The notion of the 
good thereby transcends the particular autonomous tendencies, values and concepts 
from which itself draws. In this respect I agree with Moore: the notion of the Good is, 
once established, irreducible. 
But how does the resulting notion of the Good again have an effect on the values 
which had been given before? Even values which do not represent an autonomous 
trend at all (which are exclusively based on hetero-selection) need not refer to the 
natural criteria of survival alone, because, if a general and partly autonomous (partly 
auto-selective) trend of the Good is established they may refer to this trend. This 
trend may constitute their new environment. Values within a general cultural 
development may become selected because they serve the general tendency of the 
Good, which in turn partly serves survival and partly the particular autonomous ten-
dencies involved. In this sense the Good would have become, to voluntarily misuse a 
Kantian term, a ‘regulative idea’.  
Generally this work is open to very different conceptions of the Good; 
I distinguish three types of approaches which are in principal compatible with the 
proposed view of nature.   
(a) Relativistic (normative) subjectivism. Approaches which I denominate in this way, do 
not deny the causal force (shown above) of what is regarded as being good – in this 
weak sense they remain normative. They may additionally even hold that there are 
certain standards of the good within an individual or a community. In the above 
outlined understanding, the notion would still refer to a certain hypothetical point of 
synthesis for all the tendencies which are actually given. Nevertheless, this approach 
does not claim that this good refers to any objective truth.  
(b) Relativistic objectivism likewise acknowledges the possible multitude of forms, but, 
nevertheless, still favours a logic of forms (eidos) which is objective. A general stress on 
form, reminiscent of Aristotelian or Platonic approaches, may be coherent with my 
rather hylomorphic definition of entities ( pp. 248 f.). Although in such an approach 
it would be argued that different structures may have their own optimal form, these 
ideal forms are still objective for each case. For example Aristotle understands 
rightness in an objective but still situational way. More practically one may, for 
instance, say that, if organisms have evolved feelings, consciousness, and a notion of 
the Good, it then will be a necessary ethical truth for them that the prevention of pain 
is a good in itself (which to some extent transcends mere survival). In such a 
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formulation the objective law of form is located in the if-then relation, whereas the 
relativistic pluralism is found in the different possible premises.  
(c) Universal objectivism could still possibly argue that the actual difference in the 
organisation of our highest values may be due to our ignorance. If this view should 
become possible in a context accepting evolution, it is necessary that the 
diversification of beings, which is obviously a basic phenomenon in biology, could 
become transcended on some level. The concept of the evolution of evolutionary 
mechanisms, developed in this work, renders it at least possible that on some level of 
cultural organisation it is not only diversification but also synthesis that may become 
cardinal. Even Popper argued that the process of evolution, understood as a process 
of knowledge acquisition, in the cultural quest for truth enters into a new mode, 
which does not lead to the diversification of opinions, but tends to unite them into 
one common stem.1270 One may also speculate that such a cultural process, which 
leads to synthesis, had in evolution one time also to come into being, particularly if 
one considers the concept of processes of increased sight and self-referentiality as 
they are dealt with in this work. It may be possible to make plausible the idea that one 
day evolution needed to produce beings with feelings, consciousness and reason. 
These beings in their accidental properties would possibly differ considerably from 
humans, but certain values may be essential to any entity with such basic properties. 
For instance the partly autonomous value involved in the reduction of pain and the 
pursuit of happiness, may, in this sense, be regarded as being preordained. I think, 
however, that such a position could only possibly be made reasonable in respect to the 
most general ethical concepts that we may hold,, like, for example, the a priori concept 
of Kant’s categorical imperative, or, perhaps, a general religious or Christian, 
love commandment.  
These three approaches need not to exclude each other but, if each approach is 
applied to different phenomena, they may also become combined. It may, for 
instance, be plausible to combine the third view, applied to the most abstract aspects 
of the notion of the Good, with the second (and perhaps the first) one, if applied to 
more specific aspects. I do not want to weigh these different options here against each 
other, but only aimed to point out that they may all more or less be compatible with 
the view of nature as exposed in this work. 
In any case it appears plausible that values and our understanding of the Good 
plays part in moulding the actual world (At least in the second and third case this may 
even be called metexis,  pp. 71 f.). 
None the less I finally want to consider an aspect of the notion of the Good 
which, in my view, is in any case essential to the notion itself. (Without discussing it 
here, this, perhaps, involves a certain inclination towards one of the above positions.) 
The notion of the Good is in my view tied to a search for transcending a mere subjective 
position. Although our ethical considerations will always start from a subjective or 
culture-specific viewpoint; a very property of the notion of the Good appears to be to 
aim to transcend these specific viewpoints. Although it is essential that existing 
internal autonomous tendencies are considered and possibly valued, it is, in my view, 
                                                     
1270 K. R. Popper, Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach (1972/1979), pp. 262-263. 
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equally essential for ethics to search for a more general viewpoint. Ethics itself can 
even be understood as the quest for such a viewpoint in respect to the normative 
aspects of the world (as ontology can be regarded as being such a quest in respect to 
the descriptive aspects of the world). Although Kant is concerned with what he called 
the “moral law within me”1271, his categorical imperative can be understood to entail 
such a search for a viewpoint on the Good which is as general as possible; the maxim 
one ought to search for must equally be a possible principle of a general legislation. The 
scope of this generality is in principle unrestricted. The most general viewpoint is the 
view from nowhere or from everywhere. Such a hypothetical objective viewpoint is 
compatible with the acknowledgement of the existence of individual or cultural 
subjectivity.1272 The objective viewpoint which is sought after, points to something 
like what Rawls has called a ‘veil of ignorance’1273: while determining what is just and 
good, we try to abstract from the particular role we find ourselves in. Such a position 
does not need to deny that there are different inherent tendencies, which may also 
come in conflict with each other. Such a basic position does not entail a particular 
theory of justice, such as for example egalitarianism. These more concrete theories are 
linked to our further ontological, metaphysical and ethical positions. Likewise, this 
view from nowhere does not necessarily imply that we are personally responsible for 
everyone alike. Our personal duties may well be linked to the role we actually find 
ourselves in. Such a position only assumes that we try to determine what is just or 
good independent of our actual own position in the world. 
But even if the notion of the common Good entails such a search for an impartial 
evaluation, the actual starting points of our search for the Good, and even the way in 
which we construct the world, will differ. None the less, it is of relevance whether one 
seeks impartiality or not. Such a quest implies a certain openness towards the Other. 
In a still different way also evolution from its outset is also not only directed towards 
self-preservation, but is open to the Other. Becoming, understood as a dialectical 
resolution (Aufhebung) of being and not-being, is not self-preservation, but self-
transcendence. This becomes, in a changed way, even more so, if, in culture, the 
process of self-transcendence becomes directed by the notion of the good.  
After much hard analysis in earlier chapters, in this short chapter only some 
thoughts were sketched in as to what respect the ontological view that has proposed 
here may have bearings on ethics and the general possibility of ethics. I, likewise, want 
to end this chapter in an open and slightly speculative way. It appears plausible that 
we are to a certain degree free to determine our own course of evolution and 
historical development. We are, as Sartre expressed ‘condemned to be free’. But we 
are not blind, the light will lead us out of the dark to a better idea of the Good. In 
order to determine the meaning of this notion constantly anew, we have to critically 
take into account and assess the treasures of our philosophical and ethical traditions. 
This has always been one of the primary tasks of philosophy. Contrary to some 
                                                     
1271 I. Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (1778/1990), pp. 161-162, org.: pp. 288-289 (‘der bestirnte 
Himmel über mir und das moralische Gesetz in mir’).  
1272 Cf.: Th. Nagel, The View from Nowhere (1986), pp. 3 f. 
1273 J. Rawl, A Theory of Justice (1971/1990), pp. 159 f. 
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verdicts passed on it, philosophy is far from being dead. If it were, its renaissance 

















Summary and Outlook – Towards Ecological Idealism 
This work has been concerned with the historical understanding of gene-Darwinism 
and other Darwinian paradigms, with the exposure of Universal Darwinism and finally 
with a critique of the different types of gene-reductionism and Darwinian 
process reductionism. 
In this last section, the work is first placed in a broader philosophical context. 
Then its contents are summarised with a particular focus on the work’s last part. 
Finally an outlook on ecological idealism is sketched out. 
Beyond the Two Cultures? 
With respect to the general intellectual context, this work can be regarded as being 
concerned with the gene-Darwinian approach to re-unify the so-called ‘two cultures’ 
(Snow) in a downward-reductive way. The phenomenon of two cultures, which are 
either concerned with the natural or the cultural world, goes back to Cartesian dualism 
which, in general, moulded the discourses of modern philosophy. It has been pointed 
out in this work that Cartesian dualism itself has even been influenced by a hidden 
Christian agenda regarding the human as a free alter deus and the physical world as a 
law governed, created machina mundi ( pp. 74 f.). In modern times the concept of 
Machina mundi has become increasingly understood in a hylomorphic sense, but in a 
mechanistic sense of matter in motion. 
There have been many attempts to re-unify what only later became called the ‘two 
cultures’. Often these attempts have been undertaken in a downward-reductive way. 
Materialism asserts that everything could be reduced to matter in motion and, 
perhaps, a few basic physical laws of nature. In this work we have been concerned 
with the biologistic claim that the social sciences and ethics can and ought to become 
reduced to biology and that these disciplines ought to become disciplines of 
evolutionary biology. The discussed radical paradigm of gene-Darwinism resembles 
earlier materialist approaches not only in its harsh downward reductionism, but also in 
its atomism and its understanding of laws of nature. Gene-Darwinism claims a 
thorough gene-atomism, in which single genes alone are the ultimate units of selection 
and all other seemingly existing layers of organisation are only their ephemeral 
vehicles. Moreover, gene-Darwinism (and process-Darwinism alike) advocates that 
Darwinian processes are the only and essentially unchangeable evolutionary processes. 
As elaborated in this work, Darwinism in general can be understood as materialist 
transformation of a Newtonian-Platonic understanding of laws of nature, in which the 
laws of nature, and particularly the law of natural selection, are still regarded as 
eternally given. A force acts on organisms,711 which remain the blind and passive 
objects of evolution. 
Although I appreciate the aim of formulating unifying ontological frameworks, 
I think there is some truth in dualism as well, at least in the limited sense that 
consciousness and culture are hallmarks of the human being and that they are linked 
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with a particular degree of sight and autonomy. Only because of this can human 
beings truly be characterised as having attributes like homo symbolicus (Cassirer), homo 
metaphysicus (Schopenhauer), or homo politicus (Aristotle). Any simple reduction of one 
realm to the other bears difficulties and the danger of neglecting the specific character 
of the other realm. 
However, instead of defending the autonomy of consciousness and culture, I have 
in this work analysed radical gene-Darwinism, which is normally engaged in 
biologising these concepts. Instead of ignoring biology or pursuing the downward 
reduction of all layers above selfish genes, here I try to take a third way in criticising 
gene-Darwinism in order to achieve a paradigm which is, firstly, more suitable for 
biology itself and, secondly, also provides a better ontological basis for cultural 
freedom and ethics. Hence, although I also have treated process-Darwinian 
explanations in culture, I have been mainly concerned with biological questions.  
This work generally suggests that an evolutionary theory of evolution is needed. 
Without denying the existence of selfish genes, it has proved impossible to reduce all 
evolving entities to simple selfish genes. Likewise, without denying the existence and 
importance of Darwinian processes, the Newtonian understanding, still silently 
inherent in Darwinism, that the laws of nature do not essentially evolve, can, if based 
on a strict definition of Darwinian processes, not become sustained. A truly 
evolutionary theory, in which the processes of evolution are not static, is required. 
Apparently, new processes evolve which are not as radically blind and externally 
governed as it has to be assumed of Darwinian processes. It is shown that processes 
already become autonomous and self-determined in the biotic world.  
If Darwin – as, for instance, Depew and Weber have suggested – can adequately be regarded 
as the “Newton of a blade of Grass” (an originally Kantian term), not only for Darwin’s 
importance but also because of his passive understanding of organisms on which external 
selection is acting, it appears to me – far from intending to belittle the great contributions of 
Darwin – that still an ‘Einstein of a blade of Grass’ is needed to come. Einstein has shown 
that the external categories of space and time are themselves not completely unchangeable, 
but are object to the structuredness of the physical world. Likewise, it appears that blind 
Darwinian processes are not eternally and externally given but to some extend can be said to 
evolve and change themselves. 
Summary 
This summary, like this concluding section in general, focuses on the last part of this 
work. The earlier parts are rather briefly mentioned. For a more detailed summary one 
may consult the summarising remarks at the beginnings or endings of most chapters. 
Likewise, the main line of argument has also been outlined in the introduction. 
In Part I, Chapter 1 deals with the description of sociobiology and as such pays 
attention to relevant sub-theories. At that point the distinction between the subject 
area and the paradigm of gene-Darwinism is only briefly mentioned. This distinction 
is clarified in the further course of the work. Nevertheless, even in this chapter it is 
pointed out that the central theories of kind selection and reciprocial altruism need 
not necessarily be interpreted in a strictly gene-Darwinian way.  
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In Chapter 2 the claim to biologise morality, as is often found in sociobiology, is 
discussed. It is argued that this claim, if taken seriously, would not only lead to a 
neutral acknowledgement of our biological nature – to which, no doubt, sociobiology 
can contribute – but to a dismissal of what, from quite different viewpoints, has been 
developed as ‘ethics’. If one does not dismiss ethics altogether, a, so to speak, biological 
categorical imperative, conceived exclusively along gene-Darwinian lines appears to 
follow from denial of any ethically relevant entity above single selfish genes and of any 
evolutionary process aside from natural selection. It is argued that such an account 
needs to result in a veneration of the prudent, but unconstrained, ruthless 
egoism of genes. 
In Part II, the historical part, Chapter 3 outlines pre-Darwinian conceptions of 
nature in the history of philosophy and early biology. Pre-Darwinian concepts of 
evolution have also been mentioned. This chapter provides the background to later 
definition of Darwinism, allowing for the contrast of Darwinism with other 
philosophical and biological traditions. 
In Chapters 4 and 5 an account of the internal and external history of Darwinism 
has been given. Chapter 4 on the inner-biological theoretical and empirical appeal of 
different Darwinian sub-paradigms has revealed that what is often broadly called 
‘Darwinism’ is not as uniform as is often assumed. This account of different Darwinin 
paradigms provided one of the reasons for the endeavour to formulate a strict, but 
still appropriate, definition of a Darwinian process in later chapters. In this chapter, 
the comparason of different sub-paradigms allowed to work out what the essence 
of gene-Darwinism.  
Chapter 5 investigated the external historical influences on biological Darwinism 
and its sub-paradigms. It has been shown that Darwinism developed in intense 
interaction with the more philosophical Zeitgeist and with specific ideas from theology, 
physics and economics. The historical sketch suggests, that – without denying the role 
of inner-biological developments – biology may be conceived as being in part a 
historical Geisteswissenschaft. 
In Part III on universal Darwinism, Darwinian processes in many non-biologistic 
subject areas have been laid bare. This has been done partly based on the inquiry into 
the historical interaction of Darwinian ideas in different disciplines. In Chapter 6 two 
types of universal Darwinism are distinguished, biologistic Darwinism, at best 
exemplified by gene-Darwinism, and process-Darwinism. These approaches regard 
Darwinism as a new alkahest, a universal solvent to understand any kind of knowledge 
generating process. Universal Darwinism is often not only advocated factually, but 
metaphysically, arguing that all knowledge acquision processes, like mutation, trial-
and-error learning and theory creation are in principle Darwinian, they are necessarily 
based on natural selection in the broad sense, involving blind conjectures and external 
selection. It is argued that this position is (implicitly or explicitly) bound to the 
Humian problem of induction and Popper’s negative solution to it. It results in the 
claim that, in principle, any mechanism of knowledge acquisition can never transcend 
blind guesses. This view is critisised at the point at which it is set out (and in more 
detail also later on in this work). It is contended that this argument would be justified 
only if one had already defined that any new occurrence needs to be totally 
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unpredictable. The resulting true but empty tautology, claiming that nothing 
completely unknown can be known in advance, is not at issue. However the 
interesting questions at issue are not plainly tautological, like whether change may be 
predicted in advance with a (rational) probability above chance. Although Hume’s 
problem of induction runs deep, it is argued that this is partly an empirical and not 
merely a theoretical question, involving the option that universal Darwinism is false. 
In Chapter 7 a sketch is given of how Darwinian algorithms have actually been 
applied in different subject areas outside of biology. It is pointed out that there are not 
only structural similarities between, for instance, random-mutation-and-natural-
selection processes in biology, trial-and-error learning in psychology and Popper’s 
falsificationism, but also that such processes found in several subject areas have been 
partly criticised along similar lines. This discussion contributes to the later, more 
detailed discussion of the possible tautological aspects of Darwinism particularly in 
biology. This chapter provides the basis for the subsequent discussion of substance 
reductionism (as found in gene-Darwinism) and process-reductionism (as found in 
both gene-Darwinism and process-Darwinism). 
In Part IV different types of substance reductionism and process reductionism are 
discussed. In two chapters the criticism of reductionist tenets results in suggestions 
for a multi-level account of evolution and an approach emphasising the evolution of 
evolutionary mechanisms. 
In Chapter 8, the first section concerns reductionism in general, the second gene-
atomism and the third germ-line reductionism. 
Discussing reductionism in general, first reduction is disentangled from 
explanation in general: reduction explains wholes by their parts, without attributing an 
genuin causal properties to the wholes. For reasons of clarity one may call this 
‘downward reduction’ (one may also think of upward reduction). The epistemological 
notion of downward reduction is linked to the ontological notion of (eliminative) 
materialism. I show that materialism leads to physicalism, but that modern physics 
does not at all support a simplistic concept of matter in motion, which traditionally 
had been central to materialsm. The next sub-section, which is pivotal for the general 
case against downward reductionism, it is argued that the modern understanding of 
substances, which interpretes wholes as exclusivley being made up by their parts, is 
misconceived and turns out to be inconsistent. Besides this objection, I positively 
propose a classification of different ways of explanation which would involve relations 
and structurally analogous cases as well. From this perspective substance emergence 
needs not to be linked to complete unpredictability, which is otherwise entailed by 
occasionalism and, perhaps paradoxically, prevents the possibility of process 
emergentism. Finally, the general inconsistency of biologism with downward 
reductionism is discussed and I advocate that biologism interestingly involves a 
subversion of the very idea of downward reduction. 
In respect to gene-atomism it is, firstly, argued that the size of a genetic ‘atom’ 
should not be interpreted in a tautological sense, meaning simply any stretch of DNA 
or any egoistic strech of DNA. Although such a tautological understanding seems may 
have immunised this view against criticism, a closer analysis reveals that selfish genes 
are actually taken to be relatively short sequences of DNA. It is argued that despite 
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the meiotic shuffle, it is nevertheless reasonable to accept the existence of higher-level 
genes (existing in a probabilistic sense), which, due to their synergetic properties, can 
be said to have causally a top-down impact. Synergetic properties alone, however, do 
not necessarily lead to stable larger wholes. It is conceded that higher-level units may, 
under certain conditions, become subverted by selfish parts (here genes) that do not 
contribute to the advantageous wholes. Even so, it is also showed that in certain 
populational constellations higher-level genes may be evolutionarily stable and even 
increasingly come to dominate the population.  
Still scrutinising gene-atomism, another tautological fallacy is discussed, namely 
that of defining any surviving gene as being selfish. According to such a definition 
even genes which favour radical group altruism, and possibly survive through group 
selection, would, absurdly, be redefined as being selfish.  
Continuing the discussion of gene-atomism, I consider different possibilities of 
how genes serving the good of the group can become established and evolutionarily 
stable. The proposal of ‘systemic individual selection’ is considered, according to 
which individual selection processes may occur in combinations that stabilise 
properties which would otherwise be subverted by selfish genes. Once such a system 
becomes established, for instance, by group selection, such a system is stable against 
subversion from within by selfish genes – without the necessity of continuous group 
selection. Moreover, developing on the proposals of Sober and Wilson, it is shown 
that refined structured population models, including semi-isolated groups of mixing 
individuals, can lead and stabilise evolutionary properties serving the common good. 
Gene-Darwinism has correctly pointed to some problems of simple models of group 
selection, but has gone too far in claiming that such models are never viable at all.  
The final section criticising gene-atomism deals with selection on the level of 
species and possibility multi-species systems up to the level of ecosystems. Although 
species have some unique properties, I advocate that many different levels of 
evolutionary organisation seem to have causal relevance and, additionally, under 
certain conditions, cannot be subverted by selfish entities on a lower level. Gene-
Darwinism has, in my view, been right to point out the existence of sub-organismic 
units of selection. Even so it is argued here that the existence of evolution at a larger 
level of organisation can be shown. In this sense the current work rejects the strong 
nominalism of gene-atomism.  
The next section is concerned with germ-line reductionism. First, it is argued that 
the Weismann barrier does not imply germ-line reductionism. Although I refer to 
some authors who recently have criticised the Weismann barrier, I here simply adopt 
the standard view and take Weismann’s so-called ‘central dogma of microbiology’ as 
given. Nevertheless, it is reasoned that germ-line reductionism has to be seen as a 
particularly radical gene-Darwinian interpretation of the central dogma, regarding 
phenotypes as mere vehicles of the genes. After introducing the general concepts of 
what is called ‘information’ and ‘exformation’, it is contended that phenotypes are not 
reducible to genetic information alone but necessarily rely on exformation. Although 
exformation is only indirectly altered, it has to be accepted as a cause. For instance, 
some properties of organisms are not directly stored in the genes but stored for 
instance the material used as building blocks (reminiscent of causa formalis). These 
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causes (forms) have their own necessities and can favour a certain direction or lead to 
certain evolutionary constraints. It is argued that morphological and functional con-
straints, albeit based on genetic information transfer, are a causal factor in their own 
right. I additionally advocate morphological fields (cf. Goodwin), external memory 
(still relying on genetic information transfer in another evolutionary line) and a partial 
revival of morphological taxonomy. (Cf. the summary at the end of that section.) 
Overall, in Chapter 8 several aspects of downward reductionism have been 
discussed in depth, downward reductionism in general, gene-atomism and germ-line 
reductionism. As an alternative several proposals have been made including a different 
understanding of substance and explanation; a multi-level account of evolutionary 
entities and a view whereby phenotypes have a causal importance in their own right. 
In Chapter 9, process-reductionism, characteristic of both gene-Darwinism and 
process Darwinism, is criticised. Process reductionism is a hallmark of 
Darwinian metaphysics. 
In the first section it is pointed out that if Darwinian processes are applied on 
many ontological levels, as claimed by general process-Darwinism or by (inner-
biological) multi-level Darwinism, processes will deviate from a purely Darwinian 
view. Combinations of Darwinian processes taken as a new whole may have quite 
non-Darwinian effects. 
In the next section, which is perhaps the most refined one in this work, two 
tautological arguments which are sometimes implicitly present in Darwinian 
arguments are scrutinised. Firstly, I discuss tautological aspects of pan-adaptationism 
linked to the ‘survival of the fittest’, understood in the sense of a ‘survival of the 
survivor’. I analyse different notions of fitness and how far particular theories on what 
will actually survive can reasonably be called Darwinian. It is concluded that pan-
adaptationism is either based on a tautological argument or it is plainly false. The 
concept of adaptation, if understood as an increasing fit to an external environment, 
is, however, not a tautology. Another discussion deals with possible tautological 
aspects of pan-selectionism along similar lines and provides the basis for a strict non-
tautological definition of Darwinian processes. 
To prevent tautological aspects in the definition of Darwinian processes 
subsequently Darwinian processes are defined in a strict way. Additionally, such a 
definition renders a possibly concealed evolution of evolutionary mechanisms 
detectable. A Darwinian process is, for short, understood as a process of blind-
variation-and-environmental-selection. In a next step, it is argued that Darwinism 
according to this definition turns out to be an extreme on the two dimensions of 
blindness of trials and externality of selection. In this understanding a refutation of, 
for instance, radical Lamarckism or predominantly internally directed evolution, as 
favoured by romantic biology, does not necessarily entail Darwinism and vice versa. It is 
essential to my argument that there can be positions between these extremes. 
In the further course of Chapter 9, it is shown that different defining criteria of 
Darwinian processes are not met by many actual processes – even in biology. Besides 
diversification, synthesis becomes an important factor of evolution in its own right. It 
is advocated that variation needs not always to be equally blind and wasteful but may 
gain a certain sight. Building on the earlier argument that variation should not be 
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regarded as being blind by definition, variation may well exploit the existence of inner 
or outer continuities. It is claimed that evolutionary variation is actually not always 
totally blind. But it has also been contended – without thereby promoting Lamarckism 
– that, based on our present knowledge of genetics, it appears reasonable to assume 
the existence of the variation of reduced blindness even in respect to mutations. The 
arguments discuss genetical phenomena, like mutation rates, transferable elements, or 
the role of repetition and selfiteration. It is argued, for example, that intricate genetic 
building blocks are often repeatedly found in quite different complex adaptive 
structures. It appears plausible to assume a certain enhanced fitness of integrating 
such building blocks, since it is apparent that the involved complex adaptive structures 
could practically never been build from scratch by single blind point mutations. A 
repetition of certain building blocks, relative to radically blind chance trials, could be 
assumed to have in average been internally advantageous relatively to the creation of a 
total random mix of genes. This, however, does not entail that these mutations are not 
mostly lethal as well, as hoped by early mutationist. Evolution only shows that they in 
average have – relatively – an enhanced probability of leading to advantageous 
complex mutations than single radically blind trials. Additionally, the existence, of 
adaptive dimensions (perhaps even adaptive directions) is suggested, not only in 
respect to microscopic structures, but also in respect to morphological properties. 
However, if one conceded that there are – internal or external – dimensions of 
variation that are on average more adaptive than others, it becomes, based on the 
proven heritability and selectability of both of mutation rates and transposable 
elements (and other outlined mechanisms), highly plausible that to some degree also 
mutational variation is not totally blind, but may, to some extend, be adapted itself. 
Furthermore, Darwinian hetero-selection is contrasted with the suggested concept 
of auto-selection, which can either lead to less blind evolution or to inner autonomous 
dynamics. Evolution based truly on auto-selection, like, as I would argue for instance, 
in many cases of sexual selection, needs not to lead to an adaptation to an external 
environment, but to autonomous developments. 
In this work proposals are made how (ultra-)Darwinism should be transcended, 
mentioning many known mechanims which need to be interpreted in a novel way, 
leading us towards an alternative view of nature. However, this work does not provide 
a full positive systematics of this approach. In the concluding section of Chapter 9 at 
least some aspects of the resulting alternative idea of an evolution of evolutionary 
mechanisms are sketched in a more positive way. Once more different ways in which 
new processes can evolve by being combined, changed or by emerging completely 
anew are summarised. Darwinian processes, however, are accepted to provide the 
baseline against which deviations of actual processes are measured. The role of causal 
feedback circles for the emergence of new processes is considered.  
Finally, the idea is summarized that processes, which may become their own deter-
mining cause, can give rise to developments which are truly independent of external 
selection. This can be linked to the notion of negative freedom from external deter-
mination, but I add that processes in which – in the envisioned multi-level account of 
evolution – the blindness of variation is reduced might be said to have acquired a 
certain positive freedom to achieve what is necessary. Although this necessity will in 
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biology still be mostly understood as adaptation, particularly in the cultural realm, this 
general concept of directedness may also become linked to autonomous values or the 
pursuit of the good, central – for instance to Western philosophy – since Plato. 
The brief final Chapter 10 it is sketch how an ethical theory might look like, which 
would be in coherent with the general results of this work. The regulative idea of the 
Good in my view should be understood to be a partly autonomous idea with causal 
relevance, refering to eternal truth discovered or revealed in time. This work does not 
prove that such an approach is true, but it makes such a view possible. This work 
builds a much better basis for ethics than universal Darwinism does, since it is open to 
many quite different conceptions of the Good or God as they are actually found in 
different schools of ethics or religion. 
An Outlook – Towards Ecological Idealism 
I should now like to present a slightly speculative more general outlook. There is a 
streak of W. Wordsworth’s blissful dawn to the disputes concerning the interpretation 
of evolution. A new synthesis seems to be in the making, this time perhaps leaving 
gene-Darwinism and, perhaps, Darwinism in general behind. This possible evolu-
tionary synthesis wíll have to draw from Darwinism – even from gene-Darwinism –, 
but will nevertheless transcend Darwinism and will differ considerably from 
Darwinism in its philosophical message (likewise, Einstein’s theory of relativity did 
not deny most of the phenomena acknowledged by Newtonian physics). But it 
appears that more is at stake and that more might be won than a new 
evolutionary synthesis.  
A new philosophical framework, to which this work can of course only be a 
humble contribution, appears to be needed, neither simply resting on the separation 
of the two cultures, nor simply unifing them by ‘biologising’ the social sciences. This 
framework would differ from universal Darwinism, but still needs to provide a unified 
ontological account. In post-modern times this might sound implausible also since 
today’s Lebenswelten differ enormously, a framework would definitely have to leave 
much room for plurality. Yet the final decades of the last millenium appear to have 
been under the spell of universal Darwinism. But spell can be broken. In this work the 
possibility or even necessity has been pointed out that evolution allows for several 
new layers of organisation and even evolving evolutionary mechanisms.  
The philosophical approach which I personally have in mind might perhaps be 
called ‘ecological idealism’. This approach does not directly follow from the more sober 
analysis of this work and should therefore only be characterised shortly. 
Idealism refers to the following three aspects of this approach. First, the 
evolutionary process may broadly be understood as an intellectual process. Despite 
stressing the possibility of enhanced ‘sight’, the ‘blindness’ of this process at its very 
beginning and its remaining short-sightedness is not denied, particularly in biological 
evolution. Generally, every organism is considered as representing a theory about its 
environment (and partly about its inner makeup).  
Secondly, I have advocated the possiblility of inherent tendencies of evolution. In the 
proposed account, evolution of entities is not just externally governed, but an inner 
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dynamic can, to a certain extent, gain some freedom and detachment. Cor-
respondingly, the ‘theories’ (organisms and real concepts alike) are not to be under-
stood in the sense of naïve realism. Although entities are ‘tested’ against the external 
world, they have an inner structure and an inherent tendency which may, up to a 
point, sometimes even come to dominate the direction of evolution. (Cf. the treat-
ment of auto-selection and autonomy.) Whether these inner necessities may, at least in 
culture development may correspond to consistency constrains, known for instance in 
logic or ethics, is an important question that needs to be addressed in the future. 
Thirdly, in respect of culture, it has been advocated that the possibility that values, 
which may partly serve survival and also partly refer to revealed or discovered ethical 
truth might become unified by the regulative idea of the Good. Human beings not only 
live to survive but also to realise their ideals. It has been suggested here, that the 
Good has, in any case, to be understood as taking part in moulding the actual world. 
However, the outlined understanding is open to be filled in by the different ethical 
traditions, which either interpret the Good in a relativistic and subjective sense or 
refer to the necessities of an inner (or outer) logic of forms, understood in an 
Aristotelian or even Platonic sense. (Cf. the discussion of the notion of the Good; of 
the evolution of evolutionary processes, and previously advocated hylomorphic 
conception.) Personally, I favour a view according to which eternal or necessary 
ethical truth are discovered (or ‘revealed’) in the process of cultural evolution, but 
much work is needed to bring together such Platonic, neo-Platonic or Kantian 
traditions with the idea of evolution.  
Despite these three reasons to choose the term ‘idealism’, it should be made clear 
that it is not intended to neglect the ‘outer’ when stressing the importance of the 
‘inner’. In terms of epistemology I would aim, as has become apparent throught this 
work, at a combination of coherence theory and correspondence theory of truth. 
Moreover, a certain inner freedom and an unfolding of inner forms has been 
advocated, but the freedom from external determiniation is, of course, limited. Hence, 
it is obviously not intend to defend radical idealism. The term idealism is used only in 
contrast to other theories which only refer to the external. 
The first reason to additionally adopt the adjective ‘ecological’ is exactly to moderate 
this possible understanding of idealism. Ecology usually – from the perspective of a 
human being – stresses the importance of the outer. Moreover, ecology is often linked 
with a materialist understanding of nature, although not in a radical downward-
reductive sense. These aspects of the notion ecology counterbalance the use of the 
term idealism. To put it plainly: although we may exist to serve the idea of the Good, 
we should neither ignore the actual world nor our own limitations in doing what we 
suppose to do. 
Secondly, the term ecological focuses neither on single entities nor on wholes, but 
rather on their relations between elements. The sketched conception of substance puts 
an emphasis on the concept of relation important to the employed view of nature.  
Thirdly, the term ‘ecological’ suggests that humanity may have developed far 
enough to take parts of the biotic world into ‘the expanding circle’ of ethically relevant 
creatures. This is on the one hand necessary to save the survival of the ‘zoon ethicon’, 
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Although Charles Darwin predicted that his theory “would give zest to [...] metaphysics,” even he would be astonished at the variety of paths his 
theory has in fact taken. This holds with regard to both gene-Darwinism, a 
purified Darwinian approach biologizing the social sciences, and process-
Darwinism found in the disciplines of psychology, philosophy of science, and 
economics. Although Darwinism is often linked to highly confirmed biological 
theories, some of its interpretations seem to profit from tautological claims 
as well, where scientific reputation cloaks ideological usage. This book dis-
cusses central tenets of Darwinism historically as well as systematically, for 
example the history of different Darwinian paradigms,  the units-of-selection 
debate, and the philosophical problem of induction as basis of metaphysical 
Darwinism. Crucially the book addresses the Darwinian claim that evolution 
is governed by an immutable and unrelentingly cruel law of natural selection. 
Paradoxically, Darwin’s theory is a static, non-evolutionary theory of evoluti-
on. The current book sketches the historical background and provides sug-
gestions that may help to replace this approach by the idea of an evolution of 
evolutionary mechanisms (see Escher’s “Drawing Hands” on the cover). This 
view even suggests a tendency to overcome the blindness of the knowledge 
acquisition of primordial Darwinian processes and allows for some freedom 
from external environments. This book first develops a radically Darwinian 
approach, then criticises this approach from within. Even Darwinism has a 
tendency to transcend itself. Although the book addresses several empirical 
issues, it does not challenge particular findings. Instead it builds on many 
insights of Darwinism and provides a proposal for interpreting known empi-
rical evidence in a different light. It should help pave the way for further de-






the Evolution  
of Evolutionary 
Mechanisms
